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Abstract 
 
 
In almost all commentary on the work Slavoj Žižek the question of his relationship to the 
thought of Karl Marx is either ignored or indirectly addressed in terms of his relationship 
to contemporary thinkers. This is best exemplified in discussions of what is Žižek’s most 
significant contribution to today’s growing swell of left-wing political theory: the critique 
of ideology. Against those who find its root elsewhere and who consequently offer 
various critiques of the positions Žižek takes, understanding the root of ideology to be the 
material practice of commodity exchange enables one to see the overall coherence of his 
work. After differentiating Žižek’s position from many of his contemporaries and arguing 
that Žižek’s ‘parallax view’ can be best understood as a development of Marx’s 
‘commodity fetishism’ the author goes on to use this as a means to get at the idea of form 
as it appears in Marx and Žižek. On this basis the last half of the study takes up 
contemporary history and theory on the formation of psychoanalytic associations and 
radical party politics to substantiate the claim that while both owe their existence to 
capitalism, capitalism could owe to them its destruction. 
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Digressions, incontestably, are the sunshine; – they are the life, the soul of reading! 
-- take them out of this book, for instance, -- you might as well take the book along 
with them; -- one cold eternal winter would reign in every page of it; restore them 
to the writer; – he steps forth like a bridegroom, -- bids All-hail; brings in variety, 
and forbids the appetite to fail. 
– Lawrence Sterne, Tristram Shandy  
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Introduction: From money to… materialism? 
 
The reform of consciousness consists only in making the world aware of its own consciousness, in 
awakening it out of its dream about itself, in explaining to it the meaning of its own actions.1  
                                                                                                                         – Marx to Ruge, 1843 
 
It is quite possible for a thought from waking life to play the part of an entrepreneur for a dream. 
But the entrepreneur, who, as they say, has an idea and thirsts to put it into effect, can 
nevertheless do nothing without capital. He needs a capitalist to meet the expenses; and this 
capitalist, who can supply the psychological outlay for the dream, is invariably and inevitably, 
whatever the thought from waking life may be, a wish from the unconscious. 
          – Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams 
 
!"  
 
What follows2 is in many ways a dissertation on freedom and a treatise against 
modern liberal notions of politics and the subject. Both these points can be made clear by 
beginning with a reference to modern liberalism as exemplified by John Stuart Mill in his 
On Liberty. Here Mill asserts that the principle of freedom is such that one can not give it 
away – doing so would violate the very principle. In a move similar to that used by Paine 
to defend the rights of man against the conservative attacks of Burke, Mill asserts that 
one can not tie oneself to one single historical decision – in his example, selling oneself 
into slavery – because that would undermine the very justification of freedom: one’s 
ability to voluntarily remain in a position that one finds desirable, or at least endurable. 
Formally speaking, if one gives away one’s liberty, one cannot latter renege as to do so 
one would have to be free. He readily admits, of course, that there are limits set against 
this purity by reality: one finds oneself in associations from which it might be best to 
remove oneself for one’s own wellbeing, but in so doing do harm to others. Mill’s 
exemplar in this case is the family: abdicating one’s responsibilities to one’s dependants 
might bring them harm (Mill did, of course, allow for divorce). This is not an absolute 
limit in Mill’s thought, however, but a legal one, at the extremities of which we find the 
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question of moral freedom. The real limits to Mill’s version of freedom are to be found in 
the economy: ‘…there are perhaps no contracts or engagements, except those that relate 
to money or money’s worth, of which one can venture to say that there ought to be no 
liberty whatever of retraction’ (Mill, 2006:116). A contract that one can not possibly 
renege on is no law backed by human freedom, but a natural necessity. That is, here Mill 
naturalizes the economy, makes its outcomes inevitable, thereby himself undermining 
freedom. Heller-Roazen puts it this way:  
Because of the absolutely unconditioned freedom of their will, human beings can always, in every 
condition, fail to keep their word. Were it otherwise, promises, pledges, and contracts would be 
not commitments but natural laws, physical and logical necessities shorn of ethical and moral 
significance. They might be true, even compelling; but they would not be deeds of free agents 
(Heller-Roazen, 2009: 188). 
 
The corollary to this conception of freedom and its limits is Mill’s assertion that 
despotism is a justifiable form of government when ‘dealing with barbarians’ and its aim 
is the improvement of its subjects. This because ‘liberty, as a principle, has no application 
to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being 
improved by free and equal discussion’ (Mill:16-17). This is perhaps not surprising 
coming from a  man who in the same volume asserts that the greatness of England was 
not the product of the collective work of the toilers in the English countryside and 
England’s many factories, but the great men of industry; this is the same man who 
worked for a company that had a significant role in the brutal colonization of India and 
the Opium Wars in China, the latter conducted in the name of market liberalization. What 
it shows, however, are the limits of his conception of freedom: it posses an ‘outside’ into 
which it can not encroach and leaves out a discussion of where freedom might come from 
in the first place. Mill’s account of freedom cannot, for example, be used to explain a 
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slave revolt such as that in Haiti in 1791 – which was not only a rebellion, but a 
revolution.  
A similar take on freedom, though one seen through the glass of religion, can be 
found in Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov, with an important addition: the central 
premise of one of its most well known parts – the tale of the Grand Inquisitor – is that 
once freedom is bestowed by God it can never be taken away. The bulk of the tale 
revolves around the Grand Inquisitor defending the freedom given by God against the 
threat that He had returned to, in effect, snatch it away. Once the friendly dictator 
bestows freedom it cannot be taken – Go cannot ungive his gift – but according to the 
Inquisitor it can be given away – to the Inquisitor and the Church. Weak, frail, and afraid, 
God’s people willingly give their freedom up to those above them that they might be 
cared for.  
Like Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor, one of Žižek’s fundamental assertions is that we 
are free but terrified into denying it.3 This freedom isn’t bestowed by a benevolent 
dictator, nor a god, but is instead the product of the openness of the material world per se, 
materialized in the form of money. Freedom is thus inherent to the material, but only 
begins to be fully realized in the capitalist forms of the means of exchange. To fully 
realize it one need not only destroy capitalism as a mode of production, but eliminate all 
forms of mastery.4 He develops this point over multiple years in multiple books and 
articles and not – as one might expect – through a single, concentrated line of 
argumentation. Though a perusal of his work might not produce such an expectation, 
considering three of the authors to whom he is deeply indebted might, as each slowly 
builds concepts to arrive at a theory of freedom to then show how it is possible to make it 
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worldly, make it material. First in the list is Kant, who explores the antinomy of freedom 
in his first critique to in the second show that to make it exist in the world is to include a 
universal maxim in our actions. This is continued in his third critique where Kant argues 
that freedom is to be found in artistic creation. Similarly, Hegel deduces freedom in his 
Logic to show how it’s made material in The Philosophy of Right. So too in his Being and 
Event Badiou attempts to prove that truth is possible to later, in Logic of Worlds, show 
how that truth can exist in ‘worlds.’ Žižek, by contrast, does not have a magnum opus 
that sets out a set of ‘first principles’ from which he can conduct the further development 
of his concepts. The way he writes and argues can be better understood by turning to a 
comment he makes in a footnote in The Ticklish Subject: 
[…] it would be interesting to elaborate the concept of unfinished philosophical projects, from the 
early Hegel to Michel Foucault […]; this non-accomplishment is the obverse of the procedure of 
those philosophers (from Fichte to Husserl) who never got further than the establishment of the 
founding principles of their edifice – that is, who repeatedly (re)wrote the same grounding and/or 
introductory text (1999: 67, n18).   
 
Anyone who has read a few of Žižek’s books gets the impression that they are reading the 
same ‘introductory text’ over again, that they are encountering the same ‘universal 
notions’ and examples, the same jokes and the same references to Hegel and Lacan. Here, 
a short list: objet a; empty signifier; death drive; ‘Kant avec Sade’; ‘Spirit is a bone’; self-
relating negativity; the Rabinovitch joke; chocolate laxatives; Gilliam’s Brazil. It is not 
completely without reason, however, and can be understood by looking at a comment 
Žižek makes to describe what he does: 
A materialist… tends to repeat one example, returning to it obsessively. It is the particular 
example that remains the same in all symbolic universes, while the universal notion it is supposed 
to exemplify continually changes its shape, so we get a multitude of universal notions circling like 
bugs around the light, around the single example (Žižek, 2006b, 200).5 
 
While the examples may remain the same, their place within any particular argument 
might give it a different cast. This sort of logic is explicitly approached in several places 
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in his work: in his response to one of Alain Badiou’s papers on ‘the idea of communism’ 
in The New Left Review of May/June 2009, for example, he evokes Lenin’s ‘Notes of a 
publicist’ to assert that one mustn’t cling to one’s gains as the root for each 
political/theoretical step forward – a procedure which might be said to be present in the 
three authors mentioned above – but instead repeatedly return to the level of founding 
principles. This is also the mantra of In Defense of Lost Causes, made with reference to 
Becket’s ‘Try again. Fail again. Fail better’ (2008a: 210; 486, n78).6  These are of course 
later works, but this theme also appears in comments he makes in regards to Benjamin, 
Hegel, and revolution in The Sublime Object of Ideology – his English-language 
breakthrough: ‘…so-called ‘dialectical development’ consists in the incessant repetition 
of a beginning ex nihilo, in the annihilation and retroactive restructuring of the 
presupposed contents’ (1989: 144). The return to the same is not only the logic of 
materialism, according to Žižek, but also of dialectics.   
Why this is so is to be found in part in the question of ‘retroactivity’, which should 
not be overlooked here. It deserves a brief moment of elaboration, which can be done 
with reference to the Grundrisse7 and The Interpretation of Dreams. Where Marx asks 
what accounts for the universal appeal of the great works of the ancient Greeks, Freud 
answers that they stage of the fundamentals of desire – i.e. the themes presented in 
Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex. Freud also takes another step: this ‘universal notion’ (to use 
Žižek’s formulation) can also be seen in Hamlet, and its appeal explained with reference 
to the telling of the same drama, though in different form because of historical 
circumstance – the enlightenment, the birth of capitalism, and modernity. Žižek goes yet 
another step, claming that while Hamlet historically proceeds Oedipus Rex, the truth 
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about desire that it reveals is logically prior (2004b). That is, history creates what was not 
yet possible: Hamlet’s hysterics are able to reveal the logic of desire and the anxiety 
produced by social demands and ‘symbolic mandates’ only after the birth of the modern 
and of capitalism. That is, only ‘retroactively.’ 
This is a theme that will be explored in more detail below and in the chapters that 
follow. Of present concern, however, is the first of two alternatives to theoretical system-
building that Žižek endorses: in place of the (more or less) complete philosophical 
systems of (for example) Kant, Hegel, and Badiou, Žižek constantly re-writes his 
fundamental premises. This alternative can be seen by looking at one of the ‘bugs,’ one 
of the ‘universal notions’ that Žižek lets fly: money. First, a short list of where it appears 
in Žižek’s work: The first chapter of Parallax View (2006a, 55-60); the first chapter of 
Tarrying With the Negative (1993: 28-9); the first chapter of For They Know Not What 
They Do (2008 [1991]: 21-31); and the first chapter of The Sublime Object of Ideology 
(1989: 11-26). The first and last in the list are the most significant: in them he elaborates 
the link between Marx and Freud – between capitalism and the Subject – at length. As 
will be repeated throughout this study, the commodity form (the ‘highest’ form of which 
is, for Marx, money) and the form of the dream are homologous, each marking the 
possibility of achieving freedom.  
The modern subject – another of Žižek’s constant points of return – is the 
‘fundamental fantasy’ that belies each of these forms: the logical assumption that there is 
something called ‘value’ in every commodity, the twisting and turning of which can 
never reveal value’s presence; the ‘construction of analysis’ that makes sense of an 
analysand’s symptoms but can never be recollected because it probably never happened. 
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That is, the Subject exists only insofar as it is supported in a material object outside the 
body. In the case of the Cogito, the thinking self devoid of thoughts is nothing but the 
form given in any particular thought, and cannot be had directly; For Marx, the value of 
one commodity is only realized in the material body of another commodity; for Freud 
one’s desire is only revealed in one’s symptoms (dreams, slips of the tongue, jokes…). 
According to Žižek these three work together as different manifestation of the subject, 
with the added twist that capitalism makes it possible by materializing the abstract ‘void’ 
of subjectivity as money:  
[…] there is no S without its support in a: the subject can arrive at its being-for-itself, can free 
itself from all substantial ties and appear as the point of pure negativity, only by being posited as 
equivalent to its absolute antipode, money, that inert piece of metal that one can hold in one’s 
hands and manipulate freely… (2008b [1991]: 57, n22).8  
 
This is to say that 1) it is not merely that these three operations share the same logic, but 
that this logic is shared because it has its root in the same material practice (commodity 
exchange); and 2) the openness of the material world is at the root of human essence. 
These can be understood more readily by turning to Marx.  
 It is Žižek’s relationship to Marx that sets him apart from many of his 
contemporaries, a good example of which is one of Badiou’s English-language 
commentators – Bruno Bosteels. Taking a position similar to Žižek’s, in his contribution 
to A leftist Ontology he offers that there is no division left/right because the ontological 
root of our world is undecidable – what was above called the openness of the material 
world (Bosteels: 241). There is no ‘division’ between the two because they stand on two 
different levels of the ontological playing field. He takes the position that what is right-
wing is of the order of ‘Being’, and what is left-wing is that which is excluded from it 
(242; 248). His worry, however, is that this division risks being ontologized (i.e. reified): 
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the ‘excluded’ or ‘empty’ element might be taken as a thing rather than a possibility or a 
‘generic’ (discussed below) (242). Here Bosteels briefly turns to Marx. He holds that the 
young Marx argued that the most radical approach to the world was to chase things to 
their essence, in his case the essence of human being. ‘What, then,’ Bosteels writes, 
‘could be more radical than in the name of contemporary ontological interrogations to 
forego all humanist anthropologies so as [to] unconceal the uprootedness of the human 
essence that is its absent ground?’ (243). He then turns to Foucault as a way past Marx, as 
the way of an ‘ontology of actuality.’9  
It is with the ‘generic’ that the problems begin, as it stands cheek-to-jowl with 
Kantian regulative ideas. It is, according to Bosteels, the third of three ontological 
positions. The first is that of ‘constructivism,’ which subordinates ‘openness’, the new, 
and the impasses of being to what is known; it is the translation of everything into what 
already exists. An example here might be the evolutionary biologists discussed by Gould 
in Wonderful Life: instead of seeing the completely new in the fossils discovered at the 
Burgess Shale in British Columbia, all that was seen was taken as just more of the same, 
thereby obfuscating a completely different understanding of the workings of evolution. 
The second ontological position discussed by Bosteels is that of ‘transcendentalism’, in 
which a beyond is posited in order to solve certain logical impasses. The obvious 
example here is Kant’s moral theory, in which he has to postulate God, heaven, and 
freedom itself to solve the problems posed by the good. The last position, the generic, is 
described as follows: 
…the generic orientation postulates the existence of an indiscernible with which to interpret the 
impasse of being as the effect of an event within the situation at hand – thus neither collapsing the 
event into the sum total of its constructable preconditions nor elevating the impasse to the level of 
a miraculous or monstrous-sublime Thing, as it were, taking the place once occupied by God 
(239).  
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It is unclear, however, how this is any different than Kant’s ‘regulative ideas’ – e.g. God, 
a generic idea with no discernible content (and not a ‘monstrous-sublime Thing’), merely 
a formalism that enables the overcoming of the impasses of the Good and happiness. That 
is, rather than an ‘ontology of actuality’ Bosteels offers a Kantian formalism.10  
While offering what looks like a nod to Marx, Bosteels is instead taking a shot at 
him, where the mention of ‘humanist anthropologies’ is a clear reference to a theme 
common to an approach to Marx that comes through an Althusserian lineage  (Badiou 
was Althusser’s student, and much of Bosteels’ work is derived from Badiou). What 
Bosteels misses, of course, is that ‘the young Marx’ himself went past this anthropology, 
that he already ‘unconcealed the uprootedness of the human essence that is its absent 
ground explicitly’ (Bosteels), saying that the way past it was to look at alienation, 
particularly that engendered in capitalist money.11 Not only did Marx already point out 
that the essence of ‘man’ was dissolution, but that the actuality of capitalist exchange also 
engendered the ‘actuality of the present’ – capitalism melts all into air, but it also, in 
Marx’s words, acts a social cement: a hard, human-made ground if ever there was one. 
This is to say that the particularity of Marx’s analysis is completely missed. The 
historical, non-essentialist mediation between subject and system – the commodity form 
– is ignored in favour of cheap shots at Žižek, though without naming him.12  
Bosteels’ attempts to outline the move away from Marx’s supposed essentialism 
(i.e. human essence as rooted in some substantial ground outside of history) in political 
theory and philosophy, describing it as an ‘ontological turn’ –  so dubbed to mirror what 
has been called the linguistic turn (though he leaves the relationship between the two 
unexplored). This move, as described by Bosteels, saw the base/superstructure metaphor 
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in effect replaced by Heidegger’s ‘ontological difference’ – the difference between Being 
as such (as ‘base’) and any collection of particular beings (the ‘superstructure’, the sphere 
of politics, culture, etc., as conditioned by the base). This ‘left Heideggerianism,’ as 
rooted in the work of Carl Schmidt and Hannah Arendt, has been transmitted through 
theorists like Laclau and Rancière, appearing in the work of the latter, for instance, as the 
difference between ‘the political’ and ‘politics.’ This is in part seen as progress because it 
moves away from the base/superstructure model and its supposed essentialist ontological 
presuppositions, where ‘the ontic can never be a derivation or simple application of the 
ontological dimension’ (Dallmayr in Bosteels, 2011: 67) – as if the base/superstructure 
metaphor itself should so easily be dismissed as being so coarse.  
According to Bosteels, as an attempt to overcome leftist essentialisms the 
‘ontological turn’ also includes a critique of the political subject, itself rendered in new 
ways to make it compatible with anti-essentialist ontologies. Bosteels, however, 
concludes by siding with critiques that see even the notion of the Subject as itself the 
production of anti-democratic dynamics and domination, himself preferring to see the 
‘ontological turn’ as a symptom of ‘a truly emancipatory politics’ having been missed. 
His chosen response to this ‘turn’ is revealed in his use of ‘subjective fidelity’ versus 
‘subject’ in the final volley of his paper: he asks whether or not ‘every subject [is] 
necessarily enmeshed in the history of politics as a history of sacrificial violence, or can 
there be a form of subjective fidelity to the very traumas and anxieties that bear witness 
to those vanquished and sacrificed?’ (2011: 73). Against the background of an only half-
acknowledged dismissal of Žižek’s work in the same paper, this can only be read as a 
dismissal of Žižek’s arguments against Althusser and Badiou to the effect that there is 
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never subjectivization without the subject and the death drive, and a siding with some 
form of Badiou’s arguments for ‘subjective fidelity.’  
While at the level of terminology it might appear that Žižek follows the ‘left 
Heideggerian’ route – at times making reference to the politics/police distinction, for 
example – his distance from it can be seen by taking Marx into account while comparing 
his position to those of Laclau and Rancière. That is, Žižek does not miss this link 
between subject and system as founding the commodity form, and the importance of it 
for his thought is what occupies much of the work that follows. Taking Marx into account 
also reveals Žižek’s distance from the position of Bosteels, showing how the death drive 
can be taken to itself be a mode of capitalism, resulting in the creation of the free, 
Cartesian subject that can be used against the capitalist exploitation that led to it. A 
preview of what’s to come can be seen by briefly taking up some of Marx’s early writing: 
In 1844 he wrote that ‘Man is a species being, not only because he practically and 
theoretically makes the species […] but also […] because he looks upon himself as the 
present, living species, because he looks upon himself as a universal and therefore free 
being’ (1992: 327). That is, people are free because they think of themselves as free, and 
actively reproduce themselves. Marx then goes on, of course, to show precisely in what 
way freedom does not exist in the world: under capitalism the worker is vogelfrei – which 
his translators note means ‘literally “as free as a bird,” i.e. free but outside the human 
community and therefore entirely unprotected and without legal rights’ (Marx, 1977: 
896). What needs to be pointed out here is the means by which human beings are 
universal, according to Marx – and yet alienated. This means is money. In the section 
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directly proceeding his critique of Hegel in the 1844 manuscripts – ‘Money’ – is found 
the following: 
If man’s feelings, passions, etc., are not merely anthropological characteristics in the narrower 
sense, but are truly ontological affirmations of his essence (nature), and if they only really affirm 
themselves  in so far as their object exists sensuously for them, then it is clear: […] (4) only 
through developed industry, i.e. through the mediation of private property, does the ontological 
essence of human passion come into being […] (Marx, 1992: 375).  
 
Against Bosteels’ assertions to the contrary, it is clear that Marx argues against an 
anthropological13 understanding of what it is to be human and instead holds that we reach 
our ‘ontological essence’ ‘through the mediation of private property.’ Money stands as 
this mediator, and does so because it ‘destroys’ of all our particular properties and 
replaces them with an infinite number of others. Earlier in the manuscripts Marx 
describes our universality by comparing us to animals. Among other things, ‘…man is 
capable of producing according to the standards of every species …’ (329) – and of 
course, labourers are free as birds. Perhaps not incidentally, one of the properties that 
Marx shows can be made human via money are those of animals: by way of Goethe’s 
Faust Marx illustrates that when we use money we don’t merely use a horse and carriage; 
the power of the horses feet and legs become our own (377). It is in this way that human 
essence is ‘not merely anthropological’ nor the product of an eternal or external essence, 
but historical: the universality achieved by the human animal comes to fruition only in 
capitalist money, which is also, however, the complete alienation of that essence.  
It’s worth noting that the words to which Marx turns in Faust are not those of the 
protagonist but those of Mephistopheles. Marx uses the word ‘destroy’ to describe what 
money does to each individual’s qualities, which can perhaps be substituted with 
‘negates’ as this is the name Goethe gives to his devil – ‘the spirit that negates’ (Goethe, 
1961:161). Money is thereby also ‘the spirit that negates.’ Marx puts it this way: 
 13 
If money is the bond which ties me to human life and society to me, which links me to nature and 
to man, is money not the bond of all bonds? Can it not bind and loose all bonds? Is it not therefore 
the universal means of separation? It is the true agent of separation and the true cementing agent, 
it is the chemical power of Society (Marx, 1992: 377).   
 
Capitalist money has both a positive and a negative side: for the first time human 
ontological essence is realized; but it is so via the complete alienation of that essence in 
the commodity form. As noted above, in money people are vogelfrei: free to sell their 
labour, but also free of all unalienated bonds to others. 
Similarly, in Žižek’s work money is said to function as a ‘master signifier’ that 
establishes the relationship between all commodities and is described in terms similar to 
those just quoted from Marx: ‘…it is precisely the new ‘suture’ effected by the Nation [as 
master signifier] which renders possible the ‘desuturing,’ the disengagement from 
traditional organic ties’ (Žižek, 2008: 20). This, in combination with Žižek’s comments 
on the subject and money above, shows that these two thinkers share very similar views 
of the importance of money in relation to what it is to exist as a universal subject, one 
still living under the cloud of capital – one lined with a ‘pound’ of silver.  
To return to the point where the present discussion began, here arrives the second 
component of the second type of system-building Žižek alludes to: the constant rewriting 
of a system’s foundation is the product of a necessarily incomplete philosophical project. 
István Mészaros argues that all of Marx’s major theoretical projects – from the 1844 
manuscripts to Capital – are unfinished, and this precisely because they are historical 
materialist projects: because they are the attempt to show how all aspects of the material 
world dialectically mediate each other in reality and not just in thought, because 
knowledge is constantly being expanded and history continues to flow, a materialist 
project can not be the work of one person but only of groups of people – successive 
 14 
groups of people – as time passes (Mészaros,1972a: 240-1). Because history is open 
ended (114-8) materialist theory and practice can never cease.  
Not only are Marx’s projects unfinished, left to generations of critical scholars to 
further develop them that they might change the world; many of Marx’s works are also 
the reworking of the same project. Mészaros central argument in Marx’s Theory of 
Alienation is that the 1844 manuscripts are Marx’s theory in statu nascendi. Marx keeps 
coming back to, among other things, money. And it’s not until 1859 that the project 
finally begins from the beginning: in the 1844 manuscripts money appears as the next-to-
last section (and Mészaros writes that it was in fact writen after what is now the final 
section); in the 1857-8 Grundrisse the first chapter is about money, and the manuscript 
breaks off with the discovery of the commodity form; in 1859 A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy begins with the commodity; this is rewritten as the first 
section of Capital Volume 1, which was itself repeatedly rewritten by Marx.  
All of this is a means to set the co-ordinates undertaken in the present study, 
which takes these two points as its central pretences: first, Žižek constantly returns to the 
fundamental premise that the commodity form and the subject are one, using it to help 
him develop different arguments. Chapter one in this study is an attempt to show that 
leaving this out of a discussion of his work and building upon it without taking the 
commodity form into account inevitably leads to mis-readings, misunderstandings, and 
false conclusions about his work. That chapter deals explicitly with some of the major 
works in the secondary literature, but references to secondary sources appear throughout 
what follows for the same reason. The first part of this study, continuing from this initial 
point, is used to lay out some of Žižek’s other central theoretical premises and 
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demonstrate how they can only be properly understood when Marx is included in the 
equation: these include objet a, parallax, Bartleby politics, the Act, and freedom.  
This involves – in chapter three – contrasting Žižek’s work first with that of 
Marcuse, who also uses Marx and psychoanalysis to base his political and philosophical 
writing. Where one might expect this to bring them close together, it actually 
demonstrates their distance from each other: they have quite different conceptions of 
psychoanalysis and the role that reason plays in a life ruled by the pressures of capital 
accumulation. This discussion largely hinges on showing the importance of the role of the 
work of Alfred Sohn-Rethel in Žižek’s thought, which helps to explain the different 
political endpoints that he and Marcuse come to. Beginning with a ‘maternal-eros’ that is 
sundered and distorted by capitalism Marcuse ends by positing the need for a dialectical 
return to the lost ‘whole’ by means of removing those fetters and letting creative forces 
reign. Where art is to be both the means and the ends of this overcoming of barriers, 
Marcuse is left in a catch-22. By contrast, starting from the commodity form as the frame 
of our thought and activity, but as an enabler as well as a barrier, leads Žižek to the form 
of Lacanian psychoanalysis and the Leninist party – which in specific ways share the 
form of capitalism – as the political solution to capitalist exploitation.  
This end point serves as the starting point for the next set of theorists with whom 
Žižek is then contrasted: Ernesto Laclau and Jacques Rancière, each of whom appear to 
take positions close to those of Žižek but who in actuality are quite distant from him, 
largely because of the importance that he puts on Marx’s labour theory of value. Where 
Laclau offers transcendental conditions to political action – including ‘the enemy’ and a 
universal political space that can be hegemonized – and Rancière offers ‘lot’ as the 
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condition for democracy, Žižek instead argues for an assessment of capitalism as the 
precondition for the form of the universal in Western democracies and a particular form 
of lot as a counter to it: these are, again, the commodity form as that which makes ‘all 
that is solid melt into air’ and the Leninist party as ‘lot’. This emphasizes the importance 
of form in Žižek’s thought, and opens the door to the two final chapters of this study – an 
investigation of the two forms that he suggests offer a solution to the problem of 
capitalist exploitation.  
Chapter five is a discussion of the role of professional organizations in developing 
professional psychology and psychoanalysis. The Canadian Psychological Association 
enabled the differentiation of psychology from the work of that of other professionals – 
social workers and religious leaders, for example – and thereby created a marketable 
service. This was done by defining what a person could learn and how they could be 
trained. As a liberal, individualist, and capitalist organization this precludes certain ways 
of approaching problems – like the social genesis of illness and ways to actually combat 
it. The development of psychoanalysis in France is offered as a possible contrast:  if the 
endpoint of analysis is the creation of another analyst, and an analyst is one who no 
longer believes in the ‘big Other’ – i.e. a natural substance that guarantees social and 
other outcomes – one has a group of people whose profession not only by definition 
challenges their clients on social relations, but a group that is based on that principle 
being turned upon itself in its own organization. Looking at Lacan’s tussles with the 
International Psychological Association shows that this school of analysis developed with 
the organizational question – the question of form understood as activity – at the 
forefront. 
 17 
Where Žižek draws a link between this form and that of the revolutionary party, 
chapter seven and eight are attempts to show the links between the form of capitalism, 
psychoanalysis, and the party, as well as some of the historical work done on Lenin and 
the Bolsheviks to show that as opposed to a form that leads toward the accumulation of 
value or the accumulation of totalitarian power it is one that attempts to counter these 
tendencies. Where thought is not separate from the physical world but also one of its 
elements, the ‘objective’ social world can only be because it includes the ‘subjective.’ 
That is, just as capitalism only works from the subjective engagement that is commodity 
fetishism, political intervention a la communism must also come from a particular 
subjective point and not one of neutrality – i.e. that of the proletariat. Žižek formulates 
this most directly with reference to Lukács, who  ‘…doesn’t distinguish the neutral 
objective social reality from subjective political engagement, not because, for him, 
political subjectivization is determined by the “objective” social process, but because 
there is no “objective social reality” that is not already mediated by political subjectivity’ 
(Žižek, 2011b: 662). Where capitalist money can be argued to lie at the root of the 
possibility of the psychoanalytic relationship – one relying on an alienated relationship 
between analysand and analyst – its flip side also lies at the root of party organization: the 
social relationship, the ‘real connections,’ between all who live under capitalist 
imperatives already exist ‘objectively’ but not yet ‘subjectively’, and it is this subjective 
stance that needs to be encouraged to overcome capitalism.    
 These final three chapters may appear to fall into a curious inversion: the 
discussion of what is largely considered an individual relationship (that between the 
analyst and analysand in the clinical setting) is taken up almost completely at the level of 
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its social organization (i.e. the professional associations), while the discussion of a social 
organization (i.e. revolutionary political parties) moves largely at the level of the 
individual psyche. This is not simply a matter of ‘bending the stick’ in each case, 
emphasizing an element that might be considered under-emphasized in other accounts. It 
is instead a necessary outcome of the questions posed: if the wider social implications 
and possibilities of treating psychological pathologies are to be interrogated it must first 
be asked in what ways that practice is already social, already part of the social fabric that 
generates the problems it seeks to address. Similarly, if one assumes that one must 
answer the question of who educates the educators it makes sense to ask in what way an 
organization that seeks to make social change and thereby create a new sort of person 
relates to already existing forms of consciousness. That is, one must ask how the present 
composition of the individual lends itself to a form of organization that will in turn 
transform that individual. The last three chapters then necessarily overlap at the level of 
capitalist money and the modern subject, which sits as the form common to 
psychoanalysis and radical politics, a form that can be used against itself.     
A similar inversion appears in regards to what is ostensibly the central question to 
which what follows is the answer – that of form and its importance in Žižek’s philosophy 
and politics. Only a brief discussion of its precise meaning appears just below; this 
because it is generated throughout, perhaps most clearly by the time of the work’s 
conclusion.14 This is in part to allow the ‘content’ to set the stage for form’s appearance, 
allowing it to be revealed after all the pieces have been laid in place. A provisional 
understanding, however, can be taken from the work of Evald Ilyenkov, a Soviet 
Hegelian and Marxist writing in the 1960s and 70s. The central argument in his most 
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famous book is that what should be considered concrete is not simply the material world, 
but instead a system made up of many internally related determinations. Tracing the 
development of this sort of thinking from the empiricist thinkers on up to Kant, Hegel, 
and Marx he pauses on Spinoza and the influence his work had on the German Idealists. 
Emphasizing Spinoza’s materialist inclinations and their influence on Kant and Hegel he 
argues that against some sort of transcendental notion of a form that exists a priori and 
outside the material world, form should instead be understood as one material element 
among many, but a privileged one in that it holds the key to understanding the 
relationship between all the others. The example he takes from Spinoza is the radius of a 
circle, from which can be deduced all its other properties (its diameter is 2r; its 
circumference is πr2, etc.). The example he took from Marx was of course the 
commodity. In Žižek’s work this principle appears in his reference to ‘oppositional 
determination’, where one species among many also appears as those species’ genus.15 
To avoid a misunderstanding, it should be noted that the above presentation of Ilyenkov’s 
first example is deceptive in that it perhaps masks two further important points: first, that 
this one element is not so much an object as an activity, and second that this form 
becomes revolutionary once something is ‘subtracted’ from it. This is to say that the 
‘commodity’ is less an object and more that act of exchange itself, and that subtracting 
from it the exploitation that it brings but maintaining the extent of the social relations that 
it engenders is potentially liberating. At the moment this sounds obscure at best, 
ridiculous at worst. Developing the themes above, however, should at least make it clear 
that it is worth seriously pondering.   
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The central idea behind what follows is that taking into consideration the work of 
Marx shows that Žižek is a more consistent thinker than many of his commentators take 
him to be, making it possible to elaborate on certain themes or comments that are left 
largely unexplored by Žižek himself, and do so in a way that is consistent with his 
fundamental positions. As a consequence one is able to begin to address another 
complaint that commentators take time to make about Žižek: that he has much to say 
about what is going wrong but little to say about what to do about it. Here it’s interesting 
to note the similarity with the way some people approach the political work of Noam 
Chomsky:  after hearing a lecture in which he lists all the terrible things the American 
government has done, someone in the crowd who has heard it for the first time asks, in 
utter shock, what is to be done about it. While Chomsky deals mostly with empirical 
information and Žižek largely with theory, both have more or less the same answer: i.e. 
nothing explicit to offer, only a call to get involved. Žižek’s addition, however, is not to 
get involved just for the sake of alleviating one’s anxiety about not doing anything, but to 
think before acting. And while the present study revolves around Žižek’s thinking, it does 
have some basis, however small, in an attempt to put that thought to work: the political 
activity of its author.16    
!"  
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Chapter 1 – Whither Marx? 
 
Bourgeois class consciousness, in other fields just as much as in economics, came to mean, not 
false, but falsified consciousness. This kind of class consciousness (the only one that vulgar 
Marxists seem able to grasp) is, to Marx, a subject not of critique but of contempt. Being no longer 
necessary false consciousness it is useless for his methodological purpose.  
 
  – Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labour  
 
!"  
Sublime objects of ideology 
While many have written of the relationship between Žižek’s thought and that of 
Kant, Hegel, Lacan, and Badiou – all of which make up important touchstones in Žižek’s 
work – few if any have written of its relationship to the work of Marx. This is especially 
egregious considering the foundation of Žižek’s system lies in the homology he finds in 
the commodity form as described in Marx’s Capital and the form of the dream as 
described by Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams. Focusing on the relationship 
between the work of Žižek and Marx can elucidate where theorists who have taken up 
Žižek’s thought have missed the mark and correct some of the distortions that have been 
introduced by focusing solely on his relationship to German Idealism.  
 The red thread that runs through Žižek’s work and makes sense of many of his 
claims is his attempt to further Lacan’s assertion that Marx’s ‘surplus-value’ is 
homologous to ‘surplus-enjoyment’ (Lacan, 2002; 2007). As a consequence, in Žižek’s 
work psychoanalysis is not a supplement to the work of Marx, but tied to its central 
concepts. By linking the commodity form as described by Marx and the form of the 
dream presented by Freud, Žižek finds an ideological ‘subject’ that is rooted in the 
relationship between capitalism and the individual. This link lies at the base of Žižek’s 
theoretical logic: it opens his first full-length English-language publication (1989’s The 
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Sublime Object of Ideology), can be found again in a book that he once called his 
magnum opus (2006’s Parallax View), and is peppered throughout his work (See, for 
example, the appendix to 2003’s The Puppet and the Dwarf). Just as Marshall Berman 
(1988) argues that is was only under industrial capitalism that modernism could reach it 
apex, Žižek argues that the Cartesian subject could only be fully realized in Kant and 
Hegel’s re-working of it because it is a product of the generalization of the ‘exchange 
abstraction.’ This is a thesis he develops with reference to Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s 
Intellectual and Manual Labour, in conjunction with the work of Freud and Lacan 
(Žižek, 1989: 19-21). That is, it is only with this generalization that all that is substantial 
of the human experience ‘melts into air,’ that the subject is materially realized – not as 
one subjectivity amongst others, but as the zero-level of human existence in its 
universality, upon which all subjectivity relies.17 
 The failure to account for the importance of Marx’s thought in Žižek’s theories 
can be seen in many of the shorter commentaries on Žižek’s theory when ‘the suture’ 
arises as a topic of discussion. This is a concept that is central to Žižek’s work on 
ideology, but commentators often miss that he located the most fundamental of these 
sutures in capitalist forms of money. In its place we find a variety of different ‘sublime 
objects’, each taken as equivalent in importance in terms of their structural role in the 
critique of ideology. Sharpe and Boucher, for example, make a short list of ‘sublime 
objects’ that includes ‘freedom’, ‘the Soviet Cause’, and ‘the American people’ (2010: 
56). Glyn Daly writes that ‘with today’s predominant neo-liberal discourse the category 
that performs this function of suture is, of course, the market’ (2007: 12) – by which Daly 
doesn’t mean the unconscious nature of ‘the exchange relation’ as does Žižek, but the 
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overt (i.e. conscious) neo-liberal ideology of market liberalization. Similarly, in a paper 
that he claims is a discussion of Žižek’s thoughts on capitalism, Levi Bryant writes that 
‘it is within the field of immaterial labor that ideology proper is to be located’ (2008: 29). 
By this he means the theory of capitalist empire as advanced by Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri, which clearly flies in the face of Žižek’s arguments that locate the 
‘sublime object of ideology’ in capitalist exchange and the commodity form. In the same 
vein, Ian Parker writes that ‘a most potent “sublime object of ideology” is surely the 
elevation of democracy itself to some exalted position, so that it assumes such 
inexplicable and incomprehensible importance that it cannot be criticized’ (2004: 85). 
While Žižek himself makes this claim,18 what need be asked is not what ‘a’ sublime 
object might be, but what Žižek describes as the sublime object of ideology.  
Rather than locating the root of ideology in any of these things, Žižek instead ties 
ideology directly in the capitalist economy and Lacan’s ‘symbolic order.’ That is, the 
sublime object of ideology is money, particularly that as Marx describes it in the first 
volume of Capital. This is in contrast to someone like Althusser (1971) – to whom many 
of Žižek’s contemporaries are indebted – who instead locates ideology at the level of the 
State and Lacan’s ‘imaginary order.’ Unfortunately, this shift in approach and emphasis 
is by and large missed by those who comment on Žižek’s work, even when Marx and 
Althusser are the primary topic of discussion. Sean Homer, for instance, sidesteps the 
question of Marx’s own work and asserts that Žižek ascribes to an Althusserian Marxism, 
albeit one Žižek tries to move beyond (2001: 9). Even in this claim, however, Homer 
works at a remove: rather than discussing Žižek’s ideas in relation to Althusser he 
focuses on Žižek’s relationship to the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. In so 
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doing he fails to show in what specific ways Žižek moves beyond Althusser. Where 
Althusser strictly rejects commodity fetishism and Žižek grounds his thought in precisely 
this, a discussion of Marx would have done far more to further Homer’s thesis.19  
 To emphasize the importance of this idea in Žižek’s thought it is useful to look in 
more depth at various commentaries on his work,  beginning with a brief reflection on 
one of the most significant ones, written by his student Adrian Johnston – significant in 
that it is the only book length study that tackles Žižek’s relationship German Idealism to 
the point of engaging not only Kant and Hegel, but also Fichte and Schelling. This 
touches on one of Žižek’s basic ontological principles and opens the space to show where 
a discussion of Marx should fit in to Johnston’s work, though it is largely absent. A 
similar failure to take Marx and commodity fetishism into account can be seen in how 
ideology is understood in some of the shorter commentaries on Žižek: following the 
discussion of Johnston’s thought is a discussion of authors who have more directly taken 
up the question of Marx – or at least Marxism and capitalism – in their work. One of the 
most direct engagements with the question of capitalism and surplus is that of Özselçuk 
and Madra. The problem with their work is they overlook the question of different forms 
of surplus, and take a Kantian turn in order to correct what they see as Žižek’s failings. 
This is shown to be a consequence of turning to Badiou as a way of ‘correcting’ Žižek, 
where Badiou offers not only a Kantian understanding of communism and ideology, but 
also one rooted in an Althusserian framework. Reference to Kant also presents a problem 
in Sharpe’s reading of Žižek, as it leads him to wrongly assert that Žižek posits a neutral 
‘outside’ from which to critique dominant ideologies. This also makes it impossible for 
him to understand why Žižek makes so prominent a place for class-struggle in his 
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understanding of capitalism and ideology. To begin to show why class struggle fills the 
place it does, several authors who agree with Žižek’s stand – Rex Butler, Heiko Feldner, 
and Fabio Vighi – are discussed in order to show that even they misconstrue the reasons 
why class is relevant to Žižek. Rex Butler, for instance, simply accepts it, and Vighi 
ultimately focuses on consumption at the expense of production to in the end open 
himself up to the charges leveled by Sharpe: he posits an outside to capitalism by which it 
can be overcome. This is all to show that  many of the conclusions that are drawn in the 
secondary literature are fundamentally flawed precisely because they fail to fully 
approach the role of money and the commodity form in Žižek’s thought.  This opens the 
possibility of discussing what it is that putting greater emphasis on the role of Marx’s 
theories can reveal about Žižek’s work, which is taken up in the following chapters.  
‘Transcendental materialism’: Adrian Johnston 
 In his Žižek’s Ontology (2008) Johnston argues that ‘one of Žižek’s central 
concerns in his deployment of Hegelian philosophy is the vexing question of how the 
very split between the noumenal Real and the phenomenal Ideal emerges in the first place 
– of how a presumably monistic ontological sphere internally splits itself into a series of 
incommensurable “parallaxes”…’ (155). That is, Johnston argues Žižek’s primary aim is 
to discuss how the mind comes into existence from out of the material world, as well as 
the relationship of the mind to that world. Johnston’s answer is that the material is not a 
homeostatic, balanced whole complete in itself, but an internally contradictory monad 
that spins itself into differentiated, conflicting parts. In Lacanian terms, this is to say that 
the material world is ‘not-all’: it is neither whole nor lacking, but a ‘one’ that is internally 
‘barred.’ Johnston uses various terms for this internal split, including contradiction, 
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tension, scission, strife, loophole, and antagonism.20 These different types of split lead to 
the formation of consciousness. Johnston argues – via Žižek on Schelling – that… 
first, the processes of subjectification are set in motion when the loopholes or short circuits 
generated by conflicts within substance prompt or support contractive investments into operators 
of subjectification; and second, these operators of subjectification, in their function as concrete 
universals, introduce an asymmetrical ordering of the field of phenomena, an unbalanced new 
synthesis of reality (196).   
 
Johnston is here arguing that the internally contradictory nature of the human animal and 
the material world lead to symbolic- and ego-identifications (‘investments into operators 
of subjectification’) that attempt to subdue or ‘gentrify’ these contradictions, which he 
and Žižek take to be consubstantial with the possibility of freedom. These gentrifications 
are then the new way in which people interact with the world, a new imbalance that leads 
to further contradictions and changes. From this point of departure Johnston argues that 
the Cartesian subject – as the basis of these identifications – is revealed ‘aprés coup,’ that 
the contradiction or ‘not-all’ at the heart of human subjectivity is only manifest as ‘death 
drive’ when these identifications fail or change due to the individual’s encounter with 
external influences. The contradictions – also labeled ‘negativity’ – that lead to 
identifications can only be grasped with reference to their outcome; otherwise they 
remain only a ‘virtual potentiality’ latent in the material world.21  
 Herein lies the reason Johnston calls Žižek’s theory one of ‘transcendental 
materialism.’ Arguing that Fichte holds an important key for understanding Žižek’s 
thought (2008:17) he takes this label from the politically minded German Idealist’s 
speculations on the role of the scholar: ‘The assertion that the pure I is a product of the 
not-I expresses a transcendental materialism which is completely contrary to reason’ 
(Fichte, 1987: 4). Johnston’s position is precisely to prove this inversion, to prove that the 
‘pure I’ as Žižek develops it is a product of the material world: ‘One could call this 
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theory “transcendental materialism,” defined as a doctrine based on the thesis that 
materiality manufactures out of itself that which comes to detach and achieve 
independence in relation to it’ (Johnston, 2007a: 6; see also xxv, 155);22 ‘In Žižek’s view, 
a core component of his own philosophical materialism is this inversion of idealism’s 
prioritization of transcendence over immanence’ (2008:143). This is to say that Žižek 
does not eject transcendentalism from his views on materialism, but aims to show that the 
transcendental is the product of the material, and not the reverse. 
 In all this resonances with Marx’s comments that the Paris Commune was 
‘discovered,’ that it was the product of human activity, but only produced under 
particular historical circumstances, can perhaps be seen:23 Johnston claims that it is only 
under capitalism that Žižek’s Cartesian subject as death drive is properly uncovered, later 
adding that ‘Žižek refuses to treat the negativity of anonymous, faceless, subjectivity as 
an invariant transcendental constant, a timeless structural function unaffected by the 
hustle and bustle of the empirical-phenomenal world’ (Johnston, 2008: 227). Rather than 
timeless…  
…this hole [the Cartesian subject24] is gradually hollowed out through the increasingly apparent 
contingency of all operators of subjectification, a contingency that becomes apparent solely 
through the rise and fall of various temporarily hegemonic master signifiers of identity jostling 
with and displacing one another. […] To paraphrase Marx, when all solid identities melt into air, 
the subject as devoid of any solid identity begins to emerge… (Johnston, 2008: 231). 
 
Significantly, this is one of the few references to Marx that Johnston makes.  
While his accomplishments are impressive, it is here that it should be noted that 
Johnston – not without good reason – limits Žižek’s project to a ‘carefully calculated 
interweaving of modern philosophy and Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis’ (xix), the 
former clearly referring to German Idealism in particular (20). Indeed, Žižek himself 
emphasizes this link. Johnston is correct in justifying this by pointing to the philosophical 
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content of Žižek’s oeuvre against what he sees as the tendency to focus on its less 
significant aspects – i.e. the myriad cultural references found in all of Žižek’s books. 
What is important to note here, however, is that this is part of his own project to begin 
elaborating a ‘transcendental materialist theory of subjectivity,’ for which ‘Žižek’s work 
is shamelessly and unapologetically used’ (xix). This is to say that the title of the book 
(Žižek’s Ontology) need be viewed with a critical eye. Its author too quickly passes over 
something that he should not.  
 Johnston never directly approaches what, precisely, makes up the contradictions 
of material reality that lead to subjectivity, instead making vague references to meme 
theory, evolutionary biology/psychology, and physics. At one point he turns to the 
functioning of money and the loopholes generated by the expansion of tax law to try to 
illustrate his point. What actually fills this explanatory gap in ‘Johnston’s ontology,’ as 
noted above, is a discussion of Schelling and the ‘contraction’ of the Real. What Johnston 
fails to emphasize in all this is an identifiable, actual contradiction that has led to the 
modern (Cartesian) subject and the potential for actual rather than formal freedom: the 
commodity form as the ‘cell’ of capitalism. Žižek argues that it is precisely this that made 
German Idealism, via Kant as its grand-daddy, possible (Žižek, 1989: 16-17). That is, 
Johnston links Žižek’s discussion of the subject to capitalism and Marxism too casually, a 
gap that is not remedied in his follow-up book The Cadence of Change (2009), which 
instead focuses on the relationship between the thought of Žižek, Badiou, and Lacan.25 
  As noted above, Johnston uses Fichte as a transitional figure in Žižek’s Ontology 
to begin to describe in what way he thinks Žižek is a materialist. In a work published four 
years after Johnston’s study Žižek more explicitly provides the means by which to make 
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a link between Fichte and an explicitly Marxist materialism possible. As Johnston notes 
Žižek has done in the past, in the third chapter of Less Than Nothing he argues that Fichte 
held (in opposition to Kant) that practical activity is the presupposition of the subject.26 
What he adds to this argument in this iteration is that in the end he sees two solutions to 
the problems Fichte runs into: one coming from Hegel and the other from Lacan. In place 
of Fichte’s positive notion of the I Hegel provides that of ‘self relating negativity’; in 
place of an I that seeks a ground in itself, ‘anstoss’ or the impetus/blockage to action is 
not only an other (as it is for Fichte), but the big Other – the social world, as understood 
by Lacan (2012: 183-6). The link to be made with Marxism is clear when it is understood 
that the big Other in question for Žižek is capitalism and that it’s Sohn-Rethel’s 
discussion of commodity exchange that informs his understanding of not only capitalism, 
but also Lacan’s ‘symbolic.’ Rather than turning to Sohn-Rethel or real abstraction, 
however, Johnston’s discussion of the ‘revelatory’ importance of Fichte’s philosophy for 
understanding Žižek’s work (Johnston, 2008: 16-20) sees him turn to Žižek’s discussion 
of Kant and Lacan.  
 No less casually than Johnston links capitalism to the Cartesian Subject does 
Žižek himself explicitly link Schelling to capitalism in The Indivisible Remainder, his 
first major piece on Hegel’s contemporary:  
…one is tempted, in a ‘reductionist’ historico-materialist vein, to anchor Schelling’s mega-
narrative of the divine Ages of the World to a very precise and constrained ‘ontic’ event: the 
passage from the traditional, pre-modern community to the modern capitalist society. This is to 
say, what Schelling proposes is a narrative of the ‘ages’ of the Absolute itself; this narrative, this 
most anti-Lyotardian, the largest possible, offers itself as the ideal testing ground for Frederic 
Jameson’s provocative idea that all narratives are ultimately variations on one and the same theme, 
that of the passage from the ‘closed’ organic community to modern capitalist society […]. Is not 
the Schellingian passage from rotary motion to linear progress, therefore, this same story of the 
emergence of modern capitalist society elevated (or inflated) to the level of the Absolute? (Žižek, 
1996b: 42-3).    
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Žižek can perhaps be forgiven for the spurious link he makes between capitalism and the 
thought of Schelling27 – he himself labels it a temptation – given that the opening volley 
of his (English) career is to establish the link between German Idealist thought on the 
transcendental subject and capitalism through the work of Sohn-Rethel. What can at least 
be said is that it relies on the assumption of a previous argument and is not simply an 
empty aside. Indeed, the same underlying thinking appears later in the same text, where 
he writes that…  
[…] it is, paradoxically, the worker who occupies the place of the subject in the antagonistic 
relationship between worker and capitalist: as Marx emphasized again and again, from Grundrisse 
to Capital, the worker is a subject, that is, he delivers himself from the last vestiges of 
substantiality the moment he offers himself – his productive force, the kernel of his being – on the 
market, and can be bought for money’ (Žižek, 1996b: 114).  
 
Tied to this is the idea that what Schelling develops in the ‘second stage’ of his thought is 
the move from ‘antagonism to the Hegelian contradiction between S"and S1, between the 
subject and its inadequate symbolic representation’ (Žižek, 1996b: 46). Where the 
‘antagonism’ of the ‘rotary motion of the drives’ is pre-symbolic and unpredictable 
(Žižek, 1996b: 28-30), is the push and pull of contraction and expansion which achieves 
neither, the introduction of a master signifier achieves both in contradiction: in an 
‘external’ element one finds one’s ‘internal’ being. As he puts it elsewhere in the same 
piece, ‘S is simultaneously, in the same respect, S1 and a’, which he calls ‘contradiction 
itself’ (Žižek, 1996b: 85, n53). As seen just above and in more detail in the next two 
chapters, the best example of this is capitalist money.      
A Kantian Žižek: Badiou, Özselçuk and Madra, and Sharpe 
In a more direct engagement with Žižek’s relationship to economics, Özselçuk 
and Madra argue that Žižek implicitly holds the position that capitalism will never be 
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overcome because he misreads Lacan’s thesis that ‘surplus-value’ and ‘surplus-
jouissance’ are homologous (2007: 90-91). It is their position that he wrongly concludes 
that surplus-value/jouissance is only to be found under capitalism. What they miss, 
however, is Žižek’s particular development of Lacan’s thesis: they fail to see that Žižek 
places the homology at the level of the form of surplus and not at the level of surplus 
itself. That is, Özselçuk and Madra rightly claim that surplus appears in different 
economic systems – they use the examples of feudalism and capitalism – but fail to see 
the different forms that it takes, remaining content to see surplus as equivalent in all 
possible worlds. Instead, they mis-frame the question by focusing on the state under 
feudalism and ownership under capitalism, which leads them to argue that economic 
history is the history of the class struggle over the distribution of the surplus.  
This is not of itself incorrect. What they fail to do at this level of analysis, 
however, is ask in what way domination by one class over others differs in each situation. 
Žižek offers that the difference lies in the different ways fetishism is put to use: where the 
feudal lord appears as someone who naturally dominates another and thereby 
appropriates a surplus produced by peasants, the capitalist does so while claiming that no 
domination is happening at all. Here fetishism moves from one between people to one 
between things, from a ‘lord’ who is treated as if they are so by virtue of their existence 
(Marx’s King who thinks he is directly a King) to ‘free’ agents who instead fetishize 
commodities (1989: 25-6). Extrapolating from here, it is possible to see that this is further 
manifested in the form taken by surplus in each economic system: overtly unpaid surplus-
labour as corvée and covertly unpaid surplus-labour as wage. That is, in contrast to Žižek, 
Özselçuk and Madra overlook Marx’s insight that ‘what distinguishes the various 
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economic formations of society […] is the form in which the surplus labour is in each 
case extorted from the immediate producer, the worker’ (Marx, 1977: 325).28  
Failing to see this, Özselçuk and Madra’s political assessment of capitalism 
becomes decidedly Kantian rather than Marxist: in place of a political program 
determined by the historical conditions of an economically specific class structure 
they offer the categorical imperative that ‘no one can have exclusive rights over the 
appropriation of surplus’ (2007:100; see also 2005: 93; 2010: 336).29 They come to 
this position after critiquing Laclau’s position on class to then repeat it at a different 
level: where Laclau ends up rejecting the labour theory of value to instead focus on 
the ‘founding crime’ of capitalist social relations, Ö and M focus on the ‘exception’ 
found in every historical period – the class that receives all the surplus but does none 
of the work. In their take Marx makes a ‘chain of equivalences’ between wage labour, 
slave labour, and serf labour, and so rather than differentiating between these three 
positions and how surplus is created/extracted in each case, they instead offer their 
categorical imperative (2010: 335-6). They openly acknowledge that this is abstract 
and ahistorical, writing that this axiom ‘displaces the agent of class transformation 
from a social group to an abstract principle that could insert itself into very occasion 
in which decisions over the use of surplus are being instituted’ (2007: 101). Where 
they argue that Žižek takes capitalism to be self-reproducing rather than the product 
of labour, it is significant that they make the mistake of turning class struggle into an 
idea that ‘inserts itself’ into every situation. They look at the wrong exception: where 
they focus on an ahistorical notion of a ruling class that stands as an exception to all 
the others, Žižek’s work points in the other direction – towards that ‘exceptional’ 
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commodity that is not a commodity and instead human freedom: labour power. In 
missing the importance of Žižek’s reliance on Marx’s discussion of the commodity 
form they slip from a declared materialism to an overt idealism. 
In the case of Özselçuk and Madra the ‘categorical imperatives’ and axioms that 
appear do so with reference to Badiou’s thought. That is, part of the problem in some 
commentators’ work on Žižek comes from reference to Badiou as the supposedly 
elucidating or corrective supplement. The problem stems in part from Badiou himself and 
his dedication to Althusser’s thought. This can clearly be seen in a sort of unintended 
caricature of Žižek found in the chapter on the ‘Idea’ in his The Communist Hypothesis 
(2010). Here Badiou translates his own system of political thought into Lacanian 
terminology, where he first presents a Kantian-style Real – one existing independent of 
the Symbolic – then an Imaginary realm which is one's misrecognized relationship to this 
Real (i.e. Althusser's ISA argument), and finally offers bourgeois history as the 
Symbolic. The twist Badiou gives this is that the ‘Real’ he is talking about are new 
political practices (i.e. 'truth-procedures') and the imaginary relationship to them as he 
describes it acts as a compliment to Althusser's ISA position: rather than being 'hailed' by 
the state, one 'decides' in an act of 'will' to take a position on them. This generates an 
‘Idea,’ which Badiou equates with an Althusserian theory of ideology in that he places it 
in the realm of the Imaginary. This ‘Idea’ re-orders bourgeois history (the Symbolic) into 
one compatible with the truth-procedure. 
The problem with this (to be discussed more below and in the chapters that 
follow) is that 1) Zizek gives a convincing alternative to Althusser's ISA position, 
showing some of the flaws in it; 2) the Real is for Žižek not a Kantian Noumena 
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independent of the Symbolic; 3) Badiou’s ‘Idea’ clearly lines up with Lacan's S1 – aka 
the master-signifier, aka the empty signifier. The ‘idea of communism’ is thus a 
regulative idea  rather than a discussion of concrete problems and contradictions, and as 
in Özselçuk and Madra’s paper we get a utopian ‘ethical socialism.’ In this way Badiou 
flattens the ‘idea of communism’ to a discussion of the state and the Party, rather than 
making any reference to economic life – i.e. capitalism itself.30 Making reference to his 
thought on politics in relationship to the work of Žižek is thus problematic. 
While these authors end up making statements that run counter to Žižek’s own 
assertions and do so in line with Kantian thought, and while Žižek himself castigates 
Badiou for his hidden Kantianism, in his Little Piece of the Real Mathew Sharpe argues 
that ‘underlying Žižek’s inability to “decide” on what capitalism and “class struggle” is 
today is his deployment of the category of the [Kantian] antinomy to try to renew the 
practice of immanent critique’ (Sharpe, 2004:15; see also 206, 209). Where Özselçuk and 
Madra in the end try to correct Žižek by introducing Kantian themes, Sharpe accuses his 
thought of being fundamentally flawed because it is too Kantian. From this he draws the 
conclusion that his politics suffer as a consequence.31 While Sharpe does offer many 
insights – into, for example, Žižek’s theory of language, the role of the ‘maternal super-
ego’ in consumer ideology, the significance of Hegel’s discussion of tautology – his 
central thesis is mistaken. This can be seen by approaching the forward Žižek wrote for 
Sharpe’s book, entitled ‘The Parallax View,’ which consists of some material that would 
two years later become the introduction to his own book of the same title. As he does in 
his afterward to Marcus Pound’s work (discussed in the following chapter), Žižek uses 
these pages as a platform to make a point of his own rather than approach Sharpe’s 
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arguments directly. He concludes by disagreeing with Sharpe in a somewhat backhanded 
way, writing that… 
If I see it correctly, it is this topic of the parallax view and its interstices that is central for Sharpe’s 
perspicuous rendering and critical remarks to my work. And it is in the spirit of the shared 
participation in a MARXIST ‘world-civil-society’ that I admire Sharpe’s book as a key engaged 
contribution to an ongoing debate which concerns the deep crisis of the contemporary left (Žižek, 
2004a: xiii; emphasis in original).  
 
There are three things to point out here. First is the reference to the category of ‘parallax’; 
second is the question of ‘engagement’; and last is the reference to Marxism.  
‘Parallax’ is indeed a Kantian term, one akin to antinomy, which is developed by 
Kojin Karatani in Transcritique: On Kant and Marx. While Žižek takes the title of his 
‘magnum opus’ from Karatani, in its first chapter he castigates the latter for being limited 
by his Kantianism. Žižek chides Karatani for coming very close to falling into the trap of 
positing the possibility of defetishized ‘labour money’ (for which Marx derides Proudhon 
in The Poverty of Philosophy), and positing exploitation as a function of ‘buying cheap 
and selling dear’ rather than as a function of the commodification of labour32 (Žižek, 
2006: 57). Žižek does not explain how Karatani’s Kantianism leads to these short-
comings, but what is important here is that Žižek is thus compelled to counterpose his 
own ideas on ‘parallax’ with those of Karatani. According to Žižek, Karatani posits 
parallax as two exclusive, incompatible views of the same object (i.e. an antinomy). In 
distinction to this, Žižek proposes that these two poles are asymmetrical, with one 
holding the key to the existence of the other (Žižek, 2006: 29; 42). In this way he argues 
that ‘parallax’ is another way of understanding Hegelian ‘concrete universality’: against a 
universality that stands as an empty, formal, transcendental principle, he holds that one 
element of reality holds the truth of its other. Universality is thus the embodiment of a 
struggle or antagonism inherent in every particular element of a series, and not a neutral 
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container that contains all elements. Elaboration of this point will be made in a later 
chapter of this work. What is important to note here is that, against Sharpe, Žižek rejects 
the idea of using the category of Kantian antinomy as a central principle.  
This can be further seen in a footnote to his critique of Karatani, where Žižek 
points to what he sees as a major omission in Karatani’s study of Marx: Alfred Sohn-
Rethel’s Intellectual and Manual Labor (Žižek, 2006: 394, n84). Here Žižek notes that 
Karatani and Sohn-Rethel move in opposite directions: where Sohn-Rethel uses Marx to 
explain Kantian epistemology, Karatani uses Kantian categories to explain Marx. It’s 
important to note the asymmetry of this opposition. Whereas Karatani (according to 
Žižek) uses Kant’s theories to understand Marx’s, Sohn-Rethel uses Marx to write a 
history of how Kantian thought was possible in the first place. According to Sohn-Rethel, 
the act of commodity exchange involves treating objects as if they were timeless and 
indestructible – i.e. as pure forms. He argues that Kant’s a priori transcendental subject is 
thus not simply a priori, but the product of a material practice: the generalization of the 
‘exchange abstraction’ under capitalism. From this ground Sohn-Rethel goes on to argue 
that the neutral position assumed in the sciences is historically produced and can be 
overcome in the socialist organization of society.  
This leads directly to the question of engagement, as raised in Žižek’s closing 
comments on Sharpe’s study. Where Sharpe claims that Žižek needs to find a neutral 
ground outside of ideology in order to critique the status quo,33 Žižek argues that one can 
only come to the truth from an engaged position.34 In Žižek’s version of parallax, one 
does not approach an object from a neutral position and thereby see both sides at once. 
Instead, one can see either one side or the other; and where from one side the other 
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appears to be incomprehensible, from the other the truth is revealed (this will be 
developed more in the proceeding chapters). That Sharpe’s book was written before the 
publishing of The Parallax View does not excuse him from missing this point, however, 
as it is also offered in an earlier essay – one that Sharpe himself references: the postface 
to Lukács’ Tailism and Dialectic. In this essay Žižek discusses how Stalinist ‘Diamat’ 
reduced Marxism to a ‘scientific’ epistemology, thereby ‘depriving it of its directly 
engaged, practical-revolutionary attitude’ (Žižek, 2000: 154).35 What need be noted here 
is that Sharpe attempts to substantiate his argument by pointing to what he thinks Žižek 
sees as that neutral point: the ‘lack in the Other.’ By contrast, in his essay on Lukács 
Žižek writes that ‘the [Leninist] Party addresses the proletariat from a radically 
subjective, engaged position of the lack that prevents the proletarians from achieving the 
“proper place” in the social edifice’ (Žižek, 2000: 170).  
This is not to say that Sharpe is wrong when he argues that Žižek doesn’t offer a 
substantive description of latter-day class exploitation or heed his own calls to return to 
political economy by actually doing some. To his detriment, Žižek does not do either of 
these things. This is substantially different than arguing, however, that to do so is 
impossible from within Žižek’s theoretical framework, or that this framework is itself 
faulty for not having done so. As noted above, Sharpe argues (much like Laclau36) that 
Žižek has no grounds to turn to ‘class struggle’ as a central political category. Combined 
with what has just been argued around Žižek’s position on Marx’s labour theory of value 
and parallax, it is possible to see how this is not the case by looking at how some of 
Žižek’s other commentators have taken up the idea of class.  
 38 
‘Class struggle’: Butler, Feldner, and Vighi 
The work of Rex Butler (2005) as well as that of Vighi and Feldner (2007) include at 
their core Žižek’s references to class struggle. In both of these books the authors 
approach this question with reference to Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, a written 
dialogue in nine parts between Žižek, Laclau, and Judith Butler. It is worthwhile to begin 
by pointing out that in this book J. Butler, in particular, also misses the point of 
convergence between psychoanalysis and Marxism in Žižek’s thought: 
…if a theory of capital and a theory of the psyche are not to be thought together, what does that 
imply about the division of intellectual labour that takes place [in Žižek’s work] first under the 
mantle of Lacan and then under the mantle of Marx, shifts brilliantly between the two paradigms, 
announces them all as necessary, but never quite gets around to asking how they might be thought 
– or rethought – together?” (Butler et al, 2000: 139).  
 
Soon after this remark J. Butler moves on to another topic and cites The Sublime Object 
of Ideology to make her point. This is the book, of course, in which the first two chapters 
deal precisely with the question she raises.  
Rex Butler, however, does not himself ask this question, instead siding with Žižek 
over J. Butler and Laclau in his argument that class, rather than any other particular 
struggle, is that which colours all other struggles.37 R. Butler points out that in doing this 
Žižek 1. ceases to simply except that there is a void to be hegemonized by some 
particular element/struggle and begins to question what makes this void appear in the first 
place; 2. does this by quoting Marx’s Grundrisse to the effect that class functions as an 
‘oppositional determination,’ a concrete universality, a species that is also its own genus. 
What R. Butler does not do, however, is ask why it is that class serves this function – he 
too quickly asserts that Žižek’s use of the Grundrisse is correct, but does not give an 
answer to the question of why the ‘void’ exists. Instead, he remains content in implying 
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that Marx’s fundamental insight is that class is nothing but the struggle over its 
‘existence’ as class – i.e. that it itself is not ‘whole’ or readymade.  
This conception of class can be seen in the work of the ‘early’ Marx in pieces like 
The German Ideology, The Poverty of Philosophy, The 18th Brumaire, and arguably also 
The Communist Manifesto.38 It is pertinent to point out however, that Lenin, in his State 
and Revolution, made famous Marx’s letter to Weydemeyer in which he (Marx) wrote 
that class struggle was not his own invention, but something he inherited from bourgeois 
historians. It is not that R. Butler is incorrect to assert that ‘class’ is not something that 
exists merely ‘in-itself’ in a book about Žižek: Žižek endorses this position. It is that 
Žižek does this with reference to Lukács rather than in a discussion of Marx.39 This is 
important because of what Marx thinks he has added to the question of class, and the 
problem it points to in Butler’s discussion of Žižek: ‘the existence of classes is only 
bound up with particular historical phases in the  development of production’ (Marx, 
1987:139). The ‘historical phase’ in which worker and capitalist find themselves is, of 
course, that of wage labour and capital. That is, commodity fetishism is the fundamental 
logic of capitalism, its ‘cell form,’ and this is what makes class struggle the ‘concrete 
universal’ of our ‘conjuncture.’  
This can be seen a little more clearly by briefly continuing with Žižek’s position 
on the Leninist Party. R. Butler argues that Žižek’s version of ideology can best 
understood by looking at the role of the shark in Jaws or the role played by ‘Jew’ in Nazi 
ideology. Indeed, Žižek argues that these are exemplary of ideology. However, looking at 
(the poorly translated) ‘The Fetish of the Party’ in Lacan, Aesthetics, Politics (Žižek, 
1996a) an important nuance can be added. Here Žižek argues that there are different 
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‘fetishes’ (for which could also be substituted S1, Master-signifier, suture, etc.) for 
different ideological arrangements. For the Nazi it is the Jew. For the Stalinist it is the 
Party. With reference to texts referred to above, as well as The Sublime Object of 
Ideology, two more fetishes can be added: in the liberal West it is democracy, and under 
capitalism it is commodity fetishism. The twist here is that all of these are to be 
understood by the final one: for Žižek each is a reaction to the fundamental deadlocks of 
capitalism. That is, one ‘species’ of fetishism is also the ‘genus’ of these other three, the 
one that explains the existence of the others40 – what was above called an ‘oppositional 
determination.’ In Žižek’s terminology, this could also be called the difference between 
constitutive and constituted ideology (discussed in the following chapter): the ground of 
ideology needs to be distinguished from any particular ideology.41 R. Butler is thus 
correct when he says that one of the best examples of the master-signifier is the Jew in 
the Nazi’s ideology system. However, because he displaces Marx in favour of Spielberg 
(i.e. the director of Jaws), R. Butler’s book, by his own admission, revolves around 
repeatedly failed attempts to grasp the relationship between master signifier and objet a. 
He constantly iterates that S1 is the a understood from a different perspective, but he 
never gives a clear description of how this is so. This is because he misses the clearest, 
most fundamental example of it: money, surplus, and profit.  
This will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, as will the 
question of how all this leads to the ‘void’ that is to be hegemonized – which, as noted 
above, R. Butler writes is one of the central points of contention in Contingency, 
Hegemony, Universality. Before getting there, however, it is instructive to look at the 
work of Vighi and Feldner (2007), who also rely on Žižek’s discussion of class struggle 
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as found in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. The problem is here less that of 
acknowledging that the commodity form is at the root of the crux of capitalism, but that 
they do not fully emphasize its importance or explain its relation to surplus. They are also 
unclear on the Lacanian ‘mechanism’ involved, constantly conflating ‘disavowal’ with 
‘repression’ and ‘foreclosure,’ each of which serve a different function in Lacan’s 
discussion of neuroses and psychosis.42 In Vighi’s recent On Žižek’s Dialectics (2010), 
however, the question of capitalist ‘surplus’ is more prominently placed. Here Vighi 
proposes two interlocking theses that generally correspond to the two halves of his book: 
first, he follows Žižek’s assertion that without surplus-value as the driving mechanism of 
economic production the productive capacities of capitalism disappear. This is in part 
based on the (unreferenced) assertion that Marx held that in a communist society 
‘surplus’ would be made available to workers who would in turn ‘use it for the good of 
the whole society’ (Vighi, 2010: 41). This, he argues, is done at the expense of seeing 
labour-power as the foundation of a new society, a mistake that Vighi wants to correct. 
He argues that this problem arises as consequence of Marx’s (supposed) reduction of 
labour-power to labour-time: not understanding the deadlocks of desire and the 
unconscious as built into labour-power, Marx thought that surplus could be rationally 
comprehended and put directly to use.43 To correct this apparent oversight, Vighi turns to 
Lacan’s 1968-9 seminar The Other-Side of Psychoanalysis and Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s 
Intellectual and Manual Labour to argue that part of what is most characteristic of the 
capitalist mode of production is the separation of explicit, abstract, conscious knowledge 
of how to perform various acts of labour and ‘know-how’, conceived as  an unconscious 
spontaneous knowledge:  
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The knowledge in question is not merely “work”, i.e. it does not simply coincide with skills we 
can describe, learn and put to work. Rather, it has to do with the fact that ‘getting to know 
something always happens in a flash’ […]. As children discover through experience, knowledge is 
unconscious before being pedagogical: without knowing why, things, or the objects children play 
with, all of a sudden “start making sense,” and from that revelation a piece of conscious 
knowledge is produced […] (Vighi, 2010: 43).   
 
In Vighi’s take, this ‘know-how’ is just another name for Lacan’s ‘jouissance’ – i.e. the 
basic energy of human life. What is characteristic of capitalism in regards to ‘know-how’ 
is that it is taken from workers via the commodity form, transformed into exchange-value 
or ‘erstaz-jouissance’, and sold back to them. This not only prevents ‘know-how’ from 
developing outside the circuit of capital and capitalist forms of knowledge production 
(i.e. outside the separation of intellectual and manual labour), but also limits the 
revolutionary potential of jouissance. In Vighi’s reading, enjoyment must be traumatic to 
have transformative political potential and the pleasures of Western consumer culture are 
a gentrification of enjoyment (hence the appendage ‘ersatz’) to such an extent that they 
instead propel capital forward: no single commodity can satisfy desire, and so more and 
more are sought out. From this Vighi concludes that consumption is ‘the only point from 
which we can subtract and begin anew’ (Vighi: 35). This is because ‘our being coincides 
with our being consumers’ – a statement apparently so important it originally appears 
italicized (Vighi: 26). That is, Vighi puts great emphasis on Žižek’s ruminations on the 
ideology or ‘enjoyment’ at the level of consumer society.44 
 This is not the whole of Vighi’s first thesis, however. Where he equates ‘know-
how’ with Marx’s labour-power, he also asserts that it is how work is organized that 
needs to be in the end politicized, with consumption as the realm in which to begin that 
process (77). The means by which to do this, however, is not along the lines of showing 
workers that they are exploited by capitalism, as Marx (for example) intended with his 
‘Wage Labour and Capital,’ his workers’ survey, the communist manifesto, the work 
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done with first international, etc.; instead, Vighi sees the ‘surplus’ of knowledge inherent 
to ‘know how’ linked to the production of ‘surplus’ populations in the form of the people 
who make up the inhabitants of the world’s monster-sized slums. That is, while he asserts 
that he still adheres to the labour theory of value,45 what he aims to do is ‘theorize a new 
link between production and the human surplus engendered by the mad escalation of 
capitalist dynamics’ (78). What Vighi does not do, however, is precisely that: he doesn’t 
show this link, nor describe the link between the disavowal of labour-power and the 
‘reproduction’ of this surplus in the form of so-called ‘human waste’ (i.e. slum-dwellers).  
This leads him to his second thesis: the sphere which will produce the ‘Act’ or ‘Event’ –  
large-scale social change – is not that of practice but that of theory.46 Against the view 
that theory can only engage with an Event after the fact (Vighi: 145)47, and against an Act 
that comes ex-nihilo (Vighi: 5;111), Vighi takes a position that is perhaps akin to Lukács’ 
thesis that the ‘revolution is actual.’  
He begins by giving a slight twist to Žižek’s thesis that freedom exists because 
reality is incomplete, or itself contradictory (an idea taken up above with reference to the 
work of Adrian Johnston): the deadlocks of theory are also the deadlocks of material 
reality. Rather, theory can only posit its internal limits as ‘coincidental’ with reality 
(145), and therefore must turn to the ‘symptomal points of our socio-symbolic order in 
the attempt to seize the Benjaminian “revolutionary chance” coincidental with history’s 
sudden openness’ (Vighi: 149). This is why he turns to the slum-dwellers of South 
America and beyond: like labour-power or ‘know-how’ – which is in Vighi’s view in 
excess of capitalism – he sees these people’s position in the capitalist economy as ‘the 
external remainder of capitalist dynamics,’ as an ‘external surplus, which is fully 
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detached and meaningless from the perspective of capital itself’ (Vighi: 77). They are 
thus a symptom of capitalist production.  
The obvious attack to make here is to point out that Johnston’s version of this 
thesis – that deadlocks in reality have a relationship to theory – comes out in the positive: 
what appears to be a deadlock is in fact the ‘truth’ of the situation. In this vein Žižek 
often turns to Adorno: the inability, in the social sciences, to side with either the thesis 
that society was a group of atomized individuals or an organic whole, was not the product 
of an antinomy but instead best seen as the proper definition of society: “what first 
appeared as our inability to understand what society really is [the conflict between the 
individual and the whole] turns out to be the fundamental feature of social reality itself” 
(Žižek, 2005d: 333). Vighi instead proposes that theoretical problems can be blamed on 
the object of theory rather than theory itself. Vighi’s reference to the world’s slums might 
then instead best be inverted and taken as a symptom rather than a solution. Throughout 
the book he argues that Žižek’s theory is deficient in that it relies on an Event or an Act 
to happen in order to make theory possible, but at the same time Žižek calls for thought to 
come before action and revolutionary change; it therefore ends in an impasse (e.g Vighi: 
113). It is here that the echoes of Lukács begin to ring: according to Vighi, the slum-
dwellers are already ‘subtracted’ from the circuits of capitalism and its enjoyment (Vighi: 
141) and therefore they merely need to be theorized in order to actively work towards 
creating an Event/Act. This is not merely a relation of a subject to an object, however, but 
of a subject to its ‘Real’, and as such transforms that object in confronting it – the Real 
can never be approached directly (in this case, the proposal is to confront it via the 
symbolic.) This is, incidentally, Lacan’s definition of ‘sublimation,’ tied as it is to drive:  
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…sublimation is the satisfaction of the drive with a change of object, that is, without repression. 
This definition is a profounder one, but it would also open up an even knottier problematic, if it 
weren’t for the fact that my teaching allows you to spot where the rabbit is hidden. 
 In effect, the rabbit to be conjured from the hat is already to be found in the instinct. This 
rabbit is not a new object; it is a change of object in itself (Lacan, 1997: 293). 
 
Sublimation is thus not simply the Freudian substitution of one object with another, but 
the transformation of the same object by changing one’s relation to it – part of what Žižek 
refers to as the ‘parallax view.’ This is also the move from ‘desire’ to ‘death drive’: from 
desire as an unchanging relationship to a plethora of objects we move to drive and a 
change in the object itself. In this way, then, theory is neither the application of an axiom 
to a multitude of objects, nor does it blame its faults on its object; instead, it transforms 
its object while also transforming itself.  
 There is nothing wrong with this thesis – that revolutionary theory can develop a 
revolutionary subject – per se. What this instance of it does not do, however, is solve the 
supposed deadlock in Žižek’s theory. As noted above, Vighi argues that a link between 
labour-power as surplus and the creation of ‘surplus’ populations needs to be re-
conceived in order to achieve this change. In order to do this he has to carve out a place 
for theory that is independent from practice, or at least not reducible to it. That is, he 
posits a place outside of capitalism from which he can draw ‘an unconscious knowledge 
that awaits its moment to emerge, take shape and shatter the coordinates within which we 
make sense of the world,’ one that ‘lies in wait of a chance to be translated into a fearless 
vision of society to come’ (Vighi: 164). In this way he claims to take a position against 
the idea – attributed to Žižek – that one must wait for an Act to occur ex-nihilo. That is, 
rather than waiting for an ‘Event’, there already awaits a revolutionary portion of society 
outside of capitalism that can be transformed into a revolutionary agent by theorizing it.  
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There are several further problems to be pointed to here. To begin, Vighi’s own 
theory demands at minimum that one start with a series of propositions that enable one to 
conceive certain objects (i.e. the world’s mega-slums) as symptoms of capitalism rather 
than simply the products of human nature or accident.48 The theory in this case is, of 
course, Marxism. Here the problems in his formulations become clearest. To begin, Vighi 
must assert something about the world’s slums that Žižek does not. While Vighi posits 
their inhabitants as necessarily produced by capitalism, he also posits them as external to 
its enjoyments – i.e. capitalist exchange and exploitation. Žižek, on the other hand, offers 
– with reference to Davis’ ‘Planet of Slums’ (2004) – that they are integrated into it: 
Although this population is made up of marginalized labourers, redundant civil servants, and ex-
peasants, they are not simply a redundant surplus: they are incorporated into the global economy 
in numerous ways, many of them as informal wage-workers or self-employed entrepreneurs, with 
no adequate health or social security cover (Žižek, 2006: 268).49  
 
There are two things to be noted here. First, what Sharpe has attributed to Žižek can 
instead be seen in Vighi: where Sharpe argues that Žižek needs a neutral external point 
from which to critique ideology, Vighi argues that one can only discuss the 
transformation of capitalist world if there is something outside of it, a place from which 
to think that transformation. Second, it is the apparent existence of this ‘outside’ that 
drives Laclau to post-Marxism, and comprises the root of many of the major differences 
between him and Žižek (a subject taken up here in a subsequent chapter). While not 
tackling some of the other problems with Vighi’s text,50 having considered his position in 
some detail makes it possible to show where all the above commentators have gone awry: 
when Vighi posits that it is the level of work that needs to be politicized and gestures 
towards consumption as the means to do it, he fails to mention that by virtue of the 
commodity form labour-power becomes wage labour – i.e. a commodity sold on the 
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labour market. Ignoring this, Vighi returns to a formulation of the immiseration thesis, to 
the assertion that one must turn to those with nothing material to lose but their chains in 
order to foster social and political change. That is, the corollary to his assertion that ‘our 
being coincides with our being consumers’51 is that the loss of being results in the 
potential politicization of enjoyment, and not before.52 As pointed to in the introduction 
to the present study, Žižek by contrast asserts that…  
there is no S without its support in a: the subject can arrive at its being-for-itself, can free itself 
from all substantial ties and appear as the point of pure negativity, only by being posited as 
equivalent to its absolute antipode, money, that inert piece of metal that one can hold in one’s 
hands and manipulate freely… (Žižek, 2008b: 57, n22). 
 
This is to say that our being coincides with money, rather than our being consumers. To 
formulate this slightly differently, in place of one’s labour-power – one’s ineffable being 
as a productive individual – one receives not commodities but cash. As such, ‘traversing 
the fantasy’ and ‘subjective destitution’ do not necessarily mean becoming materially 
impoverished or identifying with others who have become so; instead, it means 
identifying with one’s own non-being, universality, and freedom as embodied in the 
highest form of the commodity. As will be discussed in the next chapter, in Žižek’s 
thought the prerequisite for consumer identifications (a.k.a. imaginary and symbolic 
identifications) is the creation of the Subject via money. This is to say that class struggle 
comes not solely at the level of consumer consumption, nor at the level of identities, but 
precisely at the level of one’s social relationship with others via the commodity form as 
the embodiment of the ‘split’ subject.  
Against Vighi’s assertion that there is a deadlock in Žižek’s thought – he needs a 
revolutionary act to theorize, but also theory to help foster a revolutionary act (an 
attribution of circularity regarding revolution perhaps better leveled at Marcuse, taken up 
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here in a subsequent chapter) – what is proposed here is that the ‘Act’ can be thought 
precisely because the Subject is the product of capitalism. As will be developed as this 
study progresses (see in particular the final chapter of this study), what this means is that 
the ‘Act’ is in fact a creation ex-nihilo – not in the sense that it comes from nowhere and 
with no relation to material existence, but in the sense that it is a product of human 
freedom stemming from the world as it exists: where capitalism is ‘perverse,’ 
psychoanalysis is possible because it shares that form (with an important difference), and 
it is on this basis that freedom is possible. What Žižek has not done does not revolve 
around how to theorize an ‘Act’, but how to think what comes after. That is, is a ‘master 
signifier of a new type’ possible, or are we doomed to repetition automatism? If money is 
not only the paradigmatic master signifier, but that which sutures the subject in a 
capitalist economic system, and if that money is not the direct embodiment of wealth but 
the alienated embodiment of human freedom, then the answer to the former question is 
‘yes’, and that to the latter ‘no.’53  
The failure to take this link – that between commodity and Subject – into account 
is evident in many of texts that engage with Žižek’s politics and philosophy, as has been 
demonstrated above with reference to several of the major studies that have been 
produced to date.  It’s amusing to note that in many of these texts, rather than having its 
bar set at a 45 degree angle, the typographic symbol for Lacan’s barred subject (S)54 is 
replaced with one whose bar stands completely upright. The effect is such that one gets a 
version of the symbol for North American money ‘circulating’ throughout the secondary 
literature, without much discussion of money’s actual import in Žižek’s work. In the 
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chapter that follows, Žižek’s use of the commodity form is taken up in more depth in an 
attempt to remedy this gap. 
!"  
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Chapter 2 – Žižek, Marx, and political ontology  
 
Why should you want to confuse the material with the activity which forms it? If you do, what 
advantage have you over those who only knew the product of the activity and could not explain 
where it came from or how it was made?  
                       – Freud, Introductory Lectures 
 
!"  
No ontology without politics 
 
Although Žižek’s imitators and commentators mimic them without comment, it’s no 
mistake that Žižek’s work is laden with phrases like the following: ‘I am tempted to…’, 
‘what if…’, ‘we should hazard a step further…’, ‘my wager is…’, ‘we should take the 
risk and…’. These are not mere flourishes, but instead directly related to one of his 
fundamental premises: one is not external from one’s world but an active part of it, and 
there can be no change in any determinate form of existence without what appears to be a 
‘leap of faith’ into activity that receives no guarantees from the existing order of things. 
This is what is accomplished, according to Žižek, in an ‘Act’ – his version of the concept 
of ‘Event’, found in different forms in the work of Martin Heidegger (‘Ereignis’), 
Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Alain Badiou, and arguably Georg Lukács 
(‘Augenblick’).55 Žižek’s particular inflection of this concept is largely adapted from the 
work of Lacan, and as such is closely tied to the concepts of death drive, symptom, the 
unconscious and the Real. It is also indebted to Lacan’s version of Saussurian linguistics, 
which includes concepts like ‘master-signifier’ and ‘the symbolic.’  
Crudely put, the Act can be understood in the following way: every period of history 
(or ‘symbolic universe’) is organized around an excluded unconscious element (the Real). 
The eruption of this Real in the form of a ‘symptom’ has the potential to reorganize the 
symbolic universe that excludes and creates the Real in the first place. This eruption is 
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what Zizek calls the Freudian death drive, the push to return to a zero-point from which 
the world can be reorganized, a place from which to produce ‘creative sublimations’ and 
a new symbolic universe. This does not necessarily mean the physical razing of the 
existing world, however. Instead it refers to the re-organization of the social connections 
between people and between things.56 The Act is what he considers to be at the root of 
ontology and the political per se, and is the culmination of Zizek’s philosophy. 
Lacan is not the only root of Žižek’s thought, of course. He claims that his project is 
primarily to rethink the death drive as described by Freud and Lacan by reading them 
through German Idealist philosophy (Žižek and Daly, 2004: 61). As discussed above, this 
has most impressively been developed by Adrian Johnston (2008) who shows the 
importance of German Romantic thought to his project. It is significant, however, that 
work such as that of Johnston focuses on the philosophical content of Žižek’s to the 
detriment of its political edge. This is not to say that Johnston or others simply pay no 
attention to the political dimensions of Žižek’s work. What they do, however, is neglect 
the particularity of what could be called Žižek’s critique of political ontology (i.e. of the 
work of the theorists of the ‘Event’ listed above, among many others). Where Johnston 
emphasizes the points in Žižek’s work where he argues that the material world is an 
incomplete, open system rather than a closed homeostatic whole, Žižek argues that it is 
not this openness that is to be stressed. Rather, it is the consequences of this for a theory 
of the subject and politics that are of real interest: where this openness is the condition of 
freedom, the Subject is not the openness of material reality but the action that gives it 
‘ontological consistency’ (Žižek, 1999: 158). This ‘consistency’ is not only ‘ontological,’ 
but in being based in action is also political: ‘in this precise sense every ontology is 
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“political”: based on a disavowed contingent “subjective” act of decision’ (ibid; see also 
Žižek, 2008: 95-153). As explored in the previous chapter, there is no neutral place from 
which to assess the ontological; there is only an enagagement with the world from an 
internal/excluded position. And while Žižek here speaks of ‘every ontology,’ it need be 
emphasized that his development of this argument is fundamentally rooted in an 
understanding of capitalism as developed by Marx. That is, where he plainly says that his 
project is to read Lacan through German idealism and vice versa, he also plainly says that 
‘the roots of philosophical speculative idealism are in the social reality of the world of 
commodities; it is this world which behaves “idealistically”’ (Žižek, 1989: 32).57 This is 
of no small significance. And it is, of course, often Marx’s explanations of this world that 
Žižek relies on.   
Leaving out the question of Marx leads assessments of Žižek’s politics to run the 
gamut from charges of tailism (Dean, 2006; Brockelman, 2009) to purism (Stravrakakis, 
2010) and the titles of Jacobin voluntarist (Boucher, 2010) and closet dictator (Sharpe, 
2010). As belaboured above, this is surprising considering that his introduction to the 
English speaking world was with a book that proclaims to bring together Marxism and 
psychoanalysis at the level of the labour theory of value (via the description of 
commodity form and money in the first volume of Capital) and Freud’s description of the 
form of the dream in the founding text of psychoanalysis. Ian Parker – mentioned briefly 
above – is typical in this regard, making the mistake of focusing almost exclusively on 
Žižek’s past political activity58 when discussing his Marxism, spending rather much less 
time examining the theoretical arguments Žižek makes with reference to Marx.59 He 
thereby neglects that one of the main reasons Žižek can discuss the social world in terms 
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of what is often considered a theory of the individual (i.e. Lacanian psychoanalysis) is 
because he links it directly to Marx’s political economy: not only does he argue that 
psychoanalysis is precisely the question of how the individual and the social constitute 
each other (i.e. there is no subject without an ‘other,’ big or small), he takes the further 
step of arguing that the subject of psychoanalysis is also the subject of capitalism.  
Overlooking the role Marx’s thought plays in Žižek’s work leads to an under-
appreciation of his contribution to theories of ideology. An important part of this is the 
attempt to move beyond Althusser’s use of Lacanian psychoanalysis.60 Althusser locates 
ideology in ‘Ideological State Apparatuses,’ which include churches, schools, unions, and 
other institutions, each of which interpellate people at the level of the ego and 
misrecognition, developed in Lacan’s work as ‘the Imaginary.’ By contrast, Žižek locates 
ideology at two other levels of Lacan’s theory of the psyche: ‘the Symbolic’ and ‘the 
Real.’ Doing so, Žižek argues that the capitalist economy – rather than the different 
aspects of the capitalist state – is the root of ideology. This is not merely a passing fancy, 
but is at the root of Žižek’s thought and apparent throughout his career. Take, for 
example, this (somewhat lengthy) quote from a paper published in 2010: 
When Althusser claims that ideology interpellates individuals into subjects, ‘individuals’ stand 
here for the living beings upon which ideological state apparatuses work, imposing upon them a 
network of micro-practices. By contrast, ‘subject’ is not a category of living being, of substance, 
but the outcome of these living beings being caught in the ISA dispositif, or mechanism; in a 
symbolic order. Quite logically, insofar as the economy is considered the sphere of non-ideology, 
this brave new world of global commodification considers itself post-ideological. The ISAs are, of 
course, still here; more than ever. Yet insofar as, in its self-perception, ideology is located in 
subjects, in contrast to pre-ideological individuals, this hegemony of the economic sphere cannot 
but appear as the absence of ideology. What this means is not that ideology simply ‘reflects’ the 
economy, as superstructure to its base. Rather, the economy functions here as an ideological 
model itself, so that we are fully justified in saying that it is operative as an ISA – in contrast to 
‘real’ economic life, which definitely does not follow the idealized liberal-market model (Žižek, 
2010b: 92).  
 
Two or three major themes are present here: first, Althusser is wrong to limit ideology to 
the state and the ‘Imaginary.’ There is not only subjectivity or identification according to 
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Žižek, but also the Subject. This leads to the second major theme: the Subject is a product 
of material existence, while also being is logical precedent – this was alluded to in the 
introduction to this dissertation with reference to ‘retroactivity,’ as well as to the work of 
Johnston in the previous chapter, and will be taken up in more detail shortly. Lastly, the 
core element of capitalism – Marx’s description of the commodity form – is the form of 
the ideological per se. Or, as he puts it elsewhere, it is ideology ‘in and for itself’ (Zizek, 
1994: xx) – neither a thought without an action (a doctrine, ‘in-itself’), nor an act without 
thought (a ritual, ‘for itself’), but an act that embodies a thought, which will be 
approached in greater detail in chapter seven.  
In Žižek’s account, ideology is at root commodity fetishism in which people act as if 
money was magic (i.e. as if it intrinsically possess qualities that make it exchangeable for 
other commodities) although they know it is not. This is where the link between Freud 
and Marx becomes salient: Žižek argues that what is most important in understanding the 
work of Freud and Marx in relation to capitalism is that they point to the form of thought 
rather than any particular thought as that which determines consciousness. For Freud, it is 
neither the latent nor the manifest content of the dream that unlocks its secret, but the 
dreamwork itself (i.e. condensation, displacement, etc). The dream is a particular form of 
thinking, one that reveals desire as the distortion of particular thoughts as presented in a 
dream. For Marx, it is not any particular commodity that enables the exploitation of 
labour and the creation of surplus value under the rule of capitalism, but the commodity 
form that transforms labour power into abstract labour.  
This is key for a discussion of ideology in that it is not one’s conscious thoughts that 
are the most important aspects of ideology (e.g. expressions of liberal or conservative 
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ideologies in a newspaper), but the form of thought itself that is most relevant: ‘one 
should distinguish between constituted ideology – empirical manipulations and 
distortions at the level of content – and constituent ideology – the ideological form which 
provides the coordinates of the very space within which the content is located’ (Žižek, 
2008c).61 For Žižek, all conscious ideologies are dependant on a form that excludes (i.e. 
disavows, represses, or forecloses in a psychoanalytic sense) certain ways of formulating 
social (or other) problems.62 Liberal ideologies, for example, leave out a discussion of the 
necessarily exploitative nature of capital when talking about equality, leaving freedom at 
the level of the ‘cult of abstract man.’ 
Losurdo (2011) discusses that which liberal ideology leaves out with great force in 
his Liberalism: A Counter-History. Here he argues against theorists like Arendt who see 
slavery, racism, classism, and the like as an accidental appendage to liberalism, instead 
making the case that these ‘deviations’ were a necessary part of its development: freeing 
oneself from domination and instating self-government meant not only throwing off 
absolutist power but also creating a ‘sacred sphere’ of white, bourgeois liberals against 
the ‘profane’ spehere of ‘savages’, inferior ‘races’, and working people – all of whom, of 
course, create the bourgeois’ wealth. This was by no means repressed in an unconscious 
sense, as Losurdo demonstrates at length, but instead disavowed: shuttled off to the 
colonies in the case of England, or declared outside the pale of politics in the case of 
theory. Here he quotes Marx: ‘In its most developed form, the bourgeois state limited 
itself “to closing its eyes and declaring that certain real oppositions do not have a 
political character, that these do not bother it”’ (Marx in Losurdo, 2011: 196). Otherwise 
put, ‘I know very well that the oppression of the “lesser races” and the poor are a political 
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problem and will suggest political solutions to solving them (from miscegenation- to 
poor- laws, enforced by the state!), but nonetheless I treat them as if they are not part of 
the political sphere!’63  
What still needs to be done is develop a point that was first presented earlier: when 
one takes into account that Žižek posits that the Subject is money – the embodiment of 
the social relations that make up capitalist wealth – it becomes possible to better 
comprehend some of Žižek’s central concepts and their relevance for a ‘political 
ontology’: the subject, objet a and surplus, formal conversion, the Party, and the Act. It is 
first necessary to show how psychoanalysis, Capital, and the Cogito relate to one another 
to under-gird Žižek’s conception of the subject. From there it becomes possible to show 
the relevance of Marx’s thought in understanding Žižek’s take on ‘the parallax view’ and 
political change. The homology between the three lies in their all being ‘real abstractions’ 
– the activity of individuals that creates a logical operand that appears in the world in the 
guise of the relations between things. The basic premise that follows from this discussion 
is that only from the engaged perspective of the disavowed  (in the Freudian sense) can 
politics become visible as such. The paradigmatic case here is that of surplus and profit: 
from the perspective of capital, profit is a consequence of the activity of the capitalist in a 
relation of fair exchange. From the perspective of labour, profit is instead surplus 
extracted by virtue (rather, the vice?) of the commodity form. It is not that coming to this 
political position is something inherent to being the object of disavowal, however. 
Instead, it too can only be reached through the process of mediation through an other: the 
psychoanalyst cum Party, which leads to the ‘revolutionary Act’ that establishes a new 
‘symbolic universe.’ All of this is done relatively quickly, but serves something of a 
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double function: first, it provides the means to re-read some of the secondary literature on 
Žižek and reveal how operating without some comprehension of Marx leads 
commentators astray. This is done in the latter half of this chapter in relation to the work 
of Marcus Pound as a way to not only show that reading Žižek with Marx can correct 
some misunderstandings, but also that this way of thinking is present across the many 
spheres in which Žižek engages himself. In this instance, the sphere is that of religion. 
Secondly, reading Žižek through Marx demonstrates the logic of ‘parallax’ and symptom: 
with Marx as a reference point, the entire landscape of Žižek’s work appears to transform 
into the opposite of how others approach it. Where Pound sees Žižek as a consummate 
idealist, it becomes clear that the reverse is in fact much closer to the truth.  
Three abstractions: fantasy, money, subject  
 
Psychoanalysis and Marxism, and thus the individual and the social, overlap at a 
particular point. Based on observable phenomena both Freud and Marx deduced a purely 
logical ‘object’ that could never be directly observed, but whose existence had to be 
assumed to account for people’s behaviour. In the case of Freud this is a ‘construction of 
analysis,’ an unconscious event in an analysand’s life must be assumed to have happened 
based on their symptoms, but one that is impossible to remember (Freud, 1979).64 
Similarly, based on the fact that people trade different commodities using a single 
measure (i.e. money), one must deduce that there is something equal in them that makes 
that trade possible. For Marx this is, of course, the abstract labour in each commodity. 
Like Freud’s constructions of analysis, it cannot be directly observed: ‘Not an atom of 
matter enters into the commodities as values […]. We may twist and turn a commodity as 
we wish; it remains impossible to grasp it as a thing possessing value’ (Marx, 1977: 138). 
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That is, both of these assumptions are based on a close examination of people’s actions in 
the world – either the analysand’s speech and actions, or the theories of the political 
economists, economic history, and the act of exchange performed in a capitalist market-
economy. The patient’s unconscious is their ‘slip of the tongue’ (their symptom); the 
value of any commodity is only realized in the body of another commodity (eventually 
money) in the act of exchange.  
Before describing in more detail these special ‘objects’ (constructions of analysis; 
value) it’s first worth noting one last major difference that Žižek sees between his work 
and that of Althusser: based on the non-observable but logical necessity of these ‘objects’ 
Žižek holds fast to the difference between ‘subjectivization’ and ‘the subject,’ claiming 
that Althusser only accounts for the former. According to Žižek, Althusser’s focus on 
subjectivization refers only to a particular content and ignores the possibility of their 
being a ‘content’ in the first place.65 This is because Žižek holds that the misrecognitions 
that occur at the level of the imaginary ego are dependant on symbolic identification: in 
Žižek’s take on Lacan’s topology of the psyche, one can only misrecognize oneself by 
seeing oneself from the position of a social-symbolic mandate. This is to say that one can 
only misrecognize oneself as a citizen of a particular state by first seeing oneself from the 
perspective of the state.66  
This still demands and answer to the question of what, precisely, is being given a 
symbolic mandate. In a final step away from Althusser, Žižek turns to Alfred Sohn-
Rethel’s Intellectual and Manual Labour and the concept of ‘real abstraction.’ Sohn-
Rethel argues that the generalization of the ‘exchange abstraction’ – i.e. the near 
impossibility, within capitalism, of accessing subsistence or wealth outside of commodity 
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exchange – is what created the abstract, Kantian subject of science. In his account, 
commodity exchange is not an abstraction that is consciously thought, but one that is 
unconsciously enacted: trading materially different objects as if they were equivalent (as 
in the discussion of Marx and exchange-value above)  led to thinking of objects and 
eventually the self as self-sufficient entities. He locates the beginning of this in Ionian 
Greece (i.e. in a pre-capitalist formation), and its culmination in Kant’s critical 
philosophy (i.e. within a capitalist formation). Žižek endorses Sohn-Rethel’s position 
against Althusser, writing:  
The ‘real abstraction’ is unthinkable in the frame of the fundamental Althusserian epistemological 
distinction between the ‘real object’ and the ‘object of knowledge’ in so far as it introduces a third 
element which subverts the very field of this distinction: the form of the thought previous and 
external to thought – in short: the symbolic order (Žižek, 1989: 19). 
 
Here can be seen where Žižek’s critique of Althusser aligns with Dolar’s, who writes that 
‘the subject, prior to recognition in the Other, is not simply the individual. There is an 
“intermediary” stage in that passage from the (real) individual to the (imaginary) subject, 
the stage where the process of symbolization opens an empty space, a crack in the 
continuity of being – a void that is not yet filled with the imaginary subjectivity’ (Dolar, 
1993: 88). Before moving on to a discussion of the symbolic order, it must first be noted 
that following this line of thought Žižek advocates for what he sees as Kant and Hegel’s 
development of Descartes’ Cogito. Just as in the logic above, where a particular action 
can only be understood by assuming a logical yet unobservable form, the Cartesian ‘I’ 
must be assumed based on the existence of any thought. That is, there is an empty, formal 
subject that thinks any particular thought. He quotes Kant to the effect that… 
Through this I or he of it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented than a 
transcendental subject of the thoughts = X. It is known only through the thoughts which are its 
predicates, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any concept whatsoever (Kant in Žižek, 
1993: 15).  
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Again, it is not that the subject is here a substantial being, nor simply a deduction from 
the fact that there must be something that is thinking, but instead the realization that the 
form of thought itself is that ‘which accompanies every representation of mine’ (Žižek, 
1993: 15). This is the corrective that Žižek offers to Kant: the ‘I’ is not a noumenal thing-
in-itself – which would mean that we are completely determined by some other-worldly 
realm – nor the content of  any particular thought, nor the a priori categories that make 
thought possible. Nor is it simply thought turned upon itself, ‘abstracting’ any possible 
content from itself and revealing instead the form of thought. Rather, it is also the activity 
of thought/negativity per se. 67 This is the argument that Žižek outlines in great detail in 
the first chapter of The Ticklish Subject, and which he repeats in many other places (e.g. 
2012: 188): Kant’s ‘transcendental imagination’ is best understood not only as putting 
sensations together in a way that we can understand them, but primarily the activity of 
tearing apart sensations in order that they can be put together.  It is this subject that is 
able to take on a symbolic mandate and ego identifications. Not incidentally, this is also 
the link that enables Žižek to draw psychoanalysis and Marxism together: reference to 
people’s actions is the only way to access their ‘unconscious’ world. Differently put, any 
individual unconscious is the external, social world. The logic of the unconscious, the 
economy, and the Cartesian subject are all homologous, leading Žižek to conclude that 
the commodity form and the formal, Cartesian subject are one and the same.68  
This is to say that the ‘special objects’ that were described above – constructions of 
analysis, value, and the Cogito, each embodied in an object as the symptom, money, or a 
particular thought – are abstractions in the sense that they are the products of 
relationships between things, and not an intrinsic property that can be observed in 
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isolation. Further, as has been stressed again and again, they share this logic because they 
are the product of the exchange abstraction.   
Money’s parallax: equivalence, and ‘profit’ versus ‘surplus’ 
 
Zizek conceptualizes the relations between ‘things’ in terms of Lacan’s theories of 
language and the symbolic order. He develops this line of thinking in the first chapter of 
For They Know Not What They Do, which he considers the companion piece to The 
Sublime Object of Ideology. Interestingly enough, he doesn’t do this simply with 
reference to Lacan, nor simply with reference to Hegel, but by explaining Lacan’s logic 
of the signifier with reference to Marx’s discussion of the development of commodity 
exchange. To put it succinctly, there is one commodity – money – which enables all the 
other commodities to be set up in a chain of equivalences. That is, each is worth a 
different amount of the same thing, and are linked to each other by virtue of being 
compared to it. This one thing (money) is fundamentally different from all the others in 
that it is nothing other than the embodiment of a social abstraction. Whereas all the other 
commodities are use-values that embody exchange-values such that when they are taken 
home by their purchaser they play a completely different function, money is a pure 
exchange-value without use-value: it has no function of its own. It exists only to make all 
the others exchangeable within a certain market (i.e. one that uses a specific currency).69 
As such, it is equivalent to what Lacan calls the master signifier, the empty signifier, S1, 
or the phallus.   
Another aspect of Lacan’s theory that Žižek focuses on is the remainder created by 
the establishment of a chain of equivalences. In Lacanian terminology this is the Real, 
‘objet a,’ jouissance, or surplus-enjoyment. During the seminar that Lacan delivered in 
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1968-69 (From an Other to The other) he claimed that this concept was homologous with 
Marx’s conception of surplus value. Žižek, of course, acknowledges this. It is again 
possible, then, to again turn to Marx’s discussion of commodity exchange to understand 
it. 
Captains of industry legitimate exploitation by explaining that the purchase of labour 
is an act of fair exchange where the worker is given the full value of their labour in the 
form of a wage. Labour is taken as a commodity like any other, one that is purchased 
outright from an individual who freely sells it. The problem arises when one considers 
that there appears to be more value coming out of the system than going in. Marx rejects 
the claim that surplus value comes from anywhere but the ‘fair exchange’ of wages for 
labour, explaining that the political economists before him had already unknowingly 
come upon the answer: where the value of a commodity comes from the cost of its 
production, so too must the value of labour. This value is not the cost of the production of 
any particular labour, however, but of the worker as a worker. What is truly valued in the 
transaction between the capitalist and the worker is the worker’s labour-power: its 
reproduction – not the value of the abstract-labour worked into commodities – is what is 
measured in a day’s wages. And so Marx argues that labour-power cannot be properly 
understood as a commodity: a commodity must exist before it is sold; it must exist 
independently of the person who sells it... and labour does not. Living labour is the 
worker. Labour has no value, but is given the appearance of value when taken as a 
commodity. Effectively, labour is a commodity – this appearance is socially concrete. 
Surplus value is thus the product of the functioning of an abstract system that registers a 
material reality in such a way that reformulates its expression.  
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To make this clearer, it is useful to turn to what Žižek calls the ‘parallax view’70 – 
what he earlier labeled ‘looking awry’ – which can be used to better understand not only 
the objet a but also the relationship between the objet a and the master signifier. To 
explain this earlier formulation (i.e. ‘looking awry’) Žižek sometimes turns to Hans 
Holbein the Younger’s (surprisingly large) painting The Ambassadors,71 which adorns 
the cover of the French edition of Lacan’s eleventh seminar and can be seen on the 
website of the National Gallery, London. Standing in front of the painting, a spectator 
sees not only two figures and various cultural and scientific paraphernalia from the 16th 
Century but also what appears to be nothing but a grey smear. The same viewer standing 
almost directly next to the painting’s right-hand side will see the smear become a 
discernible figure: death’s head. In this way an object that appears nonsensical becomes 
sensible, only to reveal mortality. The same object has two different appearances. This is 
also true of money as a measure of value. The bourgeois economist, the capitalist, and 
Marx agree that money is the measure of surplus, but they disagree on what kind. For the 
capitalist and the bourgeois economist it appears as simply more of the ‘general 
equivalent’ (or ‘master signifier’) and economic growth is the result of their own work,72 
their own knowledge and ingenuity returning in the form of profit.73 For the Marxist, 
speaking from the position of the proletariat (see for instance chapter ten of the first 
volume of Capital, where Marx ventriloquizes from a worker’s pamphlet) economic 
growth comes in the form of exploitation and is expressed in surplus value. That is, profit 
is not just more money, but value created at the cost of the mortification of the worker; 
it’s a death’s head produced by – and at the expense of – those who toil for the capitalists. 
Both parties agree that money functions as a general equivalent or master signifier, but 
 64 
one side sees this as a means of the freedom of exchange and the other as a means of 
domination. 
Here we have the ‘parallax view.’ The ‘views’ are not equivalent, each one half of a 
story that when put together create a whole. Instead, one is the necessary appearance that 
keeps a system of equivalents functioning while the other is ‘negative’ in the sense of 
undermining that order, while maintaining its existence when left unexamined.74 This is 
the means by which Žižek – against Althusser’s comments in his ISA essay – can assert 
that Marx does indeed have a theory of ideology.75 Indeed, the first section of the third 
volume of Capital is dedicated to showing how surplus value, in ‘the ordinary 
consciousness of the agents of production themselves’ (Marx, 1993: 117), necessarily 
appears as profit in order for the capitalist system to function.  
It is in this way that Žižek is also able to assert that class struggle or class antagonism 
is the ‘Real’ of capitalism. The commodity form enables the ‘symbolic’ as market 
exchange to function as if it were complete, as if there was nothing to disturb its 
functioning. Class struggle is Real in the sense that the exploitation engendered in the 
commodity form cannot be registered within that symbolic without appearing as 
something external to it, rather than constitutive of it. Instead, those opposed to worker-
revolution describe class struggle from below as anti-democratic, selfishness, worker’s 
greed, or a mere demand for more wages and benefits. It is in this way that the link 
between ‘constitutive ideology’ (i.e. commodity fetishism as the form of thought 
necessary within capitalist production) and ‘constituted ideology’ (particular ideologies 
that occur within this frame) can be understood: constituted or particular ideologies are 
attempts to explain or ‘hegemonize’ the way class struggle is understood, without 
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challenging the fundamental premises of the economic system in which the struggle is 
had. Both right-wing and social-democratic ideologies can thereby be considered 
challenges to each other’s ‘constituted ideology’ rather than challenges to capitalist 
ideology per se – that engendered by the economy. This also shows that one can include 
class struggle in one’s political orientation without necessarily being anti-capitalist. As 
noted above, Marx famously pointed out in a letter to Weydemeyer that he did not invent 
the concept of class struggle; he was instead the first to show that class struggle took on 
certain inflections based on particular modes of production. Put in Žižek’s terms, it can 
thus be understood that ‘the class-and-commodity structure of capitalism is not just a 
phenomenon limited to the particular “domain” of the economy, but the structuring 
principle that overdetermines the social totality, from politics to art and religion’ (Žižek 
in Butler et al, 2000: 96). Each constituted ideology – whether as ‘politics, art, or 
religion’ – parasitizes on a failure to examine capitalist exploitation. Žižek’s discussion 
of class struggle can thus be read as referring to challenging capitalism per se, and not 
just a competition between formally equal interest groups over shared resources (e.g. a 
fight for higher wages or legal recognition). 
Capitalist ways of thinking are ‘reproduced directly and spontaneously, as current and 
usual modes of thought’ (Marx, 1976: 682). The commodity form as ‘free exchange’ is 
the lynchpin of everyday capitalist ideology because it hides the fact that labour is 
something invaluable. Understanding labour as something other than a commodity is thus 
‘outside the frame of reference of everyday consciousness’ for classical political 
economists and workers alike (Marx, 1976: 681). In Žižek’s terms, the form of thought 
remains unconscious. The decades old question arises, then, as to how to make this 
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parallax not only visible to people, but to also change the exploitation based on it. Žižek’s 
answer is to turn to Lacan’s description of ‘the Act.’ 
Formal conversion, the Party, and the Act 
 
The ‘Act’ as Žižek describes it also centres around form. It’s predicated on the 
assertion that one can ascertain the truth only from the perspective of the ‘negative.’ 
Žižek approaches this in his essay on Georg Lukács (Žižek, 2000) and in his discussion 
of Sophocles’ Antigone in the final chapter of Sublime Object: it is not that Sophocles 
knew the true meaning of what he wrote; nor is it that each successive reading of the 
play, from Hegel to Butler, can be added up to give a full picture of that meaning; nor is 
it that each reading reveals a truth particular to the age in which it was made. Instead, the 
truth of the play is that which eludes every successive reading. This can be made sense of 
with Žižek’s turn to Lukács’ assertion that relativism (the idea that each take on a subject 
is its own truth, independent of any others) isn’t relative enough because it relies on a 
particular ground against which to measure. Rather than asserting that there is a neutral 
universal perspective from which to determine truth, or asserting that all truths are true 
from their own perspective (which implies a neutral framework in which this ‘multitude’ 
can appear) Žižek – pace Lukács – argues that there is a single, universal, engaged 
perspective from which it can be asserted. (Think again to chapter ten of Capital where 
Marx speaks with the voice of the workers against their exploiters.) In Žižek’s theory, 
this perspective is that of the Real. Under the exploitation engendered in the commodity 
form, this is the perspective of the proletariat – the death’s head of capitalism. 
As noted above, ‘misrecognizing’ oneself in what Althusser called the ISAs was in 
Žižek’s view predicated on first identifying with the state per se, viewing one’s ego from 
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that perspective (i.e. ‘imaginary identification’ is predicated on ‘symbolic identification’). 
Žižek takes Hegel’s description of the constitutional monarch in The Philosophy of Right 
as the model of how this happens: there is one element which makes the state appear to 
be whole, and does so by providing the embodiment of the ‘general will’ in the form of a 
singular will. Hegel’s monarch is one that merely dots each ‘i’ and cuts through 
indecision by choosing one course of action over another. They are a mere figurehead 
that confers formal authority on the other elements of the state (in Canada, for instance, 
the Queen’s representative is officially the head of government, and yet only signs 
legislation and represents Canada in a public-relations role). Hegel’s monarch is thus a 
‘master signifier’ which confers formal consistency upon the rest of the state.  
This is what Lacan, in his The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, called ‘the master’s 
discourse.’ In contrast to it Lacan proposed ‘the analyst’s discourse’: against the idea of a 
master who confers truth, the analyst serves as a means to convert one’s symptoms into a 
means of understanding one’s role in the social edifice. This is what Žižek calls ‘formal 
conversion’: by letting the analysand speak through their symptoms,76 these symptoms 
become a new way to view a situation and one’s role in it. Rather than standing as an 
aberration that needs to be eliminated, the symptom becomes a new master signifier that 
re-orders how the symbolic is approached; it is the means by which the entirety of the 
system which produced it can be understood.  
In Žižek’s terminology this is what is also known as ‘identifying with the symptom.’ 
‘Formal conversion’ is the ‘engaged’ viewpoint in that one must see from the perspective 
of enjoyment, or surplus, and is thus a major step towards the Act.77 It is accomplished 
via the role of the psychoanalyst, and he ascribes an analogous formal position to the 
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Leninist Party: against the caricature of the Party as a dictatorial ‘master’78 he views it as 
a means by which the exploited and their allies gain new perspective on their role in the 
social system. Thus we find on the cover of The Parallax View an inverted reproduction 
(of a reproduction) of Lenin at the Smolny Institute, which gives the impression that 
Lenin is in the psychoanalyst’s place, facing an empty chair representing the ‘empty’ 
(formal) Cartesian subject of the unconscious.79  
Given all the above, the Act is an ‘identification with the symptom’ – with the 
excluded Real of a social arrangement embodied in one of its elements – and the 
establishment of a new master signifier, one beyond even the symptom. During the 
Winnipeg Strike in Canada in 1919, for instance, between 20,000 and 30,000 striking 
metal-trade workers were joined by public employees, thereby completely shutting down 
the city. In their fight for safe work conditions, livable wages, etc., the metal-trades 
workers stood as the excluded element, the symptom, with which the rest of Winnipeg 
could identify. It was not merely that the city was shut down, however. Delegates from 
the many unions formed the Central Strike Committee, which was the means by which 
the city began to function again, though under a new master signifier: the Central Strike 
Committee gave ‘permission cards’ to workers so that they could function without being 
accused of scabbing (McNaught and Bercuson, 1974: 53-55). In this way the Act can also 
be understood as a ‘parallax’: from one perspective it appears as a withdrawal from social 
life, from the other it appears as a new form of collective living and action – what Žižek 
has called ‘Bartleby politics.’80 Similarly, From the perspective of the state, bankers, and 
capitalists, the strike was a disruptive withdrawal from capitalist life.81 Rather than the 
workers seeing themselves from the perspective of the capitalist economy – as discussed 
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earlier with reference to Althusser – the state and the capitalists saw themselves from the 
perspective of the worker: the cards pointed to the destruction of the existing order and 
the establishment of a new organizational principle. Hence the brutal putting down of the 
strike with the help of the Royal North Western Mounted Police. 82  
So understood ‘Bartleby politics’ has nothing to do with what some have called either 
‘political retreat’ or a ‘wait and see’ attitude (Sharpe and Boucher, 2010: 85). This is the 
‘political parallax’, which Žižek describes as  
… the social antagonism which allows for no common ground between the conflicting agents 
(once upon a time it was called “class struggle”), with its two main modes of existence […] (the 
parallax gap between the public Law and its superego obscene supplement; the parallax between 
the “Bartleby” attitude of withdrawal from social engagement and collective social action’ (Žižek, 
2006a: 10).  
 
‘Bartleby’ is thus the overlap of ‘act and inactivity’ (Žižek, 2010a: 401). In similar 
fashion two moments of Žižek’s theory with which this chapter began – ‘death drive’ and 
sublimation – are not two separate acts that succeed each other in time but the same 
activity taken from two perspectives. Remember that death drive is not necessarily the 
destruction of things but the destruction of the links that exist between them. Remember 
also – as discussed in chapter one with reference to Lacan’s rabbit and the work of Fabio 
Vighi – that sublimation is not simply taking an object and bestowing upon it some 
special significance but the transformation of both object and subject. ‘Death drive’ is 
thus sublimation viewed through a glass darkly, rather than from the perspective of what 
has been created.83 This is what is missed by Sharpe and Boucher  when they link 
Bartleby to the death drive to assert that Žižek can offer neither a political theory nor an 
orientation to ‘emancipatory politics’ (Sharpe and Boucher, 2010: 82).84  
To this, however, should be added the following comment:  
…the proper moment of subjective transformation occurs at the moment of declaration, not at the 
moment of the act. This reflexive moment of declaration means that every utterance not only 
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transmits some content, but, simultaneously, determines how the subject relates to this content 
(Žižek, 2010a: 226). 
 
This is again ‘formal conversion’, which results in a change of object  (which Žižek 
aligns with consciousness – in the sense of class consciousness à la Lukács – rather than 
Hegelian ‘knowledge’). This is to say that objects are not only not wholly independent of 
each subject, but also not independent of other subjects – one must ‘transmit some 
content’ to others before any socially transformative ‘Act’ can occur. Just because one 
person approaches the class struggle differently than they did the day before does not 
mean the social has been transformed. Formal conversion is thus a necessary but not 
sufficient element of the ‘Act’, a point that can be clarified with reference to Žižek’s 
discussion of Lukács: the same political factors, found in both Russian and Hungarian 
revolutions, coupled with different subjective (or ‘ideological’) conditions resulted in 
different outcomes. Blockades and treasonous officers brought down the Hungarian 
revolution and not that in Russia because Party work had not secured the activity of the 
masses (Žižek, 2000: 164-165). This is to say that there need be a collective subjective 
change or ‘formal conversion’ rather than a subjective ‘Blanquism’ in order for there to 
be a revolutionary ‘Act’ – the ‘seizing the right moment’ to effect fundamental social 
changes (ibid). This does not simply mean the development of ‘conscious workers,’ but 
of the Russian Social-Democratic Praktiki – ‘purposive workers’ or ‘activists’ who not 
only were active in the worker movement (‘purposive workers’) but also possessed 
socialist political ‘awareness’  (Lih, 2011: 58-9; 2008: 335-384).85   
A critique of critical criticism: the case of Marcus Pound 
 
This reading of Žižek is very short but to the point: using Marx as a lens the 
‘sublime object of ideology’ comes into proper view. The implications, however, 
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reverberate far into the readings given to Žižek’s work by many of his commentators. 
What follows is a full-length instance – added to those of the first chapter – of how 
failing to take this into account can lead to a misreading of his work.  It falls under the 
heading of a ‘critique of critical criticism ’ as there are at least four books published in 
the last decade that share a title that revolves around the words ‘Žižek: a critical 
introduction’: one by Ian Parker, which was touched on above; another by Sarah Kay, 
published in 2003; a third written by Sharpe and Boucher, touched on above and 
approached in more detail in the following chapter; and a fourth written by Marcus Pound 
in 2008. While Parker writes that ‘The Sublime Object of Ideology is still Žižek’s best 
book, and his reading of Marx and Freud on commodities and dreams outlines an 
approach to ideological fantasy that is descriptively rich for those working in cultural 
studies or film theory’, he does not take the time to explain this reading, nor explore the 
implications it has for Žižek’s thought as a whole. Instead, he writes that ‘whether it is 
politically useful is another matter, for there is no way out of the forms of ideology Žižek 
describes’ (Parker, 2004: 83). He then goes on to criticize Žižek by, for example, citing 
the politics of his (Žižek’s) past mentor Jacques-Alain Miller and asserting that he must 
share them, concluding that Žižek abandons ‘the collective project of class consciousness 
and revolutionary change envisioned by Marxism’ without taking up an in depth 
discussion of Žižek’s position on class or the Leninist Party (Parker, 2004: 97). As 
discussed above, these are approached in ‘Lenin’s Choice’ and Contingency, 
Hegemony… – which Parker cites – as well as in Žižek’s work on Lukács – which Parker 
does not, though it was published around the time of ‘Lenin’s Choice’ and revolves 
around similar concerns.86  
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Like many commentators (including Parker), Kay falls back on the assertion that 
Žižek lacks of explicit political program as proof of his lack of Marxism. In her offering 
she writes that Žižek’s thought is ‘Marxism without much Marx’ (Kay, 2003: 130), and 
limits herself to citing Laclau – who largely rejects the labour theory of value (Laclau, 
2006a: 659; 2006b:104) – as proof of ‘Marxists who find his program not Marxist 
enough’ (Kay: 132). This she does in place of giving a full account of Žižek’s 
engagement with Marx and Marxism, and so nothing more will be said about her book 
here. Taking an in-depth look at Pound’s contribution, however, will prove instructive in 
that in so doing it can be shown how ‘Žižek’s ontology,’ tied as it is to Marx’s labour 
theory of value and the commodity form, permeates his thinking on many topics and how 
leaving out this aspect can lead commentators astray. In this case, the topic is religion – 
more specifically, Christianity – and it’s worthy of note that Pound’s religious position 
sees him invert some of Žižek’s basic arguments. Most significantly, Pound leans on 
religious arguments to assert that Žižek is not a materialist, but in so doing misses that the 
‘transcendentals’ that Žižek relies on are coming through the work of Sohn-Rethel. This 
discussion will also set the stage for another that will appear at the end of this study: the 
homology that Žižek claims he finds in the Leninist Party, the psychoanalytic setting, and 
Christ.   
Pound’s fundamental premise finds root in his assertion that ‘for psychoanalysis 
to provide a successful critique of social relations […] one has to be able to show how the 
structure of society corresponds to the structure of the psyche. Lacan and Žižek do this 
ably by showing the relation between the Oedipal law and Language’ (Pound, 2008: 43). 
He claims that this is in part accomplished by showing that it is possible to move beyond 
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the sacrificial logic of Oedipus (44). However, Pound argues that Lacan and Žižek 
ultimately ‘remain secretly wedded to the logic of sacrifice, which leads to an impasse in 
their work’ (44). In the case of Žižek, Pound locates the problem in a misquotation of 
Jesus’ words on the cross (misquoted as ‘Father, why have you forsaken me?’), which 
causes him (Žižek) to miss that He (Jesus) serenely gives himself over to ‘the Father’ in 
Luke 23:46.  From this Pound concludes that… 
By misquoting the passage Žižek is able to give the last word to abandonment, and this has 
profound moral and political consequences for his work as a whole. Chiefly because it confirms 
the subject as the subject qua victim, i.e. the one abandoned, which undermines the possibility or 
potential for political action, the very obverse of Žižek’s stated aim (Pound, 2008: 49). 
 
It becomes clear that Pound has missed a fundamental point if one looks at the central 
premises of The Puppet and the Dwarf  (2003a) – Žižek’s third book on religion at the 
time Pound was writing his ‘critique.’ Here Žižek asks: ‘Is symbolic castration the 
ultimate horizon of his thought, beyond which there is only the inaccessible abyss of the 
(M)Other, the Real of the ultimate night that dissolves all distinctions?’ (2003a: 62). The 
answer to this is no, and that the Real is instead the product of the symbolic: ‘…the 
Lacanian Real – the Thing – is not so much the inert presence that ‘curves’ the symbolic 
space, (introducing gaps and inconsistencies in it), but, rather, the effect of these gaps and 
inconsistencies’ (2003a: 65). Further: 
The Real is the Symbolic itself in the modality of non-All, lacking an external Limit/Exception. In 
this precise sense, the line of separation between the Symbolic and the Real is only a symbolic 
gesture par excellence, but the very founding gesture of the Symbolic and to step into the Real 
does not entail abandoning language, throwing oneself into the abyss of the chaotic Real, but, on 
the contrary, dropping the very allusion to some external point of reference that eludes the 
Symbolic (2003a: 69-70).  
 
This is to say that, first, Pound misconstrues the nature of the Real. This is important in 
that Žižek’s description of the Real is homologous to the final volley of the book, its final 
thesis. In place of victimhood as the product of a gift that provokes infinite debt (i.e. 
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Love in the mode of the caprice of power, or Jesus’ ‘self-sacrifice’ as burdening all of 
Christendom with the debt of his death)… 
The point of this book is that, at the very core of Christianity, there is another dimension. When 
Christ dies, with him is the secret hope discernible in “Father, why hast thou forsaken me?”: the 
hope is that there is a father who has abandoned me. The “Holy Spirit” is the community deprived 
of its support in the big Other. The point of Christianity as the religion of atheism is not the vulgar 
humanist one that the becoming-man-of-God reveals that man is the secret of God (Feuerbach et 
al.); rather, it attacks the religious hard core that survives even in humanism, even up to Stalinism, 
with its belief in History as the ‘big Other’ that decides on the ‘objective meaning’ of our deeds 
(Žižek, 2003a: 171). 
  
This ‘other dimension’ is neither the ‘abyss of the Real’ as abandonment (which Pound 
accuses Žižek of embracing) nor the pleasure of transgressing the law. Instead, Christ’s 
death on the cross is a ‘parallax split’ (though Žižek doesn’t use the term – this book was 
written several years before Parallax View), which moves beyond the false choice 
between the two by revealing the alternative presented in one of the poles: one can either 
take the crucifixion to be an act of sacrifice that incurs abandonment and debt and 
thereby maintain the status quo, or one can read it as the death of God and the birth of a 
new community.  
This is to say that rather than showing how Žižek fails to make his own argument, 
Pound has given us the other half of it: Žižek takes the position that ‘Why have you 
forsaken me’ is supplemented by ‘into thy hands I commit my spirit’ (Luke 23: 46), 
thereby covering over the atheist core of Christianity. It is precisely this latter half that 
Žižek wants to purge from the Christian legacy. Central here is that Pound misses that the 
‘perspectivalism’ of the parallax view just mentioned is that of an ‘uncanny 
“interpellation” beyond ideological interpellation, an interpellation which suspends the 
performative force of the “normal” ideological interpellation that compels us to accept 
our determinant place within the sociosymbolic edifice’ (Žižek, 2003a: 112).87 As 
discussed above, interpellation is for Žižek not in its Althusserian mode, but modified 
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with reference to the commodity form and the difference between ego-ideal and ideal-
ego. Althusserian imaginary interpellation can only work if there is an S1, or symbolic 
‘master signifier,’ from which to see that imaginary image.  
In the final chapter of The Puppet and the Dwarf Žižek writes that the 
establishment of a new S1, one that is beyond the deadlock of ‘law and sin,’ is what the 
revolutionary ‘Event’ or ‘Act’ is:  
It was God himself who made a Pascalian wager: by dying on the Cross, He made a risky gesture 
with no guaranteed final outcome, that is, He provides us – humanity – with the empty S1, Master-
Signifier, and it is up to humanity to supplement it with the chain of S2. Far from providing the 
conclusive dot on the I, the divine act stands, rather, for the openness of a New Beginning, and it 
is up to humanity to live up to it. It is as in Predestination, which condemns us to frantic activity: 
The Event is pure-empty sign, and we have to work to generate its meaning (2003a: 137).88  
 
The ‘uncanny interpellation’ that defeats the law is brought on by the establishment of an 
S1. Rather, the ‘Act’ is the transformation of the ‘excess’ into an S1. This ‘uncanny 
interpellation’ is that of the excess itself: ‘…in Judaism and Christianity, it is directly this 
excess itself which addresses us’ (113). In this case, that excess is Jesus. Why this is 
important will become clear in a moment.  
Where this cannot be properly understood unless the difference between Althusser 
and Žižek is taken into account, it should come as no surprise that in his discussion of 
Althusser and belief (59-64) Pound completely leaves out a discussion of the commodity 
form and commodity fetishism and thereby misses the fundamental difference in the 
modes of interpellation as described by Althusser (Imaginary, via state apparatuses) and 
Žižek (Symbolic, via the commodity form/money). By the same token Pound also misses 
the core of Žižek’s ontology, which he states is the main object of his criticism: against 
Sharpe (discussed above), who Pound argues thinks Žižek doesn’t do enough to inspect 
material conditions in his critiques of ideology, Pound asserts that ‘…Sharpe fails to 
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really take the question of ontology into account’ (Pound, 2008: 64). Pound claims that at 
the level of ontology Žižek commits to a ‘Gnostic rejection of the material’ (2008: 93).  It 
is his contention that Žižek is, first, unable to ‘affirm the priority of something over the 
nothing’ and ‘second, where the “presymbolic” is felt in its negativity, it is always 
excremental, i.e., impure or unaffirmed in its ontological goodness’ (69). He goes on: 
Regarding the first, it should be noted that despite Zizek’s criticisms of the “Gnostic dream of the 
immaterial” (OB [On Belief], 33-35), he retains just such a Neoplatonic shift away from matter to 
the immateriality of the sign. This makes a lie of his “materialist” theology: there is no materiality, 
only the negativity of the real, i.e., the body, present only in its absence, and which over and 
against stands the symbolic (Pound, 2008: 69).  
 
In regards to the second point, Pound again misses the nub of Žižek’s argument because 
he conceives of the Real as existing outside of the Symbolic rather than an immanent part 
of it. The veracity of the latter position was established above with reference to Puppet 
and the Dwarf.89 In addition, Pound does not see the relationship of master signifier and 
excess as one of ‘parallax.’ For Žižek, ‘good’ is just ‘evil’ from another point in the 
dialectic: ‘Evil is substantially the same as Good, simple in a different mode (or 
perspective on) it’ (Žižek, 2003a: 88). At the end of the book we find this similar 
formulation: ‘…the two sides of objet petit a: shit and the precious agalma’ (Žižek, 
2003a: 151).  
In regards to the first point, Pound misses that, via Sohn-Rethel as discussed by 
Žižek in The Sublime Object of Ideology, it is material action that comes first and the 
void of the subject that comes second. The ‘real-abstraction’ of the commodity form and 
generalized commodity exchange is the symbolic as material, as the something, which 
precedes the Real as Subject, as nothing. This line of argumentation is not limited to The 
Sublime Object, however, but can also be found in The Puppet and the Dwarf. The 
appendix to this book opens with a discussion of how commodity exchange is directly 
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related to the void of the subject, where we find comments like the following: ‘…is there 
not a clear homology between this structure of the commodity and the structure of the 
bourgeois subject?’ (Žižek, 2003a: 148); ‘Along these lines, the thing to bear in mind is 
that the dawn of Ancient Greek Philosophy occurred at the same time (and place) as the 
first rise of commodity production and exchange…’ (Žižek, 2003a: 147). These are clear 
allusions to Sohn-Rethel.  
This point can also be approached with reference to On Belief, another of Žižek’s 
books on religion available to Pound at the time of his book’s publication. Here we find 
Christ made directly homologous to the commodity form, or more precisely, its highest 
development – money. For Žižek, Christ is to man what money is to commodities:  
…in the same way money as universal equivalent directly embodies/assumes the excess (“Value”) 
that makes an object a commodity, Christ directly embodies/assumes the excess that makes the 
human animal a proper human being. In both cases, then, the universal equivalent exchanges/gives 
itself for all other excesses – in the same way money is the commodity “as such”, Christ is man 
“as such”; in the same way that the universal equivalent has to be a commodity deprived of any 
use value, Christ has taken over the excess of Sin of ALL men precisely insofar as he was the Pure 
one, without excess, simplicity itself (2001a: 100). 
 
In this way it is not that Christ as man is the embodiment of God, but that God (Christ) is 
the embodiment of man in his most immortal aspect. A similar position is taken by Marx 
in 1844, who writes the following in his notes on James Mill: ‘But Christ is God 
Alienated and man alienated. God continues to have value only in so far as he represents 
Christ, man continues to have value only in so far as he represents Christ. Likewise with 
money’ (Marx, 1992: 261).90 Remember, too, that in the 1844 manuscripts, what makes 
‘Man’ universal – though in an alienated fashion – is his relationship to capitalist money. 
Pound’s fundamental objection is that Žižek is Gnostic in that he chooses nothing 
over something, thought over being, the symbolic over the body. It is his contention that 
Žižek misses that there is a ‘divine’ element to the material world. Quoting Conor 
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Cunningham, he asserts against Žižek that ‘...being is not beyond thought; it is the 
beyond of thought” (Cunningham in Pound, 2008: 67). What this misses is that Žižek 
does not contend that the symbolic raises a material object to the level of the divine (i.e. 
the usual understanding of sublimation), but that there is one object that embodies the 
‘divine’ split (one might say contradiction) inherent in the material (what Žižek here calls 
‘desublimation’): ‘The drive does NOT “elevate an (empirical) object to the dignity of 
the Thing” – it rather chooses as its object an object which has in itself the circular 
structure of rotating around a void’ (Žižek, 2001a: 98). The model exemplar of this object 
is, of course, the commodity, which is split between its use-value and its circulation on 
the market, the ‘void’ or excess (this is again a parallax split: what from one perspective 
is a void is from the proper vantage an excess – this is taken up in more detail in regards 
to perversion in chapter seven of the present study) around which this circulation rotates 
is value. Value is, of course, also the immaterial thing that, no matter how one twists and 
turns the commodity, cannot be directly (immediately) observed. This is why Pound’s use 
of Cunningham cited a few lines previous is significant: Žižek makes the same point, 
quoting Sohn-Rethel on the commodity form: ‘The exchange abstraction [i.e. real 
abstraction – a material practice] is not thought, but it has the form of thought’ (Sohn-
Rether in Žižek, 1989: 19). That is, real abstraction is the form, the unconscious, the 
‘beyond’ of thought. 
This is all to say that Pound’s assessment of Zizek’s take on ontology is 
fundamentally flawed and leads him to the wrong conclusions. As noted above, Pound 
begins his argument by writing that ‘for psychoanalysis to provide a successful critique 
of social relations […] one has to be able to show how the structure of society 
 79 
corresponds to the structure of the psyche…’ (Pound, 2008: 43). What psychoanalysis 
need fundamentally do is not discuss the link between Oedipus and Language, as Pound 
asserts, but more fundamentally that between commodity form (capitalism) and Subject. 
Pound has ignored why Benjamin’s ‘thesis’ is the title of Žižek’s book: ‘…the time has 
come to reverse Benjamin’s first thesis on the philosophy of history: “the puppet called 
‘theology’ is to win all the time. It can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the 
service of historical materialism, which today, as we know, is wizened and has to keep 
out of sight”’ (Žižek, 2003a: 3; see also 2008b: l). Or, more clearly:  
My claim here is not merely that I am a materialist through and through, and that the subversive 
kernel of Christianity is accessible also to a materialist approach; my thesis is much stronger: this 
kernel is accessible only to a materialist approach – and vice versa: to become a true dialectical 
materialist, one should go through the Christian experience (2003: 6).  
 
In addition to being reversed Benjamin’s thesis has ‘historical’ materialism replaced with 
‘dialectical’ materialism, which is to say the empirical side of materialism is replaced 
with what Žižek takes to be the ontology of materialism – which Johnston has identified 
as the question of how the material becomes subject in the first place (see above; see also 
Žižek, 2006a: 6). So, Pound is perhaps right to argue against Sharpe about the proper 
level of critique. He is incorrect, however, in that he forgets to hunt down the source of 
this ‘Diamat’ in order to understand what Žižek is saying about religion. 
 All this is to show that failing to take Marx into account gives a different picture 
of what Žižek writes, to the extent of making completely opposite conclusions. In a 
slightly different direction, in what follows Žižek’s thought is compared to that of Laclau 
and one of the leading theorists of ‘radical democracy’ – Jacques Rancière – to show how 
they can take very similar and yet fundamentally different positions because of their 
differing positions on Marxism. Where both Žižek and Laclau rely on Lacanian themes, 
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the former embraces Marxism and the latter outright rejects it and thereby ends up 
positing transcendentals at the root of his thought. As a consequence the two thinkers 
appear to often speak the same language, but in fact come to very different conclusions. 
Similarly, Rancière develops a concept to which Žižek often refers – ‘the part of no part’ 
– to argue in favour of democracy, but does so in such a fashion that transforms it into a 
trans-historical transcendental. This ‘part of no part’ is directly related to the choosing of 
democratic representatives through the process of ‘lot’. Taking into account the inflection 
Žižek gives ‘lot’ – relating it to Hegel’s monarch and ultimately the Leninst Party – it is 
possible to show how Žižek’s Marxist bent fundamentally transforms the concepts he 
borrows from his contemporaries. Together, these two lines of thought allow for a return 
to and a further development of a topic that was presented earlier but at the time largely 
set aside: the question of where Žižek sees the ‘void’ at the heart of politics coming from, 
and not just how it is ‘hegemonized’ by different political movements. This too is done 
with reference to Marx and the commodity form, and in the end serves to answer some of 
the critiques leveled at Žižek’s politics by demonstrating the consistency – as well as the 
roots – of some of his positions.  First, however, further developing the relationship 
between Žižek’s position and that of Sohn-Rethel will help further delineate his reliance 
on Marxism. In the chapter that follows this is done in contrast with the work of one of 
the Frankfurt School theorists who has most explicitly attempted to conjoin Marxism and 
psychoanalysis – Herbert Marcuse.   
 
!"
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Chapter 3 – Battle of the giants: Žižek and Marcuse on love 
and death 
 
… the meaning of the development of civilization is no longer obscure to us. This development 
must show us the struggle between Eros and death, between the life drive and the drive for 
destruction, as it played out in the human race. This struggle is the essential content of all life; 
hence, the development of civilization may be described simply as humanity’s struggle for 
existence. And this battle of the giants is what our nurse-maids seek to mitigate with their lullaby 
about heaven. 
– Freud, Civilization and its Discontents    
 
And finally, with an effort of concentration bordering on madness, it came upon me that in the 
innermost core of the commodity structure there was to be found the ‘transcendental subject.’ 
Without need to say so, it was obvious to everybody that this was sheer lunacy, and no one was 
squeamish about telling me so! 
 
– Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labour 
 
!"  
 
Much of the above discussion has shown that ignoring the influence of Marx’s 
work in Žižek’s thought leaves one with a partial or distorted picture of his ontological 
and political arguments. For the most part this has been done with reference to those who 
are non-, anti-, or post-Marxist in their orientation. From this it should not be concluded, 
however,  that all those who have sought to bring Marx and psychoanalysis together are 
all of a kind. Quite to the contrary – and as one would expect – many divisions and 
controversies come when the two bodies of thought are brought into contact (see chapter 
4 of Jacoby, 1975 for a brief overview). Rather than position Žižek within the myriad 
ebbs and flows of this movement what follows is a discussion of the few convergences 
and major divergences with the work of ‘Frankfurt School’ member and 1960’s radical 
theorist Herbert Marcuse,91 whose ‘non-repressive desublimation’ sets the stage for 
Žižek’s critique of the Frankfurt School as found in the opening chapters of his 
Metastases of Enjoyment.92 Taking up the grounding positions of the two theorists serves 
not only to show how their respective understanding of psychoanalysis and Marxism 
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differ, but also how these differences lead to different positions on what would constitute 
effective political activity in the liberal-democratic West. Ultimately this sets the stage 
for offering a further theoretical and an historical investigation of the legitimacy of Žižek 
heading where many popular contemporary theorists would prefer not to tread: towards a 
rethinking of the Leninist political party.  
The divergences discussed below – between love and death, total gratification of 
the pre-ego id and the fantasty of ‘Maternal Eros’, rationality and capitalism – are not 
those discussed by Žižek in Metastases… but provide the means to show what pushes 
Marcuse towards Marx’s ‘general intellect’ and the ‘aesthetic dimension’ as the solution 
to the crushing onslaught of the capitalist mode of production, as well as what moves 
Žižek towards psychoanalytic practice and the Leninist party. Where Marcuse sees a 
division of head and senses – one created by capitalism – being reconciled in 
aesthetic/artistic ‘play’ as made possible by increased automation and the potential 
creation of free time, Žižek takes capitalism’s form as the form of the subject (and 
thereby the ‘psychology’ of people under the rule of capital) and the means to change it 
an alternative historical form – that of the psychoanalytic community or the Party. What 
follows is as a result a comparison in three parts. The first revolves around the different 
readings of psychoanalysis each offers, the second the different positions they take on 
‘the subject of science’, and the final an assessment of how their political conclusions 
rely on these points.  
The initial point of difference between Marcuse and Žižek revolves around their 
respective positions on the ‘pre-oedipal’ stage of an individual’s development. Marcuse 
offers a ‘maternal-eros’ in which mother and child form a utopian whole that is sundered 
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by social processes. It is to a sublated version of this whole, according to Marcuse, that 
we need to return. Revolution thus involves removing the barriers that hinder the 
productivity of capital in order to provide its potential wealth to all in order that creative 
sublimation might be allowed free reign. By contrast, Žižek argues that the ‘maternal-
Thing’ is a retroactive projection. In recognizing this – that this wholeness never existed 
– Thanatos is uncovered as ‘death drive’ (rather than mere aggressivity, as Marcuse 
would have it), an ‘excess’ of life as life’s essence rather than a product of ‘the fall,’ 
rather than the product of the destruction of a homeostatic whole. As a consequence, for 
Žižek sublimation is understood as the activity of revolution itself rather than the activity 
to come after it. That is, death drive and sublimation form a ‘parallax’ where each is the 
same process, but viewed from different vantages – in Marcuse’s language, those of ‘is’ 
and ‘ought.’  
The second major divergence of thought discussed below comes in relation to the 
development of the ‘subject of science.’ Where Marcuse uses Heidegger and Husserl to 
argue for a self-development of the inner necessity of science that leads to technological 
rationality as an aid to social domination, Žižek’s work rests on Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s 
development of a very different account of the origin of the subject and its make-up as 
presented in Intellectual and Manual Labour. In Sohn-Rethel’s account the introduction 
of coined money whose value is independent of its actual material content leads to 
particular forms of abstract thinking and eventually Newtonian science and the 
transcendental subject as developed by Kant. The generalization of ‘real abstraction’ – 
i.e. trading commodities as if they existed outside of time and space, and as if they 
contained something capable of being equated (i.e. exchange value) – not only affected 
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the development of science and fostered class division, but also created a new type of 
subject. Rather than a subject that is destroyed and in need of being overcome as in 
Marcuse, Sohn-Rethel offers the creation of a whole new subject – one which the world 
had never before seen. It is upon this basis that Žižek develops his critique of 
Althusserian ideology and develops his theorization of the modern subject and its radical 
possibilities (as discussed in chapter two). Briefly summarized, ideology and the subject 
are the creations of capitalist exchange as the ‘symbolic order’, a Subject that is at the 
same time held in check by that order. Where in this earlier discussion Sohn-Rethel was 
touched only in general terms, his work is here dealt with in more detail and his 
significance becomes even clearer as a consequence.   
These two differences – an embrace and a rejection of ‘maternal-eros/the 
maternal-Thing’;  different accounts of the development of capitalism and the nature of 
the modern ‘subject’ – have direct implications for the political conclusions drawn by 
both Marcuse and Žižek. For the former, technological rationality has sundered maternal-
eros and separated imagination from the rest of rationality, and as a consequence the task 
of the revolutionary is to rekindle the (Kantian) imagination as a world-transforming 
force. This leads Marcuse to a double-bind where one must be freed from capitalism in 
order to have one’s needs adequately met in order to develop imagination – the 
imagination that is needed to liberate us from capitalism in the first place; he is unable to 
offer a mediation by which this might happen. By contrast, because Žižek sees the root of 
human potential as the negative force that is the subject as embodied in capitalist 
exchange, the task of the revolutionary is to develop that potential and thereby transform 
the world. Given that it is the commodity form that creates this potential, it is an alternate 
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form that will be able to develop it. This form is that of the Leninist Party/the 
psychoanalytic situation. Where Marcuse relies on individual psychology and makes 
empirical arguments against the Party form (i.e. he relies on the ‘is’ and ‘positive’ 
thinking) Žižek develops a socio-ontological argument for it (i.e. he relies on the ‘ought’ 
of ‘negative’ thinking).  
Dialectic, not antinomy 
While not his final word on the question (Marcuse, for instance, shows some of 
the vicissitudes of these ideas in chapter two of Eros and Civilization), Freud’s comments 
on the ‘battle of the giants’ in Civilization and its Discontents offer something of an 
antinomic view of the drives: an image of two opposing forces locked in an eternal battle 
that only a fantasy – a regulative idea – can bridge.93 Where forever the giants battle, the 
only option left is a story proffered by the hired help94 (today paid at the minimum wage, 
or a migrant worker tied to their ‘benefactor’s’ home…) to kindle our adjustment to it. 
Marcuse, by contrast, makes the Hegelian move of finding the higher principle in which 
these two others are found, thereby demonstrating that they’re not truly at odds. Rather, 
they needn’t be at odds but are when found pulsing within the material realities of 
capitalism. This principle is the conservation of satisfaction: where the pleasure principle 
of Eros seeks to make more libidinal connections and extend gratification, it also seeks to 
conserve those connections; on the other side, Thanatos as ‘Nirvana principle’ seeks 
gratification, seeks its conservation, by means of the destruction of anything that 
introduces libidinal tension. And so within capitalism Thanatos is the ‘innermost 
obstacle’ to Eros: where satisfaction is fleeting, where a limited mode of existence is 
inherent in each aspect of life, Thanatos further undermines the making of links.95 
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Capitalism raises the biological fact of death to the level of an ‘ontological essence’ that 
prevents the proper essence of being – Eros – from developing (Marcuse, 1966: 26-29; 
222-237).  
Given a new mode of production, however, where necessities are no longer posed 
as objects of competition, where gratification is rather than ought, life ‘absorbs’ death’s 
objective. And so Marcuse sees an end – a life of gratification – that is static. It is, 
however, a stasis ‘that moves in its own fullness – a productivity that is sensuousness, 
play, and song’ (Marcuse, 1966: 164). Alienation from oneself, from one’s labour and its 
product, from others, is replaced by the preservation and development of the ‘alienation 
in which pleasure originates – man’s alienation […] from mere nature’ (ibid: 227). In this 
move, nature itself is rid of its own forms of oppression and pain and becomes properly 
itself: the final cause – the Telos – supplied by human Eros and the overcoming of 
technological rationality ‘moves [nature] to partake in joy’ (ibid: 166).96 And so 
Narcissus’ transformation into a flower takes the place of Freud’s death drive as a return 
to inorganic matter. This is the return to a ‘libidinal morality’ implied in Freud’s theory, 
according to Marcuse (delivered via the work of Hans Loewald). It is the development of 
the ‘maternal Eros’ that predates the superego and ‘castration fears,’ where the ‘pre-ego’ 
was one with all of ‘reality’ (Ibid: 228-30).  
Žižek provides a somewhat different Hegelian solution to the ‘antinomy of the 
giants,’ one that places emphasis on Thanatos. Rather than a return to inorganic matter, 
rather than a pulsion towards the homeostatic balance of nature, the death drive as 
understood by Žižek via Lacan is an inhuman, ‘monstrous’ excess, the internal limit of 
each particular drive,97 one that can flip into overdrive and the universality of negation. In 
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Žižek’s view of things, in his ontology, desire and drive are of a kind but able to operate 
in a different mode. In the realm of desire libidinal attachments assume the constant 
replacement of the object of the drive with yet another object, where each stands in 
‘metonymically’ for the fullness of the ‘lost’ ‘maternal Thing.’ Drive itself functions 
slightly differently, standing instead as the fixation on a process itself, the derivation of 
pleasure in the failure to attain an object. Žižek offers the example of a hand simply 
squeezing the air. (My own anecdote involves lifting a coffee cup to my lips two or three 
times after it’s been emptied.) In this sense drive is still within the logic of desire, 
according to Žižek, by virtue of adhering to the pleasure principle, by virtue of garnering 
pleasure. Here, however, Žižek sees ‘the “death” dimension of every drive’:98 it is the 
transformation of a process that itself has no intrinsic value into an end in itself that for 
Žižek separates humanity from other animals (Žižek, 2006a: 62). One example is, of 
course, fucking – which is taken up below. More fundamentally, humanity pertains to the 
nature of the human animal at birth. Born prematurely and incomplete (or ‘disaptated’ – 
see the first chapter of Chiesa’s Subjectivity and Otherness), there is no ‘full gratification’ 
of the id, but only its ability to become learned in the myriad ways of gratification – from 
sex to work.99 This is why, for example, that in his lecture on femininity Freud asserts 
that although the genitals are made for reproduction there is nothing guaranteeing that 
that will in the end be the use to which they are put. This is the difference between 
‘instinct’ and ‘drive’: Where the need to eat is an instinct, chewing gum (for example) is 
an instance of drive – the ‘sexualization of instinct,’ the oral pleasure of chewing without 
taking in any nourishment.   
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 What makes up the ‘death dimension’ of each drive is its fixation ‘beyond the 
pleasure principle,’ where one continues with a process regardless of it becoming 
unpleasant, and even painful, where it threatens the existence of all other libidinal ties 
and even one’s life. Here one must remember the reason, in Freud’s account, that the 
pleasure principle falters: it takes itself as immediately the world and the presence of the 
breast the effect of its own need; or it takes its fantasy as substitute gratification (think of 
Buddy Holly’s ‘all I have to do is dream’) – but this can only last so long. The reality 
principle and the ego emerge as a development of the id in response to the fact that the 
pleasure principle mistakenly takes itself as the entirety of being when it in fact relies on 
others for its gratification (Holly’s protagonist doesn’t realize this, and so ‘dreams his life 
away’ – he dies). A reflexive return to the id – one that remarks its initial mistake – is for 
Žižek the ‘undead,’ ‘immortal,’ the disruption of homeostasis, the refusal of the fantasy 
of total fullness. That is, this is a refutation of the existence of the maternal ‘Thing,’ 
Marcuse’s maternal Eros.100 This is the true ‘beyond’ of the pleasure principle, one 
stemming from the principle itself.   
There is Eros here, though Žižek doesn’t make it explicit. It is more akin to one 
half of the contradictions of Eros that Marcuse pulls from Freud: pursuing pleasure too 
far – spending all one’s time with a lover  in Marcuse/Freud’s example – ends in the 
destruction of one’s libidinal ties to the community and potentially even oneself 
(Marcuse, 1966: 42). One need only again take into account the ‘parallax view’ to 
understand how this plays out in Žižek’s work. Following in the footsteps of Lukács he 
rejects the idea that history can be understood as unrelated moments that need be 
understood on their own terms – Žižek holds that such a position assumes a common, 
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universal space in which contingencies appear and disappear. He argues that Laclau, for 
example, assumes that there always was and always will be a universal to be 
hegemonized. In place of this he argues that history need not be understood as a 
succession of particularities, not as contingent play in a unified continuum, but written 
from the perspective of the excluded element that makes the ‘ontological consistency’ of 
a period possible. Coupled with this he argues that the universal as a material element of 
everyday life didn’t appear until the generalization of the exchange abstraction – i.e. 
capitalism – became a reality. Remember here Marx’s comments in the Grundrisse that 
‘…the money system is in fact the system of equality and freedom, and that the 
disturbances which they encounter in the further development of the system are 
disturbances inherent in it, are merely the realization of equality and freedom, which 
prove to be inequality and unfreedom’ (Marx, 1973b: 248-9). And this is, of course, made 
possible by the exclusion/repression of labour-power from capitalism’s own ‘self-
understanding’ and operation. The capitalist sees only profit because labour-power 
disappears in its commodification to re-appear as labour-time, as wage. From the 
perspective of labour-power profit is instead surplus-value extracted from the worker, as 
the difference between what it costs the worker to produce themselves and what they are 
able to themselves produce. This is the parallax view: the same ‘object’ viewed from two 
different perspectives takes on two different characters – one conservative, the other 
radical and disruptive. Wage-labour keeps capitalism going; together acting upon the 
knowledge that capitalism is exploitation of labour-power, the system would be 
transformed.  
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This same logic can be applied to Žižek’s take on Thanatos: what from one 
perspective appears as destruction or death is from another creation and Eros. To briefly 
rehearse a chorus sung above: from the perspective of capitalism and the state that 
protects it, a workers’ strike is destruction – the cessation of production, the loss of 
profits, dissolution of the social pact, the potential loss of power over the state. From the 
position of the strikers it is an act of creation: the development of new social structures, 
of new relations between workers, between workers and capitalists, between workers and 
the state. It is in this way that one should take Žižek’s version of ‘Bartleby politics,’ 
which is not simply standing back and staging a ‘Great Refusal.’ It is both the ‘attitude of 
withdrawal from social engagement and collective social action’ (Žižek, 2006a: 10), the 
overlap of ‘act and inactivity’ (Žižek, 2010a: 401). Death drive and Eros as expansive 
sublimation are thus not two separate acts that succeed each other in time but the same 
activity taken from two perspectives. The death drive is for Žižek not necessarily the 
destruction of things but the destruction of the links that exist between them, and in this 
way death drive and sublimation form a ‘parallax’: sublimation is not simply taking an 
object and bestowing upon it some special significance, nor the redirection of energy that 
is repressed, but the transformation of both object and subject by changing the links 
between them. ‘Death drive’ is thus sublimation viewed from the perspective of what is, 
rather than from the perspective of what has been (or could be) created. This again points 
to the historical dimension of Žižek’s version of the death drive: it is not simply 
destructiveness as unleashed by scarcity or the one-sidedness of life under capitalism as 
in Marcuse, but the Faustian logic of capitalism itself, lived as ‘subject.’ This is to say 
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there is an historical difference between ‘aggressivity’ or ‘aggressive instincts’ and ‘death 
drive.’101  
The subject of science – Marcuse; Žižek and Sohn-Rethel 
To understand the (Marxian) historical dimension of the difference between mere 
aggressivity and the death drive as it appears in Žižek’s work, to understand how the ‘self 
relating negativity’ of the Cartesian subject can be taken as the substance of capitalism as 
subject, it is necessary to turn to the history of the development of reason as it appears in 
the theories in question. It’s worth first noting, however, that in the parallax of death 
drive there is perhaps an inkling of a potential meeting of Žižek and Marcuse: 
Where repressive sublimation prevails and determines the culture, non-repressive sublimation 
must manifest itself in contradiction to the entire sphere of social usefulness; viewed from this 
sphere, it is the negation of all accepted productivity and performance (Marcuse, 1966: 208).  
 
The following might also be taken in such a spirit: 
 
In a world of alienation, the liberation of Eros would necessarily operate as a destructive fatal 
force – as the total negation of the principle which governs the repressive reality (Ibid: 95).  
 
If Fredric Jameson is to be believed, Adorno also comes upon a similarly vision-inspired 
notion – which Jameson dubs ‘stereoscopic thinking’ – where one must attempt to 
maintain two competing thought processes at once to properly understand the matter 
under discussion  (Jameson, 1990: 28; 46). There is, then, potentially a link between 
Marcuse and Žižek where the latter begins to argue (in the first chapter of Metastases of 
Enjoyment) that he diverges from the Frankfurt School: although Marcuse does argue that 
civilization has progressed via repression, in the discussion of the move from sex to Eros 
at the end of Eros and Civilization he points to moments in Freud’s work where 
repression’s alleged necessity is contradicted, and the possibility of non-repressed 
socially-necessary work is asserted in its place (Marcuse, 2006: 213). Here Marcuse 
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opens the door to the notion that the ‘self-sublimation’ of drive is possible. Taking into 
account what was said above and given wide berth, a similarity can be found in the idea 
that for Žižek ‘there is no such thing as an unsublimated drive’ (Johnston, 2005: 372).  
This might, however, best be put down to the Hegelian concerns of the authors in 
question as the contours of the gap that separates Žižek’s ontology from Marcuse’s 
demonstrate an incompatibility at many other significant points. Where Marcuse sees 
Eros as the essence of being, one impeded by capitalism’s ‘perversion’ of Thanatos, 
Žižek takes each drive to potentially be that of death and negation and thereby a product 
of capitalism; Where Marcuse’s death drive is homeostatic, for Žižek not only is the 
death drive not oriented towards homeostasis, neither is the universe; Where Marcuse 
offers the sublated return to the unity of mother and child, Žižek rejects the ‘maternal 
Thing’ as a fantasy to be overcome. In addition to this list needs to be added another 
potential divide between these two theories, one that has to do with the relation – within 
their respective systems – between capitalism and the ‘subject of science.’ 
 It is this that makes up the middle section of Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man. 
Over the course of two chapters he puts together a picture of the rise of rationality and its 
slippage into ‘positive thinking’ and domination via technological rationality. The 
underlying premise is that ‘the science of nature develops under the technological a 
priori which projects nature as a potential instrumentality, stuff of control and 
organization’ (Marcuse, 1991: 153). This is to say that while the Cartesian subject 
appears as a neutral vantage point from which everything is quantified, seeing the world 
in this light is a particular historical product. The question then is, for Marcuse, how this 
comes into being, and so he progresses through several possible ‘interpretations’ of the 
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relation between science and its application. Rejected outright is the notion that there 
exists anything like an ‘elective affinity’ between industrialization and scientific logic 
where the latter retains its neutrality in the face of its domineering application in late 
capitalism (Ibid: 154-5). Instead he offers that science ‘preserves the interrelation 
between subject and object in a given universe of discourse and action’ (Ibid: 160), where 
theory proceeds by abstracting or negating the context in which it is found and is thereby 
limited by it. That is, thought cannot overstep its material conditions (Ibid: 158). This 
leads him to two possible options to explain the birth of this relation: that of Piaget and 
that of Husserl, where the former stands as an individualist account and the latter a social-
historical one. Piaget is understood to argue that the subject is neither simply the eyeball 
at the end of the scientific instrument that registers ‘mere objects,’ nor pure reason. 
Theory is instead the product of activity, where ‘all scientific knowledge presupposes 
coordination of particular actions’ (Ibid: 162). What Marcuse doesn’t like about this is 
that our child psychologist raises this to the level of an a-historical biological fact. 
Husserl, by contrast, performs a ‘genetic epistemology’ that focuses on the ‘socio-historic 
structure of scientific reason’ (Ibid). In this account ‘pre-scientific practice’ serves as the 
basis for making mathematical models of nature that correspond to empirical reality. This 
becomes hidden, however, because math serves as a veil that both reveals and conceals. 
(These are themes later developed by Heidegger – Husserl’s student and another of 
Marcuse’s teachers: the event of Being opens a new ‘world’ and then recedes into the 
background, thereby concealing what, precisely, Being is.) The example Marcuse briefly 
turns to is geometry: its classical form is a development – the ‘idealization’ – of its 
originally practical horizon.  
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 It is here that the gap that separates Marcuse from Žižek becomes apparent, and 
the lever to make it more so is the work of Alfred Sohn-Rethel. Marcuse’s description of 
the development of reason in many places reads like an intellectual history or an 
‘adventure of ideas’: over and over again he writes that it is the internal logic of reason 
that drives it towards positive rather than negative thinking. In the above example, this is 
attributed to the (Husserlian/Heideggerian) Being of mathematical thought. Granted, 
Marcuse does often include economic realities in his account. When looking back to the 
beginnings of Greek philosophy, for instance, he writes the following of Aristotle: 
Paradoxically, it is precisely the critical intent in philosophic thought which leads to the idealistic 
purification – a critical intent which aims at the empirical world as a whole, and not merely at 
certain modes of thinking or behaving within it. Defining its concepts in terms of potentialities 
which are of an essentially different order of thought and existence, the philosophic critique finds 
itself blocked by the reality from which it dissociates itself, and proceeds to construct a realm of 
Reason purged from empirical contingency (Marcuse, 1991: 135).  
 
The social world of the Greeks acted as an ‘historical barrier’ to the development of the 
idea of freedom because the division of labour in Greek society was raised to an 
ontological condition; because freedom is limited to the upper classes and philosophy 
couldn’t challenge that fact, truth was elevated ‘safely above the historical reality’ (Ibid: 
129). That is, because the function of reason is to negate the existing world, it also in the 
end dissociates itself from that world and continues to run on its own internal logic, 
though constrained by the empirical world in which it is lived. Because economic 
realities are purged from philosophy class dominates one’s thought unconsciously. The 
problem is that in Marcuse’s account the question of where reason comes from is left 
largely unanswered. The appearance of reason in ancient Greece, the appearance of two 
dimensional thought, of both ‘is’ and ‘ought’ is explained as ‘[reflecting] the experience 
of a world antagonistic in itself – a world afflicted with want and negativity, constantly 
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threatened with destruction, but also a world which is a cosmos, structured in accordance 
with final causes’ (Ibid: 125). The question is, of course, why this particular society sees 
reason not only flourish, but has it develop in the first place. That is, why didn’t all 
societies threatened with ‘want and negativity’ develop reason in the fashion of the 
Greeks? Class division is not enough, nor is the availability of idle time created for an 
aristocracy by a slave economy (the latter is suggested not by Marcuse but Whitehead – 
with whom Marcuse shares the term ‘Great Refusal’102). The latter assumes what it is to 
explain (i.e. the impetus behind the actual development of reason, versus the assumption 
that the human animal is rational and will self develop given the chance), and the former 
must hold some particularity or it would have the same effect elsewhere. That is, what 
need be asked is ‘who educated Meno’s educator’? The answer is not that thought 
somehow of itself developed practice, but that practice in some way enabled certain 
forms of thought that were in turn reflected in practice. 
 This is why geometry is important. In his turn to Husserl, Marcuse reports that 
modern scientific reason (Galileo, Newton, Descartes) develops while ‘concealing’ the 
‘pre-scientific’ practical ground from which it came. This ground is geometry:  
Through all abstraction and its generalization, scientific method retains (and masks) its pre-
scientific-technical structure; the development of the former represents (and masks) the 
development of the latter. Thus classical geometry ‘idealizes’ the practice of surveying and 
measuring the land (Feldmesskunst). Geometry is the theory of practical objectification (Marcuse, 
1991: 163).  
 
Marcuse asserts, with reference to Husserl, that modern science preserves the ‘pre-
scientific intent and content’ of geometry – i.e. measurement and domination (Ibid). The 
problem is  iterated in Marcuse’s review of Husserl’s The Crisis of European Science and 
Transcendental Phenomenology, which is an extended version of Marcuse’s commentary 
on Husserl in One Dimensional Man. Here Marcuse relates that the  
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pre-scientific validating ground of mathematical science […] is originally in geometry as the art of 
measuring (Messskunst) with its specific means and possibilities. This art of measuring in the 
empirical reality promised and indeed achieved the progressive calculability of nature, subjecting 
nature to the ever more exact ‘foresight’ in mastering and using nature (Marcuse, 2002: 472).  
 
In this account, geometry is the practice that develops the abstraction (‘calculability’) and 
domination of nature. With the arrival of Galileo this reaches its apex, where science 
‘establishes’ (i.e. creates) the ‘general objectivity’, the ‘de-individualization’ of the world 
– i.e. the objects of the world are treated as on an equal plain of abstraction (Ibid: 471). 
There here exits, however, the burden of explaining why geometry was developed in such 
a way. It’s not enough to demonstrate – as Kellner attempts – that Marcuse did not 
merely hold ‘technological rationality’ to be the end all and be all, but emphasized the 
role that class domination and the mode of production plays in the use of technology. 
Kellner’s discussion remains at the level of description (completely sidelining the role of 
Heidegger and Husserl) and fails to take up the burden Marcuse placed on his own 
shoulders – to historically explain the genesis of this rationality (See Kellner, 1984: 263-
267). Feenburg also fails on this note. While pointing out that formal thinking vitiates 
dialectical thinking by completely removing any conception of potentiality or the ‘ought’; 
while pointing out that this form of thought is not value-free precisely because of this 
bias; while pointing out that this bias only becomes clear when the products of a science 
based in formal thinking are brought into the lifeworld of any society (in our case a 
capitalist one); while pointing out that this formal thinking ‘originates in the split 
between essence and appearance which results from the conditions of life in class 
society’; Feenburg does not answer the questions raised above (Feenburg, 1988a: 246-7).      
Here Sohn-Rethel’s work becomes relevant. His strategy involves comparing 
geometry as practiced by the Egyptians in the Bronze Age with that of the practice of the 
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ancient Greeks. In the former instance practitioners were trained to, for instance, survey 
land after the flooding of the Nile in order that surpluses could be calculated and 
extracted from the people by the state. This was done with reference to ‘the teaching and 
exercise manual of Ahmes’ and was purely practical in nature, so much so that Sohn-
Rethel claims that the assumption – made by historians of math – that there likely also 
existed a theoretical manual that has been lost to history ‘must surely be nothing but a 
reflex of our own conceptions’ (Sohn-Rethel, 1978: 102). While there is class division 
here there is for Sohn-Rethel no true separation of head and hand, of intellectual and 
manual labour. Such a division did not come into being until ‘the manual operation 
became subordinated to an act of pure thought which was directed solely towards 
grasping quantitative laws of number or of abstract space’ (Ibid). This is the type of 
geometry he sees in classical Greece: one separated from practice, concerned with 
grasping laws and taking place in abstract space, etc. His answer as to why this difference 
existed has to do with coined money: not until the eighth or seventh century B.C.E., when 
Greek states guaranteed the worth of a coin independent of the actual amount of metal it 
contained, did the possibility of such abstract thought occur.103 
That is, the ‘development’ of geometry – that referred to by Marcuse above – is 
made possible not by thought alone, nor by the power of math to ‘reveal a world,’ but is 
instead made possible through a widespread social practice of abstraction. This is what 
Sohn-Rethel calls the ‘real abstraction’ of commodity exchange, an abstraction that ‘has 
no existence other than in the human mind, but it does not spring from the mind’ (Sohn-
Rethel, 1978: 57). That is, geometry did not transform into something other than practice 
of its own logic, but was so transformed by another social force. As this force the ‘real 
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abstraction’ of commodity exchange enabled the separation of head and hand in that in its 
everyday practice it possesses the qualities of abstract thought, ranging from practical 
solipsism, abstract notions of quantity, abstraction from time and space, and abstract 
movement (Sohn-Rethel, 1978: 35-57). Sohn-Rethel briefly traces the introduction of 
coined money, through usury, debt, and slavery, to account not only for the root of 
abstract thought but also the class division particular to the Greeks. All this is to say that 
these abstractions come to be in material practice before they can be grasped by ‘the 
educators,’ before geometry can become ‘abstract’ and oriented towards the 
technological rationality that Marcuse holds it to ground. Where for Marcuse it is class 
division and practical geometry that explain the origin of our treating the world and those 
in it as an object of domination, Sohn-Rethel explains the development of these two 
factors by a third. As capitalism comes onto the scene – with the ‘generalization of the 
exchange abstraction,’ where participation in the capitalist market is almost unavoidable 
– the division of head and hand develops into Kant’s transcendental subject and the 
scientific observer. It is, of course, from this starting point104 that Žižek opens his critique 
of Althusser, develops the links between Lacanian psychoanalysis and Marxism, and 
upon which his theories rest. That is, it is via Sohn-Rethel that Žižek is able to claim that 
the Cartesian subject (as developed by Kant and Hegel) is not concomitant with 
technological rationality, and Sohn-Rethel’s work supports Žižek’s claim that the 
Frankfurt School is insufficiently historicist when discussing such rationality. Therein is 
one more fundamental difference between Žižek and Marcuse, which has implications for 
understanding their diverging political conclusions. 
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Art or Party? 
 While the above take on the history of reason may in fact be compatible with or 
complimentary to Marcuse’s account of the development of reason – Adorno, for 
example, in places appears to share Sohn-Rethel’s position105 – in the end it is not wholly 
compatible with the assessment of capitalism and the political solutions for overcoming it 
that Marcuse offers. This is because it stands as a very different version of the subject of 
reason. This can first be seen in the question of ‘second nature.’ For Sohn-Rethel,   
Second nature finds its external expression in money, and in it the specifically human element in 
us finds its first separate and objectively real manifestation in history’ (Sohn-Rethel, 1978: 60). 
 
It is for Sohn-Rethel the social element that separates us from animals, from a life of 
instinct. This second nature is the abstract social relation embodied in the exchange of 
commodities – i.e. the relationship established between people as money. Marcuse also 
turns to the commodity form and describes it as ‘second nature,’ but it is of a completely 
different sort than that offered by Sohn-Rethel. In his account, ‘commodity form’ refers 
to consumer products per se rather than their ‘form’, and the second nature is the creation 
of new biological needs – i.e. the enjoyments of consumption (Marcuse, 1969: 11).  
In addition, in Žižek’s thought Sohn-Rethel’s study becomes the basis for the thesis 
beleaguered throughout the present work as being central to Žižek’s: 
[…] there is no S without its support in a: the subject can arrive at its being-for-itself, can free 
itself from all substantial ties and appear as the point of pure negativity, only by being posited as 
equivalent to its absolute antipode, money, that inert piece of metal that one can hold in one’s 
hands and manipulate freely… (2008b [1991]: 57, n22).  
 
As argued above, for Žižek the appearance of the Subject – of ‘pure negativity’ – is 
brought about by capitalism and serves as the kernel of freedom that could enable its 
(capitalism’s) overcoming. Where Sohn-Rethel asserts that this subject – the ‘subject of 
science’ – is Kant’s transcendental subject, Žižek develops this idea to assert that it is 
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also the subject of Hegel, which – in many ways following the work of Robert Pippin106 – 
he holds is still that of Kant, though taken where Kant, Fichte, and Schelling could not 
quite go. 
Marcuse, too, turns to Kant and German idealism for his revolutionary subject, but it 
is again one completely different in character. For Marcuse it is one left mutilated by 
capitalism and tied to the lost ‘unity’ of mother and child. For him ‘the memory of 
gratification is at the origin of all thinking, and the impulse to recapture past gratification 
is the hidden driving power behind the process of thought’ (Marcuse, 1966: 31; see also 
143). This remainder of the past is able to make links to the present world, to the world of 
consciousness, as fantasy/imagination – which manages to survive the ‘mutilation of the 
mind’ wrought by the reality principle (Ibid: 141). According to Marcuse, fantasy…  
…links the deepest layers of the unconscious with the highest products of the consciousness (art), 
the dream with the reality; it preserves the archetypes of the genus, the perpetual but repressed 
ideas of the collective and individual memory, the tabooed images of freedom (Ibid: 141).  
 
And, ‘as artistic imagination, it also links the perversions with the images of integral 
freedom and gratification’ (Ibid: 50). This is where Kant and German Idealism become 
important: in Kant’s work thought and practice are linked by aesthetics; developed into 
the ‘play impulse’ this would be the means to transform capitalist society (1966: 174; 
189). This is important for Marcuse for the same reason that Feenberg (2011) argues the 
phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger was important: convinced that class 
consciousness as understood by Lukács could not be relied upon to foster social and 
political revolution, a new – or at least different – form of sensation/consciousness had to 
be understood. As suggested above, phenomenology might even take the place of 
reification/commodity fetishism as the explanation for the development of the form of 
capitalist ideology. In this instance, Kant and the aesthetic theory he finds in German 
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idealism take the place of Lukács’ ontological arguments for the Communist (or perhaps 
more properly, Leninist) Party. In this fashion Marcuse finds himself in a vicious circle 
where one must have access to one’s imagination in order to negate the (capitalist) needs 
that one currently has – to realize that ‘another world’ – and yet one is to realize the 
imagination via total automation where one’s basic needs are adequately satisfied (hence 
automation’s constant return in Eros and Civilization). I.e. One needs freedom from 
capitalism in order to fight for freedom from capitalism: given free time by the increased 
productivity of capitalism107 the revolutionary ‘play impulse’ will develop. Thus Marcuse 
has to himself admit that the working class of the industrialized West is trapped within 
the constraints of consumer capitalism (Marcuse, 1969: 18; 1970: 80; 99).  
 Before discussing what Marcuse sees as a possible solution to this problem, it’s 
important to note that while he focuses on the ‘aesthetic Form’ as the outcome and 
possible means of socialist revolution in the West, the Leninist party also has a role in his 
thought. In his ‘33 Theses’ he wrote that the development of capitalism (this was written 
around 1947) ‘has confirmed the correctness of the Leninist conception of the vanguard 
party as the subject of the revolution’ (Marcuse, 1998: 227). Feenburg notes that as a 
suggested program for the re-establishment of the Institute for Social Research, these 
theses – which have much to say about the role of the party – were ‘stillborn for at that 
point in time his colleagues wanted nothing whatsoever to do with this kind of analysis 
and a program of studies based on it.’ Further, ‘…by the 1960s there was almost no one 
in the West – including Marcuse – who did not regard this proposition [that the 
Communist Parties of the West could urge the working class to revolution] as either 
unlikely or, worse yet, intellectually and morally bankrupt’ (Feenburg, 2007: xxvii; 
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xxxvi). Given his position on the party in 1947’s ‘theses’ and later in 1969’s Essay on 
Liberation its place in his thought is important because it can be used to re-open the 
question of its relevance.  
His analysis in 1947 centred around the proposition, as just mentioned, that the 
party was an important – and even correct – means of revolution. The problem was that 
in the face of the growing militarization of capitalist countries – both liberal-democratic 
and fascist – it was a means that had been distorted into a dominating military apparatus: 
Confronted with barbarism the Soviet apparatus itself became barbarous. In the final of 
his theses he reveals a strand of optimism, however, writing that ‘the political task then 
would consist in reconstructing revolutionary theory within the communist parties and 
working for the praxis appropriate to it’ (Marcuse, 1998: 227). While it didn’t seem to 
him that the Soviet parties could be so recaptured, he proposed that the communist parties 
of Western Europe and West Germany might. Later, in his 1969 Essay on Liberation, the 
question of communist parties enters with the problem of how political consciousness 
might be raised in capitalist countries. Given that revolution still depended ‘on the class 
which constitutes the human base of the process of production’ (i.e. the industrial 
working class), and given the ‘one-dimensionality’ that Marcuse saw in the capitalism of 
his day, it was only through a ‘catalyst outside its ranks’ that revolutionary political 
consciousness and practice could come (Marcuse, 1969: 53-4). This is, of course, the role 
traditionally attributed to the party, which in 1947 Marcuse held was paramount as it 
preserved the revolutionary tradition, a tradition that could again become a revolutionary 
goal. By 1969, however, Marcuse reported that the communist parties of the West had 
succumbed to the one dimensionality of capitalism and were forced to ‘parliamentarize’ 
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themselves and integrate into the bourgeois-democratic processes (though he leaves the 
forces responsible in obscurity). Similarly, he wrote that though the party was a 
legitimate form in the peripheries, it wrongly relied on policy oriented around popular 
fronts rather than holding to the doctrine of seizing and transforming the state (Ibid: 79-
80).  
As a consequence Marcuse saw the radical, non-conformist intelligentsia and the 
‘ghetto populations’ and ‘“underprivileged” sections of the labouring classes in backward 
capitalist countries’ as the ‘catalyst outside the ranks’ of the working class (Marcuse, 
1969: 56). The crux of the matter in 1969 was for Marcuse the following: the working 
classes of the global North (Marcuse writes ‘the advanced capitalist countries’) were so 
well integrated into the processes of capital that they had become a conservative force; 
the burgeoning movements of the oppressed within the North were too disorganized and 
too weak to reap social and political change; the ‘predominantly agrarian proletariat’ of 
the global south (Marcuse writes ‘third world’) were ‘unable to mount any concerted 
economic and political action’, and so resorted to guerilla military action – a form of 
warfare that could easily have been quashed had imperialist powers not been prevented 
from using nuclear arms by fear of the other nuclear powers. This drives him to the 
conclusion that it was only through the weakening of the capitalist North that the South 
could be liberated, and this would only come through economic crises and the ‘impact of 
the growing contradictions within the society’ (Ibid: 81; 84). Rather, radical social 
development could only be the ‘result of political education in action’ whereby the 
exploited would have not so much their consciousness raised but their needs changed – 
i.e. the would have their imagination re-kindled. And so while Ché, Castro, and the party 
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of which they were part were legitimate for their own revolutions they were not to be a 
model of revolutionary action for the North. They were to instead stand as an ‘image’ of 
‘elemental, instinctual, creative force’ (Ibid:88) – what Marcuse calls ‘solidarity.’  
This takes form in a strange suggestion, earlier in the essay, that revolution might 
in fact arise as a replacement of one ruling elite by another, the capitalist being replaced 
by the ‘dreaded intellectual,’ where the later is coupled with the increased productivity of 
capitalism (Ibid: 70). This is an image of a parliament or house of representatives (or 
some new form – Marcuse doesn’t develop the idea very far in this essay) full of artists 
and intellects directing an economy already capable of feeding its many poor, but 
prevented from doing so by class interests. It is also a reversal of Freud’s ‘Zuider Zee’ 
comments in the New Introductory Lectures:108 For Marcuse it is the imagination (akin to 
the unconscious and the id) – the faculty abused by capitalism and one dimensional 
thinking – that will come to replace the performance principle (the realm of the ego): 
‘[…]it would mean the ascent of the Aesthetic Principle as Form of the Reality Principle: 
a culture of receptivity based on the achievements of industrial civilization and initiating 
the end of its self-propelled productivity’ (Marcuse, 1969: 90). Kellner shows that this 
becomes more pronounced several years later in Counter Revolution and Revolt where, 
quietly distorting the work of a Soviet theorist, Marcuse suggests that one must consider 
‘Plato’s “educational dictatorship of the intelligentsia” and Rousseau’s dictum that people 
must be “forced to be free”’ (Kellner, 1984: 311).    
In this discussion Marcuse leans too far towards the ‘is’ while not considering the 
party in the mode of ‘ought.’ That is, his discussion relies primarily on the failures of the 
communist parties109 – their actualities – rather than negating them with another version 
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of what they could be. Instead, Marcuse begins at the level of the individual, where the 
faculties have been sundered – here fantasy and negation have been forgotten. The 
division between what capitalism can produce and what it provides to the many gives 
birth to the great refusal, the recollection of the lost promise of social revolution. Or as 
Moore puts it: ‘This revolutionary subjectivity is born of aesthetic revulsion, social 
marginalization and political disconnection […]’; ‘Marcuse agrees with Whitehead that 
the great refusal arises from an aesthetic alienation rather than anything exclusively 
economic or political’ (2007: 84; 89). In light of the elitist overtones this takes on in 
Marcuse’s work, it  might be worth remembering that while (according to Moore) ‘Great 
Refusal’ only appears once in Whitehead’s work, it is akin to the latter’s discussions of 
‘noble discontent’ in the ongoing ‘adventure of ideas.’ In place of a discussion of a social 
practice that generates individual ‘psychology’ Marcuse offers an individual form of 
psychology that could develop into practice.  
 In the central essay of History and Class Consciousness one criticism that Lukács 
levels at the German Idealists is that they replaced political practice with artistic practice, 
that they were unable to make the leap accomplished by Marx: away from aesthetics and 
towards Aristotelian ‘praxis’ – activity done for its own sake and proper to the ‘political 
animal.’110 The trajectory of HaCC follows the reification of the world via the 
commodity form such that the remedy comes in the form of the party, a form of practice 
that begins the overcoming of the limited or one-sided activity imposed on workers by 
capitalism.  The Party concerns itself with the development of people’s many political 
(and other) potentialities in service of overcoming the socio-political ‘is.’111 In this way, 
Jacoby (1975) – in his brief history of the role of psychology, psychoanalysis, and critical 
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theory in the Western world – misses the point when he alludes to arguments that Lukács 
has no proper theory of the psychology of the subject backing his positions on class 
consciousness. What is instead of primary importance is the form of everyday activity, 
which makes ‘psychology’ what it is. In addition, Lukács makes explicit that his purpose 
is not simply to describe the empirical existence and importance of the Party but to think 
through its logical necessity. That is, in his view Party activists had good instinct but 
lacked a consistent understanding of the ontological importance of the form. It is 
precisely these two things – form and ontological necessity – that drives Žižek’s political 
theory towards psychoanalytic practice and the Leninist party: they stand as neccessary 
practical forms of thought, just as the commodity form is not any particular object but the 
way objects are treated in the social realm, and necessary for the existence of capitalism. 
Without suffering the problems of chicken and egg introduced by Marcuse in his attempt 
to outline a new form of consciousness that had yet to come into being, and without 
priviledging the individual,  the ‘party as psychoanalyst’ is for Žižek a new form of 
thought,112 one already found within capitalist reality, and thereby able to fill the role 
Marcuse attributes to fantasy and imagination. It is to the historical form of 
psychoanalysis and the Leninist party that the following chapters are dedicated. First, 
however, the role of form is further emphasized by taking on the theoretical formulations 
offered by Laclau and Rancière, thereby showing how this question sets Žižek apart from 
many of his contemporaries.  
 
!"  
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Chapter 4 – From ‘lot’ to Party 
 
What if democracy, in the second sense (the regulated procedure of registering the “people’s voice”) 
is ultimately a defense against itself, against democracy in the sense of the violent intrusion of the 
egalitarian logic that disturbs the hierarchical functioning of the social system, an attempt to re-
functionalize this excess, to make it part of the normal running of things?  
 
      – Žižek, In Defence of Lost Causes 
 
But why the hell would one want today to associate that with ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ or 
communism?  
  – Stavrakakis, On Acts, Pure and Impure 
 
 
!"  
Not two, but one 
In the wake of his Little Piece of the Real Sharpe’s 2010 collaboration with 
Boucher revolves around the creation of an ‘antinomic Slovenian’: a younger ‘radical 
democratic’ Žižek and an older, voluntaristic, dictatorial, German Romantic/tragic 
Lukácsian one. The pair locate the shift in perspective in the 1990s and Žižek’s encounter 
with Schelling. As alluded to in the first chapter, Adrian Johnston argues that Žižek’s turn 
to Schelling was an attempt to describe how the immaterial is birthed from the material, 
where the antagonisms in the latter lead to the gestation of the former. Where Johnston 
fails to put this in terms of any actually existing contradictions, the work of Sohn-Rethel 
fills the gap in Žižek’s work: the generalization of commodity exchange (a material 
practice) in capitalism leads to the abstract subject of science (the immaterial Cogito). 
Sharpe and Boucher, however, make no reference to Johnston’s argument, though it is the 
central thesis of his book and reference to it can be found in their bibliography. Nor can it 
be said that they give Sohn-Rethel much more ink than to denounce him as akin to Lukács. 
Instead, they offer that Žižek’s engagement with Schelling leads him to a German-style 
romanticism where the ‘subject-object’ of history projects itself onto the world in an act of 
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voluntaristic violence. That is, Sharpe and Boucher accuse Žižek of offering a psychotic 
view of the world which suffers the further illegitimate application of the categories of 
psychoanalysis to the social. At one point they offer the following:  
[…] Žižek simply tells us that the relations between economics and politics are logically the same 
as those between the latent and manifest content of dreams in Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams. 
There could hardly be a more direct statement of Žižek thinking of political societies as ‘subject-
objects’ than this (Sharpe and Boucher, 2010: 130). 
 
What they fail to see here is that the quote they use is a reference of the opening chapter 
of The Sublime Object of Ideology: it is the form of the dream that holds its secret, and 
not its particular content. And, of course, Žižek does not ‘simply’ state this, but spends 
dozens of pages arguing that there is a homology between the dream and the cell-form of 
capitalism, as discussed in chapter 2 of the present work. Grabbing their bootstraps in this 
way Sharpe and Boucher go on to argue that Žižek can not offer a plausible account of 
social change in capitalist regimes because he stops at the level of the commodity 
fetishism, and that in place of one theory he needs at least two: using Habermas as an 
example, they hold that Žižek needs a theory of the economic ‘system’ and a separate 
theory of ‘lifeworlds’ (Sharpe and Boucher, 2010: 134). That is, they fail to present what 
might act as a mediating link between these two ‘spheres’ and disagree with one of the 
central aims of Žižek’s entire project: showing that one need not supplement the theories 
of Marx with those of psychoanalysis because they move on the same terrain. When they 
complain that Žižek errs when he applies to the social world theories that were developed 
to treat individuals they miss that the psychoanalysis of Freud and Lacan is not in the 
mode of the psychology presented in the DSM-IV (soon to be V) where categories with 
checklists are developed and used as if they existed as rigid elements that existed in every 
individual independent of their social environment; the work of Freud and Lacan are 
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instead theories of how the social creates the individual and how the individual lives 
within the social. In the same vein, they miss that commodity fetishism is not simply (as 
they claim) found in the first section of Capital I, one left behind for the purely economic 
analysis of accumulation, crises, and the like, but the core of the argument that ideology 
is at the heart of the economy and that it can not be understood without it – hence 
fetishism’s return in the first pages of Capital III and the discussion of interest-bearing 
capital, as well as at the end of ‘volume IV.’113 What Sharpe and Boucher can not see is 
that Marx and Engels, too, posed the question they are asking:  
Individuals always started, and always start, from themselves. Their relations are the relations of 
their real life. How does it happen that their relations assume an independent existence over 
against them? and that the forces of their own life overpower them? (Marx and Engels, 1973: 
80).114  
 
Marx’s answer is that within capitalism the mediation between individual and economy is 
commodity fetishism. Žižek emphasizes not only that you can’t have one without the 
other, but that where they overlap is where one finds the Subject.  
 This is to say that there are in fact not two Žižek’s, but one. In tracing Žižek’s 
move away from ‘radical democracy’115 the continuity between his earlier and later 
positions comes clearly into view. The key to this continuity is what Rancière has called 
the essence of democracy – lot – and Žižek’s discussions of the Hegelian monarch. 
Against Boucher’s claim116 that Žižek’s ‘otherwise unintelligible references to the 
Hegelian Monarch’ can only be explained by the monarch being ‘beyond democracy’ and 
thereby amenable to Žižek’s irrational will to ‘destroy democracy’ (Boucher, 2008: 212), 
a closer examination of Žižek’s treatment of the Monarch shows its intimate link with 
democracy through the tradition of filling the positions of government by means of 
lottery.   
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In his early work Žižek uses Hegel’s description of the monarch to, in effect, 
agree with radical democrat Claude Lefort’s position that the ‘democratic invention’ 
consists of a gap between the place of power and they who occupy it. This is not the end, 
however: this conception develops as Žižek’s work progresses and can be seen even early 
on in the then unexplored suggestion that it is not the horizon of left politics and must be 
challenged. Towards the time of his self-proclaimed ‘Leninist turn’ he further pushes the 
position that this democratic ‘gap’ must itself be challenged as it more closely resembles 
the psychoanalytic logic of the fetish rather than the logic of ‘drive’ or negation, which he 
sees as more fruitful. Below is outlined how this entails replacing Hegel’s monarch with 
the Leninist Party, which is done with reference to ‘radical democrat’ Jacques Rancière 
and ‘post-Marxist’ Ernesto Laclau, each of whom appear to share positions with Žižek 
but who are in fact quite different: Žižek might accept Rancière’s position that equality is 
the violent assertion of difference, but with the caveat that such an assertion needs an 
‘external’ element to make it an effective progressive force; and where Laclau offers that 
this element need be an enemy, Žižek posits it as the psychoanalyst. To outline the 
differences between these positions it’s necessary to make reference to Marx in order to 
demonstrate that the universal is not simply a form full of promise that is corrupted by 
capital, but actual alienation for all (capitalist and worker alike) that none the less offers 
emancipation as the ‘spirit of negation’: changing forms of the universal. In this case, that 
universal is that of democracy as embodied in the tradition of choosing government by 
means of ‘lot.’ Where Rancière posits it as the mode of democracy and politics per se, 
Žižek offers a specific form of lot: that of the psychoanalyst and the Leninist Party. This 
is because Žižek goes where Rancière does not. While asserting that the scandal of 
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democracy lies in its challenge to the maintenance of property relations, Rancière does 
not adapt the notion of lot to the particularity of the property relations of capitalism. 
Contrariwise, Žižek – as someone who adheres to the basics of Marx’s theory of value – 
asserts that lot as chance takes on a particular form in radical anti-capitalist politics. That 
form is not only that of a political organization, but a form of thought. Against both 
Rancière and Laclau, Žižek offers not timeless transcendentals but historical change.  
The horizons of democracy 
As an example of a ‘true democratic’ experiment Yannis Stavrakakis offers One 
and Other, a public art project by Anthony Gormley in which people were chosen by lot 
to stand on an empty plinth in Trafalgar Square for sixty minutes at a time. What draws 
Stavrakakis to this example is first that it recalls Lefort’s argument that democracy is 
fundamentally the split between the locus of power and its temporary occupation, second 
that it ‘created new forms of subjectivity, new forms of fidelity to the event of 
participation,’ and lastly that it acts as a step towards the revival of the democratic 
tradition of lot (2010: 23-4). Stavrakakis sees all of these as defenses of radical 
democracy and as rebukes to Žižek’s arguments – particularly those found in In Defense 
of Lost Causes – for communism. He is able to do this because he avoids an in-depth 
discussion of precisely why Žižek takes a stand against Lefort, why Žižek refuses some 
sort of ‘fidelity’ to democracy as the temporary power given by occupying the empty 
place of power. That is, rather than exploring the reasons why Žižek takes issue with 
Lefort Stavrakakis limits himself to asserting that he doesn’t find Lefort’s position 
objectionable (2010: 29, n15). The question, as a question rather than as mere rhetoric or 
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an angry outburst, is precisely ‘why the hell’ Žižek would align democracy and ‘lot’ with 
the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
To be precise, it is not Žižek who aligns the dictatorship of the proletariat with the 
practice of determining, by lot, who will take part in any further democratic decision-
making. It’s instead the position of Kojin Karatani – quoted by Žižek at the end of First 
as Tragedy, Then as Farce. This is to say that it is not wholly accurate to imply that 
Žižek holds this to be an adequate definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Rather, 
the quote serves as more of a passing remark, a moment of applause for Karatani for 
avoiding the technocratic trap of reducing democracy to voting for the most qualified 
candidate.117 What is more interesting – and what will enable a better understanding of 
what Žižek is getting at – is his remark that in Karatani’s discussion of democracy lot 
‘fulfills the same function as Hegel’s theory of monarchy’ (Žižek, 2009a: 152; See also 
2006a: 57). To uncover what this means it’s instructive to turn to the end of Žižek’s For 
They Know Not What They Do, a book in which Žižek still pledges some allegiance to the 
insights of Claude Lefort and which Sharpe and Boucher call his most radically 
democratic book.    
Hegel’s constitutional monarch appears from time to time in Žižek’s work, but at 
this particular moment in his thought he argues that it stands as a solution to the problem 
the Jacobins faced at the moment of ‘democratic invention’ in France: anyone who steps 
into the place of power is immediately forced to accomplish some feat or another and 
thereby betray the formal equality established by the revolution by transforming the 
universal into a particular. That is, one cannot rule innocently, but at the same time one 
cannot live by terror alone. Hegel’s monarch stands as a solution to the problem of terror, 
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according to Žižek, in that they (the monarch) stand as the means to ensure that the place 
of power and anyone who occupies it do not become one and the same: the monarch is 
the personification or materialization of the inability to fully occupy the position of 
democratic power (2008b: 269-70). This is akin to lot, according to Žižek, in that the 
monarch is the intervention of the irrational within Hegel’s rational totality (i.e. the state): 
the cutting of indecision within the state by means of the monarch’s tongue is not the 
product of calculation but of arbitrary will. Where rational discussion spins off into an 
unending torrent of reasons for and against, the knot can only be undone with a knife. Lot 
fills this function too: in the endless debate over which candidate might best fulfill a 
particular role within a democratic institution, in a discussion where no definitive reason 
can be given, random selection – lot – makes the decision for you (2008b: 277, n54).118  
As noted, Žižek quotes Karatani to the effect that this is akin to the dictatorship of 
the proletariat. This leads to the question of whether or not Žižek advocates for 
constitutional monarchy (as in Canada, for example, where the Queen’s representative 
must sign all legislation for it to become law, can prorogue parliament, etc.) as the form 
of democratic. While he ends For They Know Not What They Do after making the points 
just outlined, this is in fact not the position Žižek advocates. These comments are 
followed by a short, final, unmarked concluding section. It begins with the following 
question: ‘Is today’s Left therefore condemned to pledge all its forces to the victory of 
democracy?’ Žižek’s answer is, of course, that no, we’re not. From here he tacks in a way 
that echoes the opening pages of Marx’s 18th Brumaire – from which he gets the title for 
First as Tragedy… – but with some Badiou spun in: the present (i.e. 1991) is generating 
new movements that cannot be understood from the perspectives offered by 
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contemporary political understanding, and so the task of the left is to find new names for 
these forms of activity. This doesn’t mean renouncing the past, however, but keeping 
alive all the ‘lost causes’ that liberal-democracy and capital would rather see forgotten 
(2008b: 271). As Marx put it, the left must enable the past to rise in living spirit and not 
as a ghost or nightmare left to haunt the consciousness of the present.  
This is to suggest that a name can be put to the currently nameless finale to For 
They Know Not What The Do, and doing so will help clarify what Žižek comes to later 
make more explicit in regards to his position on the ‘democratic invention.’ Such a title 
can be devised with reference to a quote from Trotsky, taken from a book Žižek edited as 
part of Verso’s ‘Revolutions’ series:   
In the hands of the party is concentrated the general control. It does not immediately 
administer, since its apparatus is not adapted for this purpose. But it has the final word in 
all fundamental questions. Further, our practice has led to the result that, in all moot 
questions, generally – conflicts between departments and personal conflicts within 
departments – the last word belongs to the central committee of the party. This affords 
extreme economy of time and energy. And in the most difficult and complicated 
circumstances gives a guarantee for the necessary unity of action. 
 
What is striking about this passage is the similarity between these comments about the 
Party in Terrorism and Communism (2007 [1920]: 102) and the role Hegel gives to the 
constitutional monarch: it brings unity, does not directly administer, and cuts through 
indecision. This is not to say that the logic is the same, however. The most obvious 
difference is Trotsky’s comment that the Party has ‘the final word in all fundamental 
questions.’ What this hopefully points to, however, is that after the year 2000 or so Žižek 
replaces the monarch with the Party. The final section of FTKN might then be dubbed 
‘From Hegel to Lenin,’ or ‘From Monarch to (Leninist) Party.’  
It’s important to note that while the two are not homologous – the Party is not just 
another name for the Monarch – nor are they completely different. This can be 
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understood by looking at Žižek’s objections to Ernesto Laclau’s ideas on populism as 
found in a debate between the two in Critical Inquiry, had around 2006, which became 
the core of a chapter in Žižek’s Defense of Lost Causes (2008a). This is also, incidentally, 
the chapter to which Stavrakakis raises the objections alluded to above. The central point 
relevant to the present discussion revolves around two different versions of the universal: 
that of order and that of excess; that of the ‘general equivalent’, the empty or Master 
signifier, and that of a potentially explosive exclusion, or objet a. It is ‘not just about 
which particular content will “hegemonize” the empty form of universality, but a struggle 
between two exclusive forms of universality themselves’ (Žižek, 2008a: 285). In terms of 
the current discussion, this is the difference between the Monarch and the Party. 
Žižek versus Laclau: universality as excess 
While Žižek makes much of the difference between his position and that of 
Laclau, the two of them say many of the same things. Both think that Lefort needs to be 
rethought in that the ‘empty place of power’ does not merely exist, but is created119; Both 
think that ‘political will’ need not simply be heard and implemented, but actively 
developed120; Both think that democracy is the exercise of power – perhaps even 
‘dictatorship’ – rather than a neutral exercise of technocratic know-how.121 Both make a 
distinction between two types of universal. This latter point is, however, where they start 
to diverge. For Laclau, the form of the universal to be avoided is that of an ‘unmediated 
universal’ that he describes as a ‘tainted particularized universality’ in which the attempt 
to make a homogenized political space is belied by particularism (Laclau, 2001: 4; 11). 
This is merely another way of saying that formal equality is belied by actual systemic 
inequality: people are equal except at the level of property, where some are more equal 
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than others. Žižek, too, holds a similar position, using Hegel’s ‘universal class’ – i.e. the 
state bureaucracy – as an example, along with the United States as the ‘direct agent’ 
(remember that Laclau uses the term ‘unmediated universal’) of the worldwide protection 
of human rights and liberal democracy (Žižek, 2008a: 285).  
The other universality that Laclau proposes is that of a particularity that purges 
itself of that particularity, empties itself of its own demands, as it comes to embody the 
demands of more and more social grievances. This is the point where Žižek and Laclau 
finally part ways and where their projects fundamentally diverge.  
In Laclau’s account, this second universality – the transformation of one 
particular group into an empty signifier – always leaves a remainder of particularity 
(Laclau, 2001: 11). This prevents, for him, the total coincidence of the universal and 
particular, ensuring that democratic power is always acknowledged as contingent, 
ensuring that there is always a distance between those who exercise power and their 
legitimacy in doing so. Where this democratic agent is contingent so too, by necessity, 
must be that against which they raise their fists. Their enemy, against which they 
galvanize the community, is simply a particular regime, a particular government, which 
embodies some ‘notorious crime’ that it likely did not itself commit. In Laclau’s words, 
the enemy ‘… has to be seen as the symbol of something different and incommensurable 
with it: the obstacle which prevents society from coinciding with itself, from reaching its 
own fullness’ (Laclau, 2001: 9). For example, while today’s Canadian Government did 
not colonize the dominion or institute residential schools, while it neither interned the 
Japanese during the second World War nor instituted the Chinese head-tax, it is taken as 
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responsible for those actions and redress demanded from it, and consequently it has 
issued apologies and money in an attempt to offer that redress.  
Herein lies the problem with this alternative version of the universal: where there 
is no reason for any group to trump any other in the political arena, where there can be no 
‘substantial’ or ‘essential’ grievance, but only contingent ones, an enemy is needed to 
make political organization possible: the only way one’s political activity can be seen as 
‘contingent’ is if ‘essence’ lies somewhere else – in something that prevents the 
community from being harmonious. Translated into the terms of the present discussion, 
what Laclau sees as the essence of politics is problematic in that it only works if one 
assumes that one’s own demands are ‘contingent’ – that any number of grievances can be 
aligned, without priority – while the enemy as enemy is not. Otherwise we get the 
common-sense reproach that payment for the sins of the father should not be visited upon 
the son: this government had nothing to do with those ‘notorious crimes’ of the past 
(colonization, residential schools, Japanese internment, racist immigration laws), so why 
should it be expected to redress them? They were voted into power, and only recently; 
they were not the wielders of the gun. The correct answer to this is, of course, is that such 
‘notorious crimes’ are ongoing and are so because they are systemic. Each Canadian 
Government, regardless of how progressive or reactionary it might be, is sustained by this 
past: there can be no Canada without stolen land. This past is also the root from which to 
repeat itself with new racist immigration laws and migrant worker programs, 
colonizations (think of Canada’s role in Honduras and Haiti), and internments (Omar 
Khadr and Guantanamo): under capitalism, maintaining ownership of property demands 
its expansion, accomplished via the usual suspects associated with accumulation.  
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What Laclau is unable to do is show the relationship between the ‘notorious 
crime’ and the system founded upon it. This is approached by Žižek in Less Than 
Nothing as the question of the relation between trauma and law. The first chapter opens 
with a discussion of how the truth need not be exposed in some sort of raw, empirical fact 
to be truth, but that truth can instead be found in form – that is, truth can be found in 
appearances. He uses Jorge Semprun's The Long Voyage as an example: in the case of the 
representation of the Shoah, this means that an aesthetic piece depicting the trauma of the 
events need not be a realist masterpiece, but would be better served by a fragmented, 
inconsistent presentation that demonstrates the effect of the trauma on those affected. 
This is closely tied to what is ostensibly the basic question of many of his books: what is 
the relationship of the 'immaterial' (i.e. freedom and the subject) to the 'material'? (e.g. 
2012: 144-5). This is what 'Vacillating the Semblances' (the title of chapter 1) and the 
reference to Plato is all about: the ideal – the forms – exist, just not in the way that Plato 
understood (or that we usually take him to have understood). That is, 'appearance is 
essence' – there is not necessarily an empirical easily understood 'trauma' hidden behind 
the appearance; nor are the forms hidden away in some other plane or world. Instead, the 
truth of trauma is already with us as the form of the ‘symbolic universe’ that is the 
present. 
It should come as no surprise that this is very close to Marx's discussion of the 
commodity/value form: regardless of how you twist and turn a commodity you'll not find 
an ounce of value in it, and yet value's there. The truth of capitalism's supposed self-
valorization is not in the empirical fluctuation of prices as brought on by supply and 
demand, but in the form of the commodity itself; or, more accurately, in the highest 
 119 
development of the value-form – (capitalist) money. Because of the social relations of 
capitalism commodities become the embodiment of the 'real abstraction' that enables us 
to compare unequal things (use values) as if they all contained something equivalent 
(exchange value).122 For Marx, of course, this form hides that it is labour-power that 
drives capitalism forward, instead making it appear (and in so appearing actually is) that 
value is the subject, the free agent, of capitalist societies (as he writes in the last few 
pages of chapter 4 of Capital).123 This is the alienation, the inverted world, that must be 
overcome. Just as for Žižek the fragmented timeline of Semprun's novel renders the truth 
of the horror of the Shoah, in taking the appearance seriously – in looking at form – Marx 
realizes that the 'inconsistencies' of capitalism (i.e. crises) are not the product of some 
outside influence disturbing the smooth flow of the economy, but inherent to the thing 
itself. 
The trauma of the concentration camp can not only be located in that used by the 
Nazis. As Žižek notes in The Sublime Object of Ideology the concentration camp was first 
used by the British. This is to say that while the Shoah is unquestionably awful it should 
not be treated as the 'absolute evil' – i.e. a big Other that is to be left un-inspected so it 
can stand as a guarantor of our (liberal, western democratic) being: it's symptomatic that 
when one wants to point to an unchallengeable horror one turns to the Nazi concentration 
camp and the Gulag (Žižek is at times guilty of this – see e.g  2012: 33). These have 
become fetishes, the 'last thing we see' before we discover what's behind them – that the 
concentration camp and the GULAG (properly speaking it should be all-caps as it's an 
acronym for the name of the prison – something most people likely don’t know because 
of the role it has come to play in ideology) are the outcomes of a liberal-democratic 
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civilization based on brutal colonization and slavery. As Ward Churchill points out, the 
Nazi's based a lot of their racial policy on the way the Americans wiped out American 
Indians; similarly, in his Liberalism: A Counter History Losurdo argues against the 
historicist reading of liberalism that puts all its horrors down to deviations from its true 
nature to assert that it's fundamentally based on a master-race ideology. 
In this example, then, the immaterial is the system of coping with the Real/the 
trauma – i.e. the Symbolic. The question that needs to be answered is then the status of 
that trauma. In the conclusion of Less Than Nothing Žižek writes that '..what the law 
ultimately hides is that there is nothing to hide, that there is no terrifying mystery 
sustaining it (even if the mystery is that of a horrible founding crime or some other form 
of radical evil), that the law is grounded only in its own tautology' (972).This comes after 
he argues that one should not take the Real/trauma to be the thing-in-itself and reduce the 
Symbolic to mere semblance. Rather, the only way to change the Real is via the 
semblance, via the Symbolic. Turned slightly, this is also to say that the actual hold the 
trauma has on us is not because of some inherent quality of that trauma but because of 
our relation to it (and thereby the creation of it's specific character) via the Symbolic. 
Laclau is correct to the extent that there was a founding crime that helped birth 
capitalism – the brutal ousting of the peasants from the land, colonialism, etc., such that 
'capital comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt' (Marx, 
1977: 926). The solution, however, is not to find an ‘enemy’, or for the capitalist and the 
colonialist to make amends, but to destroy the logic that has come into being and now 
exists independently of it. Amends are of course offered in the form of mere verbal 
apologies... and, of course, money. Giving First Nations peoples tort money for being 
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forced into residential schools and giving band councils some share of the profits from 
the exploitation of their land will to some degree improve their living conditions. It will 
not , however, give their ancestors back their lives nor will it allow traditional ways of 
life to be reborn, prevent further exploitation of their land, or address the myriad other 
problems with the Reserve system. Rather, it pulls them further into the circuit of capital. 
Likewise, the solution to the trauma of the concentration camp is the historical 
destruction of the liberalism and capitalism that lead to it. This is all to say that it is not 
some empirical disaster/crime/trauma that is the focus of Žižek's or Marx's analysis (even 
though the latter takes great pains to show how capital destroys the body of the worker, 
the planet, other nations...). Rather, the central focus is on how the immaterial functions 
and how it can be used to change the world.124 That is, the trauma lives on in the 
law/symbolic, and the only way to overcome the trauma is to understand the system that 
it gave rise to and destroy it. 
This is not where Laclau takes his thought, however. In a paper written as a 
description of the fundaments of his project, he begins with the assertion that Marxism is 
an essentialist discourse that needs to be rejected. Thereafter he concerns himself with 
looking for the transcendental conditions (he lists four) of hegemony as the logic of the 
political, as the internal limit of ‘the principle of representation,’ by which he means both 
language and politics (Laclau, 2006b: 105). This is to say that while he castigates Žižek 
for having no political program, he bases his political theory not on the historical 
examples he presents but on the transcendental principles that he derives from Gramsci 
and Lacan. What he provides, then, is more-or-less an abstract treatise on the relationship 
of the universal and the particular in which he tries to find the moderate middle between 
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the two – hence the assertion that any particular political agent cannot wholly ‘empty’ 
itself of its own content, but must retain some leftover (Laclau, 2001: 11). The question, 
for Laclau, is not one of institutions, but (transcendentally constituted) identities: while 
Lefort focuses on actual liberal-democratic regimes and the emptiness to be found in 
them, Laclau offers that ‘for me, emptiness is a type of identity, not a structural location’ 
(Laclau, 2005: 166).  
The two differences that separate Žižek and Laclau are as follows: first, Žižek 
asserts that ‘the gap between empty universality and its distorted representation… can be 
overcome’ (Žižek, 2008a: 294). That is, the universal need not be ‘impossible,’  need not 
be tainted with a leftover as Laclau describes it. Part of accomplishing this demands 
asserting the following: 
…we cannot accept the empty place (of the impossible Universality, the place to be filled in – 
“hegemonized” – by contingent particulars) as the ultimate given; we should hazard a step further 
and ask how – through what cut in the texture of the living body – this empty place itself emerges 
(Žižek, 2006: 108-9). 
 
This is to say that it’s not enough to simply except that emptiness or lack is how 
democracy functions, adding to it the caveat that emptiness is produced (as noted above). 
Instead, asking how lack comes to be might provide grounds for rejecting lack or 
emptiness as the horizon of democracy and the political. The answer to this question 
follows from the other element that divides Žižek from Laclau: Žižek does not begin with 
the transcendental conditions of identity, but with the material conditions of that 
transcendentalism. This is key for Žižek’s entire oeuvre – though it is given less attention 
than it deserves – and demands a brief return to Karatani. The above quote comes from 
The Parallax View, in which Žižek takes up Karatani’s Kantian development of Marxism. 
As noted above, he points to what he sees as an omission in Karatani’s work: the thought 
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of Alfred Sohn-Rethel. Where Karatani uses Kantian categories to explain Marx, Sohn-
Rethel uses Marx to explain Kantian epistemology. According to Sohn-Rethel, the act of 
commodity exchange involves treating objects as pure forms. Kant’s a priori 
transcendental subject is thus not a priori at all, but the product of a material practice: the 
generalization of the ‘exchange abstraction.’ 
Žižek and Marx against ‘radical democracy’  
This is important because central to Žižek’s thinking is the argument, presented in 
the first chapter of his first book, that it is the commodity form (as described by Marx) 
that precedes the transcendental categories that make up much of his (Žižek’s) oeuvre; it 
is the commodity form that stands as the form of thought and ideology under capitalism. 
In terms of the present discussion, what it points to is the genesis of, first, the ‘empty 
place’ of democracy, and second, the auto-generated means of ‘overcoming’ it.  
Where Lefort offers that the place where king and citizen overlap is the empty one 
of power, for Marx that form is capitalist money and exchange: ‘A worker who buys 
commodities for 3s. appears to the seller in the same function, in the same equality – in 
the form of 3s. – as the king who does the same. All distinctions between them is 
extinguished’ (Marx, 1973b: 246). From the feudal ‘no man without a master’ we come 
to capitalism’s ‘money sans maître.’ For Marx, this equality is based on difference: 
because each has their own needs and possesses something that others do not, the 
labourer and the prince come together in the market. Here abstractly equal commodities 
change hands between equal individuals of their own volition, without recourse to force, 
to theft, to lying and cheating. Here we have the juridical Person, so derided by Hegel. 
Thus, ‘the exchange of exchange-values is the productive, real basis of all equality and 
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freedom,’ where the latter is the content, the former the form: the self-interest of one 
presupposes the self interest of all the others; ‘the general interest is precisely the 
generality of self-seeking interests’ (ibid: 245). While Marx is critical of this – having 
different needs and different objects to exchange presupposes the division of labour; this 
is simple exchange, and forgets the realm of production and the ins-and-outs of money as 
capital by substituting money as means of circulation, measure of price, etc. – it is not 
simply an illusion, a fake, or a lie. Against the Marxist vulgate, this is not an assertion 
that there is actual inequality in the face of formal equality, a division that must be 
overcome. Rather, equality is inequality; freedom is social determination, and so Marx 
derides French socialists (Proudhon in particular is named) who think the purity of the 
freedom found in exchange has simply been corrupted by capitalism. For Marx it is its 
culmination.125 Only when exchange meets capitalism is its essence realized, albeit in its 
opposite. Only with the development of the division of labour, of complex needs, etc., 
can exchange fully manifest. Note, too, that the conception of the universal that Marx 
derides is similar to that Laclau offers as the logic of the ‘unmediated universal’: a 
universal tainted by particularity (in this case, Proudhon’s rejection of the particularity of 
capitalism as that which corrupts the purity of freedom and equality). 
It’s important to reiterate that Marx is not here talking about what Rancière – in 
his On The Shores of the Political (2007)126 – diagnoses as that which has corrupted 
democracy through the work of ‘socialists,’ ‘communists,’ and ‘social science’: the 
argument that there is an illusion of equality (or, formal freedom as a lie) opposed to the 
reality of inequality. Instead, what Marx is opposing is what Ilyenkov (1982) has called 
the ‘abstract’ and the ‘concrete,’ where what is abstract is the one-sided and the concrete 
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the many-sided. In this way, what is generally called abstract – something like 
mathematical systems, for example – is concrete in that it includes the development of 
the links between all its elements. Likewise, something that is generally called concrete – 
a sensory perception, for example – is abstract in that it is severed from the plurality of its 
connections (an object presented without reference to how it was produced, for example). 
Marx does not argue that formal equality and market freedom is a lie, but that the 
‘apologists of bourgeois democracy’ take only one aspect of the totality – simple 
circulation – and treat it as the whole, leaving out the mediations it shares with the sphere 
of production.127 Taking this into account, as just argued, shows that freedom and 
equality thus only fully become themselves in unfreedom and inequality. There is no lie 
here; there is instead a dialectical reversal.128 
But this is not the end of the dialectic: the universality of exchange as realized 
under capitalism is only the first part of a Faustian bargain. Everyone knows that in the 
1844 manuscripts Marx posits capital as alienating, but what is almost never noted is that 
money is the mediation of one’s ‘species being,’ is the material ground of one’s (not 
anthropological, but historical) universality.129 ‘Faustian’ is used here more literally than 
figuratively: it is in the words of ‘the spirit of negation’ – i.e. Goethe’s Mephisto – that 
we learn that money is the means by which we as humans are able to take on the 
properties of any other species: the power of six horses attached to a carriage, for 
instance. Under capitalism, of course, it’s also the means of taking on the abilities of any 
other person. Herein lies our alienation: from the means of production, from others, from 
ourselves, from the products of our labour. The problem with capitalism, for Marx, is not 
the myth of a past unity destroyed by capitalism, which Rancière has called the 
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‘counterrevolutionary thought’ ‘so generously bequeathed to socialism and social 
science’ (2007: 43-4). Instead, it is the assertion that capitalism has wrought the material 
means of the universal, but in a form that need be transformed. And it’s important to note 
that this is so not only for the worker, but also for the capitalist. 
Remember that all this is the key to understanding Žižek’s discussion of the 
possibility of overcoming the division between universality and particularity. Like Marx, 
he rejects the notion that the universal is simply corrupted by its content. Instead, he 
offers that for every place without a proper object – the place of democratic power filled 
by any contingent person – there is an object without a proper place. This is the division 
between the master signifier, or S1, and the objet a: for every system of equivalence there 
is one thing that cannot be made commensurate. In Marxian terms, the apex of the 
commodity form – capitalist money as general equivalent – can be exchanged for any 
other commodity except one: labour power. Only in taking the form of a commodity is 
labour power confused for the act of labouring and surplus produced. Only in leaving 
labour power out of the discussion of political economy is capital able to continue to 
reproduce itself through accumulation. Only in treating labour as one more instance of 
the universal (something to become money in the practice of exchange) does capitalism 
function.  
Since at least 2005 Laclau has ceased to argue, as presented above, that a social 
agent takes on the role of the empty signifier only partially, maintaining some of its 
particularity as a leftover, and thereby ensures a democratic split between power and its 
exercise. Instead, Laclau relies on Joan Copjec to assert that in place of this formulation 
of the political role of the objet a one must instead see it as a partiality that becomes a 
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whole (Laclau, 2006b: 110) – a position very similar to that held by Žižek. While the 
difference between their use of Lacan may have become narrower (the divide remains in 
their exchange in Critical Inquiry, for instance, where Žižek complains that Laclau 
confuses the master signifier and objet a), their position on Marxism still remains 
irreconcilable. Leaning on a Kantian understanding of the weaknesses of Marx’s thought, 
Laclau poses political ‘antagonism’ as veritably noumenal from the perspective of 
capitalism: ‘resistance’ can not be derived from the extraction of surplus because the rest 
of the worker’s life – food, clothing, education, etc. – happens outside the relations of 
production (Laclau, 2006b: 112). This is what enables him to argue that the political 
struggle is not necessarily class struggle: the conditions of capitalism come from outside 
itself, and so are ‘articulated’ with it in hegemonic formation rather than overdetermined 
by the mode of production (Ibid: 110).  
The problem with this is that it elides the fact that workers have to reproduce 
themselves via the capitalist market (by purchasing food, clothing, etc., rather than 
growing it, weaving it, themselves…) and must work to do so. It is the difference 
between what Ellen Wood calls the ideology of opportunity versus the reality of 
necessity: the worker has very little choice as to how they reproduce themselves once 
capitalism becomes the dominant mode of production; the market is not one choice 
among many. Perhaps more importantly Laclau misses that Marx does indeed logically 
derive resistance from the extraction of surplus: ‘between equal rights, force decides’ 
(Marx, 1977: 344). Within the logic of capital the worker has the right to determine the 
price of their commodity (labour) just as much as the capitalist has the right to decide 
what they buy (the length of the workers’ day). When the two disagree, ‘resistance’ raises 
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its head on both sides. Thus we get a Kantian antinomy – Marx uses this term – within 
capital, rather than a noumenal realm outside it. There is, of course, an ‘outside’ of 
capital in Marx’s discussion, and this is labour-power – which is indeed more-or-less 
synonymous with the reproduction of the worker. It is ‘inside’ for Marx, however, in that 
it must be included to make sense of where profit comes from. Profit is properly 
understood only as surplus, generated by eliding labour power in favour of labour time. It 
is thus ‘outside,’ too, in that it is necessarily left out of the account of profit because of 
the commodity form. Where Laclau places this Real (Labour power)130 as 
external/heterogeneous to the Symbolic, Žižek argues it is ‘extimate’ – generated by, 
constitutive of, and potentially fatal for it.131 
Because it is generated by capitalism the objet a, the object without a place, is 
thus the means of transforming the universal rather than simply taking part in its 
functioning. This is why Žižek  derides democracy as described by Lefort as succumbing 
to fetishism: taking the place of general equivalency merely confers upon any contingent 
object the power of the place. This can be seen more clearly in a personal anecdote: 
during the strike organized by CUPE Local 3903 at York University in 2008, people 
repeatedly argued that the bargaining team should simply be left to their work because 
they had been voted into their positions. Neither the abilities, experience, nor the actual 
activity of these bargaining members was ever mentioned. What makes this fetishism 
even more stark is that several of the bargaining team members had in fact been 
acclaimed – that is, they occupied a place that could have been filled through democratic 
election but were there without having been selected by the community they were to 
represent. The mere fact that the bargaining team could have been democratically elected 
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was enough for them to be treated as outside any accountability, as benevolent 
representatives of democratic will. In this way they filled the role of a fetish, which arises 
where the lack in the big Other aligns with the lack in the subject as a means to gentrify 
jouissance.132 If the lack in the big Other – the social world – is the democratic gap in an 
institution, and the lack in the ‘subject’ is the incompleteness of ‘the people’ because of 
social antagonism (Laclau and Mouffe’s ‘society doesn’t exist’), the democratic 
representative is the fetish that covers the lack they share. As in Marx’s description of the 
Executive of the state in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, the elected representative is 
simultaneously the people against the democratic institution and the democratic 
institution against the people. Here Žižek’s famous Marxist refrain presents itself: the 
‘they know it, and yet they are doing it.’ Even if Laclau’s ‘people’ thinks of itself and its 
enemy as contingent, in its actions it proves itself to believe in its enemies and itself as 
essence. Even if people know a contingent person fills the place of power by virtue of 
accumulating votes, they treat them as people of a different sort.  
Democratic ‘lot’ as Leninist Party 
This description of the fetish – arising between the incompleteness of both the 
social and the individual, the Other and the subject – is also a description of the type of 
universal Žižek rails against: ‘the dimension of the universal thus emerges when the two 
lacks – mine and that of the Other – overlap’ (Žižek/Schelling, 1997: 50). This is what 
makes Žižek write what he does about ‘registering of the people’s voice’ in the quote that 
stands as the epigraph to this chapter: ‘the regulated (more or less) universal procedure of 
choosing those who will exert power’ (Žižek, 2008a: 265) stands as a way of gentrifying 
true democratic action, action that disturbs the smooth flow of a system that seeks 
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precisely to flow smoothly, a system that functions at the price of making a fundamental 
exclusion. That is, it makes a mockery of acclamation. Mladen Dolar makes this clear in 
his monogram on the voice. The vote serves to break a protean collective action into 
discreet, individual elements: 
…it has to be done one by one, so that the collective outburst of the acclamatory voice is broken 
down, nipped in the bud, seemingly deprived of its essential qualities and its spectacular effects. It 
is the voice measured and counted, the voice submitted to arithmetic, the voice entrusted to a 
written sign, a mute voice deprived of any sonority, but no matter how hard they try to dismember 
it, it is still a voice (Dolar, 2006: 112).   
 
The reference to voice here is crucial, as is the assertion that regardless of being 
‘registered’ it is still a voice. This is to say that it is still a threat: Scott Walker may have 
been voted in, but this hasn’t stopped working people from storming the Winter Palace; 
they haven’t accorded him special due by virtue of his being their official representative, 
nor simply relied on their other statesmen. This voice – along with the gaze, the breast, 
shit… – is one of the incarnations of Lacan’s objet a. And herein lies the overcoming of 
the division of the particular and universal: the objet a as the object of drive rather than 
the object-cause of desire functions as the direct embodiment of antagonism as such.133 
This is of course the death drive: the force inherent in all desire that threatens to explode 
it from within, and it’s here that Žižek, Rancière, and Marx both converge and depart. 
None are talking of a lost unity; all discuss the violent assertion of antagonism134; all 
assert the destruction of ‘class’-ification;135 Indeed, Žižek begins his debate with Laclau 
in DoLC with reference to Rancière’s ‘part of no part’, though for him it refers to the 
working class136 (2008a: 286): the generalization of commodity exchange under capital 
places them ‘in but not of’ society, counted as labour time but never as labour power, 
counted for what they have done and not what they are capable of doing.  
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 The difference between Žižek’s position and that of Rancière lies in that ‘strange 
object’137 called ‘lot’: for Rancière it effectively stands as an a-historical transcendental, 
while for Žižek the form of the Party is a particular development of lot, one appropriate 
to the capitalist present.  
 In his reading of Plato in Hatred of Democracy Rancière argues that lot is the 
moment of politics proper. This for two reasons: first, it is a means to ward off tyranny, 
the rule of those who search for power. That is, it does not open up government to an 
infinite number of qualified candidates or the excesses of individual desire, but instead 
fulfills the negative function of helping prevent the rule of those who seek power 
(Rancière, 2006b: 43). Second, politics proper is for Rancière the moment when the 
ability to govern is separated from one’s wealth or birthright – i.e. separated from nature 
as kinship, but tied to nature as chance, fortune, divine intervention. That is, ‘the “title 
that is not one” [i.e. government by lot] produces a retroactive effect on the others, a 
doubt concerning the legitimacy they lay claim to’ (Ibid: 44): the introduction of lot 
demonstrates that all claims of legitimacy to rule are based on contingency – of birth, of 
age, of wealth. According to Rancière, for Plato to have his moral government and not 
mere plutocracies he must in the end rely on the notion that ‘the power of the best cannot 
ultimately be legitimated except via the power of equals’ (Ibid: 47), where this equality is 
not the formal equality given by the law but that given by chance.  
 This is, however, all news to Plato. Though he doesn’t spell it out explicitly, 
Rancière’s ‘creative’ reading appears to rest on Plato’s comments in The Republic in 
regards to the ‘noble lie’ taken in  combination with the Myth of Er. The latter is one of 
the only places where lot is mentioned in the whole work – otherwise it appears only 
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briefly during Plato’s discussion of democracy. While Plato suggests the guardians must 
provide a foundation-myth to guarantee the unity of the state, he has no proposals for 
means to make people believe the one he initially proposes (that each person has a 
particular nature – either of gold, silver, or iron and copper – each with its proper place in 
the order of things). Socrates and his interlocutors thus leave it for the future to decide 
(Plato, 1993: 119-20). At the dialogue’s end, however, The Myth of Er appears and could 
be taken as another stab at a foundation story: taking turns as decided by lot, the dead 
decide what their next life will look like. Here is where the ‘legitimacy’ Rancière refers 
to appears to come from: one is not to blame the outcome of the process on lot but on 
one’s own choice, which is baptized as necessity by passing under the spindle at the 
centre of the universe. The archetype here is Odysseus, who declares he would have 
made the same choice regardless of his place in the lottery. This is to say that the equality 
bestowed by contingency is also a ‘noble lie’ used to legitimate inequality, as 
contingency – of being born into wealth, for example – is not merely contingency but 
also one’s own doing.138  
 Similar to Sohn-Rethel’s argument that Kant could only come up with the 
transcendental subject because of the existence of commodity exchange, in Rancière’s 
eyes Plato is only able to even pose the question of a government that is neither justified 
in the name of natural right nor a means for the cunning to seize power because actually 
existing democracy had already furnished the answer.139 It is, however, a scandalous 
answer that births hate – hence Plato’s derision of it. It not only provides a means of 
legitimation but also a challenge to two supposed goods: the government of the best and 
the preservation of the order of property, which are in the end the same thing (Ibid: 2; 
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44). This is not particular to ancient Greece, however, but holds across all time. Rancière 
claims that although Plato’s anti-democratic diatribes come from a time and place that no 
longer resembles our own they resonate in the throats of the haters of democracy 
precisely because of this challenge. Democracy is thus ‘not a type of constitution, not a 
form of society’ (Ibid:46). It is instead the political per se, and the drawing of lots its 
essence.140     
 Strictly speaking, according to one of Rancière’s own sources – Bernard Manin – 
lot is not the essence of democracy but a corollary of a more basic ‘cardinal’ principle: 
rotation of office. Via Aristotle Manin argues that to be considered a virtuous or excellent 
citizen in Athens one had to be at one point ruled, another ruler. That is, ‘democratic 
freedom consisted not in obeying only oneself but in obeying today someone in whose 
place one would be tomorrow’ (Manin, 1997: 28), the idea being that one must know 
private life to rule, and vice versa. Manin makes the case that lot served as the best means 
to achieve this end: leaving this rotation up to election meant possibly limiting the 
principle of election – i.e. allowing people to chose who they wished to rule, a principle 
which would include the possibility of choosing the same person more than once, and 
thereby undermine the circulation of offices. He argues that the Athenians recognized this 
in that the positions for which they did hold elections were not limited in the number of 
times or the length of time the seats could be filled. Making such limitations does not in 
any way run counter to the logic of lot, however, making it the proper corollary of the 
fundamental desire of Athenian democrats to see the rotation of offices (Manin, 1997: 28-
41). With this as his starting point Manin goes on to argue that the representative 
governments that follow in the footsteps of the American and French revolutions do not 
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include the principle of lot, so to call them representative democracies is at best 
misleading.141 Along the way he shows how what Rancière calls the essence of 
democracy takes on a different character given the context in which it is used: ‘Unlike the 
Athenians […] the Romans did not use lot for its egalitarian properties. In the census-
based Roman republic, lot chiefly had the effect of drawing votes together and promoting 
political cohesion, first among the propertied classes and then among the people as a 
whole, because of its neutrality and the religious interpretation that was placed on it’ 
(Manin, 1997: 51).   
 What Žižek does in regards to the Hegelian monarch and lot Manin does for the 
podestà or ‘single executive magistrate’ of the eleventh and twelfth century Italian 
commune: ‘there is a striking formal analogy between the institution of podesteria and 
the practice of lot, even though the podestà was elected and not selected by lot. The 
common element is that in both cases recourse was made to something external and 
neutral to overcome factional strife’ (Manin, 1997: 52).  For Žižek Hegel’s monarch is lot 
embodied in a constitutional (representative) monarchy, the embodiment of the fact that 
‘society doesn’t exist,’ the material realization that it is impossible for there to be a direct 
correspondence between power and those who wield it. It must also be remembered that 
he disputed that this was the final horizon of democracy for the left, and that the Leninist 
Party comes to take its place. For Žižek the monarch is a limited response to the problem 
of democracy that doesn’t allow room for radical progressive political change. Similarly, 
‘lot’ may be the essence of democracy but it is not enough to challenge the root of 
capitalism. In terms of Žižek’s thought, two things need to be noted to make sense of the 
role of lot: the transition from monarch to Party as figures of lot, and the difference 
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between those two figures. First, because there is no social group that is either 
homogeneous or closed, it can have no unmediated agency. That is, each subject is ‘split’ 
and can thereby only encounter its ‘will’ by encountering this split in a object – that is, 
the analyst (2002: 187-188). Second, unlike Hegel’s monarch, which is supposed to be 
separated from the rest of society by having no other class position than its own (i.e. 
having wealth independent of any particular estate), the Party is not a neutral outside 
observer but an engaged actor that picks sides: because not even the material world in 
closed, complete, or ‘all’, a singular ‘partial perspective is inscribed into the very material 
existence of things’ (2002: 181; see also 2000: 174). This is the ‘parallax view,’ and the 
‘a’ is this perspective. The embodiment of loss itself is thus the Party as psychoanalyst – 
subject to the necessity of the subjective engagement that is the transference – rather than 
the monarch. Where capitalism excludes the worker as labour-power, only a worker’s 
Party/analyst can stand in as the mediation that will ideologically reconstruct the nature 
of our particular ‘symbolic universe.’ 
 A comparison can here be made to what Rancière calls an ‘auctor.’ For Rancière 
an important part of democracy is the violent act of making the invisible visible. The 
essence of this is to ‘make words audible where only noise was perceptible before’ (2007: 
85), of making division where before there was a supposed unity. A similar function is 
played by an auctor, the ‘master of words,’ but in the opposite direction. The auctor pulls 
sense from ‘the noise of the world’ and thereby ‘augment[s] (augere) the power of 
collective being’ but in so doing pacifies (ibid: 10). This figure, this ‘master of words,’ is 
a psychoanalyst gone wrong; there is a more progressive half to this figure, one that does 
not pacify and unite but provokes division. Here can be seen the two sides of the Party as 
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well, the Stalinist Party of objective knowledge and queller of dissent, and the Leninist 
party that spreads the good word of the coming revolution142 and aids in the creation of 
an organization, a separation, apart from the State and the Duma. The auctor is a 
guarantor, as is the objective knowledge of the Party, as is the analyst for the patient that 
still expects the analyst to make them better (an impulse obliged by the American 
analysts that Lacan often derided). As the embodiment of the analysand’s own split, the 
analyst can be a new agent of the master’s will (Lacan’s ‘discourse of the analyst’ is also 
that of the pervert – the agent of the desire of the big Other) or the means of the 
analysand releasing themselves from that which binds them. This release is for Žižek that 
of which a progressive universality consists:  
The obverse of the Universal as the pacifying neutral medium/container of its particular content is 
the Universal as the power of negativity that undermines the fixity of every particular 
constellation, and this power comes into existence in the guise of the individual’s absolute egoist 
self-contraction, his negation of all determinate content (1999: 91).  
 
This is also Marx’s universality, that pronounced by Goethe’s spirit of negation: the 
universal is that first step that dissolves all substantial ties.  
This is where the beginning returns. Stavrakakis’ asserts that the drawing of lots –  
as embodied in Gormley’s One and Other – is worthy of respect as a democratic 
tradition. Where Rancière offers a trans-historical form of this tradition Žižek offers one 
that changes over time – the move from lot to Party, a form appropriate to capitalist 
exploitation. In place of the state-sponsored art project, the plinth lauded by Stavrakakis, 
the empty container in which a series of random individuals (‘content’) asserted their 
individuality independent of one another, one can counterpose Peter Watkins’ 1999 La 
Commune.143 In place of the empty place (a preserved form of emptiness – the plinth was 
intended for a particular statue, but no longer holds any) filled by lot, Watkins offers a 
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challenge to form, what he calls the media’s ‘monoform.’ Watkins put together an almost 
six hour film on the Paris Commune of 1871 that, like ‘One and Other’, was composed of 
‘ordinary’ citizens – 220 people from Paris and the provinces, mostly non-actors, who 
were ‘enlisted’ (perhaps the militaristic overtones are not accidental) to join the project. 
It, too, has generated a group of people ‘fidelious’ to it, Le Rebond, which promotes 
screenings of the film and organizes discussions around it. But the difference is stark: 
these actors were asked to research the commune themselves, form groups to discuss how 
their sets of characters would think and act, and ponder the links between the commune 
and present-day French society. This continued throughout the shooting of the film, 
leading to moments of confusion for the viewer when it is unclear whether the actors are 
in character talking about the commune or making links to contemporary society as 
French citizens. Rather than the collection of individuals offered up on the plinth in 
Trafalgar Square (Marx and Gramsci’s ‘sack of potatoes’), Watkins produced a collective 
voice that brought the spirit of history together with the problems of the present. 
Watkins himself admits the limits of the project, but what he offered was a means 
to speak in a collective voice that not merely challenged contemporary forms of 
communication but also created the reflexivity that produced a change in the people 
itself. In this way perhaps Lukács’ words can be used to ponder the function of the 
psychoanalyst and the communist Party as a challenge to form, and universality as 
activity: ‘it is necessary to gain a correct theoretical understanding of it in its twofold 
dialectical relationship: as both the form of this consciousness, and the form of this 
consciousness, i.e. both an independent and subordinate phenomena’ (1971: 330). There 
can be no radical democracy without a form in which it can develop, and no form in 
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which to develop without an analysis of the concrete social, historical, political, and 
economic world that made that form a possibility.  
This points to the next move in the present discussion. Against a-historical forms 
as figures of emancipation (particularly ‘lot’) Žižek offers a particular form, that of 
psychoanalysis and the Party. This demands that at least two questions be answered. The 
first is that of the actual form of analysis and the Party and why they are significant and 
homologous. The second is that of form and its actual meaning. The chapters that follow 
are thus a discussion of form as it is found in Žižek’s work and its relation to that of 
Hegel, various Marxists, and psychoanalysis, and the historical role of psychology/ 
psychoanalysis and the Party with the question of form in mind. 
  
!"  
 139 
Chapter 5 – Psychoanalysis: the political organization of a 
discipline  
 
Organization is the form of the mediation between theory and practice. And, as in every dialectical 
relationship, the terms of the relation only acquire concreteness and reality in and by virtue of this 
mediation.        
– Lukács, History and Class Consciousness  
 
There’s absolutely no reason why we should make ourselves the guarantors of the bourgeois 
dream.        
– Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis  
 
 
!"  
 
These two quotes – one from a practicing Marxist, the other from a practicing 
psychoanalyst – are a way of articulating a thesis: it’s not merely a question of how a 
patient is treated or cured, or of the theory that informs what is done in the clinical 
setting; It is also very much a question of how the profession and therefore the 
psychological disciplines are organized. The question of organization is precisely the 
question that helps properly formulate these other two. This is so because it  is tightly tied 
to the problem of ends. It’s tied to the problem of political ends.144 
The ends of psychological practice are indeed political in that they do not involve 
merely the individual but also the individual’s constitution through their social world. 
This is largely implicit, as will be shown. They are overtly political as well, and so as not 
to completely neglect this aspect of the practice of the psychological disciplines it is 
briefly discussed below. This is followed by a look at the work of German psychoanalyst 
Otto Fenichel and his suggestion that psychoanalysis could serve as a basis for the 
creation of a dialectical materialist psychology – not as a replacement of other 
psychological practices, but as a means to explain their effectivity and their relation to 
society at large. This is done to open the question of how, in addition to the explicit 
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political aspects of the psychological sciences, their organizational form is also very 
much a factor to be considered. Fenichel’s position is useful for introducing this 
problematic, but it leaves out a discussion of how the prevention of neuroses could be 
achieved via the practice of psychoanalysis, of how the clinic and the rest of the social 
world might be mediated in such a way to effect each other. As a means to elaborate how 
this might be the case, the history of the Canadian Psychological Association is taken up 
to show that the way the discipline of psychology is organized at the national level in 
Canada affects what the discipline is and how it is practiced. This is largely based on the 
work of John Dunbar, in which he suggests the introduction of the CPA’s Code of Ethics 
in 1977 transformed the CPA and what it meant to be a psychologist in Canada. While 
acknowledging some of the progressive elements of this development, it too has to be 
critiqued for its limitations. Based as it is in the discourse of human rights the CPA’s 
Code does introduce the question of the social role of psychology into the practice of the 
profession; without acknowledging the limits of this liberal discourse, however, and the 
way it is put into practice, these rights can never actually be achieved. As Žižek has 
recently argued, placing the ethical question before the question of political inherently 
limits any project by basing itself on the guarantees of a big Other rather than in the 
uncertainties of the freedom to transform the social world.145  
A potential Marxist alternative to the question of organization and the outcomes 
of psychological practice are revealed in the process of  exploring how the organization 
of the discipline affects what it is and how it is practiced. That is, the real political limits 
to the efficacy of liberal forms point to an alternative. Here enters the work Lacan. It was 
Lacan’s contention, made with reference to the thought of Marx, that the ends of analysis 
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were not to integrate people into the bourgeois world and help them achieve the 
‘American dream’, but to have them confront the truth of their existence. The end of the 
analytic treatment was thus, for Lacan, the creation not only of an individual who did not 
rely on the ‘big Other’ to furnish the elements of the ‘good life’, but also thereby another 
psychoanalyst who would work to help others achieve the same approach to the world. 
The end of analysis was thus the creation of a new sort of individual and a new sort of 
community. This is evident not just in Lacan’s theory, but also the history of his tussles 
with the psychoanalytic associations of his day. All of this suggests that an alternative to 
liberal-democratic organization is possible and worth serious consideration when 
discussing the practical and theoretical issues that arise in the psychological disciplines, 
and helps give historical credence to Žižek’s claims that there is an explicit link between 
the ‘form of analysis’ and the ‘form of the party.’ 
Psychoanalysis, psychology, war, and politics 
To assert that the ends of any psychological endevour are political is not 
something particularly new. This is most clearly discernible in relation to war: in an 
Austrian court during the First World War Freud testified against the nationalist 
commitment of army doctors whose analyses were used as a means to send soldiers back 
to the front or deny them their pensions. Freud wrote that in this way ‘medicine was 
serving purposes foreign to its essence.’146 That is, rather than helping soldiers – who 
today might be diagnosed with PTSD – overcome their traumas, German and Austro-
Hungarian army psychologists ‘aimed above all, at restoring his [the soldier’s] fitness for 
service.’ In the hands of the state the psychologist becomes a weapon: ‘[T]he physicians 
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were put into a role like that of machine guns behind the front, of driving fugitives back’ 
(Freud in Brunner, 2000: 311).  
In another better known example, French psychiatrist Frantz Fanon offered 
analyses of colonialism that didn’t separate the questions of political domination, 
liberation and the psyche, but articulated them as a complex whole. In his Wretched of 
the Earth, for example, his treatment of France’s colonization of Algeria culminates in a 
discussion of its psychological effects in terms of both the colonized and the agents of 
colonization. It was his contention that the task set for the psychiatric institutions that 
proliferated with the colonial project in Algeria – the task of ‘making him [the colonized 
subject] thoroughly fit into a social environment of the colonial type’ – was ‘difficult’ 
because the colonial project reduced the colonized population to objects, to a humanless 
part of the environment that was no different from land or camel (Fanon, 2004: 181-2). 
The answer to curing the psychological afflictions wrought by colonialism was thus not 
simply psychiatry or psychoanalysis, but revolution and the overthrow of the European 
occupier. This was not just Fanon’s analysis – in the course of his work he joined the 
national liberation movement. (For a short overview of Fanon and some of his 
contemporaries, see Hook, 2005; see also Teo, 2005).  
More recently, an American psychoanalyst attempted to organize against the 
unethical involvement of members of the American Psychological Association (APA) in 
the ongoing torture of political prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. He reported that 
psychologists are there being used not to ensure that prisoners are being properly treated, 
but aiding in the torture of detainees. Here the question of organization starts to become 
clear: while the American Medical Association and the American Psychiatric Association 
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publicly urged its members to refuse to do such work, the APA fought to protect its 
members’ ability to participate in such matters of ‘national security’ (Summers, 2007). 
As a result, the Pentagon reported a preference for members of the APA for its 
interrogations (Soldz, 2007).147  
In a related and uncanny example – uncanny in that it stands as an inverted image 
of the myriad attempts of Marxists, psychologists and psychoanalysts to bring the two 
together – Naomi Klein (2008) argues that the work done by American psychologist 
Ewen Cameron at McGill University in Montreal became the psychological backbone of 
American economic and military imperialism. In her account, the psychology pioneered 
by Cameron and used by the CIA is homologous to the logic underlying the neoliberal 
economic theories of the likes of Volker: raze the economy, raze the individual, and 
rebuild them to your liking. She outlines how the US has used this vicious method – what 
she calls the ‘shock doctrine’ – all over the planet, from Eastern Europe to South America 
to the Middle East.   
But the politics of the psychological disciplines are not limited to its relationship 
to colonialism, imperial projects and war: Morawski (1982) discusses how some of 
psychology’s early practitioners and theorists – G. Stanley Hall, Hugo Münsterberg, and 
John B. Watson in particular – saw their work as consistent with and part of a larger 
project to transform their own societies. It is only more recently that psychology’s 
political role has been neglected. Speaking of this forgetfulness in relation to post-
modernism and the rise of evolutionary biology, Conway (2010) explores the political 
economy of psychology to explain the turn away from an understanding of the social 
etiology of psychological disorders (i.e. poverty). He concludes that it is in part the result 
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of governments’ unwillingness to see the social depth of the problem coupled with drug 
companies’ interests in selling a cheaper, alternative individualist solution (i.e. 
medication) that allows it to be avoided in practice.  
Further in this vein, in his discussion of the historical roots of psychology 
Danziger (1990) shows that the discipline’s pretensions to scientism disguise its social 
nature and genesis. Danziger argues that psychology’s roots in philosophy and its search 
for the causal mechanisms behind individual human psychology (as seen in Wundt’s 
Liepzig laboratory) were displaced by functionalism and statistical analysis of aggregates 
abstracted from social reality in part because of the demands of the capitalist market: the 
development of statistical methods and their adoption by psychologists enabled them to 
‘convince their publics that they represented the sacred spirit of Science’ (119), publics 
which in the 1920s in the United States were administrators who were looking for means 
of social control. In particular, this trend took hold in relation to education, which people 
in power wanted to transform in order to meet the needs of a burgeoning corporate 
industrialism. One of the major effects of this, according to Danziger, is that what were 
initially taken to be ‘participants’ in psychological inquiry quickly became ‘subjects’ – 
passive elements upon which the psychologist (experimental or otherwise) acted. This 
has had effects on psychological research that are still very visible today. 
All of this points to the fact that the ends, theories, and practices of the 
psychological disciplines are an interrelated political problem. This is not just a scientific 
– or more accurately, technocratic – question, that of the correct pill or physical regimen, 
but also that of the relationship between the individual, the psychological disciplines per 
se, and the social. 
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Prevention = psychoanalysis + the professional associations 
The work of psychoanalyst Otto Fenichel puts an interesting spin on this, one that 
takes us from the theatre of war and the economy to that of the clinic. He was a practicing 
analyst who wrote a highly influential textbook entitled The Psychoanalytic Theory of 
Neuroses that was published in English in 1945. In its final chapter he outlines how 
treatments that do not take into account the relationship between the physician and the 
patient – a relationship, noted above, that has become one of expert and object – can lead 
to substitute neuroses that perpetuate, aggravate, or only temporarily alleviate the 
problem at hand (1945: 557-9). While focusing his discussion on transference effects, he 
also argues that the neuroses are not merely the result of the biological disposition of the 
patient but also the contradictions present in their social world. He takes several pages to 
note that the lived contradictions of capitalism are in great part what makes neuroses 
what they are. In decidedly Marxist fashion, he writes ‘it is characteristic of the present 
day society that many people are not able to satisfy their needs, although the means for 
their satisfaction are present’ (587). In this way he is able to say that neuroses are as such 
a ‘social disease’ (586).   
There is perhaps nothing terribly original in this either, considering it appeared 
during the thirties and forties. As Harris (1996: 67-68) notes, in the United States at this 
same time psychologists from many orientations claimed their own theoretical bend as 
compatible with Marxism. The reason Fenichel in particular is given space here is 
because he held that while other psychotherapies could at times be more effective than 
psychoanalysis, it was only psychoanalysis that could give an account of ‘the 
effectiveness of all psychotherapies’ (Fenichel, 1945, 554). Knowing Fenichel’s Marxist 
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disposition (which he for the most part kept hidden – see Jacoby’s The Repression of 
Psychoanalysis), it’s not hard to take this in the spirit of a Marxist dedication to the 
understanding of ‘the totality.’148 Psychoanalysis might be taken as the means to best 
understand human psychology because it is a conceptualization that sees the individual as 
constituted through the particular metabolism established between itself and the social 
and natural world. 
This can more clearly be seen in another piece written by Fenichel around the 
time of the English release of The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neuroses. In a paper 
unpublished in his lifetime Fenichel wrote that psychoanalysis was the only human 
science that ‘could be considered the nucleus of a dialectical-materialist psychology’ 
(1967: 300). His primary concern when he wrote this was to point out the need for 
‘prophylaxis’ (i.e. prevention) at the social level rather than simply treatment at the 
personal level. However, while he raises the question of the economic interests of 
clinicians and their relation to this end, while he addresses the question of the 
applicability of a supposedly ‘bourgeois science’ to the working class,149 while he raises 
questions about the organization of the state’s ‘ideology mills’ in relation to the 
psychology of those living under capitalism, Fenichel’s take is somewhat mechanical. He 
doesn’t answer the question of how prevention might actually be achieved in practice, 
how the clinic and the social world might be mediated. As such, he builds a door that 
opens onto an understanding of ‘the totality,’ but forgets to add the hinges.   
The question of the relation of the clinic and the political can be posed in at least 
three ways. First, there is the question of political advocacy outside the clinic. A 
practitioner could be a member of a political group, even one composed solely of other 
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practitioners, and not have it directly affect their clinical practice in the least. Second, 
there is the question of how politics is approached within the analytic/clinical situation. 
This might mean including a political history of the patient in their overall history, and 
attending to transferences in this light. Thirdly – and this is the more dialectical option, 
the hinge on the door that will be taken up in the most detail – there is the question of 
how the psychological professions are organized. This last option opens the question of 
the profession’s relationship to the economy, the state, fellow practitioners, different 
racialized groups, social classes, and last but not least their patients. As a result it also 
aims at what happens in research and clinical practice and the ends of that research and 
practice.  
The first of these possible approaches is fairly familiar. Examples include 
Psychoanalysts for the Prevention of Nuclear War in Britain in the 1990s, Physicians for 
Human Rights today in the United States, or some such other group found in civil 
society. Here one’s professional standing is used as a means to influence wider goings-
on. This solution to the problem of prophylaxis is an external one: actions outside the 
clinic are aimed at changing society, which would presumably in turn positively affect all 
members of it and their psychological wellbeing. While such groups serve a purpose, 
here the clinic and the political world are separated from each other in practice; Here 
politics is ‘outside’ and bringing it in forbidden.  
Politics could, of course, directly affect what happens in clinical practice, could 
be brought ‘in’ – hence its mention in the Canadian Psychological Association’s  code of 
ethics (see for instance article III.31). Here the vulnerability of the patient is at issue, as 
one’s interests might influence clinical outcomes in negative ways: patients could be 
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unscrupulously manipulated by their physicians for the latter’s own personal economic 
and political ends – consciously or not. As Botticelli points out in a review of 
Psychoanalysis, Class and Politics, bringing politics directly into the clinic raises 
complications as the spectre of transference: in many of the clinical examples presented 
in the book, ‘patients came to express views or act in the world in a way that moved them 
closer to the attitudes of which they might imagine their therapist would approve’ (2007: 
198). This is to suggest that the transference was not adequately dealt with, and as such 
the political outcomes of these analyses suspect.  
A means of properly addressing this concern is proposed by Samuels in The 
Political Psyche (1993). He suggests that it’s not only a matter of discussing political 
topics as they arise, but also constructing a political history of the analysand. In this way 
any particular political topic is tied into their psychological history, and provides a 
greater basis by which to work through the transference when it arises. In a discussion of 
an ad-hoc survey that he sent out to 11 psychological/psychoanalytic associations around 
the globe (including Brazil, Israel, Russia, The U.S. and Britain), Samuels shows that 
there are three approaches that analysts took to political question as they arose in 
practice: they either ignored the political content of analysands’ statements and took them 
merely as symbolic grist for the transference, acknowledged the political concerns as 
such (e.g. the bombing of Iraq being a terrible thing), or did both. This suggests that 
political content in analysis could be dealt with progressively by 1) acknowledging that 
politics is not merely a sign to interpret but exists as a real concern outside of the clinical 
setting; 2) the analysand has a particular relationship with those political questions and 
events and this relationship is tied into the analysand’s political history; 3) the analyst’s 
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political position – both material (i.e. class, race, gender…) and theoretical (‘I’m a 
Marxist’) – and those of the analysand meet in the transference and must be taken into 
account when working through it. 
There are some problems with this formulation, however: Samuels suggestions 
are conceptualized at the individual level (i.e. that between a clinician and a patient), and 
not that of the collective. In addition, Samuels announces his is a libertarian project 
(1993: 50), and so the outcomes of clinical practice are couched in terms of the 
‘development’ of the individual’s ego – yet another example of the importance of politics 
in relation to clinical ends. He does, however, point towards the possibility that group 
therapy is perhaps a better type of treatment in general, and gestures towards the question 
of organization in acknowledging that the training of professionals needs to take into 
account the political. He saw the lack of discussion on this topic at the level of the official 
organs of the discipline as particularly marked, often times calling psychoanalysis a 
conservative profession.  
It is professional associations that in large part maintain the standards of training 
and practice in a discipline, and therefore what is practiced and how. This points in the 
direction of the third possible approach to the political ends of clinical and 
experimental/theoretical work: changing the professional organization of the 
psychological disciplines. With this in mind the next section is a turn to the history of an 
actually existing professional body – the Canadian Psychological Association (CPA). 
Liberal organization, the market, and ethics 
Dunbar (1992)150 shows that in the beginning the CPA was a means to consolidate 
psychology as a profession per se, one that was separate from and no longer subject to 
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psychiatry. In post-war Canada there was an increase in the demand for psychological 
services by governments and private interests, but it was unclear what a psychologist did 
(as opposed to a social worker, teacher, or a member of the clergy…), how they were 
trained to do it, and who could rightly call themselves a psychologist. As a result, those 
who practiced psychology were subordinated to psychiatrists and paid substantially less. 
Professional organization was thus a means to secure not only the legitimacy of one’s 
discipline and define its scope against other practitioners, but also the economic worth of 
that discipline.  
As in other Western countries, Canadian professional associations and their stated 
standards of practice were a means to establish psychology as a legitimate discipline with 
a legitimate commodity to offer to the public.151 In Canada this took the particular form 
of using the American Psychological Association’s standards and its ethics code, in part 
to secure a place for Canadian researchers and practitioners at home as well as in the 
marketplace and psychological journals south of the border.  
Other particularities of the Canadian case include elements of the British North 
America Act that left the regulation of professional conduct to the provinces – thereby 
precluding a national association from doing this – and the Canadian government’s 
financial support of psychological research in Canadian universities. While the former 
made it difficult to establish nationwide standards, the latter circumstance led to the 
privileging of pure rather than applied research. In effect, it encouraged the development 
of a theoretical psychology that had little or no relation to practical psychology. This in 
turn led to the marginalization of practitioners within the CPA and their concerns about 
training standards.  
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Practitioners, too, had a close relationship with the state that caused problems for 
them: where many worked in publicly run institutions (for example hospitals and prisons) 
there arose a conflict between practitioners’ desire to aid their patients in terms of 
communication with multiple stakeholders and community welfare, and the state’s 
bureaucratic machinery – a machinery that demanded more immediately measurable 
goals and outcomes.152  
According to Dunbar, the code of ethics devised by the CPA in 1977 addressed 
(though perhaps did not solve) all these problems, thereby ending the CPA’s struggle to 
become the national representative of Canadian psychology. While provincial and 
territorial regulatory bodies are left to certify individual practitioners, the CPA has the 
role of accrediting training programs, publishing professional journals, and advocating on 
behalf of the discipline. The Code enabled this with reference to the discourse of human 
rights: where previous codes and of ethics were reactive in the sense that they outlined 
what not to do, this code was productive in that it could be used ‘to actively generate new 
normative conceptions of what constitutes socially responsible professional practice’ 
(Dunbar: 333-334). It can thus be used as a starting point from which to devise standards 
of practice, justify certain conceptions of psychology to both the public and the state, as 
well as solve particular ethical cases as they arise. What gives the Canadian Code this 
unique characteristic, according to Dunbar, is that it concerns itself with social 
responsibility. This is manifest in its inclusion as the last of its four principles.  
A comparison with the code currently used by the APA is instructive here: the 
APA’s code almost immediately asserts (in article 1.02) that in questions of ethics, the 
law and the state trump ethical considerations (APA, 2002). By contrast, the Canadian 
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Code demands that a psychologist speak out or act against laws and policies that are 
unethical (article IV.29); it includes the political injunction to ‘encourage others, in a 
manner consistent with this Code, to exercise responsibility to society’ (article IV.30); it 
demands that psychologists be aware of social and political climates (article IV.25), and 
that all research, service development, interpretation, information gathering and teaching 
material be ‘sensitive to the needs, current issues, and problems of society’ (article IV.20) 
(CPA, 2000).  
What begins to become clear from this is that the question of organization affects 
not only the economic place of the discipline in society, but also its perceived goals, its 
research, and its practice. The work of Bazerman (1988) is further instructive on this 
point: he shows that the development of both the natural and social sciences is tied to the 
rise of the scientific journal and the forms and standards of knowledge production that it 
reinforces. Beginning with the publications of the Royal Society, for example, he shows 
the gradual move from the simple reporting of natural phenomena to the writing of tracts 
on particular theoretical problems and hypotheses, attributing the change – and the 
development of experimental science itself –in large part to the act of debating over 
results. Doing so demanded more precision in the reporting of scientific activity, thereby 
giving experiments ‘an argumentative function’ in place of the past practice of giving 
what were thought to be ‘transparent’ reports of phenomena (68).  
This form of knowledge production was taken over by the social sciences, and in 
some instances rigidly codified. He argues that the extensive Publication Manual 
provided for authors who wish to write for the journals published by the American 
Psychological Association ‘offers a programmatically correct way to discuss the 
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phenomena under study; moreover, it stabilizes the roles, relationships, goals, and 
activity of individuals within the research community in ways consistent with the 
community’s belief about human behaviour’ (275). As noted above, journals produced by 
the CPA are a means to secure its legitimacy as a profession in the eyes of the public and 
the state. The implication to be emphasized in this regard is that to be considered a 
legitimate psychologist one must follow the rules set by the professional association and 
produce the types of knowledge that have been deemed fit by means of it (See also 
Danziger, 1990: 179-197). 
In this light it should then be considered highly significant that in 1977 the CPA 
took an explicit turn towards the social and political in its newly minted code of ethics. 
Before patting the back of the CPA for doing so, however, there are several things to be 
noted, each of which point to the limits of liberal conceptions of the subject and reveal an 
opening that can be developed in a Marxian direction.  First, there is the question how the 
Code is used. In a comparative study of psychologists’ relation to professional ethics in 
Canada and Cuba, Rossiter et al. (2002)153 attempt to show that the approach to ethics in 
the two countries differs widely: Canadian practitioners see ethics as a set of technical 
procedures that are used to solve ethical problems as they arise in clinical situations, and 
to maintain the ‘reputation or the security of the organization’ in which psychology is 
practiced (541). In this way ethics is limited to the clinical situation and separated from 
‘outside’ politics and social problems. Cuban practitioners, by contrast, see the practice 
of psychology as itself an ethics, as the attempt to ‘implement the values of the revolution 
in everyday life’ (543). Where in Cuba the practice of ethics as the practice of 
psychology is seen as a contribution to national values of solidarity and social justice, in 
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Canada ‘outcome-based ethics constructs practice as a neutral professional endevour’ 
(542). That is, in Canada ethics are subordinated to the logic of liberal ‘neutrality’ and the 
logic of the market.  
Further, as Dobson and Breault (1998) suggest in their brief review of the 
regulation of ethics in Canada, the Code is not used to the same degree by each provincial 
psychological association: It is often used in conjunction with other codified standards 
and provincial laws, and in British Columbia has not been officially adopted at all. In 
their view, the Code functions mostly as a useful educational and training tool, an 
‘aspirational document,’ and a minimum standard to consider in the event of complaints – 
legal and otherwise.   
This is the point at which  one need be reminded that the ethics developed by the 
CPA is used as a means to provide the CPA with legitimacy: the Code is used as a means 
to negotiate the way psychologists deliver their services for the government; the Code is 
an ethical basis from which to lobby for research monies; the Code provided the means of 
securing the unification of the national market for psychological services by establishing 
a set of national standards that could potentially replace the myriad, conflicting training 
and other standards set by the provincial associations. As such it is not a neutral tool that 
can do no harm, but a one that is used to further goals within a capitalist society.   
The second problem is that this is clearly an organization based on liberal ideals, 
and as a consequence suffers from liberalism’s failures. The CPA’s ethics code includes 
in writing what Badiou, in his Ethics (2002), argues is one of the limits of the liberal 
discourse of difference and human rights: it allows only differences that do not challenge 
the status quo, that do not really make a difference. The CPA’s ethics code constantly 
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calls for a respect of difference, including the political injunction to ‘encourage others 
[…] to respect the dignity of persons and to expect respect for their own dignity’ (article 
I.46). However, it also states that this respect need not be adhered to if doing so 
contravenes the Code (article IV.16). Where the Code is based on the liberal discourse of 
human rights, anything that is not compatible with it (i.e. different conceptions of what it 
means to be human in the first place; the idea of a collective or a non-liberal subject) are 
ruled out from the beginning.154 In her critique of Ignatieff’s discussion of human rights, 
Brown makes the problem clear: in the end the liberal defense of rights translates into a 
philosophical endorsement of market capitalism and a negation of all collective decisions 
because it sees them as a form of external coercion antithetical to personal freedom: 
‘human rights discourse […] carries implicitly antipolitical aspirations for its subject – 
that is, casts subjects as yearning to be free of politics and, indeed, of all collective 
determinations of ends’ (Brown, 2004: 456).   
This isn’t to say that the discourse of human rights is without a progressive 
element. For example, in his fight against the APA’s position in regards to the 
involvement of psychologists at Guantanamo (referred to above), Summers argues that 
the absence of any reference to human rights in the APA’s ethics code serves as a 
reactionary loophole. Similarly, István Mészáros argues that in capitalist society the 
discourse of human rights serves as a means of advocating for self-realization in 
opposition ‘to the forces of dehumanization and increasingly more destructive material 
domination’ and as such ‘remains a concern of paramount importance for all socialists’ 
(1986: 210). This because any Marxist must acknowledge the material effects of thought, 
ideology, and political institutions, and not brush them off as ‘mere’ components of the 
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superstructure. In part, then, the liberals have it right: the question of organization is an 
important one and the social needs to be included in any organizing principle. But the 
limits of the liberal discourse of human rights are very real, and demand a move beyond 
it.  
There are at least three failings that can be seen in the CPA’s Code in this regard. 
First is in the contradiction between reliance on the subject of science (i.e. the subject as 
object) and on the liberal subject of ethics (i.e. the autonomous individual). As noted 
above, Danziger makes much of this, showing that the move from Wundtian to Galton-
stlye psychology involved the move from ‘participant’ to ‘subject’ (see also Walsh, 1985: 
26-40; Walsh-Bowers, 1995; for a liberal attempt to overcome this division, see Martin et 
al, 2010).  Second is the assumption that the individual is a separate, mechanical piece of 
a larger whole. For example, the Code talks about respect of other cultures and of 
politics, but not the social etiology of problems, and ‘social responsibility’ is the last in a 
hierarchy of four principles (i.e. it is subordinated to the individual). Lastly, it fails to 
account for the economic and class imperatives that undermine its ethical goals at the 
social level, and belie the discipline’s practice itself: how can the dignity of the person be 
respected if they are left destitute by the society they live in? How can psychologists take 
into account political climates and problems when funding structures and the imperative 
to ‘publish or perish’ favour quantitative, positivist research over qualitative social and 
political research?  
Understanding the importance of professional organization in regards to the 
discipline of psychology as a discipline and the limits of liberal forms demands that one 
 157 
ask what a socialist psychology might look like at the level not only of its goals, but also 
at the level of its organization. 
A socialist alternative? 
The question of the potential social outcomes of psychoanalytic treatment were not 
only the purview of Marxist-inspired psychoanalysts, but also of its liberal adherents. 
During the second world war Ernest Jones, for example, wrote that… 
…it is striking to observe how little advantage is commonly obtained from psycho-analysis in 
comparison with what one knows must be potentially available. Analysts and other analysed 
persons often continue to hold heatedly the same convictions and to employ in support of them the 
same rationalized arguments as unanalyzed people in such matters as political controversy: the 
sacrosanctity of private property and the capitalistic system or, on the other hand, the panacea of 
communism […].  (Jones, 1942: 4).  
 
He then goes on to say that it would be worthwhile for someone to pioneer an 
approach that would deal with this question. Another actually existing theory and 
practice, also that of a non-Marxist, furnishes a potential answer: the ideas and career 
of Lacan. One commentator takes the possibilities opened by Lacan seriously enough 
to suggest that… 
…in point of fact, an increase in the number of people who undergo Lacanian psychoanalytic 
treatment and ethically assuming the inconsistency of the symbolic order, jouis-sans, would 
inevitably increase the chances of the success of a political force which does not aim primarily at 
obliterating lack (Chiesa, 2007: 191).  
 
To get to this point, however, it’s important to show how this is present in the actual 
organizational problems of French psychoanalysis. Much as with the development of the 
professional associations of psychology, the question of the organization of 
psychoanalysis in France centred on the refusal to be subordinated to other disciplines 
and a differentiation from them. This included questions of who was allowed to practice, 
who was allowed to teach, and who should be doing any certifying. In France in the late 
forties and early fifties this revolved around the question of ‘lay analysis.’ Following in 
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Freud’s footsteps, Lacan argued that psychoanalysis should not be reduced to a medical 
or neurological science, but include knowledge of the arts and humanities, and be a 
creative endevour rather than simply a certified, acquired skill (Turkle, 1978, 104-5; 
Macey, 1988: 87-89).   
This was no mere passing fancy. Lacan had much to say on these questions, and 
they appear throughout his Écrits and elsewhere.155 To for a moment sing a rather 
familiar refrain through the chorus of Hegel and Marx, Lacan held that language stood as 
Moses and the Profits, the discovery that Freud had made but none of his followers (in 
Lacan’s view) adhered to, at the peril of both psychoanalysis and its analysands. This was 
a problem not just at the level of theory or practice, but also of organization. In the latter 
half of ‘The Situation of Psychoanalysis and the Training of Psychoanalysts in 1956’, for 
example, Lacan argues that in creating the International Psychoanalytic Association 
(IPA)  before realizing the role of ego identification in group formations such as the army 
and Church (i.e. before the writing of Group Psychology ), Freud undermined ‘the 
objective of tradition and discipline in psychoanalysis’, which is ‘to call into question 
their [i.e. tradition and discipline per se] very crux, along with man’s relation to speech’ 
(Lacan, 2006: 397). He goes so far as to suggest that the setting up of the structure of 
psychoanalytic institutions as a ‘democracy’ of masters who decided who could become 
members of the community is what precipitated ego psychology: ‘…let us not forget that 
entry into the community of analysts is subjected to the condition of undergoing a 
training analysis; and there surely must be some reason why the theory of the end of 
analysis as identification with the analyst’s ego first saw the light of day in the circle of 
training analysts’ (398). This is to suggest that it is practice and its organization that 
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preceed theory, or at least have a hand that reaches deep into its genesis: ‘It is not, in fact, 
that conceptual rigor and developments in technique are lacking in psychoanalytic works. 
If they remain so sporadic and even inefficient, it is because of a more profound problem 
that is due to a singular confusion in the precepts of practice’ (386).156 That is, an 
organization based on identification with a master’s ego (i.e. that of Freud) perpetuated a 
theory consistent with that organization and the stifling of growth. It is in this light that 
we should read Lacan’s remarks (as in, for example, the ‘Rome Discourse’) that 
psychoanalysis had come to resemble a Church. 
The problems did not only lie with the organization of psychoanalysis and its 
theories. In his Ethics of Psychoanalysis he takes aim at the demands of the analysand 
that they be provided with the means to properly enjoy commercial goods, that they be 
cured in such a way as to enjoy the fruits of capitalist society. In turn, he was critical of 
what he saw as American-style psychoanalysts (i.e. ‘ego psychologists’) who were 
willing to validate that expectation by strengthening the ego as a means to better integrate 
their patients into the American (or bourgeois) dream. In his view, the end of analysis 
was not happiness and integration, but a confrontation with truth. To push this point 
Lacan makes use of Marx: the ends of analysis are not ‘the good’ (Aristotle) nor ‘the 
goods’ (i.e. commodities) but instead a challenge to jouissance and power. Marx’s 
critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, said Lacan, was of interest because it showed 
that there was a structural limit that prevented such a idealist state from coming to 
realization (Lacan, 1997, 208-9). This limit is jouissance in its double sense of both affect 
and access to private property: not only does capitalism prove a limit to the achievement 
of utilitarian fantasies of ‘happiness’ and material wealth, to mistakenly associate 
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jouissance with objects rather than relations between ‘objects’157 is to mistake the nature 
of human affect. It is not the object that provides enjoyment, but the processes of desire 
and drive that do so.  
This line of thought is developed in different parts of Lacan's career. Whereas in 
his Ethics he argued that Marx misunderstood the elements of enjoyment that made up 
affect, in 1968-9 he argued that, in fact, ‘surplus-value’ and his own conception of 
‘surplus-enjoyment’ were homologous (Lacan: 2002). It was also around this time that 
Lacan further elaborated his argument that the end of analysis is the end of subjection to 
both the master – ego psychologist and otherwise – and mastery per se. That is, the end 
of analysis is not an egoistic self-mastery, but the end of one’s belief in the big Other 
(institutions, assumptions, and guarantees – a list which for Marxists would include 
capitalism in its various forms158) and the creation of a psychoanalyst (Lacan: 2007).  
The trap to be spied here, however, is that pointed out by Jacoby in his survey of 
‘conformist psychology’ and the English anti-psychiatry movement’s response to it. In 
his take on R. D. Laing Jacoby argues that the confusion of therapy and political practice 
leaves both ineffective, and therapy must know its limits:  
there can be talk of therapy, but therapy as therapy – not as radical therapy or social change. The 
therapy accepts for the sake of the individual victim the distinction between the individual form of 
the illness and its social origin. In this way therapy becomes self-conscious, adequate to its notion; 
it does not mystify itself as radical cure or liberation while it responds to the emergency of the 
individual victim (Jacoby, 1975: 134).       
 
To put in terms of revolutionary practice, Jacoby means to say that one can not leave 
aside the day-to-day needs of the revolutionaries and focus solely on revolution, nor 
mistake the maintenance of day to day needs as revolution. However, where he doesn’t 
give flesh to the alternative, Jacoby effectively leaves himself in the position of 
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advocating for only responding to the psychological ‘emergency’ and leaving the social 
context at the level of acknowledgement, and exterior to practice.159  
Given the preceding discussion, psychoanalysis potentially offers a different end. 
Perhaps the conservative line in which psychoanalysis aims to make the individual better 
adjust to their environment can be given a new twist: where this adjustment is based in 
the dissolution of a the belief in the big ‘Other’, one adjusts subjectively to the existing 
world but in what Jacoby would call a negative mode – with the knowledge that another 
world is possible. The end of analysis is the creation of a new sort of subject who is a 
member of a new sort of community, a community that is created/joined at the conclusion 
of ‘the cure’. Seminal to this is psychoanalysis as a ‘discourse’, a ‘social link’ that was 
different from any other to be found in society. Remember, too, that in the view of Lacan 
and Fenichel this cure need not exclusively include ‘the talking cure’, but also other 
elements of the psychotherapeutic toolkit. 
As noted above, this is not only apparent in Lacan’s theory but also in his 
practice, infamous in its challenges to the organization of psychoanalysis as a discipline. 
This begins with a break with the IPA and the Psychoanalytic Society of Paris (SPP) in 
1953 and continues with the repeated creation, transformation, and dissolution of new 
associations – all of which happened both for, with, and against Lacan. As Turkle points 
out, in this first break Lacan was not the driving force, but served as a flash-point for 
discontent in the French psychoanalytic movement. That is, not all those that left the SPP 
at this time did so because they agreed with his theories. Some did so because he 
represented a challenge to the medicalizing and bureaucratizing currents in the SPP, as 
well as its contradictions. Indeed, Roudinesco points out that a big part of the puzzle of 
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the original break was something of a student revolt (involving Roudinesco’s mother) 
against the way the SPP was treating its trainees (1990: 244), rather than a move 
organized by Lacan. It was only after the break that he resigned from his position at the 
SPP. What all this points to is that once you conceive of analysis as something other than 
a means to strengthen the ego and integrate people into the ‘bourgeois dream,’ once you 
conceive of the ends of analysis as the challenging of power and its various masters, 
clearly you present a problem for an organization that does neither in theory nor in 
practice. More importantly for socialists, you raise the question of how to collectively 
organize those whose primary aim is to eliminate reified social systems.  
Dolar (2008) takes up this point, arguing that the end of the belief in the big Other 
is the point that psychoanalysis becomes political. Where the end of analysis is the 
creation of an analyst who is part of a community of analysts who all challenge the Other, 
the question of the form of that community becomes unavoidable. He glibly asserts that 
this is the same logic that inheres to the Leninist Party. Žižek, Dolar’s comrade, makes a 
similar comment, writing that Lacan’s repeated reformulation of his ‘schools’ were a 
‘Leninist move’ (Žižek, 2008b: xcviii; 2006a: 306).  He goes so far as to argue that the 
form of the Leninist Party is homologous to the form of the analytic relationship. He 
argues, in a similar vein that has been suggested throughout this chapter, that the form of 
one’s activity is not a neutral addition to a social and political horizon, but is instead the 
creation of a new kind of knowledge and interaction with the world that has 
transformative power (Žižek, 2002: 178-191).  
This suggests a way of understanding Fenichel’s remarks that psychoanalysis can 
be used to explain ‘the effectiveness of all psychotherapies’ and ‘could be considered the 
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nucleus of a dialectical-materialist psychology,’ raised above. This is so because 
psychoanalysis is at base the question of the relation of the individual to the social. ‘From 
the very first,’ Freud wrote in his Group Psychology, ‘individual psychology […] is at the 
same time social psychology as well’ (Freud, 1959: 1). When placed within the context of 
a Marxist analysis of the social, ‘social psychology’ becomes the question of how to 
create a socialist community by creating a new relationship with the world we currently 
inhabit. Where conditions change, so too must organizations and ways of thinking. Here 
organizational means, social realities, and political ends mediate each other: a socialist 
organization must constantly modify its form in response to the immediate social and 
political contexts in which it finds itself. It must constantly ask and act on the following: 
what is to be the form of the organization through which we approach the world in order 
not only to change it, but to best understand it and ourselves in order to properly do so?  
This was the question that Lacan posed in regards to psychoanalysis. Like 
Fenichel, he too asserted that psychoanalysis had something particular to offer the 
psychological disciplines: ‘If psychoanalysis […] is neither the only psychotherapy, nor 
applicable in all cases, it alone has brought a general theory of psychotherapies and 
ensures the psychotherapist satisfactory preparation whose basis is the training analysis’ 
(Lacan in Roudinesco, 1990: 226). It mustn’t be forgotten, however, that similar 
assertions were also being made in the United States. Shorter (1997) relates the following 
remarks made by a child psychiatrist who questioned the scientific basis of 
psychoanalysis at a medical educator’s meeting in 1962: ‘Just about every eminent figure 
present rose to defend the primacy of psychoanalysis as “the basic science” of psychiatry’ 
(quoted in Shorter: 181).  It was in the U.S., from the 1940s to the late 1960s, that 
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psychoanalysts held many of the major chairs in psychiatry, and ‘took over much of the 
apparatus of the American Psychiatric Association’ (Shorter: 172). These were the ego-
psychologists against which Lacan railed, and who dominated psychiatry not by dint of 
their numbers but because they ‘wrote the textbooks, staffed the university departments, 
and sat on the examination boards’ (Shorter: 173). Shorter contends that this happened in 
no small part because of the desire to move psychiatry away from institutional settings 
into private, individual practice, and the popularity of psychoanalytic ideas in post-war 
America. He also excoriates psychoanalysis for dogmatism and an unwillingness to 
integrate scientific measure and discovery,160 locating the cause in European émigrés who 
had close ties to Freud and who were unwilling to let go of the master’s ideas – against 
Freud’s own theoretical words (though not organizational actions) to the contrary, which 
encouraged a more limited role for psychoanalysis and an openness to new discoveries. 
Shorter thus labels psychoanalyst’s post-war hegemony a ‘hiatus’ rather than a 
development (See also Engel, 2008 on this history). 
Lacan was perhaps then justified in his attacks on the IPA and ego psychology. 
By some accounts, however, Lacan’s own organizational answer to the role of 
psychoanalysis was a miserable failure: what began as an attempt to create a non-
hierarchical organization ended in a tacit hierarchical valuation of theory and practice, 
and the instatement of Lacan as the ‘absolute master.’161 Even if this is the case, one 
shouldn’t draw the conclusion that the question was wrongly posed. Rather, it points to 
the difficulties of organizing the new within the context of the old, and the weight of the 
struggle.  
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Echoes of the history of the CPA are found in the history of the psychoanalytic 
movement in France: in both cases there was a fight for legitimacy of the psychological 
professions, in both the relationship between theory over practice was an issue, and in 
both cases organizational questions were part of the problem and part of the result. The 
work of Bazerman, Danziger, Dunbar, and Walsh-Bowers et al shows that an important 
factor in the history of the psychological disciplines more generally is their organization, 
and the French and the Canadian cases provide two possible directions that history can 
and has taken. In the case of the CPA, a liberal approach channeled through ethics and 
the discourse of human rights enabled the organization to establish itself as a national 
body that acts as a lever to ensure access to the psychological ‘marketplace.’ The 
inevitable problem in a capitalist society is that a nominal political dedication to human 
rights is subordinated to and stymied by this marketplace, making its realization 
impossible. The Lacanian case points to the possibility of countering the demands of a 
marketplace that creates ‘consumers’ who wish to be integrated into it and an 
organizational structure willing to accommodate that demand. It also points to the 
problems in creating a non-hierarchical body adequate to the task: an organization 
dedicated to the destruction of organizations as we know them runs the risk of becoming 
its own enemy.  
Marx once wrote that ‘the world has long since possessed something in the form 
of a dream which it need only take possession of consciously, in order to possess it in 
reality.’ The bourgeois dream is impossible in that its individualism is based on collective 
production and the social nature of wealth, on the exploitation of communal existence. 
What we potentially posses are the means to human emancipation, against their 
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domination and inequitable division: immense wealth, knowledge, and passion. To 
transform this reality, organization must be considered not a secondary element, but a 
primary, necessary, mediation – one to be fought both for and with. 
This is not only true of the discipline of psychology but of the social world more 
broadly – or so Žižek claims, linking the form of analysis to capitalist money and the 
(communist) party. It is these two points that are addressed in the  next chapter.  
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Chapter 6 – ‘…But not always in perverse form’: the 
vicissitudes of capitalism, the Other, and the Party 
 
Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement. It is impossible to 
emphasise this thought too much at a time when along with the fashionable preaching of 
opportunism people are carried away with the narrowest possible forms of practical activity.  
 
– Lenin, What Is To Be Done? 
 
Faced with a disaster over which we have no real influence, people will often say, stupidly, ‘Don’t 
just talk, do something!’ Perhaps, lately, we have been doing too much. Maybe it is time to step 
back, think and say the right thing. True, we often talk about doing something instead of actually 
doing it – but sometimes we do things in order to avoid talking and thinking about them. 
 
– Žižek, ‘Don’t Just Do Something, Talk.’ 
 
!"  
 
 The question of form is important not only because it focuses attention on the 
material world but also because asking which form to look to in order to precipitate 
revolutionary change is significant.162 This can be seen by turning to Rothenberg’s The 
Excessive Subject. In the final chapter she refers to Žižek’s turn to Bartleby as subject to 
‘the parallax view’ as a means to approach a new type of radical political community: in 
her account Bartleby is a figure that has the potential to both maintain the status quo (he 
does, at the beginning of Melville’s story, actually do some work) as well as disrupt it. 
The Subject is for her both one more person amongst many – simply another part of the 
system – and a singular individual who is as such also an ‘excessive’ universal – that is, a 
potentially free individual with their own, idiosyncratic sinthome. The problem, in her 
view, is accounting for how one can move from one side of the parallax to the other and 
thus affect social change, both at the individual and the social level. She begins with the 
question of how to differentiate Bartleby’s masochistic acts from those of the pervert to 
then pass through the question of the practice of psychoanalysis, which in Lacan’s work 
shares the form of perversion: in Rothenberg’s account, the analyst is one who has 
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disinvested themselves of all their psychic defenses and thereby ‘decreases a given 
subject’s contribution to the affective storm in the social field’ (Rothenberg, 2010: 211). 
At the same time, someone who has accomplished such an act serves as a prompt for 
others to undergo the same change – this because their non-defensiveness enables others 
to reflect upon their own defenses and begin to work past them. To expand this idea she 
turns to the work of Felix Guattari – before his encounter with Gilles Deleuze – to argue 
for a praxis that leads to a radical group dynamic that relies on submission to castration 
and a master-signifier, but in a non-Oedipal way. The twist is that this form of castration 
does not subsume the singularity of the group members in that its master-signifier is non-
hierarchical and does not rely on an Imaginary (in Lacan’s sense) group-image by which 
one ‘belongs’ (Rothenberg, 2010: 224).  
Rothenberg does not fully explain these latter points and admits that she is in part 
giving her own interpretation of Guattari’s position, but they can perhaps be best 
understood as a question of Symbolic and Imaginary identification: first, each member of 
the group who might otherwise have authority must self-castrate in that they submit to the 
group-signifier created by the group itself (a form of symbolic identification); second, the 
group does away with Imaginary images of a complete/whole group, instead embracing 
the non-complete relation between each of its members (eliminating any Imaginary 
identification). Here it’s worth noting that Chiesa argues that for Lacan (with whom 
Guattari trained) castration is a Symbolic threat that results in the ‘resumption of the 
image of the fragmented body’ (Chiesa, 2007: 30). Given these two points Guattari’s 
assertion (quoted by Rothenberg) that this new social link is not castration but instead on 
the ‘threshold of castration’ can be understood to mean that one once again takes on an 
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understanding of oneself as fragmented but does not resolve this crisis by accepting the 
master’s (Oedipus’) signifier, instead creating a new one along with one’s comrades.  
While this is not antithetical to Žižek’s position there are at least two problems 
here, neither having much to do with the abstract description of this new community that 
Rothenberg gives: this move doesn’t accomplish what she wants it to – it doesn’t explain 
how one might get to such a ‘Bartleby’ politic. The first thing to note here is that 
Rothenberg is describing the relatively closed, controlled conditions of a mental 
institution where the people in power who are to self-castrate are hospital employees who 
must ‘accept’ this castration (Rothenberg, 2012: 224) – why they would do this is 
unclear. There is also an ambiguity around how patients join these groups: in 
Rothenberg’s words people are ‘put’ there (Ibid: 225), making it uncertain if all this relies 
on self-selection or a benevolent master imposing a pseudo-castration. Either way, 
neither is a terribly good solution to the problem she sets: if it is a master who sets this in 
motion it opens the question of ‘who first castrates the castrator’; if it is self-selection 
there still remains the problem of why people would self-select.  
This ambiguity directly flows from the second problem in this account: the link to 
capitalism is left unexplained. Her focus is instead on hierarchy per se: in the model she 
provides, the central aspect taken into account is the flattening of difference (i.e. the 
destruction of hierarchy), a hierarchy which on the surface has nothing particularly 
capitalist about it. This is where the problem of form comes in: it will perhaps come as no 
surprise that the patients in question are schizophrenic and this model relies on an attempt 
to ‘actualize transcendental aspects of madness hitherto repressed’ (Guattari in 
Rothenberg, 2010: 227). That is, madness as it exists provides the form by which radical 
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change can be made. This, then, is the answer to how one moves to one side of the 
parallax to the other: both sides already exist, and rationally comprehending them allows 
us to make use of the ‘other side.’ Rothenberg does not, however, give a clear indication 
of how schizophrenia fits in. She moves from Bartleby the pervert to Bartleby the analyst 
while relying on a figure of Bartleby the psychotic without explaining how or why this is 
the case. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari align capitalism with schizophrenia in their two 
most famous books, and granted, in Lacan’s account schizophrenia does rely on a 
different relation to the signifier, one in which it is ‘foreclosed’ and the castration threat 
is denied such that difference is flattened. If the task is to solve a problem that supposedly 
can be found in Žižek’s work, however, there is a far more cogent way to do it, one that is 
more consistent with Žižek’s own thinking. This can be understood with reference to 
Naomi Reed’s reading of ‘Bartleby the Scrivener’ that takes into account that Melville’s 
character worked on Wall Street.163 Looking at the particular ways Bartleby’s employer 
is made to describe his ex-employee Reed argues that the Wall Street scrivener is both 
cadaver and spirit, ‘a strange admixture of the bodily and the ghostly’ – in other words an 
embodiment of use- and exchange-value (Reed, 2004: 250). His various refusals are also, 
in Reed’s take, the refusal to enter circulation – circulation in the labour market and 
circulation in space, for example (Ibid: 255-6). That is, Bartleby is ‘value’ that refuses to 
be so. Here Rothenberg’s understanding of excess becomes important: in her account it is 
‘the medium of [the subject’s] connection to other subjects and the obstacle to that 
connection’ (Rothenberg, 2010: 206). To formulate this in terms of money: the 
commodity form is that which connects all labour under capitalism while also serving as 
the means of the exploitation of that labour. 
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 This is perhaps the best way to read Marx’s comments in a letter to Ruge that 
‘reason has always existed, but not always in a reasonable form’: in a capitalist society 
reason as universal self-determination is at once made possible and obscured by the form 
of capitalist wealth-creation and exploitation – the commodity form and its fetishism. In 
this sense a position similar to Marx’s appears in Lacan’s work, as read by Lorenzo 
Chiesa. He shows that as Lacan’s thought progresses ‘the Other of the Other’ as 
guarantor of certainty disappears, with the consequence that the Master-Signifier as 
Name-of-the-Father is reduced from a ‘bi-univocal’ or ‘natural’ sign to one ‘(perverse) 
Master-Signifier’ among many – a move that Chiesa argues is tied to Lacan’s discussion 
of the historically changing  place of the Other in Western systems of thought, from 
Aristotle to Descartes, Newton, and Kant. That is, Chiesa shows that while Lacan argues 
that in the past the symbolic universe was guaranteed by the stars, then God,  and then the 
Noumenal, a similar change in reflected in Lacan’s own work: where once he held that 
there was an ‘Other of the Other’ that guaranteed the smooth functioning of the world – 
i.e. the ‘Name of the Father’ as a natural and universal necessity – in the course of 
Lacan’s work the Master-Signifier is progressively revealed to be the product of a 
‘Symbolic act’ – the activity of the subject. This is to say that Lacan is the end-point of a 
trajectory leading to the end of the belief in the big Other and the revelation that 
jouissance is instead (in a pun coined by Chiesa) jouis-sans: not something that we come 
into the world possessing and then losing with our entry into language, but the product of 
our free activity. That is, it is perversion as the form of our social relations that makes us 
potentially free.    
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What isn’t made explicit in Chiesa’s account, however, is the role that Marx’s 
thought takes in Lacan’s trajectory towards the death of the big Other: jouissance as 
Lacan understands it is what is described by Marx as surplus-value. The ‘absolutisation 
of the market’ and the creation of abstract labour, according to Lacan, bring surplus-
jouissance into discourse, just as there is no energy in moving water without a dam and a 
turbine. That is, capitalist money is a perverse Master-Signifier as when it becomes the 
basic form of social interaction all guarantees ‘melt into air’ and the modern subject as 
such is born. And, according to Lacan, this is no mere metaphor: ‘This surplus enjoying 
appeared, in my last talk, in function of a homology with respect to the Marxist surplus-
value. Homology clearly means – and I underlined it – that the relation is not one of 
analogy. It is indeed the same thing that is at stake. It is a matter of the same stuff in so 
far as what is at stake is the scissors’ mark of discourse’ (Lacan, 2002: Lecture III-1).164 
What is left is the disavowed knowledge that money – and by extension capitalism – is 
the product of one’s own activity, and thus stands as an inverted form of freedom. What 
appears as natural and unchangeable – castration as the immutable law of ‘the name of 
the father’; generalized commodity exchange as seen in the capitalist marketplace – is in 
fact the product of history and human activity.  
According to Žižek this flight from freedom appears in late-capitalism as the 
collapse of Master-Signifier and objet a – the ‘Real-ization of the symbolic’; it appears as 
the supposed certainty and freedom of hedonism, where the ‘Symbolic order’ is directly 
infused with enjoyment and the ‘superego injunction to enjoy’ is generalized. The 
antidote to this ‘development’ of  perversion is thus not to be found in madness and an 
abstract attack on hierarchy, but in the perverse form itself: not the ‘perverse’ Stalinist 
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version of the Bolshevik Party where (according to Žižek) reference to the laws of history 
stand as the big Other and a guarantor of the successful creation of communism, but in 
the emptied perverse discourse that is the discourse of the analyst – one Žižek claims is 
shared by the Bolsheviks of the Russian revolution. The Party is for Žižek not a particular 
knowledge but a different form of knowledge – one that can counter that of the 
commodity – based on the realization that there are no guarantees but only the freedom to 
change the world, for better or ill.  
The importance of the question of form – as above, between the form of the 
Leninist Party and capitalist ideology as embodied in commodity exchange – was not 
foreign to Lenin, as can be seen in his ‘The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat 
It’ (included in Žižek’s small, edited volume of Lenin’s writing). Here he argues that 
what was needed to fend off famine and continue towards socialism was already present 
in the Russia of 1917, though in an insufficiently democratic form to be effective. 
Whereas capitalists had to change the form of the struggle over capitalism’s existence 
from ‘monarchist’ to ‘republican-democratic’ to survive the attacks against it (and 
thereby fomented famine, disorganization, and general catastrophe for the workers and 
peasants of Russia), what was needed to destroy capitalism was a different form of 
democracy within the economic and political bodies of the country. Where ‘reactionary-
bureaucratic’ regulation had led to economic disaster, ‘revolutionary-democratic’ 
regulation would lead to the renewed functioning of the economy. These democratic 
transformations – the nationalization of the banks and the syndicates such that they would 
be under the control of those who made them function, the abolition of commercial 
secrecy – could be made by simple formal decree and then carried out through the 
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initiative of those who worked in the institutions in question. Lenin was disparaging of 
those who didn’t see the difference between the two forms as decisive, writing that ‘This 
“little difference” is of major importance’ (Lenin in Žižek, 2002: 78). 
This is to say that critics like Robinson and Tormey165 (2004; 2006) move all too 
quickly when they assert that Žižek is too abstract, formal, and idealist (as opposed to 
materialist) to be considered a Marxist, or to consider his work as having any substantial 
relation to Marx’s thought and the historical reality of Lenin and the Russian Revolution, 
and in the end to struggle in the world in which we find ourselves. It is also to say that, as 
Rothenberg puts it, we have the problem and the problem is in a way its own solution: 
rather than turning to actually-existing madness and creating new institutions to find the 
possibilities of that madness, actually-existing social relations between everyone – both at 
the level of the economy and the state – can be seized in their ‘parallax’ moment in order 
to affect social change. That is, where money isolates workers by creating discreet 
‘things’ that can be compared, it also unites in that each element is put into an actual 
relation with the others; Similarly, where political parties developed as a way to organize 
people as abstractly equal votes to be won in order to rule a state that is used to maintain 
economic and social relations, they can also be used to organize people against a state 
that treats them in such a fashion.   
To approach this problem adequately, however, it is first necessary to reiterate 
how it is that a psychoanalytic concept can be applied to something social or collective, 
and through this vein shoot to the heart of how it is possible that capitalism might be 
considered perverse and how this ‘perversion’ may have changed over time. This means 
touching again on commodity fetishism and disavowal as the basis of ‘perversion’, as 
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well as approaching Žižek’s discussion of neo-liberal capitalism as a further, different 
form of perversion. To put it briefly, there is no capitalist economy without the modern 
subject and commodity fetishism. This path flows into a discussion of how the form of 
capitalism, as perverse, also provides its own solution: where fetishism is the ‘perversion 
of perversions’ (Lacan in Evans, 1996: 139) the form of the Leninist Party is ‘perversion 
without perversion’ – a social relation between all that follows from an economy where 
all labour is related to all others, but is grounded on the principle that labour is not a 
commodity. Further, Žižek’s claim that the Party shares the form of the discourse of the 
psychoanalyst can be understood by taking into account two points: first, psychoanalysis 
is not an ahistorical accidental appearance but fundamentally relies on capitalist exchange 
relations; second, its purpose – like that of the Party – is to give people the means to 
realize the connections between the elements of their lives that appear to be unrelated. 
Where in the previous chapter the form of analysis was considered in historical context, 
here it is argued that the form of the subject as understood by Lacan is a free subject, one 
both created by and antithetical to capitalist relations. Here this is approached at the level 
of theory, while in the following chapter this is taken up in historical context, where the 
development of party politics and the Bolsheviks of the Russian Revolution are 
considered to show that, contrary to what some critics attempt to argue, Žižek’s claims 
may not be so removed from historical reality nor from the socialist goal of universal 
freedom and self-determination as they claim.  
 The Party form, from commodity and money 
One of the most direct engagements with Žižek’s political ontology is a book by 
Jodi Dean, the most significant shortcoming of which is that in the end she adheres to a 
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theoretical separation of Marxism and psychoanalysis. The result is that in the name of 
moving past economic essentialism she directs the focus of her argument away from the 
question of how, by further naturalizing capitalist market relations, ideology and the 
tendencies of capitalism have demobilized what was once considered revolutionary 
almost in its very nature (i.e. the working class or proletariat). Dean turns away from the 
question of what levers might exist to effect change in the existing system based on what 
it is today to train her eye on how to recognize a revolutionary or ethical ‘Act’ after it has 
already happened and thereby make it truly revolutionary. Where Marx originally looked 
at profit/surplus-value to understand how wealth is created under capitalism and how this 
knowledge might be used to transform society, and where Freud sought to understand the 
unconscious as a means to somehow eliminate the neurotic symptoms of his patients, 
Dean instead concentrates on looking for an already accomplished revolution or 
successful psychological transformation and nominating it as such. The focus of her 
argument can be found in the theoretical formulation that chases the claim that ‘class 
consciousness’ is the product of hard work. What is important, according to Dean, is not 
the hard work of preparing the ranks of leftist activists and their allies for revolution so as 
to make it happen when the opportunity arises. What is instead of decisive import is 
‘…the Party’s role in retroactively determining an act’ (Dean, 2006: 197). While 
speaking of a Bolshevik-style vanguard party what Dean instead evokes is ‘tailism’ – a 
word that makes up the first half of the title of Lukács’ defence of History and Class 
Consciousness, a defense that (not insignificantly) has been published with an essay by 
Žižek between its covers.  
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Here it’s worth remembering one of the central arguments of chapter four – that the 
logic of hegemony proposed by Laclau and Mouffe assumes a common symbolic system 
to be hegemonized, thereby leaving aside the question of how that system itself came 
about. Here Žižek intervenes, asking when abstract equality on the political plane became 
possible in the first place – the answer being with the birth of the logic of capitalism. 
Alan Shandro (2007) makes a similar argument against Laclau and Mouffe via Lenin’s 
discussion of the role of the party around the time of the creation of the Petersburg Soviet 
(i.e. the revolution of 1905): the importance of the Soviet was not that it provided the 
means to show the proletariat, the peasants, the soldiers, the petty-bourgeois, etc., that it 
had revolutionary potential (i.e. it wasn’t simply a educational opportunity), but that it 
presented an opportunity to change the form of the struggle itself – taking it out of the 
bounds of both absolutism and liberalism. That is, in Shandro’s account ‘hegemony’ in 
the way Lenin used it did not mean simply bringing consciousness to workers, peasants, 
intellectuals, etc., nor dominating the Petrograd Soviet ideologically (i.e. taking over an 
existing structure), but also changing the form of the struggle itself.166 It was not that the 
Soviet simply needed to be shown that it was revolutionary, but that it needed to be 
further organized to include revolutionary insurrection against the state as opposed to 
remaining simply an anti-state incubator: as an institution where workers, peasants, 
soldiers, intellectuals, et al., came together for the first time in transparent self-
government, came together in an institution in which all the contradictions between the 
different classes and their demands would be made clear, the possibility of an effective 
mass Marxist (i.e. Social Democratic) Party was greatly increased. That is, it was not 
only that the Party was to ‘teach’ the revolution. The Party was also to be the student – 
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Shandro’s complaint being that the Mensheviks would simply have the Party dissolve and 
the Soviet take its place rather than further develop the Party as a means to also develop 
the Soviet.167 The Party needed the spontaneous creation of the Soviet to foment its own 
ability to function, and because of the transparent nature of the Soviet the Party would 
have to adapt to the circumstances that were thereby created.  
Shandro at one point summarizes this position on ‘hegemony’ writing that it … 
figured earlier as a kind of generalized proletarian influence, liable to be confused in practice with 
the mere dissemination of Party propaganda; but with the emergence of an institutional form, the 
Soviet, capable of enacting the proletarian-peasant alliance and exercising revolutionary state 
power, hegemony could be conceived concretely as embracing the mass action of the working 
class (Shandro, 2007: 328).  
 
As Žižek puts it, the question of hegemony is that of ‘how to assert materialism not as a 
teaching, but as a form of collective life’ (Žižek, 2012: 100). Hegemony is thus not 
simply an interpretation (retroactive or otherwise) of circumstances, nor simply the 
transformation of something that is ‘impotent’ (see below), but the active transformation 
of politics, the economy, etc. (in the case of Petrograd, not only the creation of the Soviet 
– which itself changed the ways politics were played out –  but also the further 
radicalization of the Soviet itself) in order to maintain the power that it already possesses 
and, in the case of the Soviets of 1905, risked losing.   
 This is not to say that there is no role that ‘retroactive interpretation’ can play in 
Party activism.168 For now it is important to explain how Dean comes to this position and 
in so doing make Žižek’s clearer. One of his oft-repeated critiques of his contemporaries 
and of contemporary political movements more generally is that each treats capitalism as 
unassailable, as something that will never be overcome.169 This amounts to the claim that 
the economic realm has been depoliticized or rendered the ignored background of other 
political battles. Dean agrees, but writes that ‘Žižek’s claim regarding the depoliticized 
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economy as the disavowed fundamental fantasy does not follow from his account of the 
arrangement of enjoyment in contemporary ideological formations’ (Dean, 2006: 193).170 
To solve this apparent problem she suggests that there exists a ‘parallax’ whose two sides 
are Marxism (or class struggle) and psychoanalysis (or enjoyment), a parallax which 
takes as its object a pre-revolutionary or potentially revolutionary ‘passage a l’acte’ – an 
‘impotent’ outburst that has yet to be linked to its wider political significance. It is here 
that she suggests that the bridge between the psychoanalysis and Marxism must come at 
the level of Truth – the role of the Party and the psychoanalyst.  
If one understands ‘parallax view’ to mean two perspectives on the same object, 
one of which is conservative (i.e. maintains the object, makes it possible) and the other 
progressive or at least disruptive (i.e. seeing what appears as normal as problematic and 
thereby leading to a change in the object), and where the ‘Real’ is the subjective 
movement from one side to the other, it is unclear how the Act as object can have 
Marxism and psychoanalysis as the two sides of a view upon it. The paradigmatic case 
here, as has been stressed previously, is that of profit/surplus-value: from the perspective 
of the capitalist profit is simply more money generated by the hard work of the capitalist. 
From the perspective of the worker profit is instead surplus-value extracted from the 
worker and usurped by the owner of the means of production. Class struggle is here the 
Real – the move from one side to the other – in that it is not an empirical division that can 
be measured in statistics and demographics (i.e. class as a ‘sack of potatoes’) but is the 
subjective leap from one perspective to the other. Where one perspective produces an 
image of continuity (in Žižek’s terminology, ‘difference’ among formally equivalent 
elements), the other sees division (in Žižek’s terminology, ‘antagonism’ or 
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incompatibility between two different forms). This brings the ‘parallax view’ close to 
Marx’s position in The Holy Family, where he writes ‘Within this antithesis [the 
estrangement seen in private property] the private property-owner is therefore the 
conservative side, the proletarian the destructive side. From the former arises the action 
of preserving the antithesis, from the latter the action of annihilating it’ (Marx and 
Engels, 1975: unpaginated). Where the capitalist side sees their work as one more type of 
work that is simply worth more than those of the workers, the side of the worker sees 
work as fundamentally different – as generating value rather than simply something 
exchanged for  an equivalent value. This is to say that the master-signifier and the objet a 
are not conceived as two different things, but as two perspectives/approaches to the same 
thing. The fundamental difference between the two is that in the latter case the Real is 
revealed to be an intimate property of the Symbolic: the move here is from an 
understanding of the master-signifier as a simple empirical fact (‘money is wealth’) to 
rationally knowing that the master-signifier is subjectively mediated (‘money is the 
embodiment of abstract labour time and the exploitation of the worker’).  
Understood this way a ‘parallax’ between Marxism and psychoanalysis would see 
Marxism as conservative and psychoanalysis as disruptive. This could indeed be 
considered the case if one took Marxism to mean economism and the Act therefore the 
inevitable product of the ‘iron laws’ of capitalism. Dean appears to suggest just that, 
posing Žižek as neither a post-Marxist nor someone who sees ‘ideology as rising directly 
from an economic base’ (Dean, 2002: 194). The problem is that this statement is only 
partly correct. Dean does not see the division between ‘constitutive ideology’ and 
‘constituted ideology’ that operates in Žižek’s thought – the division between the form of 
 181 
ideology (in the case of capitalism, commodity fetishism) and any particular ideology 
that might take on that form.171 That is, she forgets that ideology is not separate from the 
economy, that the economy requires commodity fetishism to function, that ‘reality itself 
cannot reproduce itself without this so-called ideological mystification’ (Žižek, 1989: 
28).  Where ‘difference’ based on formal equivalence is the ideology of capitalist market 
relations and the formal-freedom that these relations require it is easy to see the division 
of ‘constitutive’ and ‘constituted’ ideology at work in Žižek’s critique of ‘identity 
politics’ and liberal demands to have ever more groups of people considered equal: each 
liberal ideology poses itself in terms of difference that demands equivalence. In this way 
ideology as form is for Žižek generated by the economic ‘base’, while ideology as any 
particular thought comes to be understood in terms set by that form. In this way it can 
also be seen how conservative-liberal ideology fits the same mold: the ‘right to life’ is the 
attempt to extend formal equality to a fetus; immigrants, different races, religions, etc., 
are too different to be integrated and so must be expelled or repelled. Here 
Žižek/Badiou’s critique of multi-culturalism enters: this ideology attempts to eliminate 
any ‘Real’ difference (i.e. antagonism, an incompatibility of forms) and reduce cultural 
traditions to one potential choice among many.172  
That is, Dean’s fundamental premise about the role of the Party in Žižek’s thought 
(‘Žižek’s claim regarding the depoliticized economy as the disavowed fundamental 
fantasy does not follow from his account of the arrangement of enjoyment in 
contemporary ideological formations’) misses its mark. It is not that Marxism and 
psychoanalysis sit in opposition to each other in a parallax, but that they meet at the level 
of form: perversion. Dean is thus only partly correct when she writes that it is at the point 
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of the Party and the ‘discourse of the analyst’ that the two meet.173 It is not only that the 
Party and psychoanalyst occupy the position of truth. The key point is that the form of 
psychoanalysis is borrowed from capitalism: as Žižek notes, ‘the link between analyst 
and the patient is not only speech, words, but also money…’ (Žižek, 2006a: 305).  
To clarify this point there are two arguments that Žižek makes that can be pointed 
to, beginning with a somewhat dubious one found in Parallax View. Here Žižek suggests 
that against Foucault’s assertion that psychoanalysis springs from traditions of 
confession174 as seen, for example, in the Roman Catholic Church, we could see the root 
of psychoanalysis in the literary figure of the Jewish money-lender – a person outside the 
social circuit to whom all one’s worries and secrets are told (Žižek, 2006a: 305). This 
comment serves more as a literary introduction to the actual substance of his argument – 
the relation between perversion and capitalist miserliness – which will be approached in a 
moment. It is first worthwhile to note a more convincing position in regards to the role of 
the exchange of money in psychoanalysis, one that appears in  the 2002 preface to The 
Know Not What They Do.  
Here Žižek describes psychoanalysis as being anti-capitalist precisely because of 
the role money plays within it, a role that possesses at least three components. The first is 
the impersonal exchange that it establishes: paying for a relationship with a person who 
hears all your troubles places them on the level of an abstract individual rather than that 
of a substantial other (a friend, for example, with whom you share experiences, emotions, 
social ties, etc.). This is supposed to help guarantee that a counter-transference (first 
discovered by Freud’s in the ‘Dora’ case, where it lead to her leaving analysis) won’t take 
place, thereby stalling the analysis or forcing its end.175 Second, one doesn’t pay for any 
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particular service (the interpretation of a dream, an analysis of a slip of the tongue), one 
doesn’t pay for a commodity, but for the opportunity to oneself do some work: to speak 
to the analyst and figure our for oneself the truth of one’s desire. Lastly, this means 
exchanging that which has an explicit value (i.e. money) for something that is beyond 
capitalist valuation: the core of one’s being (rather, non-being) – the objet a that 
structures one’s libidinal ‘economy’ (Žižek, 2008b: xxxviii-ix). In a section of Tarrying 
With the Negative titled ‘money and subjectivity’ he puts it this way:  
This is how the subject qua [split subject] emerges from the structure of exchange: it emerges 
when “something is exchanged for nothing,” that is to say, it is the very “nothing” I get from the 
symbolic structure, from the Other, in exchange for sacrificing my “pathological” particularity, the 
kernel of my being. When I get nothing in return, I get myself qua [split subject], qua the empty 
point of self-relating (Žižek, 1993: 28).176  
 
That is, via the Other we hand ourselves our freedom.  
Are you now, and have you always been, perverse? 
In this way psychoanalysis is not potentially a progressive political link because it 
shares the form of the party, as in Dean’s account, but that it is able to share this form 
because it takes it from capitalism: in the analytic relationship commodity fetishism is 
used against itself to loose its hold upon us; the flip side of the creation of the individual 
under capitalist conditions is the creation of class and the potential of class consciousness 
(approached in more detail as the present argument develops). What then needs to be 
discussed are the different ways that capitalism and analysis can be said to share a form. 
Fetishism is one way. Another way, referred to in the 2002 preface of FTKNWTD as well 
as in the section of The Parallax View mentioned above, is at the level of the miser and 
the creation of surplus value – the ‘perverse’ act of counting ‘nothing’ (enjoyment; the 
‘self-activating capacity’ that is labour-power) as ‘something’ (enumerating and owning 
people’s pleasure177; money). The two are of course related. As Fink points out, 
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perversion is subdivided into three categories: masochism, sadism, and fetishism (Fink, 
2003: 44). What Chiesa reveals in his reading of Lacan is that these are not simply 
perversions in the sense of aberrations, but are instead at the very foundations of  freedom 
and human existence. That is, to be a modern subject at all is to be perverse.  
As noted earlier, Žižek’s work relies on Marxist political economy, philosophies 
in dialogue with Descartes (i.e. those of the German Idealists), and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis sharing the logic of an immaterial moment that points to the logically 
necessary existence of something other than the simply empirical: for Marx it was the 
logical conclusion that if, in capitalist exchange, radically different use values are 
exchanged as if they were the same, there must be an immaterial stuff called value that 
they share to be commensurable; for Hegel the ‘I’ can not be had empirically, but for 
there to be any perception of the world at all we have to elucidate it’s ‘self-relating 
negativity’ by means of thought itself178. In these two cases the potential for human 
freedom is fore-fronted: exchange value is the product of human labour power as 
transformed, ‘accounted for’, and exploited by the historically specific (i.e. human-made) 
form that is capitalism, and therefore points to the possibility of actual, rather than 
alienated, freedom; for Hegel, the world is not simply perceived  by each of us by 
shuffling various stimuli into various categories of thought, but the product of the ‘I’ as 
the transcendental imagination actively tearing perceptions apart and putting them back 
together.179 Chiesa’s work can be used to clarify how this can also be said for Freud, via 
Lacan: the root of neuroses is to be found in the ‘construction of analysis’, a memory that 
can explain an analysand’s symptoms but of itself will never be remembered, thereby 
standing as a logical assumption rather than an empirical fact.180 Not only might this be 
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considered ‘freedom’ in the sense that the construction is the product of the dialogue 
between analyst and analysand; more significantly, Chiesa argues it is the product of the 
fact that we must choose to enter the social world – the big Other/language – by finding a 
master-signifier by which to order, to give meaning and effectivity,181 to the world in 
which we live.  
In the last chapter of his Subjectivity and Otherness Chiesa outlines how Lacan’s 
position on enjoyment and the end/ethics of analysis changes as he (Lacan) reconceives 
the means by which meaning is guaranteed, from the ‘natural’ guarantee of the ‘Name of 
the Father’ – i.e. paternal authority and the threat of castration leveled against incestuous 
desire – to one that is historically variable and relative to the community in which one 
finds themselves. In this way Chiesa labels the master signifier as ‘ideological’ or 
‘hegemonic’ by definition. Further than this, for Chiesa the choice of master signifier is 
not simply that chosen by the community, but the masochistic choice of the means by 
which one will relate to that master signifier and meaning – one’s ‘fundamental fantasy.’ 
That is, as a consequence of Lacan rejecting his earlier claim that ‘there is an Other of the 
Other’, as a consequence of rejecting the idea of a natural necessity for paternally 
administered castration that guarantees the symbolic order, what takes its place as the 
generalized model for the fundamental fantasy is the ‘perverse’ one described as a 
construction of analysis by Freud in his ‘“A Child is a Being Beaten”’. One is ‘castrated’, 
one realizes that one is not able to give the Other what it desires (i.e. ‘minus little-phi’ or 
– ϕ) by beating oneself with a sign of authority (a whip, a stick – i.e. ‘big phi’ or Φ) 
(Chiesa, 2007: 160-161; 213, n. 205). That is, one establishes a fetish whereby one comes 
to identify with oneself through the symbolic order, consolidating one’s own image of 
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oneself (i.e. symbolic identification bringing together all of one’s imaginary 
identifications) not because of some natural necessity for doing so, not because the 
‘Name of the father’ is a natural or ‘bi-univocal’ sign, but because of one’s own 
‘perverse’ activity. As Freud notes in his discussion of the first of the three beating 
fantasies that make up “‘A Child is Being Beaten’”, the ‘actual identity of the person who 
does the beating remains obscure at first’ (1979: 170). Freud identifies this person as the 
father. Chiesa’s thesis, however, is that the ‘beating’ is the work of masochism and drive.  
The sense in which ‘drive’ can be considered masochistic can be understood by 
taking a detour through Laplanche and Pontalis.182 In their discussion of Freud and 
perversion, they point out that one could ‘define human sexuality itself as essentially 
“perverse” inasmuch as it never fully detaches itself from its origins, where satisfaction 
was sought not in a specific activity but in the ‘pleasure gain’ associated with functions 
or activities depending on other instincts’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973: 308). This 
refers to ‘anaclisis’, which the pair see as fundamental to Freud’s theory of the drives. It 
is the idea that sexual satisfaction at first only exists alongside natural need (for 
sustenance, for instance) as a ‘bonus pleasure’ or ‘fringe benefit’, and eventually derives 
its object from those needs (in the case of sustenance, the maternal breast) (Ibid: 30-31). 
The separation of the two, of need and sexual satisfaction, comes at the behest of primary 
masochism as the death drive – as the tendency to reduce all tension to zero and to return 
to an inorganic state (i.e. death) – which they take to be less a specific drive than ‘that 
factor which determines the actual principle of all instinct’ (Ibid: 102; See also 
Laplanche, 1976: 105; 124). It is ‘libido,’ or the sexual instinct, that pushes the death 
instinct outwards via ‘the muscular apparatus,’ thereby diverting the tendency for self 
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destruction – at least for a time. More properly, then, the ‘principle’ that is the death drive 
manifests as libido, the reduction of tension via self-directed bodily activity. In this way 
the development of sexuality, independently of natural need, begins as auto-eroticism 
(i.e. taking oneself as the object of desire) to only later return to its former object (again, 
the maternal breast). In this way ‘the finding of an object is in fact the refinding of it’ 
(Freud in L&P: 31).  
If, as Laplanche and Pontalis point out, sexual pleasure was not originally 
dependant on the object but instead accompanied it, to ‘re-find’ the object is to 
mistakenly assume the source of the ‘bonus pleasure’ was the maternal object rather than 
one’s self. This is where Chiesa can be brought back in: he gives a very similar account, 
charting the vicissitudes of natural need, satisfaction, demand, desire, and love through to 
the end of a psychoanalysis. The major difference is that, via Lacan,183 death drive is 
taken not as a principle of constancy but one of disequilibrium, a masochistic forcing of 
separation of self from world that like the ‘nirvana principle’ – which is supposed to 
bring tensions to nil – is conservative, but not in that it attempts to maintain an 
equilibrium or homeostasis, nor reduce itself to 0 as in the principle of entropy. For 
Chiesa the sexual instinct/death drive is conservative in that it repeats its original act of 
separation from need. He begins his explanation with Lacan’s famous discussion of need, 
demand, and desire, founded in what he calls the dialectic of frustration – which is 
ultimately the source of language acquisition and individuation.  
In Chiesa’s account,184 one is first passively alienated in the symbolic – 
understood as language and ‘the law of culture’ – at birth: one is spoken of before being 
born, and born into and part of a familial and social context. It is only through the process 
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of self-alienation that one becomes an individual with a personal relationship to that 
matrix, which until that point is, from the perspective of the new individual, opaque and 
meaningless. That is, one begins as an individual for others, but is not for oneself an 
individual: one’s passive alienation is a complete subjection to the Other in the sense that 
there is no separation of self and world, but only the need for sustenance, etc., and its 
immediate satisfaction. From the perspective of the Other (i.e. the family, society) there 
is no such immediacy, of course: they deliver what is needed, and doing so always takes 
time. Neither, however, is this satisfaction completely immediate for the child. In 
Chiesa’s account the symbolic is already at work in that the child is subject to a 
differential system (i.e. the symbolic order) in the form of the minimal difference that is 
the presence and absence of the mother. He notes two different sources of this couplet: 
first in the separation of the child from the womb; second in the coming and going of the 
mother as the agent of satisfaction, where this latter source is predicated upon the trauma 
of the first. That is, one can only be affected by the symbolic order after one has been 
subject to it in the form of being separated from the mother in reality. It is from this 
minimal ground that the dialectic of frustration begins: where no child can take care of 
itself, is ‘dis-adaptated’, no caregiver can satisfy their ward absolutely. At some point a 
need will not be fulfilled to the satisfaction of the child.  
In this failure the mother ceases to be symbolic and is understood as an 
individual, and the object of the child’s satisfaction becomes a sign of love. What was 
once the omnipotence of the child, the correspondence of self and Other, becomes a 
world that includes something the child can’t control. The mother ceases to be a 
‘symbolic agent’ that the child themself masters and instead becomes a ‘power’ of her 
 189 
own. That is, Chiesa argues that there comes a dialectical reversal: where first the object 
was an actual satisfaction and the caregiver a symbolic function (a coming and going, a 
presence and absence, seemingly at the immediate moment of need and its satisfaction 
and thus at the behest of the child), the inability to heed the needs of the child leads to 
mother and object changing places: the caregiver becomes actual and the object no longer 
only satisfies a biological need but also becomes symbolic (a differential) – the presence 
and absence of love given by the now outside ‘power’ in the form of a gift. This is the 
‘loss’ of the maternal Thing, the end of the non-separation of Other and child – from the 
perspective of the child. It is in this sense that it can be said that one has lost what one 
never had in the beginning: the perfect satisfaction of complete alienation in the Other, 
which only existed from the perspective of the pre-individuated infant. In these beginning 
stages of Lacan/Chiesa’s version of the Oedipus complex there is, then, the move from 
the omnipotence of the child to the beginnings of the loss of the Thing; the move from 
the mother as agent controlled by the child to a power independent of the child; and the 
move from the satisfaction of need to the demand for love.185  
In addition to these three changes there is also the move from satisfaction to libido 
(which returns the argument to that of Laplanche and Pontalis). This is the product of the 
movement just described: in Chiesa’s account that which kept the mother from satisfying 
the need of the child is another – a rival that can satisfy her desire in place of the child.  
That is, it appears that the child is not being satisfied because the ‘power’ that is the 
mother is controlled by another, that the mother desires something other than the child for 
her satisfaction. This other becomes an object of  a narcissistic, imaginary identification. 
This identification and this rivalry occurs because of what Chiesa calls the phallic Gestalt 
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(Chiesa, 2007: 69-70) – a function that he sees playing a special role in Lacan’s thought. 
He argues that for Lacan the incompleteness of the human being at birth and our 
precocious visual abilities are coupled with an innate draw to particular images – images 
that resemble ourselves, and thereby enable human interaction and ultimately mating. 
This, he argues, is the only ‘significant biological reference’ in Lacan’s oeuvre (Chiesa, 
2007: 17). These special images are of the imaginary and as such form the basis of the 
logic of the mirror stage: the rival is an image of the self with which one competes, as 
one can not match images of completeness because of one’s innate incompleteness. (Not 
only can one not take care of oneself as an infant: likewise, as one ages one can not 
match the static reification that is the Imago.) As a consequence they are the objects of 
aggressivity, a narcissistic lashing out. In addition, as actual people in the world the rival 
as phallic Gestalt shows that one can not satisfy all the desires of the mother, that the 
rival is themself capable of satisfying the mother where the child is not. In this sense, 
then, the child approaches castration at the imaginary level, where it refers not to any 
actual threat of losing a part of one’s body but to the realization that one is not in fact 
complete, but a fragmented whole.186 The rival thus precipitates the move from 
satisfaction to libido, the sexualization of need: what was for Laplanche and Pontalis a 
‘bonus pleasure’ or ‘fringe benefit’ becomes a compensation for the frustration of love 
(Chiesa, 2007: 72-3). That is, just as the object of need became an object demonstrating 
love, the satisfaction of need is separated from need and becomes a pleasure of its own. 
In Chiesa’s account, then, there are not two affects that accompany the satisfaction of 
need (satisfaction of need itself and sexual pleasure), but satisfaction transformed by the 
cultural and social paths made in the service of reproduction. In this way Chiesa’s take on 
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jouissance as jouis-sans can be understood: it is the taking of pleasure from the failure to 
achieve total satisfaction.  
 All of this was to show that drive is the principle of separation from the world and 
a creation of the individual, and that the ‘enjoyment’ that comes from it is actually one’s 
own product, mistaking the ‘Maternal Thing’ which never existed (i.e. a ‘0’) as the 
source of the enjoyment one now feels (counting the 0 as 1). It needs to be noted that 
what has been described above is part of the ‘pre-Oedipal’ phases of the Oedipus 
complex and primarily subsumed under the imaginary – where the drive is primarily 
subsumed in the symbolic. Rather than discussing the transitions that he outlines to get to 
that point, however, it’s enough to iterate that Chiesa holds that Lacan’s claim to be 
discussing a dialectical process should be taken seriously. For example, where there were 
for Lacan once three imaginary complexes – the weaning complex, the intrusion complex 
(i.e. that of rivalry), and the Oedipal complex – when he begins to turn his attention to the 
symbolic they become part of an interrelated process (as was above partially described). 
Likewise, the death drive, as the principle of drive per se, is a repetition of the same 
process at a different level. In the pre-Oedipal stages ‘separation’ is in the sense of 
separation from the total subjection to the symbolic in which one is alienated at birth: that 
one does not have what the caregiver desires opens a space between the self and the 
symbolic as the material Thing by projecting one’s proto-self onto a rival as imago. 
Separation is thus initially the creation of the (imaginary) individual. Drive is just this 
process, but with a master signifier in place of an Imago/Gestalt: just as ‘the baby 
recognizes the fragmentation of his real body only when he starts to be attracted to the 
completeness of his specular image’ (Chiesa, 2007: 18), the fetish/master signifier 
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‘negates the fullness of the world of mere phenomena. That is, we could say that it adds 
the concept of lack, that its negation functions in a positive way’ (Rothenberg and Foster, 
2003: 6). The imaginary and the symbolic are not biological certainties but the creation of 
‘nothing’ (the immaterial effectivity of human freedom) at the same moment that one can 
come to acknowledge that there is also something (the ‘empirical’ world).  
Lacan, with Marx and capitalism 
The main purpose of the rather long diversion above was to establish in what way 
the basic functioning of the psychic life of the individual is like the functioning of 
capitalism: the creation of a surplus where once there was only satisfaction of need; the 
transformation of the ‘nothing’ (labour power; the maternal Thing) into the ‘something’ 
(value; Jouissance). Not only that – the process in question involves the creation of an 
‘immaterial’ element that enables things to function: the fundamental fantasy and real 
abstraction. The problem that presents itself here is the question of how this has changed 
across time: Chiesa’s arguments have been presented above not as particular to capitalism 
but as the generic development of the self’s relation to itself and to others. What is to be 
remembered here is that Chiesa’s project is to chart the continuity of Lacan’s thought 
across its many changes. As noted above, this consists in the move from the assertion that 
the master-signifier was equivalent to the authority, the law, the ‘no’ of the father as a 
natural function, to the assertion that there is no such natural guarantee, there is no ‘Other 
of the Other’, that master signifiers are culturally relative and guaranteed by a 
fundamental fantasy. The overall arc of what Chiesa offers is an account of Lacan’s 
position on how this happens across history, from Aristotle through to modern science 
and Freud. It relates back to the question of need and demand. 
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 Where need was natural necessity, demand was to desire what the other desired 
and to receive love in place of satisfaction. In the moment being analysed the objects of 
Lacan’s drives – the breast, feces, the voice, the gaze – are pre-Oedipal love objects 
rather than the ‘object cause’ of desire that they will become. In Chiesa’s account the 
difference is that an object of love is one that answers the call to receive something – an 
object in the place of the lack that is the unknown desire of the Other – whereas the 
object of desire is instead the embodiment of lack itself as an object, desire as such, 
without particular object – i.e. to desire nothing as such (2008:150), the problems and 
possibilities with which are approached just below. The difference between these love 
objects and the object cause of desire is that between desiring something and desiring 
someone to desire (whatever it is they may want) to desire. The pre-Oedipal breast gives 
food as love; feces is a gift in return; the voice is the call to note that you hear (‘j’ouis’ – I 
hear you/I enjoy for you); the gaze is not only seeing but also the demand to be seen. The 
‘object cause’ of desire is by contrast a marker of desire as such – i.e. transformed by the 
master-signifier into miniatures of itself: where the S1 becomes a sign of meaning as 
such, the objects become signs of desire and drive as such. This was in Lacan’s earlier 
account the ‘no’ of the father – castration and the phallus – which transformed these from 
conscious objects of love to unconscious objects of desire (2008: 141-151). Chiesa’s 
main thesis, however, is that this argument falls away as Lacan’s career passes, and is 
replaced by an understanding that sees different master signifiers supported by culturally 
relative fundamental fantasies.  
Chiesa sketches Lacan’s understanding of the movement through Aristotle up to 
Kant, Sade, and Freud and the different ways the Other acts as a guarantee – i.e. what it is 
 194 
that takes on the role of the ‘Other of the Other.’ To summarize very briefly: where 
Aristotle held, as an unmediated Real, nature (the celestial spheres) and the prime-mover 
(God) as the guarantee of knowledge and the good, the crisis of Aristotelian science saw 
the introduction of God as a symbolic a priori in the work of Descartes, one that was later 
replaced by the Noumena as untouchable ‘Real’ in Kant (Chiesa, 2007: 113-4; 171-2). It 
has to be admitted that Chiesa doesn’t give much detail here, instead only providing a 
hint. There are two important claims to note, however: first, each historical period and its 
symbolic order can not be understood as it was in-itself, but only from the vantage of the 
present. This implies, of course, that symbolic orders in different times and places work 
differently. Second, this does not eliminate a notion of the universal, but is based upon it: 
psychoanalysis was a science in Lacan’s view because it could identify, behind all these 
different forms of symbolic, the principle of guarantee behind them – i.e. castration, the 
threat that installs the prohibition of incest (Ibid: 114-5). Again, Chiesa does not give a 
full explanation of this, but gestures to Darian Leader’s (2003) discussion of the role of 
myth and structuralism in Lacan’s work.  
Leader’s central problematic is to attempt to answer what Lacan means when he 
says that the truth can only be half said. Leader’s answer closely resembles Žižek’s 
discussion of ‘parallax’: the Real can only be had indirectly – by creating a relation 
between two different sets of relations, by creating an articulation where the latter 
relation develops a further relationship to the problem that was tackled in the former. The 
two sets of relations are thus asymmetrical rather than mutually exclusive or antinomic. 
In Leader’s account the paradigmatic case is the symbolic in relation to the imaginary, 
where the deadlocks of the former  are (partially) solved by the contradictions in the later. 
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Where Leader refers to Lévi-Strauss’ structural anthropology and its role in Lacan’s 
thought to make this clear, it’s possible to refer to the discussion above: the fragmented 
totality of the body as resolved in the ego is further developed, is repeated, as the 
inconsistency of the self as embodied not only the ‘lack’ in the self, but also in that in the 
Other – i.e. the phallus or master signifier. The ‘Real’ that lies between these two 
positions, that which can only be ‘half said’ because it is the product of the relation 
between the two orders, is that of a ‘whole’ that never existed. That is, the same 
‘problem’ finds some sort of solution only with the introduction of the second set of 
relations. (In Žižek’s account this ‘parallax’ is seen as the possibility of undermining the 
problem altogether – i.e. using the second position as a critique to overcome the first, 
rather than ‘suture’ it).   
This relates to the question of universality in the following way: Leader offers his 
piece as an account of how an ‘historically contingent’ occurrence can be taken as 
universal. In question here is not only Freud’s myth of the horde father in Totem and 
Taboo but the Oedipus myth itself. That is, it is the question of how a historically limited 
family arrangement can be taken to account for the psyche in all historical periods. His 
answer is that it is not a question of content but one of form: Lacan is able to move 
beyond Freud’s use of myth as a ‘narrative to account for some contradictory or 
impossible real’ (Leader, 2003: 48) because  he applies Freud’s insight about the form of 
the dream to the Oedipus complex. As Freud remarks in a footnote in the seventh chapter 
of the Interpretation of dreams, and later elaborates in his Introductory Lectures on 
Psychoanalysis, and which Žižek makes the basis of the opening chapter of The Sublime 
Object of Ideology, it is not only the specific content of a dream that is to be taken into 
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account in dream analysis, but also the relation different contents are given by the dream 
work – the form of the thought that is dreaming itself. For Lacan the Oedipus myth is just 
such a form: a relation in which one element is made to make all the others make sense, 
the use of one element as a guarantee of meaning. As has been stressed again and again 
here, where he once argued that this structure was as the name/‘no’ of the father as a 
natural/biological ‘Other of the Other’ he later held that it was relative – understood to be 
the celestial spheres in Aristotle’s time and the Noumena in Kant’s (and ours – see 
below).  
The question is, then, what it is that enables this looking back; it is the question of 
the current set of relations and the ‘real’ they reveal when compared to those of the past. 
Though Chiesa makes brief mention of Marx in the final pages of Subjectivity and 
Otherness he (Marx) is left out of the historical discussion of the changing role of the 
Other (the move from Aristotle up through to Kant and Freud). As noted above, Lacan 
does precisely that, pointing out that surplus-enjoyment and surplus-value are not just 
analogous but the same thing (see footnote 164 of the present study). That is, the modern 
subject is that of capitalism and is formed by it. Where the generalization of the exchange 
extraction rules, one has a different subjective relation to the world. That is, the modern 
subject is different than that of antiquity by virtue of the different master signifier and 
fundamental fantasy that accompanies it. Not only that, but the modern subject allows a 
judgment upon the subject of the past. Given what has been said above the conclusion on 
the status of the universal can be made clearer: one can only look upon the past from the 
now, but that does not mean that one does not find the universal in the past; it is only in 
comparing the contingent, historical present to the past that one is able to discern the 
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universal. Žižek stresses this point in his critique of Postone’s re-reading of Capital: 
Marx of course knows that society has not always been divided into classes, but 
nonetheless history is the history of class struggle – i.e. the battle over the creation and 
distribution social wealth and power. Likewise, abstract labour only comes to fully exist 
in capitalist economies, but nonetheless it holds the key to understanding the role of 
labour in all of history (Žižek, 2010a: 196-7).187 This is why Marx’s method is 
necessarily historical: as Pilling argues with reference to Marx’s letter to Kugelmann 
(made famous by Lenin), one can only understand ‘value’ by understanding that it is an 
historical product that changes across time. That is, there is no thing-in-itself called value 
that exists ahistorically as an unchanging essence, but only the thing-in-itself as present in 
particular appearances: ‘The task of Marx’s critique of political economy was not one 
which involved him finding a “constant” in terms of which everything could be 
quantified but of establishing the laws of mediation through which the “essence” of 
phenomena manifested itself as “appearance”’ (Pilling, 1972: 284). Lacan’s use of Marx, 
when taking Chiesa’s work into account, can thus be understood as a discussion of the 
relation of the modern subject to capitalism, the former being generated by the latter. This 
is of course taken up by Žižek from the beginning. 
This feeds directly into the distinction that he draws between the ‘potential’ and 
the ‘virtual’ (Žižek, 2012: 229-30), and can perhaps be understood with reference to a 
‘parallax view’ on the Noumena. From one side it is a lost whole, reference to which 
leads to the assumption of the possibility of reclaiming it – what was once lost will be 
had once again. From another perspective the ‘Thing’  is ‘always already lost’ – i.e. a 
phantasm that never actually was – and when the new arises it does so as ‘that which will 
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have always been’: it was not a substantial essence that merely had to be revealed but the 
creation of something new where there was before nothing, but can retroactively be seen 
to have always existed in potential. That is, where it was once ‘virtual’ – impossible from 
the perspective of the present, of a logic completely foreign to it – it becomes a realized 
potential, something that could always have been had. There are several references that 
can be found in Žižek’s work that can help make this clear, but here is one: Stephen J. 
Gould’s Wonderful Life, to which Žižek makes reference in Tarrying with the Negative. 
In this book Gould argues that evolution is not a teleological, necessary unfolding, but 
contingent to the point that if history could be rerun the same outcome would never 
reoccur. He develops this idea with reference to the fossils found in the Burgess shale in 
the B.C. Rockies which, when found, were originally classified according to existing 
categories. Closer inspection, however, revealed that the remains found were of creatures 
that had no classificatory relation to those that had been known up to that time – they 
were species that had once existed but were totally wiped out by some contingent event. 
This presents a challenge for the theory of evolution: if evolution is the survival of the 
fittest, i.e. the doctrine that those who  adapt best to the environment will outlive their 
competitors, the question is one of which environment. If contingency eliminates a certain 
environment one species’ better adaptation to it comes to nil: 
Perhaps the Grim Reaper works during brief episodes of mass extinction, provoked by some 
unpredictable environmental catastrophes (often triggered by impacts of extraterrestrial bodies). 
Groups may prevail or die for reasons that bear no relationship to the Darwinian basis of success 
in normal times. Even if fishes hone their adaptations to peaks of aquatic perfection, they will all 
die if the ponds dry up. […] [Certain creatures] may prevail because a feature evolved long ago for 
a different use has fortuitously permitted survival during a sudden and unpredictable change in 
rules (Gould, 1989: 48).   
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From this Gould concludes that contingency is necessity, but viewed from the present: 
one can not guess beforehand which species will win out because conditions change, but 
once history has passed the story of a species’ survival and change can be understood.188 
The same logic is also to be found in Marx: it is not that there was some initial, 
substantial and knowable potential within any specific person, but only the historical 
material development of human relations. This is present as early as Marx’s 1844 
manuscripts, where human essence is not ‘anthropological’ – i.e. predetermined by some 
particular set of human attributes – but ‘comes into being’ with a particular mode of 
production:189  
If man’s feelings, passions, etc., are not merely anthropological characteristics in the narrower 
sense, but are truly ontological affirmations of his essence (nature), and if they only really affirm 
themselves  in so far as their object exists sensuously for them, then it is clear: […] (4) only 
through developed industry, i.e. through the mediation of private property, does the ontological 
essence of human passion come into being […] (Marx, 1992: 375).190 
 
Similar comments can be found in Capital – for example in the chapter on co-operation, 
where Marx argues that the formal subsumption of manufacture by capitalism precedes 
its real subsumption in the form of concentrating ‘free’ labour in co-operative work that 
is directed by capital and the capitalist. Like the co-operative work of the past (one 
example he turns to is the construction of the pyramids) this increases the productivity of 
labour. Unlike the co-operative work of the past, capitalist co-operation relies on private 
property and workers who are ‘free’ to sell their labour-power (Marx, 1977: 452) and 
serves as the basis for new forms of the division of labour and the development of 
machinery. This does not happen of itself, but is instead ‘not developed by the worker 
until his labour belongs to capital’ (Ibid: 451).191 
To be clear, this is not to introduce a teleology where capitalism is a necessary step in 
development: it too is an historically contingent formation. As Ellen Wood argues in her 
 200 
Origin of Capitalism (via the work of Robert Brenner), it is not that capitalism was an 
essence hidden behind the ‘distortions’ of feudal relations that was released when these 
fetters were thrown off and the market allowed to be its ‘natural’ self; It is instead the 
product of the particular conditions found in England in the 16th Century. As one of her 
students has put it, had an asteroid hit Earth and destroyed England before the logic of 
capitalism came into being we would not now have it as a social or economic system. It is 
easy to hear echoes of Gould’s comments on contingency and necessity and the replaying 
of history. 
While Chiesa does not take his argument about Lacan’s work all the way to the point 
of discussing Marx’s place in it, the work above has pointed to it and provides something 
of a further scaffolding for Johnston’s claim that an historical succession of master 
signifiers is what delivers the modern subject into (im)material existence.192 Chiesa also 
provides the means to understanding two further points. First are Žižek’s comments on 
what he sees as the self-reflexive, cynical, post-modern, hedonistic flight from large scale 
universalist radical political projects – collectively grouped under what he calls the 
‘decline of symbolic efficiency’ – which often appears in Žižek’s work in the figure of a 
neo-Nazi skinhead who can cite all the sociological arguments about why his anger 
manifests in brutal violence to only continue what he’s doing.193 The second are the 
political implications of seeing perversion as the root of freedom and the subject. Both 
these points relate to Chiesa’s claim that ‘what Freud called “erotogenic masochism” […] 
Lacan rebaptizes jouissance’ (Chiesa, 2007: 165).  
Chiesa shows that drive is masochistic in the sense that, if from the perspective of the 
individual to-be there is nothing but the self, any aggressivity is actually self related. The 
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implication of this is that drive does not involve enjoyment as a pre-existing energy 
which pushes it along, but that instead enjoyment and drive itself (as opposed to instinct) 
are the product of the fragmented whole that is the human body and the interaction of the 
individual with the social world (the Other) and desire – first in the form of the primary 
caregiver. Following from this, jouissance can be mistaken as a natural essence that has 
been lost and can be regained: because of one’s initial subjection to the Other something, 
nothing, and freedom are misconstrued, thereby becoming the Thing, lack, and variously 
an ‘acting out’, ‘transgressive’ behaviour, symptom formations, etc.194 Here, of course, 
enters the work of psychoanalysis – its ‘ethics,’195 Chiesa’s discussion of which sheds 
light on Žižek’s claim that as perverse, capitalism fills in what should be empty – i.e. the 
objet a, the embodiment of creation ex nihilo and freedom – with the call of enjoyment 
from the superego (Žižek, 2006a: 299-308). Involved here is what Chiesa calls the 
‘Realization of the Symbolic’ – where the Real fuses with the Symbolic and is permeated 
with enjoyment – as exemplified in Lacan’s work by Kant and the Marquis de Sade.  
Following Chiesa’s sketch of the changing place of the Other, which began with 
Antiquity, Kant is contrasted with Aristotle and presented as his inversion. Where the 
sovereign good was guaranteed by the immobile mover and nature in the form of the 
celestial spheres, Kant attempted to (in Chiesa/Lacan’s account) ‘found a new nature’ and 
the good by making the Thing (Noumena) present in our actions as the categorical 
imperative. Where the Noumena could never be had, was an unknowable blank, the good 
became the empty, formal dictum of the categorical imperative (Chiesa, 2007:171; 173). 
The implications Chiesa draws from this are 1) that the Noumena as the basis of nature 
and the good becomes human law as nature, 2) there is a flattening, a destruction of any 
 202 
hierarchy of ‘goods’, in that so long as it is universalized anything can be considered the 
sovereign good (thereby opening up the possibility of ‘radical evil’), and 3) Aristotle is in 
a sense inverted in that the categorical imperative becomes the guarantee of the Thing as 
‘sovereign good’ in that it is not only the good, but also includes happiness (Kant, 1997: 
104). That is, the highest good (the Thing) can not be had without Freedom, god, heaven, 
and soul as postulates, as the means of the infinite work in the afterlife to which 
happiness (read ‘enjoyment’) will accord. This is the ‘Real-ization of the Symbolic’ in 
that everything, every act, becomes a means of enjoyment (perhaps to be understood in 
the vein of ‘absolute actuality’). This may not seem sinister until de Sade is brought into 
the picture: he’s a good Kantian (according to Chiesa and Žižek) in the sense that he 
raises enjoyment as pleasure-pain to the level of a universal law, resulting in the infinite 
torture and debasement of his fictitious victims. The cost of making the good ‘immanent’ 
to one’s activity is to eradicate the good in a wash of solipsistic enjoyment. 
 In The Parallax View Žižek presents the collapse of the Real into the Symbolic – the 
‘short circuit’ of S1 by a, the decline of symbolic efficiency as embodied in the cynical 
Skinhead – as ‘generated by the globalization of the Symbolic.’ That is, it is a product of 
capitalism transforming more and more of the objects of our lives into commodities to be 
enjoyed (‘enjoyed’ to be taken literally as legally possessed bearers of jouissance/value) 
and ‘correlative’ to the ‘naturalization’ of capitalism as a social system (Žižek, 2006a: 
301-311). The link to Chiesa becomes clear when remembering Sohn-Rethel’s thesis that 
the Kantian subject is the product of the generalization of the exchange abstraction.196 
While using this argument to develop his position on money, thought, and ideology for 
the first time, Žižek also discusses cynicism: just because people know that money isn’t 
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magic, just because they know that it is a social product and mock it, doesn’t mean that 
their actions don’t prove the opposite. This was the initial ‘perversion’ of capitalism: the 
fetishism of the commodity is an act and the form of thought rather than any particular 
thought. Cynicism also points to a further, second-level perverse aspect of capitalism: the 
destruction of any hierarchy of morality, the waning of the idea that ‘another world is 
possible,’ and the ‘Realization of the Symbolic’ in the form of the hedonistic flight into 
consumerism.  
At one point in Capital, Volume I Marx writes that a commodity is ‘a born leveler and 
cynic’ (Marx, 1976: 179), a comment that can be understood with the help of Peter 
Osborne’s (2012) brief discussion of the historical relationship of money and cynicism. 
Remember that Sohn-Rethel argues that the coinage of money in Ionian Greece was the 
first step towards the abstract subject of science – that of Newton and Kant. In similar 
fashion Osborne points out that the archetypal cynic (Diogenes of Sinope) turned to the 
laws of nature in place of convention because he was told to ‘debase the coinage’ by the 
Delphic Oracle – which he initially took as a call to counterfeit money. Money was of 
course ‘currency’, the gold coins whose worth was guaranteed by the current rulers of the 
state. So, Diogenes came to understand the Oracle’s words to mean to debase human 
authority and instead embrace only that of nature, which saw the most vulgar activities 
treated as objects of virtue. Starting here and then tracing some of the historical 
vicissitudes that cynicism takes Osborne comes to Simmel’s discussion of the relation 
between capitalist money and cynicism: ‘The concept of a market price for values which, 
according to their nature, reject any evaluation except in terms of their own categories 
and ideals, is the perfect objectification of what cynicism presents in the form of a 
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subjective reflex.’ That is, Simmel saw stock exchanges and other financial institutions as 
the ‘nurseries of cynicism’ because they partook in large turnovers of exchange-value 
which ‘brought about the most absurd combinations of personal and objective values.’ 
Not only this, the problem mollifies itself: money’s ‘enslavement of life in its means’ 
sees release from it ‘sought in a mere means which conceals its final significance – in the 
fact of “stimulation” as such’ (all quotes Simmel in Osborne, 2012: 21). That is, the 
generalization of the exchange abstraction, the formalism that is money, results in the 
attempt to escape it in any pleasure whatsoever. Like in Chiesa’s view on Kant’s 
categorical imperative, the ‘naturalization’ of capitalism – i.e. understanding it as the 
only possible social system – is the result of applying its universal form to everything and 
thereby making every object one of enjoyment.  
In addition to helping understand Žižek’s position on capitalism and perversion, 
Chiesa’s account also makes the political implications of the masochism of drive clearer. 
For Chiesa masochism – perversion as such – as the logic of drive197 is the means by 
which something is made from nothing, the means by which the subject comes to exist 
from a non-differentiated individual – the act of creation.198 In capitalism this becomes 
explicit for the whole of society for the first time: all that is solid melts into air, 
traditional ways of life are destroyed replaced with new ones that are in constant flux. 
This masochistic self-beating finds a more clearly political expression in Žižek’s work in 
his discussion of a scene in Fight Club in which the protagonist (played by Edward 
Norton) beats himself up in front of his boss – while blaming his boss for doing it. In 
acting out his ‘symbolic identification’ in this way Norton’s character is able to free 
himself from the chains of work by realizing, in physical form, that it is instead himself 
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that gives the ‘master’ his power (Žižek, 2002: 252; 2003b). This happens three times in 
the film: first in the scene where Brad Pitt’s character – a projection of Norton’s mind 
that no one else can see – and Norton beat each other up and thereby invent ‘fight club’; 
second in the scene where Norton’s character beats himself in front of his boss; and lastly 
in the final scene where Norton shoots himself in the head (and survives) in order to rid 
himself of the master that still resides within – this is Pitt’s character, whom Norton 
mistakenly believes is the leader behind ‘Project Mayhem,’ an organization aimed at 
destroying consumerist ways of living. The positive element that Žižek sees in the second 
beating – the destructive/creative tendency that is drive, the principle of separation from 
the big Other – is lost in the fascist tones of the film: first is the focus on finance capital 
(i.e. the destruction of credit card companies in the final scene) which historically has led 
to questions of who controls finance and thereby corrupts it (i.e. racist ideologies; tales 
about the ‘elders of Zion’; the idea that destroying the financial sector will return the 
economy back to its ‘material’ roots) rather than the structure of capitalism as such; 
second, as Žižek notes, the film only manifests the destructive side of capitalism (Žižek, 
2002: 258). The problem is in the move from the first form of violence to the third: where 
drive and capitalism are violent creative-destructions, Fight Club only gives successive 
violence: from the liberation from consumerist ideology to the creation of an organization 
that provides an ‘orgy’ of destruction rather than creation. That is, it involves the 
destruction of the object – which ends with a symbolic identification and the acceptance 
of a social mandate/role and Oedipalization – rather than a change in the form of the 
symbolic itself and thereby also the form of symbolic identification.199 That is, Norton’s 
character can now have a relationship with his love interest, and everyone else (i.e. 
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society) gets to ‘start over’ – but within a capitalist universe; Norton has found a way to 
accommodate himself to the capitalist world. 
 This opens the question of what the alternative might be. In the essay in which 
Žižek discusses Fight Club he suggests that this alternative is the Party – this because it 
shares the form of the practice of psychoanalysis. All the above was an attempt to argue 
that because a subjective mediation lies at the heart of capitalist economies capitalism can 
be inspected from a  psychoanalytic perspective. Further, it was argued that 
psychoanalysis is a relevant means to look at that subjective mediation because it itself 
relies on capitalist exchange relations in order to function: because it is a practice that is 
not so much concerned about the internal, psychological motivations or capacities of 
atomized individuals but about the processes by which people are able to interact with 
others and the world at all, the categories of psychoanalysis are not simply the tools for 
an individual’s therapist but also critical categories for understanding the social world. It 
was argued that the Subject is the product of capitalism and that capitalism needed this 
subject to function. It was also argued that the modern subject is also the means of 
destroying capitalist social relation – i.e. that it was one of capitalism’s internal limits. 
What has not been emphasized is that the flip side of the creation of the modern 
individual is the simultaneous creation of individual classes: capitalism is such that each 
has a connection to others in their particular relation to the means of production. Where 
psychoanalysis relies on money in order to show the social nature of individuality as 
such, the Party thus uses liberal individual freedoms (for example, the freedom of 
association) to demonstrate the social nature of liberal social organization as a means to 
overcome its limitations. This is the question that is developed in more detail in the 
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following chapter with an eye to the history and sociology of the Bolshevik Party as well 
as the German SPD.   
 
!"  
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Chapter 7 – The Party: history, possibility, actuality  
 
In order to supersede the idea of private property, the idea of communism is enough. In order to 
supersede private property as it actually exists, real communist activity is necessary. History will 
give rise to such activity, and the movement which we already know in thought to be a self-
superseding movement will in reality undergo a very difficult and protracted process. But we must 
look upon it as a real advance that we have gained at the outset an awareness of the limits as well 
as the goal of this historical movement and are in a position to see beyond it.  
 
– Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 
 
He was an important leader, so people began to look at him as somebody who was going to do 
something for them. But Debs was always hostile to the idea that the point of organizing a 
socialist party was to get its leader elected, or that it would solve anything. So this is how Debs 
responded to people who saw him as the solution: ‘If I could lead you into the promise land, I 
could lead you back out again.’ That is, if I had the personal power to grant you socialism, then I’d 
have the power to take it away again. Ok, good quote. But how do you solve this problem? 
 
– Todd Chretien, ‘Lenin’s Theory of the Party.’ 
 
!"  
 
The necessity of the Party as a form of organization appropriate to overcoming 
capitalism needs to be further developed. The starting point, explored in the preceding 
chapter, lies hidden in the liberation implied in Fight Club, an example that seems wholly 
fantastical. A more readily understandable real-life example, however, appears in Less 
Than Nothing – a reference to the Egyptian uprising of February, 2011: 
…the violence of the protestors was purely symbolic, an act of radical and collective civil 
disobedience: they suspended the authority of the state – it was not just an inner liberation, but a 
social act of breaking the chains of servitude volontaire (Žižek, 2012: 34-5).  
 
Here, a personal liberation is contrasted to a collective one; in addition, in place of a 
literal self-beating to suspend the authority of the ‘master’ and one’s servitude volontaire 
it is the moment of acting differently that is seen as one of violence – a refusal to submit 
to the demands of the state. This reference to the state and collectivity is the key and has 
been referenced before in regards to the general strike of 1919 in Winnipeg: Bartleby’s 
refusal is not simply a standing back, but from the perspective of the state a violent 
action; from the perspective of state any refusal is seen as disorder, but from the 
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perspective of the refusal it is the creation of a new social organization. The question is 
then one of individual versus collective action, and collective action within and without 
the bounds of the state.  
  Against the assertions of Sharpe and Boucher that there are two Žižeks – one a 
good ‘radical democrat’ and the other an evil, Lukács-inspired totalitarian – it was earlier 
argued that there was a continuity to Žižek’s thought. This involved stressing his reliance 
on the commodity form and references to the formal power of Hegel’s monarch, where 
the later was seen as an empty universal that maintains the existing form of collective life 
and the Leninist Party, by contrast, stood as the particular as universal excess that could 
potentially blow apart existing structures and establish new ones. The discussion in the 
previous chapter was an attempt to establish, in broad outline, that the modern subject is 
the outcome of  the capitalist mode of production and the freedom that comes with it is 
both embodied and obscured in the commodity form as money, the discussion turning to 
the role of money in the psychoanalytic treatment. In an earlier chapter it was shown that 
the relationships had in psychological clinics are not simply individual but already 
mediated by the professional associations – the community of professionals – and the 
market. Likewise, outside the clinic in that part of our everyday reality that Marx calls the 
‘simple form of exchange’ it appears as though two equal individuals meet to mutually 
satisfy their needs, but developing the concepts that relate to capitalism from that point 
show that it is instead a phenomena that relies on an entire social and economic system: 
while exchange might at first glance appear as a personal, freely entered relationship 
between two individuals on the market, it is of course only possible because of a 
collection of people performing the same act, of contracts and laws guaranteed by the 
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‘monopoly of violence’ possessed by the state, the division of labour, and ultimately the 
alienation of the worker – ‘free’ from the means of reproducing themselves without the 
mediation of capital and the vending of their labour power.  
 The one-on-one relation between an analyst and an analysand can, of course, 
create positive results without reference to the political ether in which it swims. Likewise 
there is some freedom in the liberal democratic illusion: Žižek remarks that making the 
‘old Marxist point’ that there is a gap between formal and real equality is not enough, 
giving credit to Herbert Marcuse, Claude Lefort, and Jacques Rancière for the idea that 
formal freedom and equality, thought flawed, can lead to the fight for, and gains of, 
actual freedom and equality (Žižek 2009a: 67;143). Marx, too, should be included in this 
list:200 discussing the difference between wage work and slavery in ‘Results of the 
Immediate Process of Production’ he writes that ‘if supremacy and subordination come to 
take the place of slavery, serfdom, vassalage and other patriarchal forms of subjection, 
the change is purely one of form. The form becomes freer, because it is objective in 
nature, voluntary in appearance, purely economic’ (Marx, 1977:1027-28). He then refers 
to the following quote: ‘The condition of a labourer is superior to that of a slave, because 
a labourer thinks himself free; and this conviction, however erroneous, has no small 
influence on the character of a population’ (Edmonds in Marx, 1977: 1027, n26).201  
The point to be made here is threefold: first, though illusory this freedom  is 
‘effective’, has a result in people’s real lives; the second is that this version of the 
individual is historical and its particular character includes its opposite. The most famous 
portion of the Grundrisse, for example, is dedicated to showing the historical genesis of 
capitalism, which brought with it the development of the individual:  
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He appears originally as a species-being, clan being, herd animal – although in no way 
whatever as a [political animal] in the political sense. Exchange itself is a chief means of this 
individuation. It makes the herd-like existence superfluous and dissolves it. Soon the matter 
[has] turned in such a way that as an individual he relates himself only to himself, while the 
means with which he posits himself as individual have become the making of his generality 
and commonness’ (Marx, 1973b: 496).  
 
That is, capitalism separated ‘man’ from the clan and provided a different means of social 
intercourse, one that brought with it a larger set of ‘real connections’ – i.e. the creation of 
large groups of people who share a relationship to the means of production. That is, the 
flip side of what is left out of a perspective that focuses solely on the ‘simple form of 
exchange’ is the creation of class as a collective actor.  
The third, last point to be made is that the form is not incidental but necessary: 
there is no liberal individual without the commodity form. Likewise, there is no class 
without class-consciousness. This is of course fundamental to the arc of History and 
Class Consciousness: the limiting, reified social relationships seen under capitalism are 
made possible by the commodity form and are to be combated with the form of the party 
as a new social organization, one that encourages the development of all aspects of the 
worker along with their class consciousness. This is of course also included in the work 
of Marx and Engels: as previously noted, class is not a ‘sack of potatoes’, not a set of 
numbers that refers to all those of a certain socio-economic status; for Marx and Engels it 
is instead the conscious activity of one class in conflict with another, as can be seen in 
works from The German Ideology to The 18th Brumaire.202 The question is then one of 
the form appropriate to class, rather than just individual, consciousness.  
While not often stressed in discussions of Marx and Engel’s politics, they of 
course saw a need for a political party of the working class: arguing that ‘the concept of 
the proletarian party occupies a central position in the political thought and activity’ of 
the pair, Monty Johnstone opens his survey of the vicissitudes (and continuity) of Marx 
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and Engel’s thoughts on the party by quoting a resolution they drafted for (and which was 
passed by) the ‘First International’ in 1872:  
‘Against the collective power of the propertied classes,’ they argued, ‘the working class 
cannot act as a class except by constituting itself into a political party distinct from, and 
opposed to, all old parties formed from the propertied classes.’ This was ‘indispensable in 
order to ensure the triumph of the social revolution, and its ultimate end, the abolition of 
classes’ (Johnstone, 1967: 121; see also 132, 141, 145 n.1).  
 
On this same point Lars Lih – who has written a detailed account of the actual (rather 
than perceived) status of Lenin’s supposed recipe for a political party (i.e. What Is To Be 
Done?)203 – goes so far as to claim the following:  
Ultimately, the vanguard outlook derives from the key Marxist assumption that ‘the emancipation 
of the working classes must be the work of the working classes themselves.’ Sometimes this 
dictum is viewed as the opposite of the vanguard outlook, but, in actuality, it makes vanguardism 
almost inevitable. If the proletariat is the only agent capable of introducing socialism, then it must 
go through some sort of process that will prepare it to carry out that great deed (Lih, 2008: 556).  
 
That is, Marx’s answer to ‘who educates the educators’ is action, and to fight as a class 
there must be some means to gather experience and disseminate it rather than expect that 
different people in different places will all come to the same conclusions at the same 
time. That is, where the property owning classes have been centrally organized in the 
form of the state for much longer, the working class needs to catch up. Lih argues this 
was common sense for the ‘Erfurtians’ – i.e. those who espoused the Erfurt program of 
the SPD: the assumption, made by the Social Democrats of Germany and those who 
looked to them, that revolution would come eventually, that the working class was 
coming into class consciousness, thereby making the aim of the party to speed up the 
process (which Lih argues is part of what he dubs ‘the merger narrative’). Similarly, 
Johnstone argues that Marx and Engels pushed for a form of association that would unite 
the working classes of the world  and ‘shorten the process’ by which workers would 
come to anti-capitalist (i.e. communist) conclusions and activity (Johnstone, 1967: 143).  
 213 
Sociology against the Party; history against sociology 
 Before making a final statement of how Žižek’s reference to the Party is akin to 
these conceptions it’s important to briefly take up some of the classical sociology on the 
question of party politics (Ostrogorski, 1964a, 1964b; Michels, 1966; each of which 
inform Weber, 1958) for at least three reasons: first to head off some of the available 
criticisms of the party form based on these classical sources; second, to respond to 
Bosteels call, in the first of Žižek et al’s Idea of Communism books, to eschew relying on 
a generic version of ‘communism’ which simply rejects the question of the party and 
party-state as outdated,204 and begin a ‘comprehensive and collective rethinking, without 
epic or apostasy, of the links between communism, the history and theory of the State, 
and the history and theory of modes of political organization – with the later including 
not only the party but also the legacy of insurrectionary mass action and armed 
struggle…’ (Bosteels, 2010: 64); lastly, because Lih briefly references Ostrogorsky and 
Michels in his study of Lenin and What is To Be Done? – at one point to argue that 
substitution/oligarchy is not particular to Lenin’s vision but a problem in all democratic 
organizations, and at another to suggest that Lenin was perhaps naïve in his positive 
assessment of Russian workers (Lih, 2008: 551; 599).  
While there are of course problems in Ostrogorski and Michels’ arguments and 
their applicability to the RSDLP and political parties more generally they do contain 
some interesting insights. This is particularly true of Ostrogorski’s study, which operates 
in historical mode. He shows that the party machines that came to be in England and the 
Unites States were a convention taken over from what was essentially a different political 
and economic structure in England before the industrial revolution: a limited organization 
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that didn’t stretch far beyond the houses of government and bathed in the light of the ‘old 
unity’ – that of feudal and semi-feudal society – itself based in limited suffrage. He 
provides a rather rosy image of a gentry that acted out of a sense of public duty and 
governed through person influence and excellence in a social environ where all excepted 
this way of life and also did their duty (an image clearly taken from the eyes of the gentry 
itself). In this context parties mirrored this structure, revolving around strong 
personalities and based in a sense of duty and reverence for hierarchy. Here parties are 
socially and economically homogeneous and  based on relatively small differences rather 
than in fundamental principles – in the case Ostrogorski focuses on (and to simplify), 
being either for or against the King (i.e. the Tories and the Whigs) (1964a: 14-15; 1964b: 
350-1). With the social strife raised by the industrial revolution, the extension of suffrage 
that followed it, and the development of representational democracy, political parties 
extended beyond state institutions and into the civil sphere, in the process becoming 
formalized, mechanical organizations:205 needing to cater to socially and economically 
heterogeneous groups of people in order to take power in government parties were 
converted into a means of garnering votes. As the registration of voters was not initially 
institutionalized as part of the state, private interests took on this role; the success of these 
committees led to them being incorporated into the body of the parties, eventually leading 
to the re-birth of the party whip in the form of the party secretary: where the whip would 
trade money and favour for offices and seats in the old parties, the secretary stood as the 
prototype of the ‘wire-puller’ who chose those who could best sway the masses with 
crass feelings and zeal rather than rational argument and moral feeling – a process of 
selection ‘repeated at every stage of the Organization’ (1964a: 170; 177). In the end the 
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‘representatives’ put forward by the party and later elected to parliament were thus 
selected less by the citizen and more-so by the party elite.  
     While his ideal was of a non-party system where any individual who so desired 
could nominate themselves, and where vigorous public debate would lead to those best 
suited to govern being voted into power, Ostrogorski could see the need for collective 
action: he was not so much against parties as against permanent party machines. Non-
permanent parties were, in his view, a legitimate and necessary means for like-minded 
citizens to get together on specific topics that they thought needed redress – and he saw 
taking power as a legitimate strategy or end – so long as they disbanded when the 
problem was solved (1964b: 356-9). He goes so far as to argue that ‘wherever liberty 
reigns’ the laws that flow from it only need capable administrators to carry them out, and 
new laws can be created by legislators who must obey only the openly expressed 
rationally argued opinions of an educated, sovereign people (Ibid: 352-3). If one for a 
moment forgets that his ‘liberty’ is primarily that of the individual on the market, 
reverberations of Saint Just and Marx can be felt.  
His main objection to the political parties of his day was not only that their 
structure led to oligarchy, but that this structure could achieve this because it relied on the 
historically contingent education and habits of the masses: he held that people were 
largely ignorant, uninterested in participating in politics, or more than happy to let the 
party act as a fetishistic stand-in for their patriotism and politics needs (though he saw 
changes that began to point to this problem dissolving).206 Claiming to be representative, 
party caucuses – where parliamentary candidates were selected and party policy was 
debated – were too large to allow debate, demanded that candidates subordinate 
 216 
themselves to the resolutions passed by the caucus, had representatives vetted for them by 
the hierarchy of influence established within the party, and were poorly attended. These 
four factors made independent thought nigh impossible and saw those ‘excellent’ 
individuals who could have done the public well leave politics because they felt stifled. 
Herein, then, lies the limit of Ostrogorski’s analysis: it revolves not around ‘democracy’ 
in general, but the particularities of representational democracy as developed in the 
direction of party politics.  
The obvious differences between what he describes, the RSDLP as Lih describes 
it, and certain elements of the German Social Democratic Party are as follows: where 
Ostrogorski describes a machine designed to garner votes, the RSDLP aimed for self-
determination in a non-parliamentary democracy modeled after the Paris Commune as a 
party organization that would facilitate seizing and transforming the state. Indeed where 
the primary element of the SPD eventually became the voting district (see below), for the 
RSDLP it was the local ‘cell’ (Elwood, 1974: 88-90);207 Ostrogorski describes an 
apathetic mass of people who are little interested in politics, and if they either are 
educated, independent, or interested, the party machine favours conformity and 
mediocrity and thereby squeezes them out. By constrast the RSDLP pushed for members 
to become fully involved activists who would develop many party-skills at different 
levels of organization (agitation, activity in party schools, group newspaper reading, 
attending as many meetings as possible, contributing to publications, etc.).;208 In the party 
system of England ‘fetes’, ‘entertainments’, and other ‘periodical gatherings’ were geared 
towards giving people interested in party activity ritualistic supports of belief, a taste of 
the favour of the leader, material comfort, etc., (Ostrogorski, 1964a: 178-9) whereas the 
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social-democratic labour movement in Germany, for example, encouraged various 
different working class organizations (from dancing clubs to sports leagues) in order to 
develop a new type of culture (Lidtke, 1985); Where Ostrogorski describes the watering-
down of party ideology as a function of having to appeal to the entirety of the voting 
public – a mass of heterogeneous classes, interests, and demands – Lih describes a party 
(or at least a leader) unafraid to limit its ideology and practice to a specific set of ideas.209 
In Ostrogorsky’s account, the tendency to cater to as many interests as possible in order 
to garner as many votes as possible meant that ‘all interests but the general interest’ 
ended up being represented. For Lenin it meant diluting the aims of the Party. In 1902 it 
would have meant accepting revisionism and a reformist, rather than revolutionary, 
platform. As Lih argues, there is nothing illiberal in this in that as a voluntary 
organization no one was forced to be a member of the Party, and so accepting multiple 
ideologies was not necessary, and even antithetical to presenting a competing world-view 
for a party dominated by Tzarism and competing with a multitude of other ideas (Lih, 
2008: 747-5).210 All this is to say that the intentions, organizational forms, and historical 
circumstance are different in the case of the liberal democratic parties of Western Europe 
and the RSDLP before the civil war.  
A possible response to this lies in the work of Michels, who’s study focused 
specifically on the Social Democratic Party of Germany and led him to conclude that 
party organizations (and in the end all organizations) obey the ‘iron law of oligarchy.’ In 
large part what Michels does is add some spurious psychological arguments (e.g. 
people’s need for worship, and thus their identification of party leaders with the party 
itself) and a class component to the argument that there has to be larger, more centralized 
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organizations the more complex social needs, states, etc., become: those involved in paid 
party work eventually rely on it for their own material existence. That is, where in 1844 
Marx described workers’ organizations becoming ends-in-themselves in terms of a new 
form of social interaction not found in alienated work, Michels’ describes the party 
turning into an end-in-itself because it becomes aligned with the status quo. While there 
are of course several places to look for critiques of this thesis211 – both in terms of its 
historical accuracy as well as it generalizability – perhaps the most pertinent is Carl 
Schorske’s (1983) study of the SPD, which covers the years between the first and second 
Russian revolutions.  
Schorske’s central argument in this regard is that bureaucracies are not a universal 
phenomenon that drive in one specific direction (i.e. that of oligarchy) but that they are 
instead ‘constructed for the purposes of those who build it. Political and social aims enter 
into its fibres at its birth, while the mentality and outlook of its framers are reflected and 
perpetuated in its lower echelons’ (Schorske, 1983: 118). That is, there are more forces at 
play than just bureaucracy itself. To put it in Marxist terms, what Michels left out was not 
only historical circumstances but counter-tendencies. Where (in Schorske’s account) the 
revisionists, the radicals, and the centrists in the SPD held that Germany was not in a 
revolutionary situation, none had a problem with making use of parliament in their tactics 
– because, for instance, unlike the parliaments of today they were an important part of 
disseminating ideas because debates were followed far more closely. As a consequence, 
when the parliamentary route became more and more successful it was decided to revise 
party organization in such a way as to strengthen the means of mobilizing the electorate. 
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This lead to a manifestation, at the level of organization, of a fight based on differing 
theoretical starting points. 
The revisionists held that social change was to be the product of the upper-classes 
crumbling under their own weight, making revolution and the violent seizing of power 
and the transformation of the state unnecessary. This lead to a parting of ways at the level 
of organizational principle, as best felt in the more rural areas of Germany: tending to be 
more conservative their populations were less friendly to revolutionary party platforms to 
the point of completely ostracizing activists from social life. Where the party program 
was a radical one (passed at Erfurt), and where these areas were in many instances 
worked by revisionists, there was a push to limit the authority of the central organization 
over the local and provincial (rather, ‘state’ – Land) levels in order to be free to present a 
less radical program. At the same time the popularity of revisionism drove the radicals to 
demand more centralization in order ensure party discipline and adherence to the party 
program. In the end both won out, where the party became more centralized and yet 
much autonomy was maintained at the other levels of the organization, allowing 
revisionist party members in conservative areas to tone down party objectives for their 
audiences. That is, parliamentarism plus revisionism plus the Erfurt program meant a 
push and pull between centralism and federalism. Schorske charts this tension up through 
to the formal splitting of the party during the First World War, while at the same time 
describing another tendency/counter-tendency: to avoid becoming de facto illegal in the 
face of a Germany-wide declaration of a state of siege (thereby allowing the state to 
legally harass anyone seen to be undermining German unity), the party executive could 
only make reformist statements in public and was forced to act as the means to discipline 
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party members who did otherwise. This meant that party discipline – for example in the 
form of parliamentarians voting en bloc on various issues as a symbol of the unity of the 
working class – became the means of maintaining a revisionist (i.e. reformist) position 
rather than that of the party program (i.e. the Erfurt program). The more this happened, 
the more the radical factions pushed back, culminating in an organizational split and the 
re-adoption of the Erfurt program by the newly established party.  
  The SPD became akin to the parties described by Ostrogorsky in that securing 
votes became its most prominent function, to the point where the electoral district 
organization became the basic organizational unit of the party (Schorske, 1983: 121). 
Instead of succumbing to Michels’ ‘iron law’, however, it was pushed and pulled in ways 
particular to its historical circumstances – German laws, the length of the struggle for 
legitimacy, the popularity of and struggle against revisionism, etc. Schorske’s account 
thus also establishes the ground for a further differentiation of Ostrogorski’s and Michels’ 
account from the Russian case. Lih goes down this route, suggesting that ‘one might, in 
fact, argue that the Russian underground was forced to be more democratic than the SPD 
in some respects, because the constant arrests prevented the formation of a permanent 
elite and because support for the Party remained not only voluntary but highly dangerous’ 
(Lih, 2008: 472).212 While it might raise some eyebrows (if not hackles) to put them in 
the same paragraph, Robert Service213 takes a similar tack against Michels – as well as 
Weber – arguing that the conditions in Russia were very different than those in Germany, 
giving rise to different results: in addition to giving a list of outcomes of Bolshevik 
activity that would have defied Michels’ expectations (Service, 1979: 200-1) he outlines 
factors and forces that led the Bolsheviks away from a relatively open, decentralized, 
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democratic organization that were not simply historical circumstance, the force of 
personality, nor the logic of bureaucracy (1979: 7). They were instead largely 1) a push 
from the grass roots of the party for greater centralization and organization of information 
and instructions in the face or worsening conditions during the civil war; 2) the 
decimation of the ranks upon seizing power214 (where people were sent to fight, were 
constantly changing posts in light of new problems, etc.); and 3) a series of people at the 
top who were more than willing to oblige in demands for centralization (ibid: 207-8). 
Rabinovitch gives a similar account in the first and last installments of his trilogy on the 
Bolshevik Party and the Russian Revolution (1968; 2007), arguing that the relatively 
open, decentralized party of early 1917 was transformed not because of pre-conceived 
ideas about centralization and ‘totalitarian’ rule, nor an iron law, nor Lenin’s own 
supposed lust for power. Instead, he locates the cause of the change in historical 
circumstance and the push-and-pull between rank and file members,215 the Bolshevik 
Central Committee, the Bolshevik Petersburg Committee and Military Organization, and 
the right/left/moderate ideological divisions found throughout. In the end both conclude 
that the shift in party organization was anything but inevitable.   
Revolution: impossible and actual? 
 
 This brief treatment of the historical question is far from comprehensive but at 
least points in the direction of ‘totalitarianism’ being anything but the inevitable outcome 
of party organization. What it does is help eliminate recourse to what Marcuse called one 
dimensional thought – the emphasis on a supposed ‘is’ rather than a possible ‘ought.’ 
This does not account, however, for the necessity of the Party in working towards a sea-
change in social organization, but it does not mean that one has to turn to an ‘ethical 
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socialism’ conceived of independently of what is. It demands a revolutionary theory of 
capitalism – as Lenin is quoted as saying above – but also a revolutionary theory of the 
Party. That was in large part approached in the previous chapter and above. It has to be 
reiterated that this latter question was also what Lukács attempted in the last chapter of 
History and Class Consciousness, writing that… 
The Idea of the Communist Party, opposed and slandered by all opportunists, instinctively seized 
upon and made their own by the best revolutionary workers, has yet been seen purely in technical 
terms rather than as one of the most important intellectual questions of the revolution (Lukács, 
1971: 295).216 
 
Some of the technical questions – as posed by Michels, who at the time of his study was a 
Social Democrat – have been reviewed above. One possible theoretical answer has also 
been provided above: that the form of capitalism holds within it the form of its negation – 
i.e. that of analysis/the Party. Driving this point home perhaps requires two more steps. 
The first is to re-iterate that the subject is its own product (and is so via the intervention 
of the capitalist signifier – money); the second is to compare the theory of the role of the 
party as presented in Lukács and draw the links between it and the practice of 
psychoanalysis.  
The first can be approached with reference to Brockelman’s (2009) study of 
Žižek, in which he absolutizes the ‘impossible’ against Žižek’s own use of the term, 
arguing that in giving us a description of the Party Žižek thereby makes us ‘forgo the 
thesis of utopia’s “impossibility”’ (115): ‘We can’t say that utopia is “always already 
there” in the form of a potential to be realized without compromising this truth of its 
unanticipated nature’ (116).217 Brockelman has, in saying this, reproduced a problem that 
Žižek sees in the work of Badiou and tries to eliminate: conceiving the ‘event’ as 
independent of ‘the situation’, as coming from somewhere outside it. Žižek argues, 
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constantly argues, that the Real as impossible that erupts in an Act is part of the situation. 
That is, the Real is not completely heterogeneous to or outside of the ‘situation,’ but 
‘extimate’ to it – its excluded inside. In doing this Brockelman also misses Johnston’s 
description of one of Hegel’s arguments against Kant, one that Johnston sees as important 
for understanding Žižek’s reliance on German Idealism: in asserting something is 
completely unknowable to us (i.e. Noumenal) you betray at least a minimal knowledge of 
that unknowable thing.218 Put in Lacanian terms, ‘the non-immanent Real is reached only 
through the deadlocks and inconsistencies immanent to the Symbolic’ (Johnston, 2008: 
152). That is, once one describes the ‘inside’ one has already given a description of the 
‘outside’, if only by negation. Žižek makes this argument about limits clear in the third 
chapter of Tarrying With the Negative: ‘We cannot know them, but we must think them’ 
(1993: 111).219 The distinction is here between ‘contentless form’ and ‘formless content’: 
‘formless content’ is unknowable ‘abstract matter’, the product of the form of our 
thought, and ‘contentless form’ the practice of thought itself (Žižek, 2012: 167-8). In this 
instance, the ‘contentless form’ is capitalism rid of its capitalist content in the 
psychoanalytic relationship (see the previous chapter). That is, the limit is in one’s 
practice, the ‘unknowable’ a product of current ways of doing things and not of the world 
itself. This is all to say that the only reason Žižek can say there is something that is 
impossible in the first place is because it is ‘impossible’ by dint of the form of the 
situation in which we find ourselves, but that form itself contains the means of its 
overcoming.  
A very brief discussion of Hegel’s version of ‘actuality’ – through the eyes of 
Carlson and Žižek – can make this point clearer. In Carlson’s account (2007: 402-13), 
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when in The Philosophy of Right Hegel pronounces that the rational is actual and the 
actual rational he is not making an apologia for the Prussian state but saying that there is 
no essence without that essence appearing, and that all that is can be understood 
rationally – whether it be irrational, contingent, or otherwise (Carlson, 2007: 393). This 
only becomes clear, argues Carlson, if one turns to the Logic: and as perhaps comes as no 
surprise, ‘actuality’ does not have a single meaning for Hegel, but passes through several 
developments. These are formal actuality, real actuality, and absolute actuality, which 
make up some of the final sections of the ‘doctrine of essence’ and Hegel’s discussion of 
objectivity. The first moment roughly corresponds to vulgar empiricism: what is, is, and 
one cannot determine the links between any property.220 Here none of the appropriate 
categories (actuality, necessity, impossibility, contingency) can be held to any real 
distinction and collapse into each other. In the second moment, all the links between 
properties are taken into account: rather than isolated moments there is instead ‘the 
totality,’ where any event is related to every other one and cannot be understood without 
reference to them. This is still not absolute actuality, however, which in Carlson’s 
account is when what is can negate itself – that is, actuality appears as contingency, 
where contingency is the freedom to not actualize.221 Here, then, the difference between 
form and content disappear as there is no longer merely formal determinations and latent 
content to be realized: there is instead only the ‘activity of form’, where appearance is 
understood to be essence (Ibid: 411). It is this third moment, and Žižek’s take on it, that is 
of interest for the present discussion.  
It is the shift to necessity as contingency that sustains his attention here, and to 
explain it he turns to Marx: regardless of how it began, once set in motion the logic of 
 225 
capitalism is such that contingent conditions allow it to manifest itself (Žižek, 1996c: 
403). There are perhaps three ways to grasp this: First, every contingent capital, 
competing with every other, is what makes capitalism what it is – Adam Smith’s 
‘invisible hand.’ A further example is money itself: the embodiment of ‘essence’, of 
value, it transforms any contingent thing (i.e. commodities) into its equivalent. Lastly, 
once operative the logic of capitalism turns what appears to be external to it into one of 
its own determinations. One way to understand this is through Marx’s description of 
‘formal subsumption’: a pre-existing labour process may not change in-itself when 
subjected to relations of wage-labour and capital (i.e. the way the work is actually 
performed can remain the same) but its fundamental end changes and becomes that of 
capital: the creation of more money (Marx: 1997: 1019-1023). More properly speaking – 
and this is the example that Žižek actually gives – each component of capitalist 
production of itself does not explain the functioning of capitalism; once the logic of 
capitalism comes into existence, each of its component parts performs a different 
function than it did before, subordinated to capital’s tendencies. That is, every particular 
embodies the essence of the universal. This can be seen in Marx’s discussion, in the 
introduction of the Grundrisse, of the difference between the historical genesis of 
different elements of what becomes capitalism and how they work together in bourgeois 
society (Marx, 1973b: 107): while money has existed in many different societies, ‘it 
makes an historic appearance in its full intensity only in the most developed conditions in 
society’ (103). More generally speaking, Marx puts it this way: 
At the very beginning these [the preconditions of a mode of production] may appear as 
spontaneous, natural. But by the process of production itself they are transformed from natural 
into historical determinants, and if they appear to one epoch as natural presuppositions of 
production they were its historical production for another (Marx, 1973b: 97).  
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To put it in terms that Žižek uses, what was once a presupposition becomes posited: the 
subject retroactively chooses its own causes. Or, to use another turn-of-phrase used by 
Marx, after the first cycle of the movement of capital the son begets the father.222 
At least, that’s how it may appear. Where the self-negation of any property in 
‘absolute actuality’ is taken as akin to freedom – i.e. self-mediation – it is not yet the 
completion of the move from objectivity to subjectivity (i.e. the ‘doctrine of essence’ is 
not the end of Hegel’s Logic). The pitfall to be avoided is then that of taking capital as if 
it is a ‘self-mediating’ entity. Marx presents the tendency to do so in political economy 
and everyday life the following way:  
The mystification in the capital-relation emerges at this point [when labour-power is subsumed 
under the wage-form]. The value-sustaining power of labour appears as the self-supporting power 
of capital; the value-creating power of labour as the self-valorizing power of capital, and, in 
general, in accordance with its concept living labour appears as to be put to work by objectified 
labour (Marx, 1997:1020-1021).  
 
This is of course the work of commodity fetishism, and is directly related to the critique 
that McNally levels against Postone’s reading of Marx: Postone takes abstract labour to 
simply be an empirical fact, forgetting that capitalism is parasitic on maintaining abstract 
labour and that the latter is subject to the push-back of workers. As a  consequence 
Postone is lead to understand capitalism as ‘a self-mediating social mediation’ (McNally, 
2004: 197-200). Marx himself, of course, appears to make this claim at the end of chapter 
four of Capital, at one point writing that value is the ‘dominant subject’ of the process of 
capitalist production and exchange, and is at this moment in ‘identity with itself’, a ‘self 
moving substance’ (Marx, 1977: 255-6). This is, however, only when it possesses the 
form of money (Ibid: 255), a form which he goes on to argue disguises that its supposed 
self-mediation is actually based on eviscerating labour-power – a power which Marx 
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even later in Capital calls a ‘self-activating capacity’ (Ibid: 980).223 Žižek, too, realizes 
this, writing the following in ‘Lenin’s Choice’: 
Is capital, then, the true Subject/Substance? Yes and no: for Marx, this self-engendering circular 
movement is – to put it in Freudian terms – precisely the capitalist ‘unconscious fantasy’ which 
parasitizes upon the proletariat as ‘pure substanceless subjectivity’; for this reason capital’s 
speculative self-generating dance has a limit, and brings about the conditions of its own collapse 
(Žižek, 2002: 283).224 
 
In the paper where he discusses ‘absolute actuality’, however, it may at first 
appear that Žižek simply does not address this issue. This is because in the piece in 
question (“Hegel With Lacan, or the Subject and Its Cause”) Marx’s take on capitalism 
and contingency is merely used as an example to help Žižek get at the point he is trying 
to make in regards to the Lacanian conception of the Subject. Following his use of Marx 
he makes a turn to religion. More specifically, he turns to a discussion of Hegel’s account 
of the creation of the Christian community as the embodiment of the Holy Spirit in the 
wake of Christ’s crucifixion.225 This is because he acknowledges that absolute necessity 
‘is not Hegel’s last word’ (Žižek, 1996c: 403). However, the point he makes is not so 
much about Christianity as about ‘the subject’s belief in itself’ (Ibid: 405), and so it can 
easily be applied to commodity fetishism. Take the following quote about the Holy Spirit 
and the activity of the Christian community, from the paper in question: 
The relationship of cause and effect is here dialectically reflected. On the one hand, the cause [the 
Holy Spirit] is unambiguously the product of the subject’s activity; it is ‘alive’ only insofar as it is 
continually resuscitated by the passion of the believers. On the other hand, these same believers 
experience the cause as the Absolute, as what sets their lives in motion – in short, as the cause of 
their activity; by the same token, they experience themselves as mere transient accidents of their 
cause. Subjects therefore posit the cause, yet they posit it not as something subordinated to them 
but as their absolute cause. What we encounter here is again the paradoxical temporal loop of the 
subject: the cause is posited, but as what it ‘always-already was’ (Žižek, 1996c: 406). 
 
Clearly it is the workers who generate value, but it appears as though value determines 
the actions of the workers and they posit it as such a cause. Important is the role played 
by Christ in this discussion of the Holy Spirit: first he is an object of doctrine – the story 
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of the ascension; secondly he is a point of subjective identification – feeling as one with 
Christ on the cross; then he is the subject-substance of the community, alive as the Holy 
Spirit. While Žižek discusses these moments in relation to different forms of syllogism, 
they roughly correspond to the moments of the Logic presented by Žižek: first, the 
contingent individual comes to embody essence/the beyond in the world (i.e. ‘absolute 
actuality’); second is the moment of narrativization, where one chooses which story one 
wants to explain the cause/effect relations one sees (which roughly corresponds to 
Carlson’s discussion of ‘the relation of causality’ – 2007: 418-426); This is not yet 
substance-as-subject because the narrative is not yet one that actually determines ‘the 
absolute’ – the social-substance embodied in everyone’s activity as the community of 
believers, and not in just one individual as Christ (i.e. the moment of ‘reciprocity’ – that 
found at the very end of the section on the ‘objective’ in Hegel’s logic. See Carlson, 
2007: 426-31). 
The key is in that with which one is said to identify in Christ: his abandonment on 
the cross, the question of why he had been forsook. Remember that in chapter three of the 
present study it was argued that in Žižek’s take on religion – at around the time of the 
‘Leninist turn’ – the logic of Christ was compared to the logic of the commodity (Žižek, 
2001a: 100) as it was in Marx’s 1844 manuscripts (Marx, 1992: 261); note too that 
Marx’s comments about the son ‘begetting the father’ is a reference to Christ and is 
found precisely at the moment when Marx declares that value is a ‘self-moving 
substance’ (Marx, 1977: 256); also recall that Žižek’s primary argument surrounding 
Christ was – as opposed to what he sees as the standard reading of the crucifixion – that 
He could be taken as a negative, disruptive universal rather than a positive, conservative 
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one (as was also argued in regards to the Leninist party and Hegel’s monarch in the above 
discussion of Laclau and Rancière). That is, when Christ dies so too does God – one 
realizes that He does not exist (this also appears in 1996c: 408). When he writes that the 
subject ‘is posited as what it “always-already was”’ (quoted above) he means that the 
community already created God through its own activity, but in killing God that 
community comes into their own creation – i.e. they are free, self-mediating subjects. The 
caveat he adds is that this is still not a ‘transparent’ community. Although now seen as 
incomplete or barred, the big Other still exists: people still can’t control all the outcomes 
of their actions, there is still an external, ‘immaterial’ social element that enables people 
to interact.226   
In addition to noting that Hegel’s discussion of doctrine, ritual, and belief is the 
logic that Žižek uses to describe ideology in his 1994 paper in Mapping Ideology (see 
also Sigurdson, 2012: 48-53), taking all this into account reveals his comments to be 
more directly related to overcoming capitalism than it might first appear. Indeed, fourteen 
years later, on the final page of Living in the End Times, Žižek explicitly links the 
Leninist party to the Holy spirit: the death of God means the birth of a community based 
in the non-existence of the big Other. The analogy with capitalism and money is, then, 
this: God as Value and Christ as Money are the unconscious embodiment of human self-
determination – labour-power as Marx’s ‘self-activating capacity’; Christ as money is the 
means of overcoming this alienation, if only he is taken as a means to show that God was 
always dead; once this is done labour as self-activating capacity becomes a new, 
conscious community – though still with externalized, non-certain, forms of social 
interaction. The argument that Žižek makes in regards to Christ was above applied to 
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money: ‘why has thou forsaken me’ without ‘into thy hands I commit my spirit’ makes 
Christ a revolutionary; the connections made between people through capitalist money 
without the separation that money also brings is progressive – likewise replacing the 
money-form with the party-form minus the trend toward parliamentarism and the 
unification of diverse interests; lastly, perversion without the big Other is not perversion, 
but psychoanalysis.227 The further point to be clarified is that the ‘community of 
believers’/Party has to then be understood as both ends and means, which will also 
address some of Rothenberg’s concerns as presented in the introduction to chapter seven. 
Before taking this up, however, it remains to make some clarifications not about the 
actuality of capitalism and value, but the actuality of revolution. For this a turn to Lukács 
is necessary.  
While he doesn’t use the Hegelian terminology (Lukács writes of ‘Aktualität’ 
rather than ‘Wirklichkeit’) his monogram on Lenin can easily be seen in the light of 
‘absolute actuality.’ Fundamental to his argument is not only that Lenin could see the 
‘actuality of the revolution’ but that he was building on the work of Marx: where Marx 
saw the actuality of revolution in the logic of capital per se, Lenin saw it also in the 
particularities of imperialism and monopoly capitalism as well as the conditions in 
Russia. That is, Lukács argues that there is an actuality at the level of the universal 
(capitalism as such), the particular (monopoly capitalism), and the individual (Russia).228 
The difference is that he is not talking about the effectivity of capitalism – the fact that 
immaterial value animates the capitalist system and the fact that the logic of capital is 
more than just the sum of its parts – but its flip side: the revolutionary potential that 
comes with it. Lukács was clear that this didn’t mean that revolution was possible at any 
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moment,229 but instead that every political problem and outburst could be seen as a 
manifestation of the revolutionary potential pregnant in capitalism. In contrast to the 
‘mediocre scholar’ who ‘does nothing more than interpret as “general Laws”, in a truly 
abstract way, certain aspects of phenomena limited in time and space, and apply them 
accordingly,’ the ‘genius’… 
…on the other hand, for whom the true essence, the living, active main trends of an age are clear, 
sees them at work behind every event of his time and continues to write about the decisive basic 
issues of the whole epoch even when he himself thinks he is only dealing with everyday affairs 
(Lukács, 1970: 10).230  
 
The link to capitalism as ‘absolute actuality’ is clear: where in capital contingent 
elements partake in the ghostly logic of accumulation, in contingent everyday struggle 
one can see the living logic of revolution. Consequently, the role of the Party is to show 
these links to all the oppressed and prepare them to take best advantage of those 
moments.  
 Before turning to the question of the self-causing subject and the political 
community as both ends and means (as was done in regards to the organization of 
psychoanalysis in chapter six), a formal link between psychoanalysis and the Party can be 
drawn. Just as the Party is there to make connections between what might otherwise be 
taken as insignificant everyday occurrences, the analyst works to demonstrate how 
insignificant everyday slips of the tongue, etc., are in fact symptoms that point towards 
the whole of one’s subjective organization. This can in part be seen, in a rather morbid 
vein, in Henry Bond’s Lacanian analysis of photographs of murder scenes taken by 
English police agencies in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. Bond points out that ‘the perverse 
subject often creates a scenario in which all is not as it seems…’ (2009: 86), where a 
‘punctum’ (a term akin to Lacan’s objet a developed by Roland Barthes) is used as ‘“a 
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spark of contingency” that the pervert often leverages in order to instigate a level of 
doubt, or hesitation, in the viewer, jury members, an interrogator.’ The ‘seemingly trivial 
punctum’ is used to ‘undermine a hitherto dependable logic.’ In place of the quietly 
accepted norm, the pervert ‘offers instead open-endedness, and a quixotic shifting that 
produces a permanent state of permeability…’ (all quotes Ibid: 87). All that one need 
remember here is that the analyst shares the ‘discourse of the pervert’ to take the point: 
the role of the analyst is to use the analysand’s own everyday parapraxes, etc., to 
encourage them to realize that the world is not as it seems: there is no big Other; it is 
unstable and changeable; it is the product of your relation to the social world. In words 
closely echoing Lukács’ on ‘genius’, Gallagher describes the analyst’s relation to these 
signifiers: 
The analyst is not the possessor of a general knowledge which is then applied to particular cases. 
The dictum of Picasso: “I do not search, I find” is quoted approvingly by Lacan. The analyst is not 
to construct theories about the subject who is speaking to him, he is there to hear and to reveal to 
that subject the incontrovertible signifiers which appear concretely in his spoken discourse 
(Gallagher, 1995:14-15). 
 
  Likewise, against the hegemonic understanding of capitalism, the Party seeks to 
make links between events to show its inherent instability and the possibility of change. 
Not only that, it is not simply a work of intellectual suasion: it involves approaching the 
desire and feelings of the workers. This finds expression in Lenin’s What Is To Be 
Done?: if indictments of tsarist repression could be better organized by activists of the 
RSDLP, then… 
…the very simplest worker will understand, or will feel, that the dark force that mocks and 
oppresses the student and the sectarian, the muzhik and the writer, is the same that oppresses and 
weighs on him at each step of his life. And, when he does feel this, he will himself desire, with 
and overwhelming desire, to respond – and he will know how to do it … (Lenin, 2008: 738).231  
 
That is, Party work is not only to point out how everyday struggles are related to the 
destruction of capitalism, but also how each group of oppressed people are linked to the 
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next, and in so doing making affective connections (and, not incidentally, doing so will 
enable people to themselves know what to do about it). Indeed, the Party would be 
nothing without this feeling. Lih’s central thesis on WITBD is that Lenin, along with the 
vast majority of Social Democrats in Russia and Germany, held that the workers would 
spontaneously come to class-consciousness and all that was needed were activists to push 
that process along. This because of the creativity and enthusiasm of the workers. He 
begins to present this when giving a slightly different spin on ‘the actuality of the 
Revolution’ and Lenin’s outlook in What Is To Be Done?:232 
If Russia was entering into a period of revolutionary crisis, if almost all of Russian society was 
turning in anger against the tsar, if everyone was waiting for some sort of mass action against the 
tsar before revealing their own radical dissatisfaction, if an underground organization would 
receive support not only from the workers but from all groups – then, indeed, even a pathetically 
small and weak Social-Democratic organization could make a major impact and genuinely lead a 
revolutionary transformation of Russia. For Lenin, all of these ‘ifs’ were facts (Lih, 2008: 8). 
 
Not only that, according to Lenin they were hungry for information and action. As noted 
above, Lih – with reference to Michels and Ostrogorski – suggests that Lenin was 
perhaps too naïve in making this judgment, proposing that his contemporaries did not 
share it. However, where Ostrogorski discusses how party caucuses were thinly attended 
but gives historical justifications for why this may be, Elwood similar discusses the role 
of party organization and gives historical reasons for the ‘apathy and indifference’ that at 
times befell the Party in the Ukraine: it was in part the product ‘of too many spies and too 
few intellectuals, émigré factionalism and local isolation. But it also was the natural 
reaction to the defeat suffered in 1905’ (Elwood, 1974: 87).233  
Not only that – it was also the product of a lack of effective Party organizations. 
In making these observations Elwood points to one of the ways the Party is both ends and 
means: without the feelings of the working class being roused there would be no Party 
activists to in turn rouse and direct more feelings towards revolution. In Lenin’s outlook, 
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however, – at least at the junctures around the two revolutions – the feeling is already 
there. It simply needed to be reformulated. Indeed, Elwood points to the same issue. His 
study revolves around the Party’s activity in the Ukraine as in his assessment the low-ebb 
of labour actions and mass unrest can not be explained by Ukraine’s relatively ‘backward 
economy’ – he claims that similar levels of oppression and the sub-par working 
conditions could be found there as in the bulk of Russia, and there were examples of 
large strikes and labour unrest. What was missing, however, was an active Party 
underground that could organize this unrest into concerted action, in part because of 
heftier police organization. There was also little activity in legal organizations, however, 
unlike in the rest of Russia. What was also lacking, in Elwood’s assessment, was a party 
program that could appeal to the largely peasant populations and Ukranian nationalism 
(Elwood, 1974: 245-270). That is, the form of the Party as an organization to develop 
revolt was not enough – it needed to develop feeling by means of appropriate content.  
 Here the parallel between the Party and psychoanalysis reveals more of its links: 
one of the central features of the psychoanalytic session is its reliance on the transference. 
For Freud this meant the analysand reliving past experiences and emotions, which is most 
famously taken up in the ‘Dora’ case study as well as his lecture ‘Recollection, 
Repetition, and Working Through’: living through past experiences and affects and 
working out the problems that were not then worked out could lead to the end of analysis 
– so long as (among other things) the analyst didn’t themselves fall prey to the ‘counter-
transference’, acting out their assigned role in the analysand’s scenario. That is, it is 
instead when one encounters the ‘subject supposed to know’ – supposed to know one’s 
desire – that one is in the thrall of transference.234 And, like the Party giving pointed 
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determinate social form to feelings of unrest (Lenin’s making the link between creating 
an understanding and generating a feeling), in Lacan’s assessment the transference did 
not see one reliving an old feeling, but generating a new one. In Lacan’s reading of the 
Dora case study it is the subject’s relation to other subjects that is of greatest import, not 
the affect involved: ‘…transference does not fall under any mysterious property of 
affectivity and, even when it reveals itself in an emotional guise, this guise has a meaning 
only as a function of the dialectical moment at which it occurs’ (Lacan, 2006: 184). This 
is directly related to the brief discussion of sublimation in chapter two and the discussion 
of masochism and jouissance in chapter six: where for Freud there is a pre-existing libido 
that is then redirected toward other aims, for Lacan libido is instead the product of the 
encounter with the Other. Likewise, what’s being suggested here is that it is not simply 
the feeling of the workers (and peasants, etc.) that is being roused and rechanneled, but its 
transformation into a feel for revolution.   
Here it has to be remembered that Žižek’s position is that the link between 
analysis and the Party is that ‘…the authority of the Party is not that of determinate 
positive knowledge, but that of the form of knowledge, of a new type of knowledge 
linked to a collective political subject’ (Žižek, 2002: 188), the crux of course being that 
both the Party and the analyst generate theoretical and factual knowledge. There are two 
points to be made on this score, both of which relate directly to the role of the training 
analysis in Lacan’s teaching: as was broached in chapter six, for Lacan there was to be no 
distinction between a training analysis and any other analysis. Each analysis, if 
successful, would end in the self-invention of a new analyst – i.e. the entry of a new 
member into the particularities of a community based on the overcoming of a belief in the 
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big Other. Second, this meant that, against the received wisdom of the International 
Psychological Association, analysands did not have to wait until a certain point of the 
analysis to attend lectures and begin studying psychoanalysis (Gallagher, 1995: 2). Like 
in Elwood’s discussion of the Party’s failure in the Ukraine, or Lenin’s insistence that a 
party Member not only possess formal membership but also write for a newspaper, 
agitate, spread the good word235, etc., a full analysis includes both the analytic session 
and lessons in theory – both ‘form’ and ‘content.’236  
 This returns the discussion to the question of organization being both means and 
end. The issue with Rothenberg’s take on ‘Bartleby politics – as was broached in the 
previous chapter – is that her attempt to elucidate how Bartleby might be put to work 
doesn’t solve the chicken/egg problem: that of how Bartleby comes about and how 
‘Bartleby politics’ are to be implemented. Rothenberg’s solution was to posit an outsider 
– Guattari as benevolent medical doctor – who could impose a new form of social 
engagement, and that form of social engagement was one generated by capitalism – i.e. 
schizophrenia. The solution that can be extrapolated from Žižek’s work is that the form 
for organizing against capitalism is generated by capitalism – the form of capitalist 
money and the legal ‘superstructure’/the state that supports it – and that this form must 
change as the struggle does. Just as Lacan held that the form of analysis had to change to 
take into account the way analysands related to it (for example, introducing the ‘variable 
hour’ so that analysands could not use a standard time as a means to avoid confronting 
their symptoms) the Party has to adapt not only to the form of opposition that it faces 
(legal versus illegal status, for example) but also to the activity of the working class. 
Lukács puts it this way:  
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Lenin’s concept of organization is in itself dialectical: it is both a product of and a conscious 
contributor to, historical development in so far as it, too, is simultaneously product and producer 
of itself. Men [sic] themselves build a party. […] The individual Jacobin who joins the 
revolutionary class can shape and clarigy its actions through his determination, militancy, 
knowledge, and enthusiasm. But the social existence of the class and its resulting class-
consciousness must always determine the content and trajectory of his actions, which are not 
undertaken by him on behalf of the class but are the culmination of class activity itself (Lukács, 
1970: 37). 
 
It can, then, in fact be said that ‘utopia is always-already there in the form of a 
potential to be realized’ (Brockelman) when discussing the role the Party plays in 
Žižek’s work, if the word ‘potential’ is replaced with ‘actual.’ Brockelman makes the 
misstep that he does because he misunderstands ‘the Party’ as the ‘impossible’ Real, 
conflating actual self determination at the level of the economy (i.e. an 
economic/social revolution) with the form of the Party by which this might come to 
be. To ape Žižek’s comments in Tarrying…, we cannot know what fully democratic, 
communist self-determination will be like until we build it, but we must think the 
mediation by which this building will happen. As Marx puts it, ‘…it is precisely the 
advantage of the new trend that we do not dogmatically anticipate the world, but only 
want to find the new world through the criticism of the old one’ (Marx, 1844: 
unpaginated). 
Given everything that has been put to paper in this study, is it then merely a 
coincidence that there exists a strong resonance between Marx’s second thesis on 
Feuerbach237 and Žižek’s assertion that ‘Truth is this shattering experience of the 
Void – a sudden insight into the abyss of being’ (Žižek, 2008b: lxxxii), a void which 
is embodied in a world-changing activity nominated not by the word ‘Event’ but by 
the word ‘Act’?238   
!"  
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Conclusion – In the beginning… was the Act 
 
It says: ‘In the beginning was the Word.’/ Already I am stopped. It seems absurd. / The Word does 
not deserve the highest prize, / I must translate it otherwise / If I am well inspired and not blind. / 
It says: In the beginning was the Mind. / Ponder that first line, wait and see, / Lest you should 
write too hastily. / Is mind the all-creating source? / It ought to say: In the beginning there was 
Force. / Yet something warns me as I grasp the pen,  / That my translation must be changed again. 
/ The spirit helps me. It is exact. / I write: In the beginning was the Act.  
– Goethe, Faust 
 
!"  
Sympathy for the devil 
 In his study of modernity Marshall Berman (1988) suggests that the story of Faust’s 
encounter with the spirit of negation – Mephisto – embodies the core impulse of 
modernity. Dissatisfied with a life dedicated to the cultivation of the mind Faust is 
pushed by despair to an encounter with his childhood, thereby pulling himself from his 
funk and to the Gospel. Turning to the work of St. John in his native German – as 
bequeathed by the reformation – Faust continues in the spirit of Luther and substitutes the 
lay translation of the good book’s opening volley with his own: in the beginning was not 
the word, but the act. Faust turned from the life of the mind to, in the end, focus his 
energies on the social and economic transformation of his surroundings, coming to his 
solution only after passing through his mistakes. As Berman sees it, Faust’s deed was that 
of creative negation, of the dismemberment seen in the capitalism of nearby England 
supplemented by the developmental ideals of German utopianism.239 
 This is the Faust of Goethe, a lifelong labour that pulled together and tore apart the 
myriad versions of the tale. Berman argues that the modernist impulse found in it is also 
visible in the works of Marx, whose observation that ‘all that is solid melts into air’ 
serves as the title of Berman’s study. The modern experience of dislocation and constant 
change, in addition to the ability to realize the developmental ideal that he sees in Faust, 
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would – according to Berman – only be fully realized in industrial capitalism. This is, of 
course, Marx’s major contribution: he too spent a great portion of his life forging a 
masterwork, in this case from the myriad works of European political economy. This he 
did with the intellectual tools he found in Hegel, but with his own Faustian inversion of 
theology: in place of the idealism he found in Hegel he focused on our interaction with 
the world in which we live, the labour with which we transform the world and ourselves. 
From this work Marx concluded that the horrors of capitalism would end with the 
complete emancipation of those who suffered within and because of it: Mephisto’s 
‘mother night,’ Mephisto as negation, would end with in the brilliant dawn of 
communism. And while Berman doesn’t point this out, Mephisto is directly tied to that 
aspect of capitalism that Marx pinned as its ultimate negative power: in his manuscripts 
of 1844 Marx quotes Mephisto as a means to describe money’s role in bequeathing our 
species its universality while also alienating us from it. For Marx money is, of course, the 
highest development of the commodity form, which he understood as the key for 
understanding how capitalism makes ‘all that is solid melt into air.’  
 While he doesn’t appear in Berman’s study, a modern figure who has a similar 
connection to Goethe’s Faust was Freud. In his papers on metapsychology the creator of 
psychoanalysis compared the work of theory to a necessary evil, to Mephisto’s handmaid 
the witch (Freud, 1968: 225). Taking up this hint, Sabine Prokhoris (1995) shows that 
Mephisto was Freud’s most constant and unnamed partner: whenever Freud ran into a 
roadblock he would summon a quote from Goethe, most often from the pages of Faust 
and the mouth of Goethe’s devil… though Freud never pointed this out. In her view the 
Faustian narrative was the unconscious frame of Freud’s theory. Knowing this, it is not 
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without significance that the most notorious of his ‘metapsychological speculations’ was 
precisely this character: Freud declared that despite his followers resistance to it, the 
theory of the death drive was the most consistent explanation for the aggressivity he 
continuously encountered in analysis (1961b: 66). Mephisto as ‘the spirit that negates’ 
became one of Freud’s core tenets. 
Berman argues that capitalism is the culmination of the both creative and 
destructive negative force of modernity. Similarly, Žižek argues that the Cartesian subject  
could only be fully realized in Kant and then Hegel’s re-working of it as a non-substantial 
‘I’ of negation because it is a product of the generalization of the ‘exchange abstraction.’ 
This is not, of course, the only way Žižek develops this theme – he also delves directly 
into the work of the German Idealists, arguing against what he sees as the contemporary 
tendency to blame the Cartesian subject for all the evils of modernity. Instead, he puts the 
responsibility squarely on the shoulders of capitalism and shows that the development of 
Descartes’ discovery holds the key to freedom and anti-capitalist struggle.240 As has been 
emphasized, the basis of this claim is the link between the ‘form’ of the dream and that of 
the capitalist commodity. This demands an answer to the question of what, precisely, 
form means, and how this impacts Žižek’s take on the relation between politics and 
economy, between the subject and the overcoming of capitalism. While it might seem 
like an odd place for such a discussion – at the end of a study ostensibly on form – it is 
only through dealing with the diverse ‘content’ of Žižek’s work that it can be properly 
grasped. What follows is the final product of the work done in the preceding chapters, 
presented now in an attempt to clarify the import of what has already come. That is, it is 
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only at the end that, finally, one is able to being at the beginning… where form is 
revealed to itself be the sought after content. 
This should not be taken in the sense that it might be if considering Taussig’s 
work on the relationship of commodity fetishism and the devil in Columbia and Bolivia 
or McNally’s on the relationship between zombie stories and the introduction of capitalist 
wage labour in Haiti and the African continent: in each case the author demonstrates the 
way that economic activity and the class discipline imposed on the exploited becomes a 
topic of cultural production. What is instead meant here by ‘revealing form to be content’ 
is that ‘form’, too, is one of  the predicates of any thing, but stands as a predicate in its 
status as process rather than as an unchanging object. Once this is understood it becomes 
clear that this is true of all the object’s other predicates as well: none are a static thing, 
but are instead the product of the object’s creation and people’s historical relationship to 
each of those predicates. Similar to Ilyenkov’s discussion of the radius in relation to the 
other properties of a circle, ‘form’ is the process/predicate that explains the relationship 
between all the others.   
Not skepticism, but form 
 Much of the discussion that takes place between Laclau, Butler, and Žižek in 
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality revolves around the question of formalism. Žižek’s 
central argument is that in their emphasis on contingency – as a counter to essentialism – 
Laclau and Butler implicitly rely on a static formalism within which contingency can take 
place. That is, they rely on a notion of form as an empty container that retains its 
properties across time. Regardless of how accurately this represents their position, what is 
of interest here is the alternative he presents. As opposed to a continuous historical space 
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filled with contingency, one must ask how there is something to in the first place be so 
transformed or hegemonized before determining what particular content mediates the 
meaning of political discussion and action (i.e. before looking for particular ‘points-de-
capiton’): ‘How, in what specific historical conditions, does abstract universality itself 
become a “fact of social life”?’ This is to ask why Laclau and Butler can speak of the 
universal or its failure at all. His answer relates directly to Marx: ‘in a society in which 
commodity exchange predominates, individuals themselves, in their daily lives, relate to 
themselves, as well as to the objects they encounter, as to contingent embodiments of 
abstract-universal notions’ (Žižek in Butler et al, 2000: 105). These premises are of 
course those first introduced through the work of Sohn-Rethel, and here flogged again 
and again. What these imply, what Žižek’s objections centre around, is what he sees as a 
silent acceptance of a Kantian skepticism – the idea that there is some impossible outside 
that can never be reached by human senses, minds, or activity. In Žižek’s opinion, the 
contemporary left’s version of this skepticism finds capitalism in place of the Noumenal 
in that ‘the very notion and form of the “political” within which it operates is grounded in 
the “depoliticization” of the economy’ (Ibid: 98). This is to say that emphasis on constant 
change and the absence of any essence in which the social world could be anchored is 
only possible within an economic system in which ‘all that is solid melts into air.’  
What is instead needed, according to Žižek, is a discussion of the changing 
conditions that make certain forms of politics seem possible and others appear 
impossible. In the preceding pages this was thematized in terms of the changes in the 
democratic principle of lottery/contingency, beginning with actual lottery in ancient 
Greece, moving to the constitutional monarch as understood by Hegel, and ending in the 
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Communist Parties of Europe. Here Marx’s comments at the end of the introduction of 
the Grundrisse come to make sense in a different way: Greek democracy (rather than its 
art) is still an object of fascination for us because it offers freedom, but not at its freest. 
The ‘essence’ of democracy, that which gives it its specific character, manifests in a 
different type of activity as history flows on. While economic transformations are not 
explicitly taken into Žižek’s account, while he does not explain why the transition 
between economic modes occurred – for that it would be necessary to turn to the 
‘transition debate’ – he does argue for the possibility of changes in form in principle. This 
is, of course, the ‘Act’. As opposed to a reading of the Lacanian ‘Real’ that understands it 
as an unreachable ‘Noumena’ that pulls the strings of the phenomenal world, as opposed 
to  a conception of the Real that leads to treating the universal as a mere regulative idea 
that if taken too seriously can only lead to political monstrosity when pursued, Žižek 
argues that ‘it is possible to touch the Real through the Symbolic’ (Žižek in Butler et al, 
2000: 121). This is because the Real is in his view ‘posited’ by the Symbolic and serves 
as its immanent limit.241 This is to say that it is by means of the present – in this case the 
commodity form and potentially the Party form – our ‘essence’ can be transformed. 
His comments about capitalism being an historical form in his debate with Butler 
and Laclau can also be seen in the difference he asserts exists between the form of 
politics in feudalism and capitalism, as found in the first chapter of The Sublime Object of 
Ideology: whereas in the former class exploitation was explicit, in the latter it is latent 
because of the commodity form as applied to labour power. Whereas in feudal relations 
such ‘fetishism’ appears as the reification of social roles, where monarchs hold 
themselves to be of a different cloth (i.e. as imbued with divine right, taking themselves 
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to be monarchs by their own virtue, the power given them by blood or God, etc.) rather 
than the products of their social relations – where people think they are subjects by virtue 
of there being a monarch, rather than the reverse – in capitalism fetishism appears as the 
displacement of human relations onto things. In the latter case this means that people 
approach each other as formally free and equal in the marketplace, where the truth of 
their relations is embodied in the commodities for which they become the representative: 
the relations that actually sustain lives and determine the ways in which people interact 
happen at the level of money.242 ‘Freedom’ in market relations would thus collapse 
without commodity fetishism to sustain it. That is, this ‘reality itself cannot reproduce 
itself without this so-called ideological mystification’ (Žižek, 1989: 28).243 In other 
words, there is no simply empirical, non-mediated interaction with the world; there is 
always some ‘subjective’ element to every ‘objective’ one. There is no capitalist 
economy independent of ideology. This is why one can use ‘subjective categories’ (like 
those of psychoanalysis) to talk about ‘objective conditions.’  
 In this take on the subject as developed in German Idealism, in his rejection of 
Kantian skepticism (in which the world is inherently unknowable to us), Žižek follows 
the line of argumentation developed by Robert Pippin in his Satisfactions of Self-
Consciousness (1989), giving it no small praise in a footnote to his own Tarrying with the 
Negative (1993: 265, n.12). Pippin’s fundamental argument is that rather than being 
outside the Kantian universe, Hegel continues in the footsteps of Fichte in building upon 
Kant’s work by questioning the role of ‘intuition’ – the supposed faculty by which we 
simply perceive the world, the perceptual products of which the Understanding and 
Reason act upon to make them intelligible. In Pippin’s view Hegel holds that even our 
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barest of perceptions are already mediated, that we always discover that we have 
‘posited’ what we assumed was immediate. As Žižek formulates it in another footnote in 
Tarrying…, it is only when we realize that this is the case that we are ‘…able, finally, to 
begin from (being which is) nothing’ (1993: 269, n.43), that we can finally begin from 
the beginning: the world created by our activity. This is important to note because it helps 
gesture at a redress to a possible criticism of Žižek’s work, one based on his use of Lacan 
and a linguistic theory of the subject.  
While he only makes passing reference to Lacan, McNally’s take on Derrida 
might readily be aimed at him and thereby Žižek in that Lacan in part shares Derrida’s 
reliance on the work of Saussure. McNally argues that Saussure uses a vulgar notion of 
capitalist exchange as a basis for a formal description of the differences between 
signifiers, and that this cannot account for how particular binaries come into being – i.e. 
how meaning comes to be a part of a system of formal difference. He instead turns to a 
critique of the work of Voloshinov and Bakhtin to build a theory of language and 
meaning that offers a changing, ‘open totality,’ one that is not arbitrary but determined 
‘by a finite number of concrete social settings’ (McNally, 2001: 115; 117). There are 
perhaps two answers to this (potential) reproach, the first having to do with Lacan’s own 
departure from Sassure. The second revolves around Žižek’s insistence on differentiating 
language from other concrete, empirical practices. According to Žižek thinking of 
language in certain ways eliminates the possibility of ‘meaning’ in the first place, its 
arbitrary character – but arbitrary in a particular sense.  
In Žižek’s account ‘arbitrary’ means that there is no continuous chain of 
causation, that there is a gap between the subject and its genesis. For Žižek the subject is 
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the gap itself, the ‘break’ in the chain of causality. In terms of language this is to say that 
language is a formal system of signifiers, but one that also stands as its own limit and 
therefore its openness – language is both constraint and freedom. To put it in terms of 
Pippin’s arguments, one can only measure the correspondence of language and the 
objects of cognition from the perspective of language itself, but this system holds within 
itself the means of both divergence and correspondence. This is the master-signifier, the 
signifier that means nothing other than there being meaning at all, and thereby also that 
meaning can change: it guarantees both the ‘quilting’ of the other signifiers to a signified 
and enables that difference to begin with.   
This can be explained in the following way: if the world is knowable and can be 
apprehended by means of language, image, or another system of difference, it is because 
it is not already known, because there is a separation between that which knows and the 
known. This is perhaps a commonplace, but otherwise put it means that one does not 
directly cognize the world, but must come to it by first being separated from it and 
thereby interact with it. This sets up the problem in terms of the ‘Noumena’ – the 
completely unknowable – which is for Žižek not the material world as a Kantian 
substratum that determines phenomena, but precisely the subject itself. This is most 
easily recognizable in the case of other people – one can not know them directly, but only 
in their communicating to us. That is, coming to know the material world is simply an 
epistemological problem in the sense that getting to know it is a possibility if one can find 
the proper means; by contrast, knowing the ‘other’ – i.e. the subject, including one’s own 
self – is an ontological impossibility that makes systems of difference necessary in the 
first place and the ambiguity essential to any ‘meaning’ possible. In this sense the 
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‘Noumena’ as subject is also not unknowable, but only knowable through the 
(psychoanaltic) ‘Act’ of the subject – which manifests the susceptibility of the present to 
the past, and that present’s overcoming. That is, the ‘Noumena’ as truth only flies at 
dusk. According to him, this is what Lacan means by truth: not a simple material fact, but 
the traumatic link between past and present (Žižek: 2008b, 197-203), a link  between two 
different processes or forms, two different ‘gaps.’ This was earlier discussed in terms of 
the work of Darian Leader and Lorenzo Chiesa: the ‘trauma’ of ‘castration’ – understood 
as a realization that one is not a complete, self-enclosed whole – is only overcome with 
the overlapping of the symbolic and imaginary, with their ‘parallax’ relation.   
Žižek summarizes the difference he sees between language and a cause-and-effect 
material substratum in the following way: 
The moment we oppose the finitude/closure of the given symbolic texture to the endless horizon 
of its possible rearticulations, language is reduced to an ordinary natural entity and its 
development to a gradual evolution of such an entity. What differentiates language from a natural 
entity or system is the presence in it of the element designated by Lévi-Strauss as the mana-
signifier: the ‘reflective’ signifier that holds the place, within the system, of what eludes the 
system, of its not-yet-signified. The ‘openness’ of a symbolic system has nothing whatsoever to do 
with the pressure of an ever-changing external circumstances that compel the system to transform; 
in the case of a symbolic system proper, this openness has to inscribed into the ‘closed’ system 
itself in the guise of a paradoxical signifier that represents non-sense in the field of Sense – what 
Lacan calls the phallic signifier (Žižek: 2005c, 201). 
  
Yet, all this asserts is that there is a necessary non-correspondence between signifiers and 
what they signify, that there is an inherent need of ‘formalism’. This is not yet an answer 
to the problem proposed above – how particular binaries arise and how particular 
meanings come to be associated with particular differentiated elements. Lacan himself 
admits that the work of Saussure is limited by this problem,244 but the solution he 
proposed is not immediately clear in his own work or in that of Žižek. 
It does, however, become much clearer in a book published under the banner of 
Žižek’s ‘Short Circuit’ series – Chiesa’s Subjectivity and Otherness – taken up in detail in 
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chapter seven. McNally briefly criticizes Lacan for reducing mothers to natural forces 
and failing to see how they can nurture a child and help them develop. Without going into 
much detail, let it suffice here to say that McNally’s view of development and Chiesa’s 
discussion of Lacan are not necessarily at odds: what is described in chapter seven is the 
introduction of the symbolic, the ability of a child to apprehend themselves as part of, 
rather than all of, the world, the ability of the child to differentiate objects, including 
words. That is, it is a discussion of how a child comes to know difference as such. That 
discussion comes from the last two chapters of Chiesa’s study of Lacan, where the first 
three chapters deal with issues that pertain to the ways in which a child acquires 
language, including the necessity of identifying with their caregiver – a point when the 
sort of nurturing that McNally discusses could be theoretically introduced. In addition, 
where McNally argues that the problems with Derrida’s work can be traced back to 
Saussure’s theory of language and its inability to account for relevant oppositions or 
differences, it’s important to note that in these early chapters Chiesa goes into depth 
about how Lacan, too, disagreed with Saussure on this point. In the 21st lecture of 
Seminar III, for example, he introduces the idea that the signifier is of the body, that there 
are significant limits to Saussure’s method (e.g. that no signifier exists in isolation), and 
part of the solution to those limits is the introduction of the individual’s relation to the 
social: with reference to Racine’s Athalia Lacan begins to argue that meaning can only be 
had when the big Other – in this instance the church and God – becomes a means of 
establishing it. Note, too, that where McNally attempts to replace Derrida’s discussion of 
escaping totality with the notion of an ‘open totality,’ Žižek replaces it with a similar 
notion: Lacan’s ‘feminine’ logic of ‘not-all.’245 
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This discussion hasn’t truly been broached in this study because the main focus 
falls elsewhere: Chiesa’s assertion that the ‘master signifier’ that marks the internal limit 
and possibility of a system of difference is not eternal – not always the commodity form – 
but changes across history, this because difference as such is introduced into the human 
mind by means of social contact. What Chiesa sidesteps, however, was here made more 
explicit: Lacan himself emphasizes that Marx’s conception of surplus-value is what he 
(Lacan) is referring to when he speaks of jousissance and thus stands as the culmination 
of this line of thinking. And it is this line of thinking that not only appears in Žižek’s 
oeuvre, but runs through it like Ariadne’s red thread.   
The ‘activity of form’ – Non-olet 
One indication of this continuity is the reappearance throughout Žižek’s work of 
the arguments made in the first two chapters of The Sublime Object of Ideology and in 
The Parallax View. In discussing Marx, Freud, and form (in relation to Karatani) Žižek 
makes reference to section 87 of the preface to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit – that it 
is not so much content that matters, but the form of its mediation (Žižek, 2006a: 394, n. 
78). Perhaps more importantly, form is there directly linked to activity and becoming 
rather than to a static object. This is also clear in the first chapter of Sublime Object 
(which is also referenced in this chapter of Parallax View) where Žižek clearly outlines 
the two different types of ‘content’ that Marx and Freud deal with: manifest and latent 
dream thoughts for Freud; the difference between the particular price (manifest content) 
realized by any particular commodity and the fact that value is the secret (latent content) 
of that price for Marx (Žižek, 1989: 14-15). What is important in each case is less the two 
types of content, but the form that makes that content possible in the first place.  
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 It is far easier in the case of Marx, however, to see how ‘form’ is synonymous 
with activity: trading items in the market (including labour) as if they were exchange 
values makes them commodities; treating labour as a commodity is what makes 
capitalism a producer of value and a system of exploitation. For Freud the link is 
somewhat more obscure. Understanding how the form of the dream can be understood as 
activity can be best approached through a discussion of the footnote in The Interpretation 
of Dreams246 from which Žižek derives the claim that it’s the form of the dream rather 
than its manifest or latent content that’s important. The point is somewhat unclear even in 
the note Žižek references, but in his eleventh and fourteenth introductory lectures on 
psychoanalysis Freud gives the problem a more extended treatment. The eleventh lecture, 
in fact, opens and closes with reference to the confusion had by readers of the 
Interpretation of Dreams over what part of the dream was most significant (i.e. the claim 
that is made in the note to which Žižek refers). This is the dream-work – the mind’s 
activity of putting existing thoughts (the latent dream content) into a new order (the 
manifest dream content).247 (In lecture XXXII Freud describes ‘forgetting’ – i.e. 
repression – as consisting ‘mostly of a falling away of the links between various ideas, a 
failure to draw conclusions, an isolating of certain memories.’) Once the principles of 
distortion were understood, according to Freud, dreams could be properly interpreted. 
Similarly, because Freud found that the sleeping mind had no way to visually express 
‘relations between thoughts’ the connections could only be understood by the distortions 
given by the dream-work. ‘Thus,’ concluded Freud, ‘the form of dreams is far from being 
without significance and itself calls for interpretation’; he went so far as to further write 
that ‘as compared with the processes we have come to know in [the dream-work], interest 
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in the manifest dream must pale into insignificance’ (Freud, 1961a: 177; 181). That is, it 
is the process of thinking that is important. Why this is important becomes still clearer 
when turning to a subsequent lecture on wish-fulfillment: there is nothing particularly 
interesting or traumatic about the material from waking life that is put to use in dreams, 
nor in the latent dream thought, without them being attached to some sort of desire. It is 
this element that introduces the need for the dream-work to occur in the first place: the 
wish is usually not one which is to the approval of the ego or the big Other.   
This is perhaps still obscure, but can be readily comprehended with a glance at 
Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality: here Freud again shows that it is not the 
hidden fantasy of the analysand that is of greatest import, but the way it is distorted. Here 
Freud asserts that ‘neuroses are the negative of perversion’ (Freud, 1991a: 80; 155; 163), 
where ‘perversions’ are either fully conscious or disavowed and ‘negation’ refers to 
subsequent repression which leads to neuroses. That is, the two phenomena are tightly 
linked. For Freud perversion is any activity that isn’t directed at the final aim of 
reproducing the species, one that becomes pathological only when that final aim is 
precluded by fixation on one or several of the component drives. The activity of the 
partial or component drives – for Freud, oral, anal, and phallic – is by nature perverse 
because they are not aimed at copulation, but when they come to be subordinated in 
‘normal’ sexuality in the form of genital development their perverse nature is mooted. 
‘Normality’ is of course a rarity, with people more often taking on several different 
strategies in relation to enjoyment: the pervert openly enjoys their activity and knows that 
they enjoy it (for Freud kissing is technically a perversion, for example); the neurotic 
only unconsciously enjoys; the psychotic is awash in enjoyment. In a footnote Freud goes 
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so far as to claim that the conscious fantasies of the pervert, the unconscious fantasies of 
the hysteric, and the delusions of the paranoiac share the same content (Freud, 1991a: 80, 
n1).248 What differs, then, is the way this content is approached. The pervert disavows 
what they know, the epitome being fetishism; the neurotic represses, resulting in 
hysterical and obsessional symptoms; the paranoiac forecloses, fomenting psychoses. 
That is, the content of the fantasy is the same, but the form, what is done with the fantasy, 
changes. It is precisely by this means that Lacan differentiates the neurotic from the 
pervert: ‘To return to fantasy, let us say that the pervert imagines he is the Other in order 
to ensure his own jouissance, and that this is what the neurotic reveals when he imagines 
he is a pervert – in this case, to ensure control over the Other’ (Lacan, 2006: 699).249 That 
is, each of these three positions is a means of relating to the social processes in which one 
participates. In the end, the analyst doesn’t seek to treat the fantasy, but to look at 
whether one relates to it as an hysteric, psychotic, pervert… or analyst. To relate this 
back to dreams: it is not either type of content – the hidden desire/fantasy or the fantasy 
as ‘constituted’ in the dream – but the ‘constituting’ distortion that is important. (The 
question in relation to Marxism is, it must be pointed out, not just how one relates to 
value, but to labour power – that is, ‘value’ is the form of a relation, and not that which is 
related to. The relation in question is with that of freedom.) 
 This directly relates to Žižek’s theory of ideology and its relation to Marx: this 
distinction can be mapped onto that between ‘fetishes’ and ‘symptoms’, which can then 
be used to distinguish between two levels of ideology – commodity fetishism as 
constitutive ideology and (for example) formal freedom as constituted ideology. 
Commodity fetishism/exchange as real abstraction produces ‘formal freedom’ as a 
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subsequent abstraction: once formal freedom as a principle necessary for market 
exchange is on the table people can begin to demand to be treated as equal in other ways 
and make gains that bring them closer to actual equality (Žižek 2009a: 67;143).250 This in 
turn means the appearance of ‘symptoms’ that haunt it: confronted with race and gender 
inequality, for example, the state begins to alter who is included in the list of the equal. 
This is more-or-less the position of Losurdo in his Liberalism – A Counter History: rather 
than simply an historical contingency, racism (which according to him includes not only 
people of colonized territories, but also the poor and the workers, as the master-race was 
not simply the whites, but wealthy whites) was built into liberalism from the beginning 
and for the most part purged from it only because of forces come from without. One of 
the great strengths of liberalism, one not to be ignored (according to Losurdo), was its 
ability to transform itself in the face of these symptoms.251 The limit to this 
transformation is that which constituted liberal ideology in the first place, as can be seen 
in the work of Mill (whom Losurdo likes to point out made a great many leaps forward, 
but, for instance, replaced racism with the ideology of violently uplifting ‘savages’): 
‘…there are perhaps no contracts or engagements, except those that relate to money or 
money’s worth, of which one can venture to say that there ought to be no liberty 
whatever of retraction’ (Mill, 2006: 116).252  
That is, once we leave the sphere of exchange – ‘a very Eden of the innate rights 
of man’ – we move into the inferno of production (Marx, 1977: 280). Here then is the 
relation between symptom and fetish: where the symptom is the return of the repressed 
and the dissolution of one symptom often leads to the repressed reappearing in a new 
symptom, ‘the last impression before the uncanny and traumatic is retained as a fetish’ 
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(Freud, 1991b: 354). As Žižek puts it, the symptom momentarily disturbs ideological 
fantasy while the fetish maintains it.253 Where more and more groups of people can make 
more-or-less successful claims to liberal equality, ‘the buck stops’ at class struggle: any 
claim of inequality between labour and capital is denied, stifled in contracts of equal 
exchange. As Žižek puts it, liberalism is not strong enough to save ‘its own core’ – 
freedom and equality (2011b: 664) – because the ‘perverse’ fetish is the basis for the 
appearance of more and more ‘hysteric’ symptoms. 
This is in effect what was approached in the final three chapters of this study: 
locating the activity that lead to the genesis of psychology, the subject, and the party 
enables one to transform them.  In terms of the political organization of psychology the 
‘form’ of the organizations that helped create psychology and psychoanalysis were 
shown to be that which gave each its particular character. This was explored by looking 
at the role of professional organizations in creating psychoanalysis as a discipline in 
Canada and Lacan’s tussles with the International Psychoanalytic Association in the early 
days of his career. The Canadian Psychological Association was developed as a means to 
secure a market for certain services and to offer it the legitimacy of allegiances with the 
medical profession. Its creation also affected the sort of research that was done and the 
kind of knowledges and practices that were then developed. By contrast, Lacan’s 
discussion of the role of psychoanalytic associations and his corresponding actions were 
an attempt to offer a discipline that was subordinated to neither market imperatives nor 
medical imperatives, each of which demand quick solutions rather than deep seated 
personal and social change. That is, where other professional associations aim at creating 
liberal citizens and fulfilling the bourgeois dream Lacan sought to enable people to 
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challenge the social norms embodied as the ‘big Other’ and to create a social organization 
(i.e. his particular form of Psychoanalytic association) to match that aim. He did this not 
so much by treating people, but by training them – i.e. pointing them towards a new form 
of activity. That is, Lacan’s premise was not that people should simply be analysed to the 
point of a cure but trained as analysts from the time they stepped up to the couch.  
The ‘form of analysis’ is of course not immune from the viciousness of the 
commodity form – Lacan’s is not the only subspecies of psychoanalysis, and as was seen 
in chapter seven Žižek argues that the particularities of psychoanalysis are the product of 
capitalist social relations, particularly that engendered in money. The difference is that 
rather than simply pushing psychoanalysts along in the stream of market imperatives the 
commodity form as the embodiment of the split subject can be used to elicit a ‘cure’ 
(perhaps better understood as a ‘plague’ – Freud’s characterization of psychoanalysis 
while ruminating about his passage across the pond for the first and only time): the 
psychoanalyst exploits the particularity of the exchange relationship such that the 
analysand can develop their own particularity by treating the human being that is the 
analyst as an empty sounding board, as a completely alienated (in the Marxist sense) 
counterpart. It was also in this chapter that the link between the form of analysis and the 
Leninist party was clarified: the Party, too, relies on the commodity form in that it is the 
social link that effectively connects each person subjected to capitalism to all the others – 
hence the ability of an economic crisis stemming from one country sending the capitalist 
planet into a tailspin. Unlike other parties, however, The Leninist party is (potentially at 
least) to parliamentary/electoral parties what psychoanalysis is to other psychotherapies: 
just as Fenichel held that psychoanalysis was not to replace all other forms of 
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psychotherapy, but was in a better position to understand and make use of them, the party 
takes advantage of those elements that are effective organizing tools but always with a 
view to their relationship to capitalism and the ultimate goal of the self-determination of 
the people (as formulated, for example, in Lukács’ ‘Tactics and Ethics’).  
All this points to a further differentiation: not only between fetish and symptom, 
but also between these two and the empty signifier as such. This can also be formulated 
with reference to one of the few places in Žižek’s oeuvre where he explicitly addresses 
the question of form at any length: the fourth chapter of Tarrying With the Negative, 
which is dedicated to Hegel’s ‘logic of essence’ (which was discussed in chapter eight of 
the present study). Where the symptom is used by the analyst to re-orient the analysand to 
the meaning of the totality of their actions (a slip of the tongue, for example, is used to 
discuss one’s fundamental unconscious fantasy, and not just the particularities that lead to 
the slip), and the fetish is the means by which the analysand avoids approaching their 
fundamental fantasy (the pervert stops at the last thing they see before what is in effect 
their own lack254), the empty signifier refers to the potential of a different future. Žižek 
puts it this way:  
…as the signifier of pure possibility, the phallus is never fully actualized (i.e., it is the empty 
signifier which, although devoid of determinate, positive meaning, stands for the potentiality of 
any possible future meaning), whereas a fetish always claims an actual status (i.e., it pretends 
actually to substitute for the maternal phallus). In other words, insofar as the fetish is an element 
that fills in the lack of (the maternal) phallus, the most concise definition of the phallic signifier is 
that it is a fetish of itself: phallus qua “signifier of castration” as it were gives body to its own lack 
(Žižek, 1993: 161). 
 
This can be better understood with reference to different conceptions of form (as the 
relation of form and essence, form and matter, and form and content) as explained by 
Žižek in the same chapter (1993: 134-6) and by combining them with Žižek’s brief 
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discussion of the development of Freud and Lacan’s practice as described in the second 
chapter of The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989: 73-74).  
In the first case (form/essence), form is the passive expression of an underlying 
essence: regardless of its external appearance essence remains unchanged, but causes 
changes in appearances. This is the status of symptom – a passive expression of an 
underlying trauma in the sense that dissolving the symptom achieves nothing but the 
appearance of a new symptom to take the old one’s place… this because the trauma still 
exists. There is a contradiction here, however: essence presents itself in something 
inessential, as something that can fade away and appear as something else. Either essence 
is not essential or the relation between it and its form is inessential. In either case 
‘symptom’ falls away as a clinically productive category in the sense that removing 
particular symptoms doesn’t end the analysand’s distress. In Lacan’s work symptom was 
thus something to be interpreted, was a coded message to the Other sent by the 
unconscious, but never able to fully reveal its root. Another solution presented itself, 
however: this is the symptom that just won’t go away, one that is enjoyed as such. This is 
the fetish: not present to be interpreted but present only so that enjoyment can exist at all. 
This aligns fetish with the couple form/matter, where form is taken to be ‘essential’, or 
determining, and matter the passive ‘stuff’ that is formed. Rather than trauma it here 
makes more sense to think of the ambiguous status of Trieb (instinct/drive) in Freud’s 
work: it was always a convention, assumed to be the mental representation of a biological 
process that could never quite be pinned down (see for example the few opening pages of 
‘Instincts and Their Vicissitudes’), so much so that he goes so far as to deem them ‘our 
mythological theory of instincts’ (Freud, 1963: 144). This changes with Lacan, as was 
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argued in chapter six: ‘drive’ is the product of the individual’s exposure to the symbolic. 
That is, the introduction of the fetish ‘forms’ the ‘matter’ of instinct into drive, which is 
to say that the drives are ‘mythic’ because of their relation to instinct, because they are 
social ‘effectivities.’ Here again, however, an ambiguity presents itself: it is not simply 
that the symbolic imposes a form upon a formless, indeterminate matter, but upon a 
matter that is itself determinate, which itself has its own structure. That is, the symbolic 
transforms instinct (the need to eat, defecate, etc.) to create drive, enjoyment, etc. Here 
again the symptom as fetish is a means to an end rather than an end in itself. One 
disavows, makes unconscious, that one is oneself lacking and using the fetish to 
overcome that lack and enjoy the other. The end of analysis is thus that the analysand no 
longer produces symptoms that point to an underlying cause, nor grasps a fetish that 
replaces a lost essence (the mythical maternal phallus), but establishes a new form of 
community. This roughly corresponds to the couple form/content, which is in effect a 
tautology because there is neither form nor matter nor essence, but only content: each 
person acting as the mediator of the other. That is, the empty signifier is not a means to an 
end, but the community itself – the social world that Marx holds is in actuality human 
‘essence.’ 
Jameson too, makes this point: giving primacy to form is not a question of it being 
imposed upon a passive ‘matter,’ but is instead akin to a process he points to as primary 
in modern literature. Here the question of form explicitly presents itself as an element of 
concern: ‘…from a certain elevation intrinsically formal considerations suddenly dissolve 
into problems of content’ – the self-reflective author, internal to the narrative, of Simone 
de Beauvoir’s The Mandarins standing as one of his examples (Jameson, 1971: 351-2). 
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And this is precisely what happens with Lacan and Lenin – the question of organization, 
of form, is not a secondary question but a primary problem. This can be made a little 
clearer with reference to where one locates form in the discussion of 
symptom/fetish/empty signifier: in the case of the symptom some portion of the 
‘polymorphously perverse’ hysterical body acts as the source of satisfaction; in the case 
of the fetish an external object replaces the ‘missing’ portion of the other, thereby 
enabling sexual gratification; in the last case, it is the other per se that mediates 
enjoyment in the form of a community that is mutually decided upon by that 
community’s members. It is in this sense that Molly Rothenberg’s discussion of radical, 
community oriented psychological practice (as discussed in chapter six) is on point – all 
that was missing was the universal historical means of its creation.    
   Given that this means exists in the social relations created in a capitalist society 
by means of money, communism – as the negation of capitalist exploitation, the negation 
of the commodity form and thus what is dependent upon it – is to be considered neither 
total equality nor a leveling, a conception Marx instead attributes to the enviousness of 
‘crude communist’ (Marx, 1992: 346). It is instead, as Lenin saw in Marx’s critique of 
the Gotha Program, ‘a society without any standard of right’ – as in liberal ‘equal right’ 
(Lenin, 1987: 343). Eliminating the standard of equality attendant to capitalist exchange 
would not mean an exchange of social wealth measured by the amount one labours, but a 
distribution of wealth along the lines of Marx’s well rehearsed ‘from each according to 
their ability, to each according to their need,’ which might be best understood as 
‘producing as a human being’ (his formulation in  his ‘comments on James Mill’). This 
for Marx means developing one’s specific talents and, externalizing these talents in a 
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product, having that product satisfy the need of someone else who thereby likewise 
develops their talents. Being both satisfying and satisfied, each mediating for the other as 
the link to the species, production expresses the human nature of both (Marx, 1992: 277). 
This need not necessarily refer to an Aristotelian equality of virtue, however, which can 
be seen in Žižek’s brief discussion of Theodor Sturgeon’s More Than Human if taken as 
a metaphor for Marx’s ‘from each, to each’ (Žižek: 2010a: 377-8): on their own the misfit 
characters are separated from society and ineffectual, but when brought together they 
compliment each other’s abilities and amplify them to the extent that they are ‘more than 
human’, the next stage of human development, a group of people that has the means to 
help others also reach that same point. That is, where a master signifier as just described 
above is understood as an open rather than a closed social mediator (i.e. as opposed to a 
symptom or a fetish) it is subjects themselves as ‘not all’ that can serve as that social 
mediator.  
This leaves open the question of what, exactly, might be done with money once it 
no longer stands as the intermediary of all social relations. Rather than discuss the limited 
role that markets might play in such a society, perhaps for the moment something of a 
joke can suffice. At one point in Capital Marx discusses the capitalist’s indifference to 
money’s origin: Non olet, writes Marx – ‘it has no smell’. This was apparently once said 
by Vespasian, the Roman Emperor, to his son Titus, who had reproached his father for 
making money by taxing lavatories (Marx, 1977, 205). While a capitalist doesn’t care 
where their money comes from, a socialist of course does. Not only that – the form of 
money itself is a problem. Discussing what should be done with gold once capitalist 
exchange relations had been done away with altogether Lenin wrote the following:  
When we are victorious on a world scale I think we shall use gold for the purpose of building 
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public lavatories in the streets of some of the largest cities of the world. This would be the most 
“just” and most educational way of utilizing gold for the benefit of these generations which have 
not forgotten how, for the sake of gold, ten million men were killed and thirty million maimed in 
the “great war for freedom”, the war of 1914-18 […] (Lenin, 1965, unpaginated). 
 
There are two things to note here: this was written in 1921, upwards of five years after 
the revolution had taken place. The Act, mediated by Party work, was and is not simply 
an immediate sea-change, but also akin to what Badiou calls an Event – something that, 
once accomplished, changes everything but also nothing. The old remains, and can only 
be overcome with fidelity to the new. Secondly, once ‘castrated’ by the exploited, what 
better throne to relegate the capitalist big Other than a public shitter? 
 
!"  
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Endnotes 
Introduction 
1 While not to be found in the Padover translation of Marx’s correspondence (1979), 
Lukác’s translator renders a different passage from this letter in the following way: “It 
will then be realised that the world has long since possessed something in the form of a 
dream which it need only take possession of consciously, in order to possess it in reality” 
(Lukács, 1971, 2). This translation speaks more directly to the thesis of this dissertation: 
that consciousness is but another form of matter, one that can be apprehended through 
Marxism and psychoanalysis… 
 
2 The majority of the ideas in this chapter come from a presentation made at Historical 
Materialism – Toronto in May 2010. 
 
3 ‘If theology is again emerging as a point of reference for radical politics, it is not so by 
way of supplying a divine “big Other” who would guarantee the final success of our 
endevours, but, on the contrary, as a token of our radical freedom in having no big Other 
to rely on. It was already Dostoevsky who showed how God gives us both freedom and 
responsibility – he is not a benevolent Master steering us to safety, but the one who 
reminds us that we are totally left to our own devices’ (Žižek, 2010a: 401). See also the 
joke found in the last chapter of Less Than Nothing (2012: 965). Here is perhaps the 
place to note that Žižek aligns the Monarch, Christ, the psychoanalyst, and the Leninist 
Party in his ‘Lenin’s Choice.’ Indeed, on the following (and very last) page of Living in 
the End Times – from which the above quote comes – he compares the Christian 
community in the guise of the ‘Holy Ghost’ to the Party. See also this comment from an 
interview with Ian Parker: ‘I remember when I was young I found Dostoyevsky always 
boring but I heard about and basically went to the Grand Inquisitor in Karamazov 
Brothers. Even now I’m on the side of the Grand Inquisitor you know, which is why my 
hero is St. Paul. He is totally disinterested in Christ as a person. You find almost none of 
this, Christ did that miracle, he did this, and this doesn’t bother St Paul. It’s only, Christ 
died, he arrives, and ok that was the event, now let’s build the party and so on’  (Parker 
and Žižek, 2008: 13). The reasons for this will become clear as the present study 
progresses.  
 
4 This is not to say the elimination of all forms of discipline, however. Žižek often spills 
ink in defense of discipline against what he sees as attempts to make it synonymous with 
Nazism and totalitarianism. See also Mészáros, 1986, in regards to Hegel’s master/slave 
dialectic, and Marx’s move beyond it: ‘The problem is that discipline is indeed an 
absolutely necessary requirement of all successful formative activity, it is quite another 
matter as far as ‘fear’ and ‘service’ as well as ‘obedience’ are concerned. Nor is there a 
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necessary connection between disciplined formative activity and fear/service/obedience, 
provided that the activity in question is determined by the ‘associated producers’ 
themselves who also determine the self-discipline appropriate to their own aims and to 
the inherent nature of the activity itself which they embark upon’ (191, note 46).   
 
5 See also Žižek, 2012: 364, where this same argument appears, although minus the 
circling flies. See also ibid: 465 where Žižek talks about ‘retroactivity’ in relation to the 
necessity of not at first realizing the potential in an historical situation: first making a 
mistake creates the possibility of realizing something that didn’t exist before the mistake 
itself made something new possible, something that it could not itself have ‘saved’ or 
done correctly.  
 
6 It’s also the logic that Benjamin ascribes to Brecht’s constant rewriting and restaging: 
‘…Brecht started at the beginning again and again. And this, incidentally, is the 
distinguishing mark of the dialectician. […] Make certain, says Gide, that the impetus 
you have once achieved never benefits your subsequent work’ (Benjamin, 1998: 37-8). 
Placing the same content in new form and new historical context (or to use Žižek’s words 
from above, new ‘symbolic universes’) Brecht attempted to ‘alienate’ his audiences as a 
means of consciousness building, as a way of rebirthing the universal in a new context. 
 
7 See Tarrying with The Negative (1993), page 61, on this point. 
 
8 See also Žižek, 2012: 384, n 24. 
 
9 This discussion also opens Bosteels’ The Actuality of Communism (2011).  
 
10 See, however, Bosteels’ (2010) critique of the ‘generic’ of ‘communism’ in The Idea of 
Communism, edited by Žižek. Bosteels (2011b) further develops his critique of Badiou by 
turning to his (Badiou’s) earlier involvement with Maoist organizations in France. 
Against arguments like Žižek’s – that Badiou is too Kantian – Bosteels argues that taking 
into account Badiou’s engagement with the Party shows his thought to be far more 
dialectical than is often supposed.   
 
11 See the section labeled ‘money’ in the 1844 manuscripts. See also Marx, 1992: 355. 
This argument is developed in slightly more detail in the seventh chapter of the present 
study. While he doesn’t do it with reference to money, in his Hegel’s Rabble Frank Ruda 
gives a beautifully succinct rendition of the argument that the Early Marx held that the 
human species had to lose its ‘essence’ in order to become universal (Ruda, 2011: 171-
177): ‘…what universal production designates is a process of production that – in always 
singular historical situations – generates step by step certain determinations which 
retroactively always determine the ever new species-being. This means that the essence 
of man is and will always be a non-being [Unwesen]’ (Ibid: 175); ‘being the negation of 
the essence, man neither must have an essence nor does he not have one’ (Ibid: 172). 
Note that Ruda makes explicit that his reading of Marx stands in opposition to that of 
Althusser (Ibid: 204-5, n3), that Žižek has written a positive preface for the book (and 
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discusses it in detail in Less Than Nothing), and both Žižek and Chiesa (who is taken up 
in great detail of chapter seven of the present study) are thanked in the 
acknowledgements and are referenced throughout the text.  
Also of interest in this note is Joan Copjec’s ‘May ’68, the emotional month’, in 
which she takes up the argument that the signifier and jouissance are not two 
incompatible logics but tightly related. She takes a position against visions that see 
people as anchorless and therefore infinitely malleable, instead pointing to a ground in 
jouissance – the key being that this jouissance is not simply pre-existing but tied to the 
signifier and as such in part a product of it. She runs with the notion that Lacan’s 
enjoyment and Marx’s surplus value are one and the same, arguing that as capitalism has 
become more powerful and able to transform the reality around us the reality and 
pleasure principles have merged (i.e. we can mold the world into satisfying our desires), 
jouissance thereby being a question of investiment in the same sense that capital is 
invested: calculations are made as to where to put it in order to get more in return. Her 
aim is to ask how this enjoyment can be in turn transformed: instead of a superego guilt 
that castigates for bad investments she seeks a shame and anxiety that she argues by 
definition make visible ‘the unrealized, the “thrust aside” powers of the past that might 
have caused my personal history or history tout court – and thus me – to be otherwise’ 
(Copjec, 2006: 104). The ‘ground’ that she points to is thus the potential of any particular 
historical moment. She posits this enjoyment as contrary to the ‘sham’ offered by 
capitalism, suggesting that the universalization that capital offers can be superceded by 
one that instead takes full advantage of anxiety as she describes it.  
 
12 ‘Whence also the stubborn not to say hackneyed insistence on motifs – hence we can 
forego the mention of proper names – such as indivisible remainder or reserve, the 
constitutive outside, the real that resists symbolization absolutely, the dialectic of lack 
and excess, or the necessary gap separating representation from presentation pure and 
simple’ (Bosteels, 2009: 239). This is clearly a shot at Žižek, but Žižek’s work is not 
taken up in any depth in this article in order to substantiate it. This same comment 
appears in Bosteels The Actuality of Communism, which does include an extended 
critique of Žižek but not on these particular themes. There he argues that Žižek in fact 
holds 4 different versions of the ‘Act’, all of which fail because of Žižek’s adherence to 
negativity/the death drive and, in the end, Žižek’s apparent ‘hysterical’ need to be a 
contrarian – an ad-hominem disguised with an unelucidated reference to ‘purely 
structural reasons’ (Bosteels, 2011: 215). Bosteels’ critique is taken up in detail in a 
footnote to chapter three.   
 
13 This is also what Marx is referring to in his sixth thesis on Feurbach: ‘…the human 
essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble 
of social relations’ (Marx, 1992: 423). Further disagreeing with Feurbach in regards to 
anthropology in the same thesis, Marx writes that in not critiquing the social ground of 
essence means that Feurbach can only comprehend it ‘as “genus”, as an internal, dumb 
generality which naturally unites the many individuals’ (Ibid).     
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14 While not attempting to suggest that the following work is of the same calibre, a 
similar logic can be seen in the writing of both Marx and Lacan: in the case of Marx, 
what stands at the end of the notebooks that became Capital, Volume 1 becomes the 
starting point of the finished work (i.e. the commodity); in the case of Lacan, the paper 
that for Lacan best represented the central point of his Écrits (‘Seminar on “The 
Purloined Letter”’) is ripped out of chronological order to appear at the beginning of the 
collection because it best demarcates the important discovery that appears at the book’s 
end – the objet a: ‘For I decipher here in Poe’s fiction […] the division in which the 
subject is verified in the fact that an object traverses him without them interpenetrating in 
any respect, this division being at the crux of what emerges at the end of this collection 
that goes by the name of object a’ (Lacan, 2006: 4). In these studies, of course, what was 
discovered was not sought, but found; in the case of the present study, however, form was 
its primary question from the beginning. 
 
15 See for example Less Than Nothing, page 469, note 19, where Žižek uses material 
found in Marx as an example to explain the relationship between form and content as an 
oppositional determination: within each mode of production there is a type of production 
that gives each of the others their specific character. Žižek asserts that in feudalism 
handicraft is organized as another branch of agriculture while in capitalism industrialism 
gives an industrial character to agriculture.    
 
16 See Flemming, 2011.  
Chapter one 
17 It is because of theses like the following that Sohn-Rethel’s work is key for 
understanding Žižek’s positions: ‘Second nature finds its external expression in money, 
and in it the specifically human element in us finds its first separate and objectively real 
manifestation in history’ (Sohn-Rethel, 1978: 60).  
 
18 “THIS is the hard kernel of today's global capitalist universe, its true Master Signifier: 
democracy” (Žižek, 2005). See also The Parallax View, 321. 
 
19 Choi (2012) makes a similar mistake, arguing that Žižek misses how Althusser, against 
Žižek’s assertion to the contrary, does deal with the Real: "Let us […] pay attention right 
away to the fact that what we see in Althusser’s final formulation of ideology is the 
imaginary and the real—not the symbolic" (13). This, however, is the real core of Žižek’s 
argument: Althusser can’t see that commodity exchange – as the symbolic, as an 
ontological and material practice – is what lies at the root of capitalist ideology, instead 
seeing it as a problem of the imaginary and epistemology.  
While Valente (2003) approaches the question of Althusser’s position on the 
Symbolic, arguing that he misses the way Lacan conceptualized it and thereby collapsed 
it into the Imaginary, he makes a similar mistake in regards to Žižek: his argument 
revolves around the assertion that Lacan emphasizes the conservative aspect of the 
symptom while Marx’s project revolved around capital’s tendency to destroy itself. What 
he misses, of course, is that in addition to enabling the centrifugal force of capitalism it is 
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commodity fetishism that plays this conservative role in Marx’s work. Using the same 
logic against Valente one could argue that while the symptom is conservative in that it 
allows one to continue to avoid one’s issues, it also leads one to find a cure in analysis: 
missing in Valente’s paper is any discussion of the Act or the ends of ‘sitting on the 
couch’. Valente’s other central argument against a link between Marxism and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is that while Marxism is inherently forward looking Lacan’s work is 
essentially a discussion of retroaction. This misses that capital is always ‘retroactive’ in 
the sense that it is only considered capital after it generates a surplus, as well as in that 
what historically appears as a contingent element of capital is later then posited as a 
necessary condition of it (which is approached in chapter seven of the present study). 
Instead of tackling Lacan’s assertions in seminars XVI and XVII that surplus value 
(Marx) and jouissance were one and the same Valente instead asserts that Lacan made 
but ‘loose analogy to broadly Marxist principles’ merely to make his ideas 
comprehensible to his politically minded followers (2003: 159), and denies Lacan did 
anything but flirt with Marx in an opportunist way in order to ingratiate himself with 
Althusser and thereby secure himself a new venue and audience for his teaching.  
 
20 E.g. ‘tensions and scissions’ (130); ‘contradiction and strife’ (172); ‘loopholes’ (187). 
These terms are not necessarily synonyms for ‘contradiction’, of course – ‘scission’ has, 
for example, been used by Deleuze and Guattari as a means to escape Hegelian dialectics 
and contradiction – but Johnston does not in this book develop what these terms might 
actually mean. It would perhaps not be incorrect to see in this and echo of Engel’s thesis 
that nature is internally contradictory, and this is what drives its development.  
 
21 ‘This negativity, as a set of virtual potentialities perpetually ready to break out of 
Imaginary-Symbolic systems through the events of acts, haunts the actuality of every 
Imaginary-Symbolic system’ (Johnston, 2008: 196).  
 
22 This, then, in Johnston’s reading is Žižek’s contribution to a Hegelian Marxist ‘theory 
of everything’, and not the more general thesis that what at first appears as a problem is 
instead a solution: the open totality that is the material world is both the condition of 
freedom and that which generates attempts to flee from that freedom. This because, as 
Jameson points out, seeing the obstacle as the solution is attributable to dialectical reason 
in general: ‘this is indeed the most sensitive moment of the dialectical process: that in 
which an entire complex of thought is hoisted through a kind of inner leverage one floor 
higher, in which the mind, in a kind of shifting of gears, now finds itself willing to take 
what had been a question for an answer’; ‘[Dialectical reversals] can be described as a 
kind of leap-frogging affair in time, in which the drawbacks of a given historical situation 
turn out in reality to be its secret advantages…’ (Jameson, 1971: 307-8; 309).  
 
23 Marx wrote that the Commune was ‘the political form at last discovered under which 
to work out the economical emancipation of Labour’ (Marx and Engels, 1985: 75). In 
State and Revolution, Lenin writes that ‘…Marx, despite the failure of that movement, in 
spite of its short life and its patent weakness, began to study the political form [i.e. the 
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Commune] that it had disclosed,’ and goes on to quote Marx as above (Lenin, 1987: 312, 
italics in original).  
 
24 ‘The I’s apperception is by definition devoid of any intuitional content; it is an empty 
representation which carves a hole into the field of representations’ (Žižek, 1993: 16).  
 
25 This is also apparent in his review of The Parallax View, where he focuses on 
Hegel, contemporary analytic philosophy, and Lacan. Here he quickly lines up Hegel, 
Marx, and Lacan and their ideas on abstraction without much discussion (Johnston, 
2007: 13).  
 
26 ‘…every appearance of substantial identity has to be accounted for in terms of 
transcendental genesis, as the “reified” result of the pure I’s processuality’ (Žižek, 2012: 
154); ‘…when I (as finite subject) “posit” an ideal/unattainable practical goal, the finite 
reality outside me appears as “not-self”, as an obstacle to be overcome, transformed. This 
is Fichte’s version (after Kant) of the “primacy of practical reason”: The way I perceive 
reality depends on my practical projects’ (Žižek, 2012: 160). 
 
27 A supplementary link between Schelling and Capitalism can perhaps be made via his 
Spinozism and that of Soviet philosopher Evald Ilyenkov. In his The Dialectics of the 
Abstract and the Concrete in Marx’s ‘Capital’ Ilyenkov draws a link between Spinoza’s 
materialism and Marx’s description of the working of capitalism in that the universal is 
immanent to the material, one element raised to a determining characterisic. The example 
Ilyenkov lifts from Spinoza is the radius of a circle, from which all its other properties 
can be deduced (D = 2r; circumference = πr2, etc). The example taken from Marx is of 
course the commodity form/money. Schelling begins his essay on human freedom by 
trying to save Spinoza’s single-substance universe from Spinoza himself (Schelling 
argues his pantheism is ruined by his mechanistic understanding of science) to go on to 
argue that evil is not a subtraction from the world of good, not a lack introduced into it, 
but a ‘misuse of freedom’ or a ‘positive perversion or reversal of the principles’, where 
instead of consonance between universal and particular the particular takes dominance 
and becomes universal (Schelling, 2006: 31-35). A vulgar example might be that of cell 
reproduction: subordinated to the whole organism it brings life, but any single set of cells 
that reproduces uncontrollably (i.e. cancer) brings death. Capitalism is, of course, the 
one-sidedness of profit (i.e. the generation of surplus-value), or the greed of every 
individual capital for growth made into the universal principle of the economy – what 
McNally calls a ‘bad infinity’ (McNally, 2003: 7). That is, if Schelling’s philosophy is a 
reaction to modernization and capitalism his description of evil might be taken as a 
reflection of an actually-existing one. See also Žižek’s discussion of Schelling’s notion of 
contraction in The Ticklish Subject, where it is described in such a way as to be 
applicable to capitalism’s tendency to ‘dissolve all that is solid’, as a negation of the 
world that is reconstituted by selecting a ‘unifying feature’ to reconstitute it (Žižek, 1999: 
33-34). Note that this ‘contraction’ is for Žižek the act of the subject, the act ‘tarrying 
with the negative’ and the ‘transcendental imagination’ – i.e. that of human freedom.  
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28 In his studies of how Capital came to be Rosdolsky emphasizes the same point: 
‘processes can only be investigated if the central focus is directed toward the changing 
forms of the objects under investigation’ (1974: 66). In his intervention in the early 
seventies Pilling argues that even the most prominent Marxist political economists (e.g. 
Mandel and Dobb) fail to take this into account and thereby misunderstand the role of the 
labour theory of value, driving them closer to Ricardo and mainstream political economy 
than to Marx and class struggle.    
 
29 Mézáros makes the case that Lukács falls into a similar trap, although unbeknownst to 
himself: ‘an anticipated moral postulate, as mediator between the ultimate postulates of 
the universal perspectives of socialism and the immediacy of a given situation, is and 
necessarily remains a pseudo-mediator, an ideological postulate, an ultimate “Sollen” 
[ought]’ (Mézáros, 1972b: 85). More generally, see pages 77-86. Lukács of course levels 
the critique that their moral postulates are only regulative ideas at bourgeois 
individualists (Lukács, 1971: 315). 
 
30 While Žižek initially defends Badiou (2008) against such charges (Žižek, 2009b), he 
later concedes that Badiou is indeed too Kantian in his later development (Badiou, 2010) 
of these positions (Žižek, 2010a: 181-5). Similarly, Bruno Bosteels argues that Badiou 
strips away much of what should be included in the ‘idea of communism’, raising it to 
‘the status of a Platonic or Kantian idea’ (Bosteels, 2010: 50; 59)  
 
31 ‘Žižek’s hesitation as to “what is to be done” is over-determined by the political 
neutrality of his political ontology’ (Sharpe, 2004:16). 
 
32 Ellen Wood discusses the differences between these two sorts of profit-making in her 
The Origin of Capitalism (2002).  
 
33 ‘The problematic underlying Žižek’s insistence on this rubric [‘the big Other doesn’t 
exist’], I am claiming, is his political need to locate some non-ideological point from 
whence he can proffer his work as a critique of ideology, and in the name of which he 
can also construct a theoretically informed politics’ (Sharpe, 2004: 125).    
 
34 ‘The whole point of the Pauline notion of struggling universality is that true 
universality and partiality do not exclude each other, but universal Truth is accessible 
only from a partial engaged subjective position’ (Žižek, 2006: 35). 
 
35 For an English-language history of the vicissitudes of ‘Soviet Marxism,’ see Bakhurst, 
1991. The subject of Bakhurst’s study – Evald Ilyenkov – is used by Žižek as an example 
of an engaged Marxist philosopher, and is described as a ‘superb dialectician and expert 
on Hegel’ (2000: 155-6). It’s perhaps also worthwhile to here point out that Alfred Sohn-
Rethel could also be considered an ‘engaged’ philosopher, as he worked in ‘one of the 
inner centres of finance capital as an unrecognized Marxist’ pre-WWII and used this 
experience to write a study of the rise of Fascism in Germany (Sohn-Rethel, 1987: 11).  
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36 Laclau rejects ‘class struggle’ in part because he holds that ‘a homogeneous space of 
dialectical mediation’ as seen in the co-dependence of the capitalist and the worker 
cannot account for the necessity of the worker to resist the capitalist: ‘Why could an 
antagonism, however, exist between workers and capitalists? Because of the way the 
worker is constituted outside the relations of production (the fact that below a certain 
level of wages he/she cannot live a decent life, etc)’ (Laclau, 2006b:112). What Laclau 
has done, of course, is to forget that the ‘outside’ is the product of the ‘inside’: capitalism 
can only function by being the only, or at least the predominant, means to make a living, 
thereby compelling workers to sell their labour in order to survive. Hence, for example, 
Marx’s discussion of the ‘reserve army of labour.’ This is to say that there is far more to 
the dialectics of capitalism than just the ‘capitalist-worker’ relation. The rejection of 
dialectics is here also of interest in the midst of a discussion of a ‘Kantian’ Žižek, as in 
the above cited paper Laclau turns to several Kantian Marxists to bolster his arguments.  
 
37 Sheehan’s 2012 ‘guide’ to Žižek’s work also emphasizes class struggle – see in 
particular the opening pages to the book’s fourth chapter. However, when pressed to give 
an example of how this works in Žižek’s theory of ideology Sheehan turns to the figure 
of the ‘Jew’ developed by the Nazi’s rather than to commodity fetishism: ‘At a 
fundamental ideological level, it is society’s class struggle […] that needs to be filled in 
and given body by a seemingly positive object. Such an object is the sublime object of 
ideology and Žižek’s definitive example in this regard is the figure of the Jew in anti-
Semitism’ (2012: 45). As is discussed in a note further below, this sort of turn to anti-
Semitism as definitive of ideology as understood by Žižek fails to account for its 
historical particularity, where discussing it in relation to commodity-fetishism allows one 
to do so. Sheehan’s study is one of the better ‘introductory’ guides, however, more of 
which are taken up in the following chapter. 
 
38 ‘Various individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a joint battle 
against another class. Otherwise they are hostile, competing with each other’ (Marx and 
Engels, 1994a: 144). ‘The combination of capital has created for this mass a common 
situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not 
yet for itself. In the struggle […] this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a 
class for itself’ (Marx, 1973a: 150). ‘The Immediate aim of the Communists is the same 
as that of all the proletarian parties: formation of the proletariat into a class […]’ (Marx 
and Engels, 1994b: 169). ‘In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these 
small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no 
national bond and no political organization among them, they do not form a class’ (Marx, 
1987: 124). Jameson: ‘..what distinguishes Marxist from the sociological notion of class 
is that, for the former, class is precisel a differential concept, that each class is at once oa 
way of relating to and of refusing others. […] the sociological view is formally wrong to 
the degree that it allows us to think of the individual classes in a kind of isolation from 
each other […]’ (Jameson, 1971: 380-1).  For an example of Žižek’s comments on this, 
see footnote 42.  
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39 See also Mészaros, 1971. Žižek also glowingly summarizes what he sees as Lukács’ 
position on the relationship between consciousness and objectivity in the introduction to 
The Parallax View: ‘“consciousness” (becoming-conscious of one’s concrete social 
position and its revolutionary potential) changes being itself – that is to say, it transforms 
the passive “working class,” a stratum of the social edifice, into the “proletariat” as a 
revolutionary subject’ (Žižek, 2006: 6). A similar formulation is found in Žižek, 2000: 
174-5.  
 
40 This will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter of this study. Briefly put, just 
as the secret of value is revealed only in the historical moment that is the generalization 
of capitalist production – i.e. as the product of labour – the secret of the ‘master’s 
discourse’ as the fundamental discourse in Lacan’s theory is revealed under capitalism to 
be that of the pervert – i.e. human freedom. (That is, the absolutist monarch/master is not 
so by virtue of god given right or their personal attributes, but by the activity of people).    
 
41 Žižek does little to show how National Socialist ideology can be considered a 
displacement of class struggle, but Postone, however, does. His contention is that the 
anti-Semitism of the Nazis differed from that which came before it because of the 
changes brought on by capitalism and its further development into industrial capitalism. 
Where the dual form of the commodity makes the separation of exchange value (in the 
form of money) and use value (in the form of the commodity) appear as though the 
former can be separated from the latter, anti-capitalism can mistakenly take the form of 
attacking money alone rather than the system of production (as in Proudhon’s 
formulations, and Marx’s comments about ‘striking the sack rather than the donkey’ – 
Marx, 1973b: 239-40). In Nazi ideology this became the attack not on industrialization 
and machinery – i.e. the material aspect of capitalist production – but the abstract form of 
capital as finance. Postone argues that Jews came to be an embodiment of the abstract 
form of capitalism and were ‘identified with capitalism itself’ and descriptions of them 
had them take on the qualities of money: ‘abstractness, intangibility, universality, 
mobility’ (Postone, 2003: 91). In answer to the question of ‘why race?’ he provides a 
similar answer: the naturalization of capitalism as seen in the separation of commodity 
and money also saw the naturalization of biology because ‘the capital fetish […] gives 
rise to the notion that the concrete is “natural”, and […] increasingly presents the socially 
“natural” in such a way that it is perceived in biological terms’ (Ibid: 93). As to why Jews 
in particular were the group of people identified with capitalism, Postone points to their 
relatively recent political emancipation, which constituted them ‘as the only group in 
Europe that fulfilled the determination of citizenship as a pure political abstraction. They 
were German or French citizens, but were not really considered Germans of Frenchmen’ 
(Ibid: 94). That is, such an identification was possible because they already appeared as 
abstractions, and because the emancipation that led them to be able to become more 
prominent and visible in civil society coincided with the changes wrought by capitalism. 
He admits that he does not address the question of why this happened in Germany in 
particular. (Note that Postone attempts to develop commodity fetishism without reference 
to class, private property, or the market – see page 103. For a critique of Postone’s 
overall position on Marx’s Capital see McNally, 2004.) 
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 Herein, then, is the historical element of fetishism: the absolutist master sits at the 
top of a hierarchy of ‘blood and soil’ as an excess that maintains social stability (i.e. 
Hegel’s description of the Monarch as a member of an estate that is not an estate, and so 
can make decisions from ‘outside’). Here social relations are fetishized and exploitation 
naked. In capitalism everyone is formally free, but exploitation hidden, with money 
playing the role of fetish. At the same time ‘blood and soil’ becomes race – McNally 
(2002: 96-146) and Losurdo (2011), for example, show how the rise of capitalism 
necessitated the development of racial ideologies (McNally mostly in historical mode, 
and Losurdo focusing more on the intellectual history of liberal/conservative theory). 
Here the capitalist becomes the formal-legal ‘one’ of civil society against which all else 
becomes a lower race (from the indigent to the Irish to the people of Africa), the ‘excess’ 
of which (the ‘thing without a place’, the embodiment of abstraction) appears in 
Postone’s account as the object of Nazi anti-Semitism, to otherwise appear as ‘symptom’ 
– a potentially infinite list of groups claiming and fighting for formal equality. This is to 
say that capitalism, too, simmers in social-fetishism. Similarly, the Stalinist Party follows 
the logic of capitalist money-fetishism in that it presents itself as ‘the immediate and 
individual incarnation of these objective laws [of history/capitalist society]’ such that 
anyone bearing the party pin has their body become ‘sublime’ – the bearer of the 
knowledge supposedly possessed by the Party (Žižek, 1996a: 3-4). That is, knowledge 
becomes the fetish/guarantee of the social structure – but unlike the feudal master, it is an 
impersonal knowledge, one akin to the ‘impersonal power’ of the modern state.         
 
42 See page 65, for example, where ‘repression’ is used; see also 129 and 130: ‘The 
crucial contribution of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Hegelian dialectics to Žižek’s 
thought is the mechanism of foreclosure, which is therefore its fundamental kernel, its 
disavowed ‘truth’’; ‘A similar mechanism of foreclosure is in place in commodity 
fetishism…’; ‘… the significance of Žižek’s contested assertion that “capital is Real” 
depends on the understanding of capital as the foreclosed hard kernel embodied by the 
Marxian commodity….’ 
 
43 On the first count, it is perhaps best to attribute this fault to state-capitalists or Stalin. 
See Vighi, 43. On the second, let it suffice here to say that it is not Marx that reduces 
labour-power to labour-time, but capitalism.  
 
44 See also page 76: ‘In circulation, the gap in question is substantially different [than that 
in production], concerning the cleavage between the consumer’s perception of enjoyment 
as fullness, which allows capital to complete its cycle and realize itself, and the 
correlation between jouissance and lack which, if actively assumed and/or politicized, 
would seriously threaten the capitalist logic.’ A similar focus on the consumer-identity 
side of capitalist ideology can be seen in Thomas Brockelman’s Žižek and Heidegger. 
Brockelman, however, does not come nearly as close as Vighi to a discussion of the role 
of production in capitalism or in Žižek’s work. Instead, taking a more Heideggerian 
position against Žižek, he aims to prove that technological rationality – and not 
capitalism per se – is the root of the evils of the modern era and what he calls ‘techno-
capitalism’ (a term he does not even begin to qualify). Another weakness of 
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Brockelman’s study is that he prefers to interpret what Žižek has to say about 
technological rationality and Heidegger rather than approach what Žižek actually writes 
about them. Indicative of this approach is his failure to even mention that some of Žižek’s 
earliest work is in fact on Heidegger’s philosophy and language (Žižek, 1999: 13).  
 
45 ‘The existence of exploited workers and the formation of value in factories and 
sweatshops is still the key to understanding the actualization of surplus-value in the 
stock-exchange’ (Vighi, 2010: 78).  
 
46 In a somewhat similar vein, Johnston argues that Žižek’s ‘modest political practice’ is 
to use his theory and public appearances as a means to precipitate a transference in his 
audience, one in which they will no longer look to him for political answers but instead 
develop them themselves (Johnston, 2007b: 28-9).    
 
47 This is more-or-less the position Dean takes in Žižek’s Politics. See chapter seven of 
the current study.  
 
48 As Mike Davis relates, not everyone sees the slums as a symptom of capitalism: ‘One 
of the researchers associated with the report [produced by the UN on the world’s mega-
slums] told me that “the ‘Washington Consensus’ types (World Bank, IMF, etc.) have 
always insisted on defining the problem of global slums not as a result of globalization 
and inequality but rather as a result of ‘bad governance’” (Davis, 2004: 11). One need not 
necessarily be a Marxist to see them as such, however. Davis goes on to show that the 
UN’s report sees the slums as the products of neoliberalism.   
 
49 Davis takes a similar position (Davis, 2004: 26).  
 
50 There are three other major problems with Vighi’s position: in regards to the slum-
dwellers, he runs the risk of reproducing the theft of knowledge from the ‘slave’ by the 
‘master’, the position he develops through Lacan and Sohn-Rethel in the first sections of 
his book. That is, he doesn’t give an account as to how the people who live in the slums 
would contribute to their own political education and the theorization of their position. In  
regard to Hardt and Negri, he follows Žižek’s line of argument in which he castigates 
them for thinking capitalism can merely have its head cut off and thereby become 
socialism. Vighi – following Žižek – offers that the productivity of capitalism would be 
lost without the exploitation inherent to it: not understanding how Lacanian ‘desire’ and 
‘surplus’ function, Hardt and Negri mistakenly think the wealth of capitalism can simply 
be controlled with complete transparency (for Žižek’s arguments on Marx’s supposed 
positing of a fully transparent social world post-capitalism, see e.g. 1997: 99-101; 1993: 
25-26. For a counter-argument in favour of Marx see Sutherland, 2010: 89-90). Like 
Žižek, Vighi accepts Hardt and Negri’s basic arguments about ‘immaterial labour,’ 
though their work has been shown to be both internally inconsistent and incommensurate 
with reality (Camfield, 2007). Lastly, Vighi’s discussions of ‘labour-power’ generally 
make it come off as an a-historical humanist panacea with infinite potential, when Marx 
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clearly discusses the historical development not only of capacities to work, but the senses 
themselves (see e.g. Marx, 1992: 352-3).     
 
51 McNally points to a similar shift in the way zombies have been treated in Hollywood 
film: from its Haitian origins and 1932’s White Zombie, where the undead is a worker 
reduced to nothing but a tattered body with a suppressed consciousness, later Hollywood 
movies transform the figure of the zombie into a critique of the mindless consumer 
(McNally, 2011: 210-213; 260). 
 
52 This thesis might be more appropriate for the likes of 17th and 18th century England, a 
time before the market became the sole means to reproduce oneself and feudal custom 
and right had been completely obliterated. In his discussion of various bread riots of the 
time, Thompson argues that people’s rebellions were not simply akin to a natural force, a 
mere reaction to hunger, but instead a conscious and often well-organized rebellion 
against attacks on market practices that saw the poor unable to receive a fair price for 
wheat and other commodities in times of dearth. This ‘consumer-consciousness’ (as 
Thompson calls it) was the product of a dieing ‘moral economy’ rather than the new 
capitalist one, an economy ‘in which consumption held somewhat the same primacy in 
the public mind, as the undisputed arbiter of economic effort, as the nineteenth century 
attached to profits’ (Tawney in Thompson, 1971: 132). This did not lead to socialist 
revolution, of course, though it did at time get mixed with politics in the form of leveler 
and Jacobin ideology (Ibid: 126-131); most often it lead to a forced lowering of price. 
The point is that in Žižek’s account current ideological formations do not rely on a ‘moral 
economy’ but one based on the exploitation of labour via the commodity form, and that 
he does not suggest that the breaking of present ideological formations should be 
approached at the level of consumption; he is, for example, highly critical of ‘ethical 
consumption.’ The relationship between ideology, commodity fetishism, the enjoyment 
of commodities, and perversion is taken up in chapters three and seven of the present 
study.   
 
53 This is not to suggest that a new S1/money would be a ‘labour money.’ 
 
54 See, for example, Bruce Fink’s translation of Écrits. 
Chapter two 
 
55 See for example Žižek, 2006a: 165-8. 
 
56 ‘…class struggle aims at overcoming and subduing, annihilating even, the other – even 
if not a direct physical annihilation, class struggle aims at the annihilation of the other’s 
socio-political role and function’ (Žižek, 2005e, unpaginated; 2004: 186-7).  
 
57 See also McNally, 2011: 126-132.  
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58 See the special issue of  Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society, printed in 2011 as 
volume 16(3) for a discussion of Žižek’s actions in and positions on the Balkans.  
 
59 Most recently this took the form of spreading the rumour that Žižek was, before the 
collapse of the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia, spying on his fellow citizens on behalf of his 
government (This article can no longer be found on the internet). By contrast, see the first 
chapter of Butler’s Slavoj Žižek: Live Theory (Butler, 2005) for an attempt to make the 
link between Žižek’s theory and some of the political positions he takes. 
 
60 See the first three chapters of Žižek, 1989. He has several times compared his position 
to Dolar’s ‘Beyond Interpellation’ (Dolar, 1993). For Žižek’s critique of Althusser’s 
followers, see chapters three and four of Žižek, 1999. 
 
61 These same words also appear on page 55 of Living in the End Times (2010). Sohn-
Rethel draws a division similar to Žižek’s ‘constitutive ideology’ and ‘constituted 
ideology’: ‘Necessary false consciousness has its roots, not in the class struggle, but in 
those conditions of historical necessity out of which class antagonism itself results. This 
might give rise to distinguishing necessary false consciousness from ideology understood 
in a narrow sense as accessory to class struggle’ (1978: 198). 
 
62 See Žižek’s first two essays in Butler et al, 2000. 
 
63 While acknowledging that English slavery was more brutal than other forms, he 
doesn’t account for why this might be the case. One alternative would be to turn to Ellen 
Wood’s The Origin of Capitalism  and her development of Brenner’s side of the 
‘transition debate.’ It’s perhaps worth noting that Losurdo makes reference to Wallerstein 
in the course of his argument.  
 
64 I have only found one place where Žižek explicitly makes the link between Lacan’s 
‘fundamental fantasy’ and ‘constructions of analysis’: ‘In clear  contrast to [an 
interpretation], a construction (exemplarily, that of a fundamental fantasy) has the status 
of a knowledge which can  never be subjectivized, assumed by the subject as the truth 
about himself, the truth in which he recognizes the  innermost kernel of his being’ (Žižek, 
1997b, 147). The only other place that Žižek comes to this again, so far as I have found, 
is 1996c: 399-400. Here Žižek writes that the subject is the Real as retroactively created 
by the subject in relation to their trauma. The example he gives is Freud’s ‘Wolf Man’ 
case study, the analysand’s trauma of catching his parents having sex. Žižek doesn’t 
mention it, but in this case study Freud relates that this traumatic memory is not simply 
remembered – it is instead a construction of analysis. (See also Koehler, 1996 for more 
on constructions and the fundamental fantasy).   
 
65 See also Johnston, 2008: 10 
 
66 This appears to be a conflation of ego-ideal/ideal-ego with the logic of master-
signifier/signifying chain, because it is: see Žižek, 2008b: 233. See also Chiesa, 2007:  
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117-8;158-161. Chiesa shows that this link comes with Lacan’s eventual re-formulation 
of the relationship between the Symbolic and the Real, where the former is no longer 
thought to be guaranteed by ‘the name of the father’ as a natural necessity but instead by 
the perverse/masochistic activity of drive. This is taken up in greater detail in a later point 
of the present study. 
 
67 ‘Thus we arrive at the most concise definition of the subject: the subject is an effect 
that entirely posits its own cause’ (Žižek, 1996c: 404). This is also the conclusion Hegel 
makes in sections 86 and 87 of the preface to his Phenomenology of Spirit. Take the 
following as an example: ‘Thus in the movement of consciousness there occurs a moment 
of being-in-itself or being-for-us [the philosophers] which is not present to the 
consciousness comprehended in the experience itself. The content, however, of what 
presents itself to us does exist for it [everyday consciousness]; we [the 
philosophers/scientists] comprehend only the formal aspect of that content, or its pure 
origination. For it, [everyday consciousness] what has thus arisen exists only as an 
object; For us, it appears at the same time as movement and a process of becoming’ 
(Hegel, 1977: 56). That is, ‘they do not know it, but they are doing it.’ See also Žižek 
1989: 172;175, where he argues that the subject is the result of hunting for itself. David 
Gray Carlson (2007) approaches this problem in the 18th chapter of his commentary on 
Hegel’s Logic. See particularly p. 430.  
 
68 This is iterated in many places, but here is a recent instance: ‘The philosophical 
consequences of this real status of abstraction are crucial: they compel us to reject the 
historicist relativization and contextualization of different modes of subjectivity, and to 
assert the “abstract” Cartesian subject (cogito) as something which today corrodes from 
within all different forms of cultural experience – no matter how far we perceive 
ourselves as being embedded in a particular culture, the moment we participate in global 
capitalism, this culture is always-already de-naturalized, effectively functioning as one 
specific and contingent “way of life” of abstract Cartesian subjectivity’  (2009a: 143-
144). 
 
69 This is of course a gross over-simplification. Money is for Marx many things other than 
just a means of exchange. The point made here is that money is not a use-value.  
 
70 Fredric Jameson develops a similar visual conception of the relationship of universal  
and particular in his discussion of Adorno in Late Marxism. He labels it ‘stereoscopic 
thinking’ (Jameson, 1990: 28; 46). A stereoscope functions on the principle of parallax in 
that two photographs of the same scene, taken from slightly different perspectives, are 
presented independently to each eye and thereby give the impression that one is looking 
at a three dimensional object.   
 
71 The painting’s actual title is Jean de Dinteville and Georges de Selve (‘The 
Ambassadors’). Lacan (1978) discusses the painting on pages 85-90 and 92 of The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychanalysis. What is not noted by Lacan (or Žižek, for that 
matter) is that at the top left-hand corner of the painting the curtain that forms the 
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background to the two figures that stand before it is slightly pulled back to reveal a small 
crucifix. (Indeed, while it is visible in the reproduction on the cover of the original 
edition of the seminar, printed by Seuil, it is cropped out from later French editions, the 
English edition printed by Karnac Books, and from the cover of Fink et al’s Reading 
Seminar XI.)  In a more traditional reading of the painting one could say that although all 
human effort is vain in the face of death, Christ’s own death saves from such a fate. Read 
as a ‘parallax’,  death then acts as both S1 and ‘a’. As will be discussed below and in the 
final chapter of the present study this could be said to be where Žižek in fact goes, with 
the caveat that, one, it is a crucified Christ who does not seek to submit himself to God’s 
hands who is that salvation and, two, that this Christ as the self-mediating ‘community of 
believers’ finds homology in the Party. That is, God, too, is dead – when one views the 
painting from the far right (physically speaking, not politically) Christ, too, vanishes in a 
blur when the head of the grim reaper appears. That is, it is a conservative painting in that 
it is an official icon of the church that saves human endevour from futility. Perhaps the 
position of the death’s head and Christ should be reversed to instead suggest that all 
current human endevour is threatened by the true infinite (rather than the simply finite – 
i.e. subject to death) in the form of a Christ that brings the ‘sword of division.’ 
 
72 Marx goes through some of the twists and turns of the capitalist’s justifications in 
chapter seven of Capital, where he ventriloquizes… ‘“Have I myself not worked? Have I 
not performed the labour of superintendence, of overseeing the spinner? And does not 
this labour, too, create value?” The capitalists own overseer and manager shrug their 
shoulders’ (Marx, 1977: 300). Amongst other wrinkles in the mind of Marx’s capitalist 
we also see a version of ‘Bartleby politics’ from the conservative side of the ‘parallax 
view’ – the capitalist as the rational miser exercises his abstinence as a means of creating 
value, ‘…and as a reward he is now in possession of good yarn rather than a bad 
conscience’ (Marx, 1977: 299). See also Chapter 24, Section 3 of Capital.  
 
73 This activity results in profit, euphemistically called ‘earnings’ – a term ‘designed to 
cast the concept of profit in a more respectable light, [which] came into widespread use in 
the 1950s, when the “profit motive” was under routine attack from postwar socialists’ 
(Olive, 1998). 
 
74 Similarly, in The Holy Family Marx writes that ‘within this antithesis [the 
estrangement seen in private property] the private property-owner is therefore the 
conservative side, the proletarian the destructive side. From the former arises the action 
of preserving the antithesis, from the latter the action of annihilating it’ (Marx and 
Engels, 1975: unpaginated). While Flisfeder (2012) gives some interesting commentary 
on ‘feminine and masculine logic’ in an attempt to elucidate why ‘proletarian’ might still 
be an important category for us today he misses this crucial point, thereby driving his 
discussion of historical and dialectical materialism (where Žižek stands as the means to 
better understand the difference between the two) in the wrong direction. Rather than two 
complimentary processes he offers to mutually exclusive ones. See Flemming, 
forthcoming. 
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75 Žižek isn’t completely equivocal, however: ‘…finally, the most elusive domain, the 
“spontaneous” ideology at work in the heart of social reality itself [i.e. commodity 
fetishism] (it is highly questionable is the term ‘ideology’ is at all appropriate to 
designate this domain…)’ (Žižek, 1994: 9). The point being, however, that it is this 
‘domain’ of ideology that makes the others possible – i.e. ‘constitutive ideology’ – in that 
it is the ‘genus that is also its own species.’  
 
76 ‘what is repression for a neurotic? It’s a language, another language that he 
manufactures with his symptoms, that is, if he is a hysteric or an obsessional, with the 
imaginary dialectic of himself and the other. The neurotic symptom acts as a language 
that enables repression to be expressed. This is precisely what enables us to grasp the fact 
that repression and the return of the repressed are one and the same thing, the front and 
back of a single process’ (Lacan, 1993: 60). 
 
77‘…the proper moment of subjective transformation occurs at the moment of declaration, 
not at the moment of the act. This reflexive moment of declaration means that every 
utterance not only transmits some content, but, simultaneously, determines how the 
subject relates to this content’ (Žižek, 2010a: 226). This is one of the ways sublimation 
relates to the act. It is one’s relation to the object that changes in sublimation and the 
formal conversion brought on by analysis. In this way both the object and the subject are 
changed.  
 
78 See Lars T. Lih’s Lenin Rediscovered on this point. Note that Lih has a paper in Lenin 
Reloaded, co-edited by Žižek for Verso Books. 
 
79 For a longer treatment of some of these themes, see Flemming, 2008 
 
80 Rothenberg also takes up the ‘parallax’ quality that Žižek sees in Bartleby, but 
emphasizes a slightly different aspect than is discussed above. In her reading the Bartleby 
parallax is one in which the subject is at one moment ‘the missing piece that will unite 
the social field’ and at another ‘the obstacle to its coherence’ (Rothernberg, 2010: 191). 
Rothenberg does see Bartleby primarily as a negation – a ‘symbolic divestiture’ (Ibid: 
192) – excluding that he is also a positive entity in his own right, but does however come 
close to the latter position in some of her comments: ‘the subject’s role oscillates between 
being the cause of social discord and its solution’ (Rothenberg, 2010: 191). In a similar 
vein she notes that at one point Bartleby is made to say ‘I have nothing to say to you’ to 
his employer – read literally this sentence could be understood to mean that Bartleby 
stands as a prosopopia for ‘nothing’, that through Bartleby nothing ‘has its say’ (Ibid: 
213). In the end this negation is also a new, positive community of analysts – for her the 
negation of defense mechanisms leads to new social interactions – but is an outcome that 
has to be precipitated. That is, Bartleby is not in-himself the answer but needs something 
else to give rise to the move to his position. The relation of all this to capitalism, 
however, is discussed as a question of hierarchy per se – i.e. there is nothing particularly 
capitalist in the social structures she posits as the problem – and so the means for all to 
become Bartleby is instead the group therapist who can organize the mental-heath 
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institution such that hierarchy does not interfere with the creation of new group 
dynamics. This is taken up in more detail in chapter seven of the present study.  
 
81 Marcus Rediker describes Anglo-American pirates of the 18th Century – drawn from 
the ranks of the lower classes as they escaped the extreme discipline of their naval, 
merchant, and privateering ships – in similar terms: ‘Contemporaries who claimed that 
pirates had “no regular command among them” mistook a different social order […] for 
disorder. […] This social order, articulated in the organization of the pirate ship, was 
conceived and deliberately constructed by the pirates themselves. Its hallmark was a 
rough, improvised, but effective egalitarianism that placed authority in the collective 
hands of the crew. […] A striking uniformity of rules and customs prevailed aboard 
pirate ships, each of which functioned under the terms of written articles, a compact 
written up at the beginning of the voyage or upon election of a new captain, and agreed to 
by the crew. By these articles crews allocated authority, distributed plunder, and enforced 
discipline’ (Rediker, 1989: 261). The social order this is contrasted to is of course a 
capitalist one – which set up military operations to destroy piracy – and the ensign (or it 
might be said the ‘S1’ or ‘phallus’) under which such pirates sailed was not that of any 
nation but that of death. Not only death, but ‘Old Roger’ (the Devil, Mephistopeles) or 
‘Jolly Roger’, where roger is slang for penis (Rediker, 2004: 164-9). It’s perhaps worth 
also noting that the term ‘strike’ comes from sailors ‘striking the sails’ (i.e. lowering 
them) of their ships and refusing to work. 
 Wahnich makes similar claims in her study, which takes on contemporary 
understandings of the French revolutionary Terror: from the perspective of today’s 
political hegemony (comprised by not only the right, but also the left – Agamben stands 
as her example of the latter with the argument that the Terror is the germ of biopolitics) it 
appears as a thirst for blood and death. From the perspective of the revolutionaries 
themselves, however, it was a ‘sign of a movement of life and enthusiasm’ and the 
protection of newly created rights and freedoms (Wahnich, 2012: 27). In Wahnich’s 
presentation of the problem the revolutionary tribunal was a way to acknowledge the 
outrage of the people and transform it from a non-poitical outburst to an institutional 
protection of the revolution against its enemies: ‘the means for dissipating these fears [of 
a massacre of social elites] lay in giving popular enthusiasm a normative symbolic form. 
It was explicitly demanded that the sovereign emotive power of the people, so that it 
should not turn destructive, be translated into terms of law’ (Ibid: 30). In contrast to the 
Thermidorians, who saw the Terror and the right to resist oppression as enshrined in the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man that led to it as an unthinkable evil, ‘for the 
revolutionaries, the arbitrary violence that dissolved all social ties arose from a confusion 
between private and political wellsprings’ (Ibid: 74) – that is, from people confusing 
vengeance for affronts to personal safety with those to be meted out for attacks on public 
safety. (Finally, against Arendt, Wahnich locates the basic principle being protected in 
that of political equality for all, not egalitarianism of wealth and a pity for those living in 
poverty).  
 Thompson’s “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth 
Century” stands as another example: The bread ‘riots’ of the 17th and 18th centuries in 
England have been considered so only from the position of power and not from the 
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position of those doing the ‘rioting.’ In Thompson’s view these actions were instead 
relatively organized and based not on an abstract, unthinking outrage, but in relation to 
long held and accepted moral rights and the question of ‘just price.’ (See also note 52 of 
chapter two). This is to say two things: first, that ‘the fact that something appears to us as 
a raw, meaningless, unjustified state of things is also a result of our “positing”’ – it is not 
a neutral act (Žižek, 1996c: 412). Second, perhaps when people focus too closely on 
Bartleby as an example they miss what was said about him, instead looking at the content 
of the story itself and thereby listening to Melville’s words rather than Žižek’s. This is 
not without merit, of course, but tends to lead people astray. Indeed, such a reading of 
Bartleby is presented later in this study.  
 
82 In Strumpet City, the television series based on the novel by James Plunkett, 
Communist labour organizer James Larkin (played by Peter O’Toole) convinces Irish 
stevedores to go on strike with the following words: ‘Look at their paid henchmen: 
they’re afraid. They’re afraid of what they know I’m here to ask of you. They know that 
I’m here to ask you to do something that’s greater than their power, than the batons they 
beat us with, than the foundry and dockyard gates they bolt shut against us; something so 
great it can rock the world. I want you to do nothing. Nothing. Go home; take a rest. 
That’s the help your comrades need from you; That’s the help they’ll give you one day in 
return because it’s all the same fight. An Injury to one is the concern of all. Help them. 
Do nothing. Go home.’ 
 
83 Johnston also provides grounds for this reading in the appendix to his Time Driven: 
‘He [Žižek] asserts that there is no such thing as an unsublimated drive’ (2005: 372). 
Johnston discusses the drives, desire, death drive, sublimation, the Real, and the 
Symbolic as elements of the ‘splitting’ of drive. Note that this was published a year 
before Žižek had fully developed his ideas around ‘the parallax view’, so no such 
language was available to Johnston. See also Žižek/Schelling, 1997: 83 – ‘…drive is its 
sublimation…’. Chiesa makes the same claim for Lacan. See Chiesa, 2007: 135-6. As 
will become clearer in the final two chapters of this study, where Freud assumes an 
animal energy to exist from the beginning to be later re-channeled, Lacan (via Žižek and 
Chiesa) can be said to argue that there is no libido before there is social interaction – that 
is, the historically changing sociality of human beings creates libido as death drive… a 
particularly human trait. Where for Freud sublimation is the redirection of an instinctual 
aim – i.e. the fulfillment of an animal need is redirected to a ‘civilized’ need – for 
Lacan/Žižek each drive is already a step outside of instinct and need and into desire or 
death drive, and hence by definition sublimated.   
 
84 Bosteels makes similar comments at the end of his chapter on Žižek and the ‘Act’ in 
his The Actuality of Communism. Here Bosteels begins by taking issue with what he sees 
as Žižek’s use/development of at least 3 different or competing descriptions of the Act: 
one as a traversal of the fundamental fantasy as a mere formal conversion, where only 
one’s subjective relation to the world, and not the world itself, is changed (Bosteels, 
2011a: 178-184); an act that actually changes the symbolic and the new is allowed to 
emerge (ibid: 184-5); and the purely formal sticking to principles without changing 
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course (Ibid:188). Against Bosteels, the latter is better understood not simply as an 
adherence to form but a dialectic between form and content – i.e. that which is seen as an 
external means to save the ‘substantial’ content becomes that content itself. See Žižek, 
2001a: 85 – where he discusses the film Brassed Off. The band portrayed in the film is at 
first a means to save a coal mine from the vindictive policies of the Iron Lady (on which, 
see Milne, 2004), but when the mine is finally closed it reveals itself to be the working 
class ‘content’/way of life that was in the first place to be saved… and lives on beyond 
the mine. Here the symbolic frame changes, where the alternative is between giving up a 
particular object in order to maintain or achieve one’s symbolic place – in classical 
psychoanalytical terms, Oedipalization; in the case of the film, remaining a waged worker 
– versus keeping the object while giving up on the symbolic mandate/symbolic 
identification that makes it desirable (and thereby transforming the object, effectively 
meaning that both the symbolic identification and the object have been given up). On this 
see also Žižek, 2001b:168. That is, revolutionary struggle is not simply to maintain the 
means of one’s livelihood – i.e. the mine – but to achieve production through freedom – 
in this case, playing music with others for its own sake. (This is not unlike Marx’s 
comments in the 1844 manuscrupts on French working men’s organizations, which began 
as a means of struggle but became ends in themselves where each enjoyed the others’ 
comradeship). The ‘formal sticking to principle’ (i.e. being in the band) becomes the end 
itself because of a change in the symbolic identification which effectively makes the band 
a new object, though it is still empirically the same. One could argue that this also opens 
a different ground of struggle – i.e. the new. That is, all three aspects that Bosteels sees as 
incompatible are present in this one example. (This is not to suggest, however, that ‘art’ 
is in Žižek’s view the form of revolutionary action. It’s important to remember that the 
band was first a means in an actual struggle and only later an end in itself. This is 
broached in more detail in the following chapter).     
This is immaterial, however, as in the end Bosteels asserts that each of these 
descriptions were in Žižek’s work from the the beginning, that they can be discounted as 
inconsistent as they operate at different levels or because they are jumbled but held 
together with a dogmatic adherence to certain Lacanian and Hegelian positions, and that 
the real problem is Žižek’s adherence to a fourth notion of the Act: what Bosteels calls 
the ‘arch-act’ or the radical negativity of the death drive. He asserts that in this final 
formulation all that is left are calls for inactivity and the elimination of any room for 
identification with any sort of political cause, and thereby also the ability to actually 
create a new world (Bosteels, 2011a: 208; 217). 
According to Bosteels this is all because Žižek apparently gives up on the notion 
of truth. ‘Žižek could not be clearer in this regard’, writes Bosteels, who after making a 
few references to Lacan on the subject takes a quote from Žižek out of context to prove it 
(Bosteels, 2011a: 211-212). In the passage in question (Žižek, 2008b: lxvii) Žižek argues 
that truth can be used as an ideological mystification (‘being right, but for the wrong 
reasons’ – ibid: lxix) – i.e. used to disguise the jouissance that belies it. Later in the same 
piece Žižek argues that Lacan does, in fact, hold to a notion of the truth that doesn’t 
simply subordinate it to jouissance (the subordination being the core of Bosteels’ 
dissatisfaction): ‘…for Lacan, Truth is this shattering experience of the Void – a sudden 
insight into the abyss of Being…’ (ibid: lxxxii), a formulation that Žižek then goes on to 
 281 
                                                                                                                                            
argue is not a relativization or subordination of truth, and which he contrasts to Badiou’s 
understanding of the term (see particularly ibid: lxxxvi-lxxxviii). This in the end is the 
real problem for Bosteels: Žižek is wrong by virtue of not being Badiou. This 
disagreement is what functions as a blinder enabling Bosteels to take the Act to be only 
destructive, hiding that the creative/destructive parallax inherent to Žižek’s description 
not only exists, but is also present from the beginning – including in several of the books 
Bosteels references. For example, from The Sublime Object of Ideology (upon which 
Bosteels relies heavily): ‘In this sense, revolution is strictly a creationist act, a radical 
intrusion of the “death drive”…’ (1989: 143); ‘the moment we “see it [reality] as it really 
is,” this being dissolves itself into nothingness or, more precisely, into a new kind of 
reality’ (ibid: 28); from the 2002 preface from For They Know Not What They Do: 
‘Nothingness is being itself viewed from  a different perspective’ (2008b: xxvi); in First 
as Tragedy, Then as Farce, close to the pages from which Bosteels takes the epigram for 
his introductory chapter, Žižek explains that Aufhebung and ‘subtraction’ mean to 
withdraw, to reveal difference as such, and to destroy, to then one page later add that to 
properly subtract oneself from a situation also means to transform it (2009a: 129-30).  
Note too that Žižek at times describes death drive as the inhuman aspect of being 
human, the adherence to one particular aspect of being that thereby tears us out of the 
‘natural cycle’ of mere instinct. The exemplar here is of course sex – it’s not just for 
reproduction anymore! Alternatively, this can be formulated as ‘sticking to principle’ 
regardless of the supposed content that it is to produce (in this case, children), effectively 
bringing us back to the last of the three ‘different’ versions of the Act that Bosteels 
presents.   
It’s also important that in contrast to ‘subjective destitution’ – the outcome of 
stepping through one’s fundamental fantasy – Žižek cautions that the process can go 
wrong and lead to a ‘subjective disintegration’ (Žižek, 2008b: lxvii). The latter notion is 
perhaps best understood as something closer to what Bosteels is railing against – not 
death drive, but an unredeemable destruction, perhaps akin to the psychiatric work done 
by Ewen Cameron for the CIA as described by Naomi Klein in the opening chapters of 
The Shock Doctrine. It’s also worth noting that while Bosteels discusses ‘inactivity’ he 
doesn’t reference The Parallax View and the sections on Bartleby (cited above, in which 
Žižek describes activity/inactivity as a parallax). Perhaps all this is excusable given that 
Žižek himself often talks about sublimation and death drive as two different moments 
(e.g. 2008b: lxxxiii), but Bosteels appears to be more interested in defending Badiou than 
understanding Žižek.  
 
85 This is further taken up in chapter seven of the present study. Zelnik (1976a: 282; 
1976b: 424) makes similar observations about the ‘conscious’ vs ‘intellectual’ worker in 
his discussion of two famous memoirs of Russian activist-workers. (Zelnik is also the 
translator of Kanatchikov’s memoir A Radical Worker in Tsarist Russia.) Lih departs 
from Zelnik in that the latter, based in part on Kanatchikov’s ambivalence to the non-
worker intelligentsia, finds it incredulous that Kanatchikov could so easily and so early 
be on side with the Bolsheviks given their supposed inclinations towards intellectuals 
(Zelnik, 1976b: 441-2). Lih’s work centres around destroying the understanding of the 
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pre-revolutionary Bolsheviks that leads to this sort of reading. Lih instead sides more 
with Reichman (1996).     
 
86 Given that Parker thinks that the link Žižek makes between the commodity and the 
dream are useful for the study of culture and film, one would expect him to give an 
exposition of this link in his chapter on culture. Instead, he mostly cites the negative 
opinions of others – for example,  Homer (discussed above), Ebert (1999) and McLaren 
(2002). In Ebert’s case, the treatment of Žižek makes up only a small portion of her 
paper. The comments that Parker most approvingly refers to pertain to the notion of class 
struggle as an ‘unsymbolizable antagonism,’ which she takes to be an idealist inversion 
of actual class struggle. This she does – as does Parker – without a discussion of what 
Žižek might actually mean by this: i.e. that ‘class struggle’ is not merely an empirical 
reality (as discussed above). And while Parker cites McLaren as a seconder to Ebert’s 
motion that Žižek ignores the material reality of struggling working bodies, McLaren’s 
conclusions are actually quite different. McLaren turns to McNally’s Bodies of Meaning 
to argue that while Žižek does rely on a theory of language that focuses on the erotic side 
of the body rather than its toiling side, he does not make such a discussion impossible – 
which is what McNally argues is most problematic in Derrida’s work (McLaren: 638-
640). In fact, McLaren approvingly discusses Žižek’s claims that class struggle is the 
‘Form of the Social’ and that as a consequence truth can only be had via class struggle 
(McLaren: 635-6). By contrast, Ebert asserts that truth is not something Žižek thinks is 
attainable (Ebert: 407). In the end, Parker merely relies on an aside that McLaren does 
not in fact go on to substantiate: that Žižek at times provides a ‘Hegelian re-reversal of 
Marxism’ (McLaren: 620; Parker: 110). (For a similarly sympathetic siding with Žižek 
over Derrida on the question of Marx, see Veire, 2007.)  
 
87 On a similar note, see Johnston’s Žižek’s Ontology, p 112. 
 
88 Mladen Dolar, one of Žižek’s Slovenian-Lacanian fellow travelers, makes a similar 
argument in his A Voice and Nothing More (2006: 98-99; 122-3) 
 
89 This is also the position that Johnston establishes through the course of Žižek’s 
Ontology, with the added subtlety that there is a relationship between the Real as ‘pre-
symbolic’ and as the product of the Symbolic. It is his contention that the two meet where 
the not-all material world and the symbolic are each, themselves, internally ‘barred’ 
(Johnston, 2008: 152).  
 
90 Note too that when discussing how value is the ‘dominant subject’ of the circuit of 
capital when it is embodied as money he likens the process to the birth of Christ – rather, 
the birth of God through Christ (Marx, 1977: 256).   
Chapter three 
91 This chapter began as a paper presented in October 2011 at the 4th biennial conference 
of the International Herbert Marcuse Society.  
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92 Interestingly enough, Adorno’s name appears more often than Marcuse’s in those 
pages. 
 
93 In his brief “A Critique of the Death Instinct” Otto Fenichel also argues against the 
view that there are two foundational ‘instincts’ rather than a fundamental principle that 
governs all ‘instinctual’ activity (i.e. the activity of drives). One of the pitfalls of a dual-
drive view, according to Fenichel, is that some analysts fell into the trap of seeing 
neuroses as the product of an internal instinctual battle and thereby eliminated the ‘social 
etiology of nueroses’, which amounts to their complete biologization (Fenichel, 1953: 
370-71).  
 
94 For a discussion of Freud’s own relationship to his nurse maid, see McClintock, 1995: 
87-9; 406 n41. 
 
95 See also An Essay on Liberation, p 50. Freud makes the observation that Eros and 
Thanatos may be the same instinct in their conservative nature in his The Ego and The Id: 
‘…we put forward the hypothesis of a death instinct, the task of which is to lead organic 
life back into the inanimate state; one the other hand, we supposed that Eros, by bringing 
about more and more far-reaching combination of the particles into which living 
substance is dispersed, aims at complicating life and at the same time, of course, at 
preserving it. Acting in this way, both the instincts would be conservative in the strictest 
sense of the word, since both would be endevouring to re-establish a state of things that 
was disturbed by the emergence of life’ (Freud, 1984c: 380-1). He goes on, however, to 
argue that they are in fact two separate drives.   
 
96 Note that in his account of Lacanian ethics and the end of analysis Chiesa argues that 
to posit that nature will come to enjoy is a negative consequence of holding to a notion of  
a Kantian Noumena/pre-symbolic Real – i.e. akin to Sadean ethics (Chiesa, 2007: 181-2). 
This is approached in the final chapter of the present study. 
 
97 Lacan,with reference to Heraclitus, compares the component drives to a bow, playing 
on the word ‘bios’, or life: ‘to the bow is given the name of life […] and it’s work is 
death’ (Lacan, 1978:177).  
 
98 ‘In this way [with reference to libido/lamella] I explain the essential affinity of every 
drive with the zone of death, and reconcile the two sides of the drive – which, at one and 
the same time, makes present sexuality in the unconscious and represents, in its essence, 
death’ (Lacan, 1978:199). ‘…the signifier as such, whose first purpose is to bar the 
subject, has brought into him the meaning of death. (The letter kills, but we learn this 
from the letter itself.) The is why every drive is virtually a death drive’ (Lacan, 2006: 
719). According to both Fink and Chiesa, what the letter ‘kills’ is not any particular 
‘thing’, but the maternal Thing – the fantasmatic wholeness of the pre-linguistic (Fink, 
2003: 52; Chiesa, 2007: 74; see also chapter 5 of Chiesa).   
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99 Kant provides a description of birth that is perhaps fitting: ‘The cry of the newborn is 
not a note of distress but one of indignation and raging anger: he is screaming not from 
pain but from vexation, presumably because he wants to move about and his own 
impotence feels to him like fetters on his freedom’ (Kant, 1974: 188). 
 
100 For a different critique of Marcuse’s approach to the maternal, see O’Neill, 2007: 
‘…Marcuse completely psychologized the historical location of matriarchal values as the 
source of critical utopianism, while historicizing Freud’s two principles of reality and 
pleasure’ (8). Part of the present argument is that Marcuse also fails properly historicize 
Thanatos.  
 
101 Žižek’s reading of the difference between desire/drive and death drive has another 
potential ally in Jean Hyppolite (an influential reader of Hegel) who made similar points 
in a talk on Freud’s ‘On Negation’ to one of Lacan’s audiences in 1954. Take for 
example the following: ‘We have here, in some sense, <the formal couple of> two 
primary forces – the force of attraction and the force of expulsion – both of which seem 
to be under the sway of the pleasure principle, which cannot but strike one in this text’ 
(Hyppolite, 2006: 750). ‘We must clearly distinguish between the destructive instinct and 
the form of destruction, otherwise we will not understand what Freud meant’ (Ibid: 753). 
For a Lacanian take on agressivity (as opposed to death drive) see Chiesa, 2007, 20-23.  
 
102 See Marcuse, 1966, 149. See also Moore, 2007. Referring to the 1960 preface to 
Reason and Revolution, Kellner points out that the term is shared with and derived from 
André Breton (Kellner, 1984: 279; 457 n. 5). Moore, however, finds this unsatisfactory – 
in part because he primarily associates the term with Whitehead. 
  
103 Sohn-Rethel does not himself offer a discussion of why coining by the state began in 
the first place. Kraay (1964) argues that the growth of the Greek world in the seventh and 
sixth century BCE increased trade and led to the state becoming more complicated and 
more official payments being made to it (e.g. taxes) and from it (e.g. creating and paying 
for ‘public works’ projects). As a consequence it became more cumbersome to use 
existing methods of weighing precious metals and more convenient to invent and insist 
upon the use of units of measurement that it itself devised (i.e. coinage with the stamp of 
the current government upon it) (89-90). Seaford (2004) gives a slightly different 
account, linking the adoption/creation of coining to religious sanctuaries redistributing 
their precious metals in paying for services, using a standard of measurement that 
‘derived at least in part from the ancient and powerfully persistent notion of the universal 
right to a share of sacrificial meat, carried over into pieces of metal that, just like the 
meat, would have to be in small pieces of standard size and quality, acceptably equal for 
all’ (110). That is, the state practice in part derived from practices of sacrifice and the 
concentration of ‘communal wealth in the form of precious metal stored in sanctuaries’ 
(Ibid: 96).  Like Sohn-Rethel (Seaford makes several brief references to Intellectual and 
Manual Labour) he attributes many of the particularities of pre-Socratic thought to the 
qualities of coined money – though the relevant list of attributes he associates with 
currency differ. Sohn-Rethel, of course, leaves out an extended discussion of Greek 
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thought to instead focus on how it resembles the Kantian conception of the ‘I.’ Like 
Žižek, who rails against the idea that ‘technological rationality’ and the Cartesian subject 
are to blame for ills better laid on the shoulders of capitalism (Žižek,1999: 4), Seaford 
argues that the emergence of ideas about a non-changing ‘one’ (as opposed to the wealth 
of experience that points to the world being nothing but constant destruction and change) 
can not explained ‘merely by the “economy of simplicity” characteristic of science or the 
“drive for epistemological power over nature”’ (Seaford, 2004: 217).    
 
104 In Tarrying With the Negative Žižek muses that ‘it would be of great theoretical 
interest to establish the conceptual link between this genesis of self-consciousness [i.e. 
Hegelian self-relating negativity] and the modern notion of paper money’ to then briefly 
discuss Brian Rotman’s Signifying Nothing (Žižek, 1993: 28). Not unlike the present 
study (in which the link Žižek draws between the Cartesian subject, Freudian 
‘constructions of analysis’, and Marx’s notion of commodity fetishism are brought to the 
forefront) Rotman attempts to show that the modern subject is linked to the introduction 
of the concept of zero into Western mathematics and philosophy, the use of formal 
perspective (i.e. the vanishing point) in painting, and the introduction of paper money 
into commerce.  
There is a further similarity between Rotman’s study and this one in that he 
concludes that the possibilities opened up by the initial discovery of ‘the void’ come to 
also occlude that discovery. Here that takes the form of the exchange abstraction opening 
the possibility of concrete freedom but also occluding it in commodity fetishism. Rotman 
gets to a similar point by beginning with the argument that the Western resistance to the 
concepts of zero and nothing came largely from the Greek philosophical doctrine that 
nothing came from nothing (a notion that Christian philosophers who believed that God 
created the world from nothing had to wrestle with). In his account Zero was the 
introduction, into mathematics, of the idea that there were not simply objects that were 
counted but someone who originated the counting and therefore also the sequence of 
signs that followed. This, in his view, thereby introduced the idea that objects did not pre-
exist their counting but were in some sense created by it – hence Žižek’s attraction to the 
book: for Hegel the world is always mediated, never simply empirical or ‘sense certain’ 
(see the ‘here’ and ‘now’ examples from the Phenomenology of Spirit).  
This is compatible (in Rotman’s view) with the Christian notion that God created 
the world Ex Nihilo, but with secular overtones: in each of these three instances 
(Mathematics, painting, exchange) the first step was the creation of an anonymous, 
generative subject who originates the sign system (in painting, the ‘embodiment’ of the 
vanishing point in a window or door within the scene), the embodiment of that point in 
the particular (the vanishing point occurring at the place in the scene where a figure 
stood), and finally the generalization or naturalization of that position so that it is once 
again obfuscated (the vanishing point no longer being represented in the painting, but 
instead indirectly referred to and ironized). That is, agency/freedom is revealed only to in 
the end be ‘sutured’ or concealed (Rotman, 1987: 54). This thesis holds for money as 
well, but Rotman does not go very far down the road of anti-capitalism, instead using his 
study to reflect on the work of Derrida. He does at least, however, finish his book by 
suggesting that capitalist exchange is a semiotic system that needs to be destroyed in 
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order to reveal that the world is not simply one of money but one made by people 
(Rotman: 107).  
Though his book gets another brief mention in The Parallax View (on a different 
topic), it is, however, Sohn-Rethel’s work that lies at the foundation of Žižek’s claim that 
‘the roots of philosophical speculative idealism are in the social reality of the world of 
commodities; it is this world which behaves “idealistically”’ (Žižek, 1989: 32), and so no 
further treatment is given to it here.      
 
105 This can be seen in the last paragraph of the third aphorism of Adorno’s ‘On Subject 
and Object.’ Take this line, for example: ‘The doctrine of the transcendental subject 
faithfully discloses the precedence of the abstract, rational relations that are abstracted 
from individuals and their conditions and for which exchange is the model’ (Adorno, 
2005: 248; See similar comments in Adorno, 1967: 73-4, 76). While reporting he was 
personally acquainted with Adorno, Sohn-Rethel had apparently only encountered 
Marcuse in books.  
The argument leveled here at Marcuse – that he obfuscates the historical 
circumstances that can be shown to precipitate changes in the form of reason, instead 
positing that it is driven to unfold into technological rationality by its own internal logic – 
finds a counterpart in John Abromeit’s biography of Max Horkheimer. He argues that 
Adorno held an ahistorical understanding of the categories of bourgeois thought (i.e. he 
treated them as if they existed through all time), a position that later came to be accepted 
and adopted by Horkheimer, ultimately leading to the pair’s collaboration on The 
Dialectic of Enlightenment – which in Abromeit’s view represents a break with 
Hormheimer’s earlier development of a Critical Theory fundamentally based on historical 
analysis (Abromeit, 2011: 349-432). Part of the development of Abromeit’s argument 
involves reference to Adorno’s relationship to Sohn-Rethel and Horkheimer’s refusal to 
consider Adorno’s requests that the Institute support SR’s work: Abromeit presents Sohn-
Rethel’s supposed ahistorical view and Adorno’s advocacy of it as support for the 
argument that Adorno’s work suffered the same ill. That is, in Abromeit’s view 
Horkheimer refused to accept Sohn-Rethel’s work in part because references to 
exploitation, money, and the division of intellectual and manual labour appear to be 
treated as categories that remain the same across history, thereby undermining Sohn-
Rethel’s attempt to link exploitation and abstract epistemologies (Abromeit, 2011: 383-
385; 387-8). This neglects that money and exploitation have, of course, existed long 
before capitalism, and that it is the generalization of their use in the capitalist mode of 
production that becomes decisive for Sohn-Rethel; it also neglects that Sohn-Rethel’s is 
also a discussion of when the division of intellectual and manual labour first appears in 
history – i.e. at the same time as the introduction of money. Admittedly, he does not 
discuss the effects of this introduction on Greek life as a whole to any great degree (for 
such an account see Seaford, op. cit.), and judgment is here reserved on his discussion of 
overcoming the division of intellectual and manual labour (a topic which also forms part 
of Horkheimer’s objections).   
 
106 In his review of Less Than Nothing, however, Pippin makes claims about Žižek’s 
definition of the Act that resemble those made by Bosteels, that it ‘makes zero Hegelian 
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sense. Something understood by an agent as an “abyssal” act is a delusion, the pathos of 
self-inflating and posed heroism, and the gesture belongs in the Hegelian zoo along with 
the Beautiful Soul […]. And if the act is “abyssal”, then “politics” simply means 
“power”, power backed by nothing but resolve and will, likely met with nothing but 
resolve and will’ (2013, 16). Again, the response to this criticism is that the Act appears 
to be abyssal from the existing categories of the Symbolic, but as a product of that 
symbolic system – i.e. being the ‘extimate’ objet a – it can’t be said to be abyssal in the 
sense of coming from nowhere; it is abyssal in the sense of not being 
sanctioned/‘guaranteed’ by the status quo. Unlike Bosteels, who can apparently find 
nothing redeeming in what Žižek writes, Pippin does, however, give Žižek some praise 
on pages 16 and 17 of his review.  
 
107 In Eros and Civilization Marcuse relies on Marx’s description of the ‘general intellect’ 
as found in the Grundrisse to back this thesis. Žižek explicitly rejects the notion of the 
General Intellect, and thereby also large swaths of the arguments made by Hardt and 
Negri, who also rely on this part of Marx’s work. See for instance Žižek’s Living in The 
End Times, page 192, n. 18. 
 
108 ‘Where id was, ego shall be. It is a work of culture – not unlike the draining of the 
Zuider Zee’ (Freud, 1965: 71). For Lacan’s take on this quip, see the Écrits, 347-8. The 
first half of the first sentence of this phrase – in its original German – is also the name of 
a series of books edited by Žižek, a series intended to bring together psychoanalysis and 
Marxism – which ‘enables us to question the very presuppositions of the circuit of 
Capital.’ Among other things it includes Žižek’s The Ticklish Subject, Zupančič’s Ethics 
of the Real, and Badiou’s Ethics.  
 
109 The Marxist-Leninist Black Panthers, for one, are passed over silently. Interestingly 
enough, Huey P. Newton held that because of the increased productivity of capitalism the 
lumpen-proletariat would do nothing but increase (Hayes and Kiene, 1998: 161) – a 
position which has clear affinities with that of Marcuse. Relying on the work of Fanon, 
Mao, Guevara, and others, the aim of the BPP became that of organizing this mass. It 
may just be that the timing of Marcuse’s book was such that this couldn’t be included, 
but other than a passing reference in Counterrevolution and Revolt there doesn’t appear 
to be any real discussion of the BPP in his work.  
 
110 What is valuable in Kant’s discussion of artistic practice – as found in The Critique of 
Judgment – is his definition of art as production through freedom. That is, art is a means 
of communicating a universal via feeling (i.e. without concepts) as produced in a work 
done for its own sake. The problem is that Kant doesn’t extend this possibility to 
‘handicraft’, the production of everyday things that is done for other ends – i.e. making a 
living (see for example §43). What Marx does, of course, is crack this latter possibility 
wide open. See, for example, his ‘Notes on James Mill’ in Early Writings.     
 
111 Marx held a similar view, putting it this way in the 1844 manuscripts: ‘When 
communist workmen gather together, their immediate aim is instruction, propaganda, etc. 
 288 
                                                                                                                                            
But at the same time they acquire a new need – the need for society – and what appears 
as a means has become an end’ (Marx, 1992: 365).  
 
112 ‘…the authority of the Party is not that of determinate positive knowledge, but that of 
the form of knowledge, of a new type of knowledge linked to a collective political 
subject’ (Žižek, 2002: 188).  
Chapter four 
113 In his assessment of the foundations of the Marxism of the second international 
Colletti levels the same charge: separating ideology and science (i.e. economics) and 
seeing the economy as simply a question of the empirical is to eviscerate what was in 
Marx’s work the ‘most profound originality and its strongest element’ (1974: 76). Linked 
to this is the inability of Marxists of the second international (and later) to see that 
‘Marx’s theory of value is indentical to his theory of fetishism…’ (Ibid: 77). Shandro 
disagrees with Colletti aiming this critique at Kautsky. See Shandro, 1997/8: 475-9.    
 
114 See also Marx and Engels, 1973: 36; Marx, 1977:1054-55. 
 
115 This chapter is the product of two presentations: one given at The Radical Democracy 
Conference held at the New School for Social Research and Columbia University in 
April of 2011, and Forms of Domination and Emancipation held at the University of 
Sussex in June of the same year. 
 
116 For Žižek’s (badly edited – at one point we learn of a ‘transcendent Thong’!) critique 
of Boucher see Žižek 2005b. While Žižek explicitly argues against Boucher’s central 
thesis that the death drive is for Žižek a return to a lost fullness, while Žižek outlines the 
difference between his Hegelian position and Boucher’s Kantian one, Boucher sticks to 
his position with the explanation that ‘Žižek does not appear to me to have a reply’ and 
does not ‘explain his side’ of the ‘political difference’ between them (Boucher, 2008: 165 
n1). That is, he doesn’t bother to reply to Žižek’s criticisms. Boucher suffers from the 
same malady as Sharpe, as outlined in the first chapter of this study: he does not 
understand the ‘parallax view.’ It is this concept that serves as the primary means by 
which Žižek refutes Boucher in the above-cited article.  
This is all the more interesting given that the thesis that the division between the 
‘good Žižek’ and the ‘bad Žižek’ springs from the influence of Schelling is primarily 
Boucher’s, and Schelling provides a similar concept: ‘what-is-not and what-is are not two 
different essences in it but are rather one essence regarded from different sides’ 
(Schelling/Žižek 1997: 143); ‘necessity and freedom are in one another as one being that 
appears as one or the other only when considered from different sides, in itself freedom, 
formally necessity’ (Schelling, 2006:  50). See also Schelling, 2006: 31; 63). What should 
be noted here, however, is that in this essay Schelling is primarily concerned with the 
work of Spinoza, who in his Ethics argues that thought and extension (i.e. the body) are 
both the same thing viewed from a different perspective. Take this comment on free will, 
for example: ‘both the decision of the mind and the appetite and the determination of the 
body by nature exist together – or rather are one and the same thing, which we call a 
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decision when it is considered under […] the attribute of thought, and which we call a 
determination when it is considered under the attribute of extension…’ (Spinoza, 1996: 
73). Spinoza differs from Žižek in several respects, of course, but most important here in 
terms of ‘parallax’ are these two: where the link between the two attributes is for Spinoza 
the essence/substance of God, it is for Žižek the ‘void’ of the Real that lies between each 
side of the parallax; where for Spinoza the two attributes are symmetrical, for Žižek they 
are lopsided – not in the sense that one side determines the other, but in the sense that one 
side can undermine the other.  
In the end Schelling introduces a similar ‘parallax’ into Spinoza: standing by 
Spinoza’s arguments that there is only one principle in the world, he differs in that he 
thinks it is one-sided and too mechanical, too lifeless, arguing that what is needed is the 
introduction of God’s ‘personality’, his becoming particular (i.e. becoming Christ and 
dying away). That is, Schelling argues for a God who also has ‘wit’ (Schelling, 2006: 
59), the paradigmatic example which can perhaps be found in Monty Python’s (Life of) 
Brian: not only a particular, but also an entire comedy troupe. Therein lies the parallax: in 
place of one God with two equal attributes (thinking and extension), a particular person 
that exists in and through a community. And perhaps Schelling moves to fast in asserting 
that Spinoza has missed this point. Take these comments on the story of the fall and the 
loss of human freedom: ‘…this freedom was recovered by the patriarchs, guided by the 
Spirit of Christ, that is, by the idea of God, on which alone it depends that man should be 
free, and desire for other men the good he desires for himself’ (Spinoza, 1996: 152).  
 
117 ‘… equality begins only when the power of the experts ceases to hold sway. Wherever 
the vaunted triumph of law and of the legal state takes the form of recourse to experts, 
democracy has been reduced to a caricature of itself – to nothing more than government 
by wise men’ (Rancière, 2007: 89).   
 
118 ‘This is also why Hegel’s deduction of the monarchy can be given a democratic 
supplement: Hegel insists on the monarch as the “irrational” (i.e. contingent) head of 
state precisely in order to keep the summit of state power apart from the expertise 
embodied in the bureaucracy. While the bureaucrats are chosen on account of their 
abilities and qualifications, the king is the king by birth – that is, ultimately, he is chosen 
by lot, on account of natural contingency’ (Žižek, 2011a: unpaginated). See also Žižek, 
2011b, 666-7.  
 
119 ‘… Claude Lefort’s argument, according to which in democracy the place of power is 
empty, should, I think, be supplemented by the following statement: democracy requires 
the constant and active production of that emptiness’ (Laclau, 2001: 12).  
‘… it is misleading to say that the ‘democratic invention’ finds the locus of power empty 
– the point is rather that it constitutes, constructs it as empty; that it reinterprets the 
“empirical” fact of interregnum into a ‘transcendental’ condition of the legitimate 
exercise of power’ (Žižek, 2008b: 276 n52). 
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120 ‘…the function of the representative cannot be purely passive, transmitting a will 
constituted elsewhere, but that it has to play an active role in the constitution of that will’ 
(Laclau, 2001: 13). 
‘This external element [the Party] does not stand for objective knowledge, that is, its 
externality is strictly internal: the need for the Party stems from the fact that the working 
class is never “fully itself.” So the ultimate meaning of Lenin’s insistence on this 
externality is that “adequate” class consciousness does not emerge “spontaneously,” that 
it does not correspond to a “spontaneous tendency” of the working class; […] “adequate” 
class-consciousness has to be fought out through hard work’ (Žižek, 2002: 189). See also 
Žižek 2006: 149; 2000: 174-5.  
 
121 ‘…power, as the medium through which the incommensurability between particularity 
and universality shows itself, is not the antipode but the condition of democracy’ (Laclau, 
2001, 13). ‘Again, there is only emancipation if there is never ultimate self-
determination, if the gap between necessity and freedom is never finally bridged. The 
name of this asymmetry can be called – depending on the dimension we are emphasizing 
– either democracy, power, or hegemony’ (ibid: 13-14). 
‘“Dictatorship” does not mean here the opposite of democracy, but democracy’s own 
underlying mode of functioning […]. In other words, one should use the term 
“dictatorship” in the precise sense in which democracy also is a form of dictatorship, that 
is, as a purely formal determination’ (Žižek, 2007: xv-xvi).  
 
122 This is also the basic thesis of Evald Ilyenkov's (2012) "The Ideal", recently translated 
by SPT Grad Alex Levant and published in the most recent issue of Historical 
Materialism. See also the first third of 'interlude 1' of Less Than Nothing. 
 
123 This echoes the 1844 manuscripts, were Marx writes that ‘the inversion and confusion 
of all human and natural qualities, the bringing together of impossibilities, the divine 
power of money lies in its nature as the estranged and alienating species-essence of man 
which alienates itself by selling itself. It is the alienated capacity of mankind’ (Marx, 
1992: 377). This also appears in the “Chapter on Capital” in the Grundrisse, where 
capital is labour as an alien ‘subject-object’ that in ‘its relation is itself as complete a 
contradiction as is that of wage labour’: where the labour of any individual is only 
possible in relation to all labour (abstract labour) the property of all (this abstract labour) 
becomes the property of one (a particular capitalist) in the form of machinery and other 
means of production and the commodities thereby produced (Marx, 1973b: 470-1). Žižek 
acknowledges this ‘subject-object’ is an alienated one (Žižek, 2012: 251-2; 2002: 283).  
 
124 While Laclau is the object of the argument above, these comments also serve as a 
retort to the comments made in Jonathan Rée’s (2012) review of Less Than Nothing, 
printed in The Guardian: just because Žižek isn't talking about particular empirical 
instances of exploitation, war, and destruction does not mean he can not be considered as 
part of a line of Marxists.  
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125 ‘…the money system is in fact the system of equality and freedom, and that the 
disturbances which they encounter in the further development of the system are 
disturbances inherent in it, are merely the realization of equality and freedom, which 
prove to be inequality and unfreedom’ (Marx, 1973b: 248-9). See also Marx, 1977: 152.  
 
126 See also Rancière’s Hatred of Democracy (2006: 14-15; 64-5).  
 
127 See also Marx and Engels in The German Ideology: ‘If the conscious expression of the 
actual relations of these individuals is illusory, if in their imagination they turn reality 
upside down, this in turn is a result of their limited mode of activity and their limited 
social relations arising from it’ (1994: 111).  
 
128 Žižek also rejects the idea that ideology is an illusion: ‘…the concept of ideology must 
be disengaged from the “representationalist” problematic: ideology has nothing to do 
with “illusion”, with a mistaken, distorted representation of its social content” (Žižek, 
1994: 7).  
 
129 See also the second notebook of the Grundrisse (Marx, 1973b: 243).  
 
130 Laclau, of course, outright rejects the labour theory of value. 
 
131 Michael Lebowitz develops this line of argument in his Beyond Capital. Most 
pertinent here is the way he sets up the problem in chapter 4 (Lebowitz, 2003: 63-76): 
while each can not survive without the other (with the caveat that in the end labour could 
live without capitalism, but capitalism could not exist without labour), and each attempts 
to be ‘for-itself’ at the expense of the other, that which appears to be ‘outside of capital’ – 
i.e. historically determined ‘necessary needs’ (the category Marx uses to replace 
Ricardo’s use of the ‘natural’ limits of the productivity of land and Malthus’ theory of 
population as the determinant of the subsistence wage) – is in fact the product of class 
struggle. As the relation between wage labour and capital are an ‘antinomy’ that cannot 
be overcome (without the destruction of both), resistance is necessarily a part of 
capitalism.  
 
132 ‘Crucial for the fetish-object is that it emerges at the intersection of the two lacks: the 
subject’s own lack as well as the lack of his big Other’ (Žižek, 1997a: 103). ‘…what both 
child and mother give without having is the phallus: a temporary superimposition of lacks 
is obtained’ (Chiesa, 2007: 72). 
 
133 ‘…in the case of objet a as the object-cause of desire, we have an object which is 
originally lost, which coincides with its own loss, which emerges as lost, while, in the 
case of objet a as the object of drive, the “object” is directly the loss itself – in the shift 
from desire to drive, we pass from the lost object to loss itself as an object. That is to say, 
the weird movement called “drive” is not driven by the “impossible” quest for the lost 
object; it is a push to directly enact the “loss” – the gap, cut, distance – itself’ (Žižek, 
2008a: 328). 
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134 ‘The effectiveness of the community of speaking beings is predicated on a violence 
which antedates it. […] It creates separation in a community, making room for debate 
therein […]’ (Rancière, 2007: 85) 
 
135 ‘the compromises and disorders of domination are only “democratic” to the extent that 
they themselves are effects of egalitarian division, the contingent historical 
configurations where that division can recognize its own place and reaffirm its power, 
which is the power to declassify’ (Rancière, 2007: 56. See also 32-3).  
 
136 ‘The claim that the proletariat is the “universal class” is thus ultimately equivalent to 
the claim that, within the existing global order, the proletariat is the class that is radically 
dislocated […] with regard to the social body: while other classes can still maintain the 
illusion that “Society exists”, and that they have their specific place within the global 
social body, the very existence of the proletariat repudiates the claim that “Society 
exists”’ (Žižek, 2000: 169).  
 
137 ‘…as it [the principle of government] attempts to separate out the excellence specific 
to it from the sole right of birth, it encounters a strange object, a seventh title that is not a 
title, and that, the Athenian tells us, is nevertheless considered to be the most just…’ 
(Rancière, 2006: 40).  
 
138 To these two myths should also be added a third: that of the city so organized in such 
contravention of the rules of The Republic that it suffers a terrible fate – Atlantis. This is 
introduced in Critias, considered (along with Timaeus) to be a companion-piece to The 
Republic (Plato, 2008: 93-110).   
 
139 ‘…democracy must have already – without having had to kill any king or shepherd – 
proposed the most official and the most intolerable of responses…’ (Rancière, 2006: 44).   
 
140 ‘The scandal of democracy, and of the drawing of lots which is its essence, is to reveal 
that this title can be nothing but the absence of title, that the government of societies 
cannot but rest in the last resort on its own contingency’ (Rancière, 2006: 47).  
 
141 For a similar argument, see Ellen Wood’s Capitalism Against Democracy (1995), 
chapter six.  
 
142 See Lars T. Lih’s contribution to Lenin Reloaded, edited by (among others) Žižek. 
 
143 For Watkin’s discussion of the film, see http://pwatkins.net/commune.htm 
Chapter five 
144 The first iteration of this paper was originally prepared for and presented at Marx and 
Psychology, a conference held at the University of Prince Edward Island in August of 
2010.  
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145 ‘What the inexistence of the big Other signals is that every ethical and/or moral 
edifice has to be grounded in an abyssal act which is, in the most radical sense 
imaginable, political. Politcs is the very space in which, without and external guarantee, 
ethical decisions are made and negotiated. The idea that one can group politics in ethics, 
or that politics is ultimately a strategic effort to realize prior ethical questions, is a version 
of the illusion of the “big Other.” From the questions “which ethics fits psychoanalysis?” 
we should therefore pass to the question “Which politics fits psychoanalysis?”’ (Žižek, 
2012: 963).  
 
146 Freud’s testimony makes it clear that this essence is some form of liberal humanism. 
This will be problematized later in this paper when the discourse of human rights is 
discussed. 
 
147 For an interesting take on the relationship of psychology and torture, see De Vos, 
2011. 
 
148 I.e. the assertion that reality is not composed of unrelated parts, but is composed of 
reciprocally mediating ‘distinctions within a unity’ (Marx, 1973: 99-101). ‘In authentic 
Marxism, totality is not an ideal but a critical notion – to locate a phenomenon in its 
totality does not mean to see the hidden harmony of the whole, but to include into a 
system all its “symptoms”, antagonisms, inconsistencies, as its integral parts’ (Žižek, 
2011b, 664).  
 
149 On this question Fenichel briefly brings up the free clinics that were organized in 
Vienna and elsewhere. For a much fuller treatment of the subject, see Danto’s Freud’s 
Free Clinics (2005). 
 
150 For a condensed account of this history, see Dunbar (1998). For a more general 
discussion of professional organizations and psychotherapy, see Lipsig-Mummé, 2006.   
 
151 The CPA reported that in 2010 it had, among other things, lobbied the Natural 
Sciences and Engineering Research Council to allow graduate students in clinical 
psychology to apply for funding, spoken to the Federal Government about providing 
psychological services to its thousands of civil servants, and prepared briefs on 
government budgets with other national professional associations (CPA, 2010). 
 
152 For a discussion of how public employees more generally embody the contradiction 
between human welfare and the economic and political needs of the state, see Stephanie 
Ross’s history of the founding of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (Ross, 2005).  
 
153 The limitation of this study, however, is that it relies on practitioners’ perceptions of 
their use of ethics, not their actual practice.  
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154 Mill’s On Liberty is instructive on this point: free speech and liberty hold only for 
those in ‘civilized’ countries who have reached the age of majority. Anyone else is 
considered a barbarian, and can thus justifiably be ‘improved’ by violent paternal means. 
It’s not incidental that Mill, like his father, was an employee of the East India Company, 
which had a major role in colonizing India and attempts to ‘liberalize’ China in the 
Opium Wars.   
 
155 ‘The aim of my teaching has been and still is the training of analysts. The training of 
analysts is a subject that is well to the fore-front of analytic research. Nevertheless […] in 
the analytic literature, its principles are lost sight of’ (Lacan, 1978: 230).  
 
156 Or, as Roudinesco (1990) puts it, in the late forties Lacan hoped “The training analyst 
would be a theoretician of therapy since technical training governs theoretical 
intelligence” (225-6).  
 
157 Working out the relation between object and drive in regards to sublimation, Lacan 
argues that what is at stake is not a mere replacement of one object by another, but a 
change in the nature of the existing object itself. I.e. ‘objects’ are not unchanging facts 
(Lacan, 1992: 293).   
 
158 Not everyone draws this conclusion, of course. French Canadian analyst Willy 
Apollon has what sounds like a liberal understanding of the ends of analysis. For him it is 
to achieve ‘no other regard for the demands of the Other than the symbolic limits of 
social or citizen coexistence’ (Apollon, 2002, 140). This can easily be read as liberal 
negative-freedom, in which one is to let well-enough alone until well-enough infringes on 
the rights of others.  
 
159 One wonders how Jacoby would respond to Frantz Fanon’s comments as regards 
colonial racism as it appears as ‘inferiority complexes’ and the danger that people’s 
‘psychic stricture is in danger of disintegration’: as a psychoanalyst Fanon’s ‘objective 
will not be that of dissuading him [the analysand] from it by advising him to “keep his 
place”; on the contrary, my objective, once his motivations have been brought into 
consciousness, will be to put him in a position to choose action (or passivity) with respect 
to the real source of the conflict – that is, toward the social structures’ (Fanon, 1967: 
100).  
 
160 For an example of exactly the opposite, see Noble Prize winner Eric Kandel’s 
Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis and the New Biology of Mind (2005). See also the 
International Neuropsychoanalysis Society at <neuropsa.org.uk>. 
 
161 See in particular chapters four and five of Turkle’s Psychoanalytic Politics, as well as 
the final section of its second edition. Also of interest is David-Menard (1982). 
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Chapter six 
162 An early version of this paper was prepared for and presented at the 2012 Žižek 
Studies Conference in late April of 2012, held at The College at Brockport (SUNY) in 
upstate New York.  
 
163 Rothenberg does, of course, touch on the readings of Bartleby that likely prompted 
Žižek taking the story up in the first place (Rothenberg, 2010: 245, n 2). As noted in 
chapter three, like many other authors who take Žižek on with regards to Melville’s 
character Rothenberg sees Bartleby as a figure of negation, missing out on the aspect of 
parallax that also sees negation appear as a positive entity of its own. 
 
164See also Lacan, 2002, lectures II-4 and II-8. This also appears in the following year’s 
seminar: ‘I have already shown you that in the master’s discourse the a is precisely 
identifiable with what the thought of a worker, Marx’s, produced, namely what was, 
symbolically and really, the function of surplus value’ (Lacan, 2007: 44). See also 
Zupancic, 2006. Her main thesis is that where earlier in Lacan’s work the signifier and 
enjoyment were incompatible, separate, and related only as analogy, in his later work – 
starting with the seminar presented the year before the one just cited – the theory of 
discourses ‘articulates the enjoyment together with the signifier and posits it as an 
essential element of every discursivity’ – that is, at the level of homology rather than 
analogy (2006: 155). She also discusses the turbine example, as does Chiesa (Chiesa, 
2007: 127-8). Diane Elson makes a similar argument in relation to Marx: it is not price or 
value or exchange that are the objects of Marx’s study, but labour and the different forms 
it takes (Elson, 1979: 123). One of the particular forms is that of value, a form which 
exists only under capitalist social relations. That is, Abstract labour comes fully into 
being, is embodied, only in capitalist forms of money, and so she dubs Marx’s take on 
labour not the ‘labour theory of value’ but the ‘value theory of labour.’  
 
165 Robinson and Tormey’s critical strategy in regards to Žižek’s work relies on pulling 
quotes from myriad works and patching them together rather than dealing with how any 
one argument develops at any one point in any one book. The most significant example 
of this is when, contrasting what they see as two incommensurate versions of commodity 
fetishism (those of Žižek and Marx), they take short quotes from works published in the 
mid-to-late 1990s rather than talking about the first chapter of 1989’s The Sublime Object 
of Ideology where it is developed most extensively. The result is a list of sins with the 
appropriate footnotes, but no consideration of how these snipits might in fact contradict 
longer-argued positions or be taken in a different light when read within the context in 
which they are found.  
Perhaps more significantly, though their paper on Marx and Žižek was published 
in 2006 the vast majority of what they cite from Žižek’s oeuvre does not post-date the 
year 2000. One of the more substantial critiques that they raise regards Žižek’s assertion 
that social order needs a master or master signifier in order to achieve stability after any 
revolutionary ‘Act’, but their critique is limited because of the books they choose as their 
points of reference. In the 2002 preface to the new edition of For They Know Not What 
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They Do Žižek offers a long ‘auto-critique’ of his earlier work, which includes a 
discussion of how his mistaken adherence to a ‘masculine logic’ (based primarily on a 
master signifier as one usually understands it in Lacanian theory) rather than a ‘feminine 
logic’ (which bucks reference to the master signifier as an absolute) contributed to the 
skewing of his Marxism towards liberalism (though R & T would prefer to here find 
‘authoritarianism’). While R & T make no reference to this Lacanian distinction, it 
ironically appears in completely distorted form in the (unsubstantiated, un-cited) claim 
that Žižek prefers ‘muscular’ to ‘effete’ political action and theory (Robinson and 
Tormey, 2006: 146). They are unable to see how Žižek himself problematizes the 
formulation to which they object because they leave out a discussion of the 2002 preface 
and the development that it represents. It is also significant that For They Know Not What 
They Do – one of the early, significant follow-ups to Sublime Object – also includes a 
development of themes surrounding commodity fetishism but does not appear in the 
bibliography of either of the two papers by Robinson and Tormey cited here. The 
question of the post-revolutionary need (or lack of need) for a new master signifier also 
appears in The Parallax View – a book published the same year as R&T’s paper, 
featuring a painting of Lenin on its cover and containing a discussion of Marxism and 
commodity fetishism that closely follows the arguments made in The Sublime Object of 
Ideology. That the problem of the post-revolutionary master signifier and the creation of a 
new social order is not simply one upon which Žižek has decided is further confirmed in 
his Less Than Nothing, where he claims that the deadlock that Lacan uncovers but is 
unable to overcome is precisely this one (Žižek, 2012: 18-19). That book takes this 
question as one of its central themes.   
The pair also slip into superficial comments on the number of times Marx appears 
in Žižek’s work as compared to Schelling, Hegel, or Lacan – as if the number of citations 
is a ‘fact’ that speaks for itself in regards to Žižek’s ‘idealism’ – and how his mixing 
discussions of movies, books, jokes, and theory is somehow invalid or debasing. Here a 
pro-Lenin quote from a scholar of whom they approve is fitting: ‘He [Lenin] knew, as all 
adult education teachers know, that a general point of theory is illuminated far more 
quickly by an apt example drawn from the current problems of his audience, than by an 
exposition of its validating rationale’ (Harding, 2009: Vol 1, 74). In the end, because they 
misread Žižek’s take on commodity fetishism they level at him a critique that is perhaps 
better suited for the psychoanalytically oriented work of Fromm or Money-Kyrle: the 
reduction of social subordination to psychological processes.   
 
166 See, for example, Lenin’s Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic 
Revolution, written and published in 1905, in which he argues that ‘dictatorship’ means 
not simply seizing the state and becoming a parliamentary (rather than a working) body, 
but transforming it, and also blasts those who had taken over the editing of Iskra (among 
others) for wanting to remain a party in opposition rather than pushing for an insurrection 
that would lead to taking power (Lenin, 1962).  
 
167 In his Lenin, Hegel and Western Marxism, Anderson argues that although his reading 
of Hegel enabled him to understand, in dialectical fashion, the relation between state, 
imperialism, and progressive nationalism, he (Lenin) did not extend this understanding to 
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the Party (see for example Anderson, 1995: 166; 229). By contrast, Shandro and Lih (the 
latter of whom stresses that  for Lenin the Party is not to ‘come from without’ but is 
instead the reciprocal merging of the worker-class and the Party, in line with the position 
argued by Kautsky) paint Lenin as having a dialectical understanding of the Party long 
before he (Lenin) ever seriously studied Hegel (Lenin’s philosophical notebooks date 
from 1914-1916). Shandro is here of course discussing some of the views Lenin made 
public between 1904-5, while Lih focuses on 1902 and before. Similarly, Shandro 
elsewhere argues that Kautsky’s understanding of the party was also a dialectical one 
(though not without its problems) (Shandro, 1997/8).      
 
168 This is the premise of Andrew Feenberg’s paper on Lukács and the party: that at 
different points in history there are different appropriate types of party activity – i.e. 
consciousness raising in the face of ‘spontaneous’ outbreaks at some points, and active 
organization of outbreaks at others. See particularly Feenberg, 1988b: 144; 147. Lih notes 
a similar division in Lenin Rediscovered, pointing to the difference between propaganda 
and agitation: propaganda was ‘aimed at creating worker leaders’ and agitation was 
‘aimed at awakening the mass of workers’ (Lih, 2008: 542). 
 
169 See, for instance, his contributions to Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, or his 
retort to Simon Critchley in The London Review of Books, as well as in the final two 
chapters of The Parallax View. 
 
170 Sharpe and Boucher make a similar mistake in their contribution to a recent collection 
of papers dedicated to the relationship between psychoanalysis and the economy as seen 
in light of the 2008-9 financial crisis. Here they argue, as they have in the past, that Žižek 
illegitimately extends concepts of a discipline that has cut its teeth on individuals to a 
social sphere to which it does not apply (2012: 201). The flaws in this argument have 
been elaborated in several chapters previous to this one. What they add in this particular 
paper is that Žižek’s assessments of the social aspects of contemporary capitalism – that 
the ‘big Other’ has ceased to exist and is instead replaced with a series of ‘little Others’ – 
doesn’t follow from what they call the ‘homology thesis’ – i.e. his references to Sohn-
Rethel and the relation he sees between the form of the commodity and that of the dream. 
It is in this sense that they make the same mistake as Dean, proposing a lack of 
connection between his social analysis and his understanding of the economy. Their 
particular spin on this thesis follows from their observations that while the latter is a 
perverse relation the former is a psychotic one. What they miss is that perversion was for 
Freud not that far from psychosis in that it involves a loss of the sense of reality. This in 
part because both psychic forms involve a splitting of the ego (Laplance and Pontalis, 
1973: 309; 427-9). Coupling this with the knowledge that a capitalist economy ‘melts all 
that is solid into air’ it is not hard to see how one (commodity fetishism) can lead to the 
other (the dissolution of all big Others via that commodity fetishism). This will be be 
broached in this chapter with reference to Simmel.  
The other misstep that the pair make is in claiming that Žižek overextends his use 
of psychoanalysis while failing to following this assertion to the end by seeing that he 
also applies psychoanalytic concepts when discussing the political implications of his 
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assessments of contemporary Western, capitalist societies. Ignoring his claims that the 
Leninst party and the discourse of the analyst share the same form, Sharpe and Boucher 
instead focus on Žižek’s discussions of Mao, Stalin, and Robespierre as a basis to claim 
that given the dissolution of the big Other Žižek proposes that we need a new one, a new 
master. As will be emphasized below, this misses that the end of analysis is for Žižek an 
end in the belief in a big Other, and that the analyst is the ‘master that is not a master’ – 
i.e. one who realizes that the world is ‘not-all’ and thereby enables others to reach the 
same conclusions. In asserting that Žižek advocates for a new master the pair also miss 
that Žižek himself criticizes Jacques-Alain Miller for proposing just that, and in a section 
of The Parallax View to which they refer when J.A.M. comes up in their own discussion. 
Tightly tied to this confusion is that they conflate Master-Signifier, Fetish, and Empty-
Signifier, between which Žižek makes important distinctions. These are discussed in the 
conclusion of the present study. For the moment suffice it to say that while the Master-
Signifier as fetish is unconscious the Empty-Signifier as phallus is not. 
 
171 ‘…what is really at stake in ideology is its form…’ (Žižek, 1989: 84).  
 
172 Zupančič summarizes this way: ‘Capitalism is a major producer of differences, as well 
as a major leveler or equalizer of these same differences. This is what makes it the 
greatest promoter of liberalism and of all kinds of liberties and rights (especially the right 
to be different), and the greatest deactivator of any real liberating or subversive potential 
of these differences’ (Zupančič, 2006: 174).  
 
173 In his Badiou and Politics, however, Bosteels argues that this is the case for Badiou – 
i.e. Badiou’s early and later works have more continuity than difference precisely 
because of the role that Maoism plays in his thought. ‘…only an understanding of 
Badiou’s ongoing debts to Maoism can give us insight into his proposed renewal of the 
materialist dialectic, while, conversely, a miraculous and antidialectical understanding of 
the relation between truth and knowledge is often the result of an undigested failure to 
come to terms with the Maoist legact in Badiou’s work’; ‘… the immanent critique of the 
party qua form has always been a benchmark of Badiou’s Maoism’ (Bosteels, 2011b: 
115; 126).   
 
174 In his Outline of Psycho-Analysis Freud himself compares psychoanalysis to the 
practice of confession, but claims there is a fundamental difference: where the catholic 
tells the priest what others don’t know about them, the analysand tells the analyst what 
they don’t yet know about themselves (Freud, 1969: 51).  
 
175 A similar argument can be found in On Belief: ‘… Lacan was well aware of the 
historical constellation within which psychoanalysis – not as a theory, but as a specific 
intersubjective practice, a unique form of social link – could have emerged: the capitalist 
society in which intersubjective relations are mediated by money. Money – paying the 
analyst – is necessary in order to keep him out of circulation, to avoid getting him 
involved in the imbroglio of the passions which generated the patient’s pathology’ 
(Žižek, 2001a: 17).  
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176 It’s at this point that Žižek makes reference to Rotman’s Signifying Nothing. See 
above, Chapter three, note 104.  
 
177 This can be seen in so-called ‘mommy-porn’ title 50 Shades of Grey. In it the 
eponymous character (Grey) is a ‘dominant’ that formalizes a BDSM relationship with 
the young protagonist whose pleasure he comes to ‘own’ by having her sign a legal 
contract. The ownership involved takes the form of a list of certain conditions under 
which she is allowed to orgasm (i.e. only in his presence), which translates into the need 
for the author to enumerate the orgasms the protagonist has in various sex scenes.  
 
178 Pippin summarizes this way: ‘…the formula for getting Hegel from Kant would be: 
Keep the doctrine of pure concepts and the account of apperception that helps justify the 
necessary presupposition of pure concepts, keep the critical problem of a proof of the 
objectivity of these concepts, the question that began critical philosophy, but abandon the 
doctrine of “pure sensible intuition,” and the very possibility of a clear distinction 
between concept and intuition, and what is left is much of Hegel’s enterprise’ (Pippin, 
1989: 9). Pippin’s thesis is that the work of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel was precisely to 
develop this point of Kant’s philosophy. Fichte develops ‘I=I’; Hegel comes to the 
infinite, negative, self-relation of thought.    
 
179 Žižek makes this argument in the first chapter of The Ticklish Subject.  
 
180 ‘We must say of it that in a certain sense that it has never had a real existence. It is 
never remembered, it has never succeeded in becoming conscious. It is a construction of 
analysis, but it is no less a necessity on that account’ (Freud, 1979: 170-1). ‘No memory 
of one special kind of highly important experience can usually be recovered: these are 
experiences which took place in very early childhood, before they could be 
comprehended, but which were subsequently interpreted and understood. One gains 
knowledge of them from dreams, and is compelled to believe in them on irresistible 
evidence in the structure of the neurosis’ (Freud, 1961a: 368). 
 
181 I.e. Wirklichkeit. Capitalist exchange can only happen with the Wirklichkeit that is 
commodity fetishism; the subject can only function with the effectivity made possible by 
the fundamental fantasy. See Chiesa, 2007: 126-7. Note that this term can also be 
translated as ‘actuality.’ 
 
182 The following account is taken from their entries on Anaclisis, Death Instinct, 
Masochism, Perversion, Sado-Masochism, and Libido. See also chapters four through six 
of Laplanche, 1976.  
 
183 Laplanche was analyzed by Lacan, but broke with him in 1963. See Ray’s short 
obituary (Ray, 2012).   
 
184 The next several paragraphs are taken from the third chapter of Chiesa’s book.  
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185 For a brief response to McNally’s criticisms of Lacan in Bodies of Meaning, see the 
conclusion of the present study.   
 
186 Recall the following description of castration: ‘…castration – which Lacan refuses to 
read in terms of a real threat and understands, rather, as a resumption of the image of the 
fragmented body…’ (Chiesa, 2007: 30).  
 
187 See also Elson, 1979: 144-50. ‘…Marx’s argument is not that the abstract aspect of 
labour is the product of capitalist social relations, but that the latter are characterized by 
the dominance of the abstract aspect over the other aspects of labour [i.e. concrete labour, 
private labour, and social labour]’ (Elson, 1979: 150).  
 
188 ‘I believe that the reconstructed Burgess fauna, interpreted by the theme of replaying 
life’s tape, offers powerful support for this different view of life: any replay of the tape 
would lead evolution down a pathway radically different from the road actually taken. 
But the consequent differences in outcome do not imply that evolution is senseless, and 
without meaningful pattern; the divergent route of the replay would be just as 
interpretable, just as explainable after the fact, as the actual road. But the diversity of 
possible itineraries does demonstrate that eventual results cannot be predicted at the 
outset. Each step proceeds for cause, but no finale can be specified at the start, and none 
would ever occur a second time in the same way, because any pathway proceeds through 
thousands of improbable stages. Alter any early event, ever so slightly and without 
apparent importance at the time, and evolution cascades into a radically different channel. 
This third alternative [i.e. the argument above] represent no more nor less than the 
essence of history. Its name is contingency – and contingency is a thing unto itself, not 
the titration of determinism and randomness’ (Gould, 1989: 51). 
 
189 This against Žižek’s unreferenced, unsubstantiated, throwaway comment that the 
‘early’ Marx has an Aristotelian, substantialist understanding of labour’s ‘potential’ 
(Žižek, 2012: 223, 251, 261). 
 
190 Similar comments appear in the Grundrisse. See below.  
 
191 Frank Ruda makes a similar argument in the conclusion of his Hegel’s Rabble, at the 
end of which he sides with Marx against (but with the help of) Hegel: ‘The actual 
communist action names an event; an evental irruption into the structures of historical 
societal dynamics which lets the specific “universality of man”, the matter of the ethical 
space, following the logic of double latency, appear as something that logically lies 
“before” (although it is always only accessible “after”) the structures of the state and civil 
society’ (Ruda, 2011: 173; see also 175-6).  "192" ‘…this" hole" [the" Cartesian" subject] is" gradually" hollowed" out" through" the"increasingly"apparent"contingency"of"all"operators"of"subjectification,"a"contingency"that" becomes" apparent" solely" through" the" rise" and" fall" of" various" temporarily"
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193 See for Example Žižek, 2002; 2006a.  
 
194 Žižek’s point being that this misconstrual is necessary – the truth can only be revealed 
by first making the mistake.  
 
195 In the opening paragraphs to the conclusion of his Less Than Nothing Žižek replaces 
‘ethics’ with ‘politics’ – if the establishing of the fetish/master signifier is an act of 
creation based not in any other necessity than of making a choice (or choosing not to 
choose – i.e. becoming schizophrenic) then it is necessarily political.  
 
196 ‘…Lacan’s emphasis on how Kant’s ethics is the ethics intrinsic to the Galilean-
Newtonian universe of modern science has to be supplemented by an insight into how 
Kant’s ethics is also the ethics intrinsic to the capitalistic logic of circulation as an end in 
itself’ (Žižek, 2002: 332, n 162). 
 
197 Žižek argues that drive is as such perverse in Less Than Nothing (2012: 549-50). 
Rather, he argues that drive as such is separated from perversion by a ‘thin line’, where it 
is done with no reference to the Other. As it was described above, it is a ‘perversion 
without perversion.’ 
 
198 ‘Is such a radical gesture of “striking at oneself” not constitutive of subjectivity as 
such?’ (Žižek, 2010a: 398). ‘Subjectivity as such’ should here be understood as ‘subject’ 
and not ‘subjectivization.’ The sentence following the one quoted reveals as much.  
 
199 On the destruction/giving up of the object, see Žižek, 2001b:168. A similar ‘self 
destruction’ and an attack on the object that leads to symbolic identification rather than a 
change in the symbolic happens in the film adaptation of Woody Allen’s Play It Again 
Sam, to which Žižek makes reference in Sublime Object of Ideology. Where Norton first 
literally beats himself in Fight Club under the guise of a projection that no one else can 
see (think of the rivalry of the ‘mirror stage’) to later give up this imaginary 
identification, it is the imagined projection of Allen’s lost love object (his ex-wife) that 
shoots the imagined projection of his imaginary role-model (Humphrey Bogart) and sees 
the return of Allen’s own voiceover (which had been replaced by conversations with 
Bogart when his ex-wife left him). Bogart returns when Allen loses his new love object 
(played by Diane Keaton), and this new love object appears as an imaginary projection 
that attempts to shoot Bogart only to have him slap and disarm her. Allen then confronts 
the ‘actual’ Diane Keaton, ‘telling her how it is,’ ‘cutting her loose’, speaking Bogart’s 
lines from Casablanca rather than having Bogart first prompt him with what to say. Then 
follows the scene to which Žižek refers: Allen tells Bogart that he doesn’t need him 
because he, Allen, is short and ugly in his own right. That is, via an identification with 
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the weakness in the Other and rejecting/beating the object (Bogart’s slap; Allen ‘breaking 
the news’) Allen has taken on his symbolic mandate (Žižek, 1989: 109-110). That is, he 
gives up the object he can’t have anyway (Keaton’s character tells him that she was about 
to leave San Francisco with her husband, regardless for her feelings for Allen) and 
thereby completes his assumption of a symbolic mandate – his Oedipalization, the 
acceptance that though he wants the object it has been denied to him.  
This ‘self-beating’ theme also appears at the end of Living in the End Times with 
reference to Bertolucci’s 1900 (2010a: 397) and in the conclusion of Less Than Nothing 
with reference to the film  They Live (2012: 999). 
Chapter seven 
 
200 Which Žižek in effect does in Less Than Nothing, where he attributes this role to 
Marx’s discussion of commodity fetishism (2012: 360-1). Colletti also makes this point 
(1974: 92-98). 
 
201 See also earlier in the Grundrisse, where Marx argues that to take the exchange 
abstraction is not simply not-freedom, but a one sided-conception (Marx, 1973b: 240). 
 
202 See chapter two, note 38. 
 
203 Hal Draper makes similar, though far less detailed, arguments against what Lih calls 
the ‘textbook interpretation’ of What Is To Be Done? in “The Myth of Lenin’s ‘Concept 
of the Party’, or, What They Did to What Is To Be Done?” (Draper, 1990 [1963]).  
 
204  Unfortunately, in an otherwise interesting paper Ruda (2013) uncritically sides with 
Badiou’s later work on the question of the Party, writing that “the centralized party that 
had taken power come with a tendency to bureaucratization, a tendency that the Trotzkyst 
[sic], not without reason, called state terrorism and the Maoists themselves called 
reformism”; :The model of the party with all its implications […] is saturated today” 
(307; 308). He goes on to make the un-dialectical sounding remark that we need to ‘take 
into account’ the history of the party in order to move forward, rather than suggesting that 
the present might be a means to reflect back upon the need for a ‘party of a new type.’  
 
205 ‘Formal’ in the sense that all that mattered was getting votes; mechanical in the sense 
that laws/conventions took the place of moral persuasion (Ostrogorski, 1964b: 324; 342).  
 
206 Ostrogorski’s pessimism is best seen on pages 166-85 of volume 1 of his study. His 
‘ideal’ and his optimism can be best seen in the conclusion to volume 2.  
 
207 ‘Unlike Lenin’s corps of professionals, Ebert’s [the German SPD’s first paid 
bureaucrat, who helped transform the party into a massive ‘state within a state’] was built 
primarily to compete with other political parties, to get members and voters, not to shatter 
the existing order’ (Schorske, 1983: 127).  
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208 Zald and Ash remark that in What is To Be Done? Lenin doesn’t outline a hierarchical 
organization, but one of ‘concentric circles of lessening commitment and participation’ 
(1966: 329, n9). Similarly, Lukács claims that precisely that question – who is committed 
to Party work and to what degree – is Lenin’s central principle of organization: ‘other 
questions of organization – that of centralization, for instance – are only the necessary 
technical consequences of this […] Leninist standpoint’ (Lukács, 1970: 25). On the 
question of engaging the ‘total personality’ of the worker and Party involvement, Lukács 
(1971: 316; 319; 335) makes reference to ‘The Organizational Structure of the 
Communist Parties, the Methods and content of their Work’, a set of theses passed at the 
third congress of the communist international of 1921(anonymous, 1980). Part III deals 
with the need for members to be actively engaged and includes a discussion the different 
types of activity in which they should participate. Here is also found distain towards the 
idea that formal democracy alone makes for a democratic organization, and the counter-
assertion that only political activity can meet that aim.  
 
209 A similar point also makes up part of Feenberg’s (1988) paper on Lukács and the 
differences he saw between the SPD and the RSDLP.  
 
210 Lih acknowledges that Lenin made no such liberal argument,  but that making it is not 
contrary to what Lenin was arguing in What Is To Be Done?. Lukács makes a similar 
point about the Party in his Lenin: singleness of ideology and purpose allowed it to make 
alliances and move in the direction that it sought, rather than including multiple 
ideologies within itself and thereby diverting its aim (Lukács, 1970: 28-31). In the second 
section of the third chapter of Marxism and the Party Molyneux goes so far as to claim 
that it was the willingness to divide the Party in order to maintain doctrine that ‘was 
really the distinct hallmark of Leninism, and which resulted in 1912 in the formal 
foundation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) as a completely 
separate and independent party’ (Molyneux, 1978: unpaginated).   
 
211 For example, see Zald and Ash, 1966; Rucht, 1999; and Clemens and Minkoff, 2008. 
For a book-length Canadian counter to Michels, see Macpherson, 1962.  
 
212 Molyneux makes a similar point, writing that because of Tzarsist repression ‘…the 
Bolsheviks did not and could not develop, as did for example the SPD, a broad layer of 
functionaries consisting of local officials, trade-union leaders, members of parliament, 
local councilors etc. This is a stratum which is inevitably subject to enormous 
“moderating” pressures from its environment’ (Molyneux, 1978: unpaginated [Chapter 3, 
section 3]).  
 
213 In outlining his beef Lih focuses on Service’s later work and not the study referred to 
here. Lih’s argument of course revolves around Service’s take on What is To Be Done?: 
where Lih holds that Lenin’s party was in fact not of a new type but in large part inspired 
by the SPD, he takes Service to task for suggesting that Lenin’s supposed love of Russian 
terrorism inspired a new version of the party. See Lih, 2008: 364; 377-384.  
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214 See also Rabinowitch, 2007: 392.  
 
215 The classic study establishing the fact that the Bolsheviks were not simply a Blanquist 
elite but actually a mass party with many members who were primarily young workers is 
David Lane’s The Roots of Russian Communism (1968).  
 
216 In his ‘The Freudian Thing or the meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis’ 
Lacan poses the question of a return to Freud in a way similar to how Lukács posed the 
question of thinking the Party: while some, in Lacan’s view, argued that psychoanalysis 
was an eternal truth that had been discovered by chance and as a consequence could not 
be altered, the task was instead to ask why it was possible for it to have been uncovered 
in the first place and to inspect its possibilities further, rather than assuming all the basics 
had already been discovered (Lacan, 2006: 339-40).  
In The Ethics of Psychoanalysis Lacan appears to dismiss claims that the ‘Thing’ 
in ‘The Freudian Thing’ had anything to do with Lukács: ‘That text and that title 
surprised because if one starts to analyze my intentions from a philosophical point of 
view, one comes to relate them to a concern that was very popular at one time, namely, 
the resistance to reification. Of course, I never said anything about reification. But 
intentions can always be wrapped around a discourse’ (1997: 132). It is in this paper that 
Lacan argues that one uses external objects as a means to speak, that the unconscious 
speaks through the ego as an object (where Lacan makes a big show – which is actually 
quite funny – of ventriloquizing for his lectern). The claim above is that there might exist 
an alternative link to Lukács: at the level of the ‘return.’ 
 
217 Also: ‘the utopia of a radicalized labour fails the other Žižekian test, the test of 
conceptual impossibility’ (Brockelman, 2008: 112). 
 
218 ‘…as Hegel later puts it long after his break with Schelling, to know the limits of 
possible experience as limits, one must already have overstepped these limits via the 
requisite apprehension of the Beyond thus separated and demarcated by these limits’ 
(Johnston, 2008: 135). Brockelman lists Johnston as someone who ‘provided valuable 
responses to parts of’ his manuscript… (Brockelman, 2008: xxi). For similar comments 
on ‘limits’, see Jameson, 2006: 391. 
 
219 ‘Negative judgment is thus not only limiting, it also delineates a domain beyond 
phenomena where it locates the Thing – the domain of the nonsensible 
intuition…’(Žižek, 1993: 111); ‘A Hegelian corollary to Kant is that limitation is to be 
conceived of as prior to what lies “beyond” it, so that ultimately Kant’s own notion of the 
thing-in-itself remains too “reified”’ (Žižek, 1993:112). 
 
220 It is on the grounds of ‘formal actuality’ that Marx critiques various socialist doctrines 
circulating in 1844: ‘…the other communism, which is not yet fully developed, seeks in 
isolated historical forms opposed to private property a historical proof for itself, a proof 
drawn from what already exists, by wrenching isolated moments from their proper places 
in the process of development […] and advancing them as proofs of its historical 
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pedigree. But all it succeeds in showing is that by far the greater part of this development 
contradicts its assertions and that if it did once exist, then the very fact that it existed in 
the past refutes its claim to essential being’ (Marx, 1992: 348). Carlson gives an inverse 
example, from Hegel: ‘…he means that the determination of a finite thing (today’s lost 
kingdom) is itself a contingency. Maybe it is lost, maybe it will come roaring back, like 
the Borbons in Spain. “What simply is, is not itself the necessary”’ (Carlson, 2007: 407).  
 
221 See also Žižek,1996c, 402-5 for a brief discussion of these three moments.  
 
222 Freud makes similar comments about the role of childhood experience in the creation 
of the formations of the unconscious: ‘Analytic experience has convinced us of the 
complete truth of the assertion so often to be heard that the child is psychologically father 
to the adult and that the events of his first years are of paramount importance for his 
whole later life’ (Freud, 1969: 68).  
 
223 The basis of McNally’s argument against Postone is that money is in the end a ‘bad 
infinity’, which undermines the argument that abstract-labour and capitalism is a self-
mediating substance. He makes these points while turning to the work of Michael 
Lebowitz on labour. Lebowtiz is discussed with reference to Laclau in chapter four of the 
present study, note 131. See also McNally, 2003: ‘…at the heart of capital’s self-
contradictory character is its inability to be truly self-positing (infinite), since it does not 
capitalistically produce its own vital presuppositions – notably living labour and the 
natural environment’ (7).  
 
224 This is also appears, word for word, in Less Than Nothing (Žižek, 2012: 251-2). 
 
225 On the question of the relation between religion, politics, Marx, Hegel, and Žižek see 
also Chiesa, 2013. There he argues that Žižek appears to get stuck actually advocating for 
religion, rather than in Marxian fashion overcoming it to turn the criticism of religion into 
the criticism of the world at large. Where Chiesa argues that making the leap is quite 
possible for Žižek, the current discussion (as well as that found in chapter two) is an 
attempt to not only show what that leap would look like, but also that the link is not to 
simply be made at the level of the proletariat (which is what Chiesa advocates) – it must 
first pass through the economic via commodity fetishism.  
 
226 This position does not preclude the possibility of a rational, planned economy: Žižek 
suggests such a thing is possible in In Defense of Lost Causes (2008a: 384; 419). His 
issue with the planned economies of ‘actually existing socialism’ is that they focused too 
narrowly on production at the expense of consumption (2008a: 485, n64). The point 
being made – which is present throughout Žižek’s oeuvre – is that there can be no 
‘complete transparency,’ that there will always be something that eludes one’s grasp by 
virtue of the fact that one is dealing with Subjects immersed in a symbolic system and the 
way our actions will be taken up by other subjects so immersed is necessarily 
unknowable (Žižek, 2008b: 199-200).  
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227 This perhaps fits the bill of Žižek’s reformulation of Badiou’s ‘subtraction’: negating 
something and thereby changing the field by which the world functions (Žižek, 2008a: 
409). 
 
228 In ‘The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci’ Anderson argues that in his own political 
activity Lukács confused the ‘historical epoch and the historical conjuncture’ thereby 
allowing ‘Lukács and prominent colleagues in the KPD such as Thalheimer and Frohlich 
to ignore the whole problem of the concrete preconditions for a revolutionary situation by 
abstractly affirming the revolutionary character of the time itself’ (1976: 56). While 
reserving judgment on Lukács’ own political activity, it is easy to see in Lenin that he 
clearly outlines the difference. For a critique of Anderson’s paper (among other takes on 
Gramsci), see Thomas, 2009.  
 
229 ‘On the one hand, neither Marx nor Lenin ever thought of the actuality of the 
proletarian revolution and its aims as being readily realizable at any given moment. On 
the other hand,  however, it was through this actuality that both gained a sure touchstone 
for evaluating all the questions of the day’ (Lukács, 1970: 12). 
 
230 This should not be limited to the ‘genius’, but extended to work of the Party itself: 
‘The Bolsheviks always showed the connection between the maltreatment of factories, 
and the rule of autocracy [… ]. At the same time the autocracy was connected up in the 
agitation of the party cells with the capitalist system, so that at the very beginning of the 
development of the labour movement the Bolsheviks established a connection between 
the economic struggle and the political’ (Piatnitsky in Molyneux, 1978: Unpaginated).   "231"See"also"Lih,"2008:"204;"301;"338;"365;"420;"581V2""
 
232 Lukács was of course writing after the October revolution, and not about Lenin  in 
1902. Perhaps the collection of letters written by Lenin around 1917 put together by 
Žižek can be said to display this same enthusiasm.  
 
233 Elwood further elaborates this relationship in chapter six of his study.  
 
234 ‘As soon as the subject who is supposed to know exists somewhere […] there is 
transference’; ‘Whenever this function [the subject supposed to know] may be, for the 
subject, embodied in some individual, whether or not an analyst, the transference, 
according to the definition I have given you of it, is established’ (Lacan, 1978: 232; 233).  
 
235 On the comparison between the Social Democray and the Preacher, See Lih, 2007.   
 
236 ‘… the fact that the Moebius strip – a belt of ribbon whose ends are fastened 
together after the strip has been given a half-twist – does not define an inside and an 
outside in the way a circle does, is used to question the received psychoanalytic 
wisdom of distinguishing between the container and the contained’ (Gallagher, 1995: 
8). Using the distinction between knowledge and know-how that Lacan introduces in 
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his seventeenth seminar Vighi notes that this sort of arrangement is the split between 
knowledge as content and know-how as action, the latter supported by the 
unconscious (Vighi, 2010: 52). For Žižek the unconscious is synonymous with action 
and the form of thought itself. 
 
237 ‘The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a 
question of theory but is a practical question’ (Marx, 1992: 422). 
 
238 ‘We, however, are convinced that the Russian Revolution is not simply an event but a 
proletarian act, and that it must naturally debouch into a socialist régime’ (Gramsci in 
Hoare and Smith, 1971: xxxi). ‘The creation in not an occurrence but an act. There are no 
results from general laws’ (Schelling, 2006: 59-60). Žižek’s comment on truth comes 
from a discussion wherein he distinguishes his own theories on social change from those 
of Badiou. Badiou, of course, nominates these sorts of changes as ‘Events’, and in his 
account ‘subjectivity’ is the product of being fidelious to the Event and comes as a 
consequence of it. For Žižek, however, the Act itself is the self-creation of the subject.   
 
Conclusion 
 
239 One can find a similar thesis in Ellen Wood’s Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View. 
Wood argues that in the 18th century the English ideology of ‘improvement’ was much 
different than anything found in France in the same period. Where the English 
emphasized the capitalist improvement of land (i.e. the increase of its productive 
capacities) the non-capitalist French emphasized the improvement of human potentials. 
Berman argues that the motives of the individualist, capitalist entrepreneur of Goethe’s 
time did not match those found in Goethe’s tragic protagonist (72). Instead, Goethe’s 
developmental ideal ran counter to this current, one that he considers may be ‘Germany’s 
deepest and most lasting contribution to world culture’ (96).  
 
240 In the intro to his The Ticklish Subject – which is an explicit defense of the Cartesian 
subject against its nay-sayers – he writes that ‘while this book is philosophical in its basic 
tenor, it is first and foremost an engaged political intervention, addressing the burning 
question of how we are to reformulate a leftist, anti-capitalist political project in our era 
of global capitalism and its ideological supplement liberal-democratic multiculturalism’ 
(Žižek, 1999: 4).  He goes on to ask is we are ‘merely dealing with the logic of Capital, or 
is this logic just the predominant thrust of the modern productivist attitude that of 
technological domination over and exploitation of nature? Or furthermore, is this very 
technological exploitation the ultimate expression, the realization of the deepest potential 
of modern Cartesian subjectivity itself? The author’s answer to this dilemma is the 
emphatic plea of “Not guilty!” for the Cartesian subject’ (ibid). This has been taken up in 
more detail in the third chapter of the present study.  
 
241 It’s worth noting a difference that Žižek wrongly claims exists between the use of 
‘fetishism’ in psychoanalysis and in Marxism: ‘in Marxism a fetish conceals the positive 
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network of social relations, whereas in Freud a fetish conceals the lack (‘castration’) 
around which the symbolic network is articulated’ (Žižek, 1989: 49). That capitalist 
fetishism in fact does partake of the same logic can be see in McNally’s historical 
treatment of it, where he argues that ‘…instead of the absent female phallus, European 
traders and writers invented the fetish in order to mask the absence of market-values 
among Africans. In their case too, a frightening discovery – that market-logic is by no 
means universal – was denied’ (McNally, 2011: 203). Confronted with African peoples’ 
refusal to sell certain items regardless of the price offered and thereby shown that market 
relations were by no means universal, Europeans attributed ‘artificiality’ to the acts of 
others rather than to themselves (Ibid: 202; see also McClintock, 1995,185-9). Marx of 
course takes up this terminology to show that capitalist relations are themselves not 
natural. 
In something of a throw-away comment Žižek also wrongly claims that while 
Sohn-Rethel understands that money has a ‘sublime body’ that doesn’t wear away (i.e. up 
to a point a coin retains its nominal worth regardless of the value of the metal it contains) 
this is a ‘problem unsolved by Marx’ (Žižek, 1989: 18). From A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy: ‘Although friction with the external world causes other 
entities to lose their idealism, the coin becomes increasingly ideal as a result of practice, 
its golden or silver substance being reduced to a mere pseudo-existence’ (1970: 109); 
‘…so gold money in circulation is sublimated into its own symbol, first in the shape of 
worn gold coin, then in the shape of subsidiary metal coin, and finally in the shape of 
worthless counters, scraps of paper, mere tokens of value’ (1970: 114). This is of course 
guaranteed by the state, as it is in Sohn-Rethel’s account  – see the quote Žižek uses on 
page 19 of SOI.   
 
242 This of course flies in the face of Robinson and Tormey’s claim that ‘for Žižek, 
commodity fetishism is most definitely not about relations between people being 
misperceived as relations between things’ (2006: 148). Most definitely, Žižek 
approvingly quotes lines from Capital, Volume One where Marx makes the claim that in 
capitalist economies we see the personification of things and the reification of persons. 
See Žižek, 1989: 26. See also Žižek, 2009a: 141-2.  
 
243 ‘That supplementary snare [the subjective ‘illusion’ that the Other knows the meaning 
of my symptoms – i.e. transference] is, rather, and internal condition, an internal 
constituent of the so-called ‘objective’ process itself: only through this additional detour 
does the past itself, the ‘objective’ state of things, become retroactively what it was’; ‘the 
initial ‘illusion’ of the subject consists in simply forgetting to include in the scene his 
own act’; ‘not only is misrecognition an immanent condition of the final advent of the 
truth, but it already possesses in itself, so to speak, a positive ontological dimension: it 
founds, it renders possible a certain positive entity’ (Žižek, 1989: 57; 58; 66).  
 
244 ‘Saussure tries to define a correspondence between these two flows [i.e. signifieds and 
signifiers] that would segment them. But the sole fact that his solution is inconclusive, 
since it leaves the locution and the whole sentence problematic, clearly shows both the 
sense and the limitations of his method’ (Lacan: 1993, 262).  
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245 See for example Žižek,1993: 53-58. Žižek takes his cue on this point from Copjec’s 
Read My Desire. The chapter in question can be found in an edited volume on Lacan 
Žižek put together in 2003 (Copjec, 2003).  
 
246 ‘At bottom, dreams are nothing other than a particular form of thinking, made possible 
by the conditions of the state of sleep. It is the dream-work which creates that form, and it 
alone is the essence of dreaming – the explanation of its particular nature’ (Freud, 1991c: 
649-50, n. 2).  
 
247 ‘The material of the dream-work consists of thoughts – a few of which may be 
objectionable and unacceptable, but which are correctly constructed and expressed. The 
dream-work puts these thoughts into another form…’ (Freud, 1961a: 172).  
 
248 Žižek makes similar claims throughout his work, though usually only about the 
hysteric and the pervert. See for example Tarrying With the Negative, 268, note 31.  
 
249 Sheridan’s translation gives these lines an inflection that better matches Žižek’s claim 
that the pervert knows the Other exists and what it wants, while the hysteric does so 
unconsciously (i.e. ‘God is unconscious’): rather than controlling the Other, Sheridan 
tells us that Lacan has said that the hysteric imagines himself to be the pervert ‘to assure 
himself of the existence of the Other’ (Lacan, 1977: 322 Ecrits: A Selection. Alan 
Sheridan, trans. New York: W.W. Norton Company).  
 
250 Žižek gives credit to Herbert Marcuse, Claude Lefort, and Jacques Rancière for this 
idea. A similar one can also be found, however, in Marx (Marx, 1977:1027-28). See 
chapter seven of the present study.    
 
251 Žižek says something similar, writing that ‘an “honest” liberal democrat will have to 
admit that the content of his ideological premise belies its form, and thus will radicalize 
the form (the egalitarian axiom) by way of implementing the content more thoroughly’ 
(2009a: 68).  
 
252 Marx acknowledges that commodity fetishism is itself a legal contract in the first 
volume of Capital: ‘This juridical relationship [of treating each other as equal traders of 
commodities], whose form is the contract, whether as part of a developed legal system or 
not, is a relation between two wills that mirrors the economic relationship’ (Marx, 1976: 
178). Miéville (2004) turns to Pashukanis’ work on this topic (rooted in this particular 
quote) to discuss the ‘developed legal system’ of international law.  
 
253 ‘… the symptom is the exception which disturbs the surface of the false appearance, 
the point at which the repressed Other erupts, while fetish is the embodiment of the Lie 
which enables us to sustain the unbearable truth’ (Žižek, 2001a: 13).  
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254 In discussing fetishism as presented in one of Freud’s introductory lectures Fenichel 
summarizes the unconscious thoughts of the fetishist in the following way: ‘the thought 
that there are human beings without a penis, and that I might myself be one of them, 
makes it impossible for me to grant myself sexual excitement. But now I see here a 
symbol of a penis in a woman; that helps me shut out my fear, and thus I can permit 
myself to be sexually excited’ (Fenichel, 1945: 341). The twist is here that ‘I might 
myself be one’ does not so much refer to the possibility of being castrated by the father in 
the near future – i.e. of classical Freudian ‘castration fear’ – but the possibility that I am 
already one, that I do not in fact possess the phallus. 
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